作者：Chu, Mei Fen 年份：1978
"Religion"
Religion can be understood as a "stepping out" of oneself to look at things－－including oneself－－from the standpoint of a whole. "Stepping out," of course, is metaphorically used. For it is possible only because the self and the whole of reality are understood to be related. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, the whole of reality is understood to be the fullness of being in which the person participates. In the Buddhist tradition, it is understood to be the opposite, that is, non-reality or non-being. Even then, the self can choose non-being only because non-being is already part of selfhood. Apart from the content of the "whole of reality," then, religion is a passage from the self into a greater whole, a passage which can be called transcendence.
The distance gained through such a passage is not that between two points of relativity, but that between an assumed absolute and all points of relativity. From the viewpoint of the absolute and the ultimate, all parts fall into context and all concerns appear preliminary. A preliminary concern is not a lesser concern. On the contrary, the standpoint of the ultimate tends to make one or another of the preliminary concerns assume a character of ultimate importance. But that element of ultimacy coming from a meaning greater than oneself is not identical with the importance given by common-sense perspectives. A decision of faith is still a decision. While it affirms some things, it negates others. All concerns being put in the context of the ultimate concern, however, even that which is affirmed is not in itself ultimately important. Transcendence can be metaphorically expressed as vertical transcendence.
*(Extract from the doctoral dissertation submitted by the author to The University of Chicago Divinity School.)
Religion can be involved when the peasant watches the grains grow, when the poet writes poetry, or when the philosopher philosophizes. Religion is involved if, for the person concerned, the work is more than a task to be accomplished, and the product is more than a commodity. For, by viewing oneself, one's product, and the working process with all the relations they involve from the standpoint of a whole, the fragmentariness of commodities is overcome in one way or another. It is by stepping into the whole and viewing life from thence that religion enters into play. A manifestation of reality is involved which grasps and changes the life of the individual and perhaps also changes society. If the meaning that faith provides is of a transcendental character that is superadded to the everyday reality, both on the individual and on the societal levels, then religion easily falls into the category of metaphysics and of idealism such as described by Mao. This has to do with the content of religion. Formally, religion is vertical transcendence regardless of its content.
Religion thus understood is not limited to institutional religions. Both institutional religions and religion in the generic sense involve the use of the language of symbols. Whereas institutional religions are characterized by their use of sacred symbols, religion in the broad sense may use secular symbols to express a reality which is for that reason not less sacred to the people concerned. In either case, symbols point to an ultimate meaning which everyday language cannot express. As Mircea Eliade says: "If the mind makes use of images to grasp the ultimate reality of things, it is just because reality manifests itself in contradictory ways and therefore cannot be expressed in concepts." 1
Formally speaking, then, religion is the interpretability and the acceptability of everyday realities on the one hand, and the meaningful relatedness of those realities on the other. According to C. Geertz, religion with its system of symbols acts to make the world view and the ethos of a people a closely knitted whole. The world view is the way, according to a given people, "things in sheer actuality are," and "a people's ethos is the tone, character, and quality of their life, its moral and aesthetic style and mood; it is the underlying attitude towards themselves and their world that life reflects." 2 P. Tillich similarly describes religion as "an attitude of the spirit in which practical, theoretical, and emotional elements are united to form a complex whole." 3
The religious dimension in Mao Tsetung Thought
With the above undersanding of religion, a religious dimension can be viewed as underlying Mao Tsetung Thought. The following paragraphs will explain what we mean by this.
The idea of social development
In July 1955, Mao describes his dissatisfactions with the way economic development was unfolding itself, and the Great Leap Forward policy began to be formulated. By the time of the Third Five Year Plan, the principle motivating the GLF was consolidated and priority was given to the lessening of the gap between industry and agriculture, between the urban and the rural areas, and between the intellectual and the manual work. From the decision he then made, a religious dimension seems to have been present in his thought. We do not mean to identify the GLF policy and the values he then affirmed with religion. Neither are we suggesting that the opponents of that policy have no religious dimension implicit in their thought. The difference might have been in the content of the religious dimension. In Mao's case, it seems that the fear he expresses, namely, that the work-peasant alliance might break up, indicates a "stepping out" of the situation and a viewing of the same from the standpoint of an ultimate concern.
China was then high in international rankings of economic growth. 4 That Mao should have been dissatisfied and afraid precisely at such a moment indicates that the understanding of reality underlying his thought makes economic growth into a preliminary concern. Given Mao's numerous statements revealing his wish and his effort to speed up the process of industrialization, the ultimacy of his central concern stands out even more clearly. The imperative to alter the trend of development seems to arise from the standpoint of the whole of reality. From such a viewpoint, life is no longer seen in quantitative terms, but quality becomes more important. From the same viewpoint, one is not satisfied with structures only, that is, with reason providing maximum progress in high technology and development ad infinitum.
Mao's way of dealing with the issue of social development may appear to be idiosyncracy to some and political romanticism to others. To us, Mao's position in this issue as in others clearly presupposes a totality of view, a sense of mutual dependence of structure and meaning, and an ultimate concern which transcends all other concerns. The whole that is presupposed is unified, teleological, and sacred. We will clarify what we mean by these categories.
A metaphysical whole is also a whole, but it is not a unified whole. Its static character repels parts. Mao's sense of totality and interrelatedness locates security neither in a static whole nor in parts. It unites both the whole and the part. The unified whole indicates that Mao relates himself to a reality beneath appearances, a reality which is the ground beneath the surface where the whole and the part compete, an abysmal reality which unites and transcends opposites and which we call "depth."
The whole that is presupposed in Mao's thought is a teleological whole. It does not locate meaning at the end of history or beyond history in a realm different from the historical, but it tends towards integral meaning at every point in history. The telos is always near at hand; yet it is not totally reached. The process assumes thus primary importance. The expectation of fulfillment challenges from within each given situation for new forms, for greater meaning, for more relatedness. Yet, the teleological whole does not reject the old as such. On the contrary, the historical process appears dotted with moments where the same telos had become manifest. Only a teleological whole can in its process creatively unite opposites such as the old and the
new. But it can do so because it is related to the depth of history, to that reality beneath the historical process which sustains the latter by giving it meaning. The teleological whole can unite and hold opposites together because it is related to a reality in the light of which the aim of history appears to be so sublime that the warring opposites within the current of history are relativized and therefore reconciled albeit momentarily.
The whole presupposed in Mao's thought is a sacred whole. Its symbols are purely secular, yet implicitly they speak of an ultimate concern, and only a sacred whole can be the object of an ultimate concern. Nationalism, communism, socialist revolution, socialist construction, development, and humanity all have great significance for Mao. Interpreted in certain ways, these policy goals can become opposites; that is, nationalism can militate against communism, socialist revolution against socialist construction, and economic development against the mass line approach to development. In Mao's thought, however, these sets of opposites are held together. These sets of categories, it seems, would bcome irreconcilables if they were taken in their literal sense. Mao holds them together because implicitly they are symbols for him as well as policy goals. They are symbols for him because: (1) They are not abstract ideas but part of the concrete reality in which the Chinese people including Mao parti- cipate; (2) They are related to their own depth－－nationalism to a vocational consciousness, communism to the communal dimension of the socio-political realities as they are given, development to human relations, humanity to the needs of the poor and blank; and (3) Their own depth points to a sacred whole which is the object of Mao's ultimate concern. Short of a relation to the sacred whole, it seems that the elusive depth of these symbols could easily disappear. The ultimate concern which focuses on depth not only holds the opposites in tension, but also it sustains the symbols in their humanizing function.
Thus the need for technology is keenly felt by Mao. But he must needs ask the question of the why of technology. The demand to turn the course of development towards greater inter- relatedness was unconditional. From this, we infer that his understanding of reality is underpinned by a depth. The totality that Mao's thought presupposes is able to unite the opposites because it is a unified, teleological, and sacred whole, and a whole that is related to the depth of reality which in turn gives depth to Mao's thought. From the depth of reality, an imperative emerges causing structure to seek meaning. A vision of the good is implied in the move, a vision according to which technological progress must be subordinate to human purposes, and modernization must start from the given Chinese situation interpreted as a whole.
For Mao, the growth of the Gross National Product is seen in the context of the welfare of the peasant masses, of the growth and the transformation of the person, and of the interdependence among different sectors in society. While the conditions of under- development tend to subordinate all else to modernization and industrialization, China under Mao stands for a notion of social development that is the total development of the human person. Technologization and humanization constitute mutually competing opposites. To hold both together in a creative way is an impossible task unless both are transcended in the light of the depth of reality. It seems that Mao's thought has a religious dimension freeing it from the pressures of life and of history because it is related to the depth in which there is space to view problems from a distance. From the viewpoint of depth, what capitalist society considers important is secondary in importance to Mao, and what constitutes the core of alienation in capitalist societies is truly resisted. Mao's statement to the effect that the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie constitutes the major contradiction during the socialist stage is perhaps the best illustration of the depth in his thought.
The viewpoint of depth does not mean a heteronomous approach to suppress the human needs for economic development, for modernization, and for technology. Heteronomy implies an alien power working against the claims of reason and of structure. If the approach to social development through depth were heteronomous, Mao might have taken a more moralistic approach and advocated certain attitudes, norms, and styles as blueprints to be modeled. Mao's attitude is more than this. It involves a basic directedness that is not the sum total of a number of behavioral practices. It is a spirit that can only result from a state of being grasped by an ultimate concern, an ultimate concern which does not suppress structure, but one that seeks its fulfillment.
Mao's approach through depth may have resulted in the preference of elementary technology for certain areas that are beginning to modernize, and through intermediate technology to let it develop towards high technology. But this gradual process of development at a different pace in different localities is not anti-technology. Mao's slogan "Walking on two legs" that describes the process implies a balance and a unity. Technology united with meaning seems more likely to be an instrument of peace although in the course of its implementation, struggles in the superstructure may be involved. Technology according to the First Five Year Plan model minimizes struggle. But it may bring in its wake a widening gap between different social groups, and this gap might become the basis of future cataclysmic strifes.
Thus the centrality of Mao's theory on struggle paradoxically combines with a long range vision of relative peace. In unveiling the reality of present contradictions, future antagonistic contradictions can be avoided. Mao's fear lest the worker-peasant alliance be broken speaks volumes. It results from a sensitivity that prefers reality to appearance. Perhaps his self-identification with the poor and the lower-middle peasants explains in part this preference. But such a self-identification itself seems to point to a prior experience of being grasped by an ultimate concern.
The means of social change
If religion is viewing reality from the standpoint of depth, a standpoint which locates all socio-political structures, and structures of meaning in the context of ultimate meaning, then Mao's class theory and his theory of the state both point to a religious dimension in his thought.
Mao's class theory affirms the class nature of revolutionary struggles. The complex nature of classes in China, however, prevents him from assigning the role of dictatorship in an exclusive sense to any one of the existing classes, not even to the industrial proletariat. Strictly speaking, social change is not the prerogative of any one social class since both interdependence and conflict characterize the relationship between any two of the classes existing in Chinese society. Belongingness to the industrial proletariat does not automatically make the person in question an agent for social change.
The same happens in the case of the Chinese Communist Party as the vanguard. The latter is the most important means for social change. But social change depends on much more than the vanguard. The "much more" can be thought of in terms of "the stand, viewpoint, and method of Marxism-Leninism." This stand, viewpoint or method seems to be something that grasps and changes the person. Once the person is so grasped, he or she is freed from servile dependence on dogma, from arrogance in holding a position of authority, and from confinement to his/her self-interest.
What Mao means by the Marxist-Leninist stand, viewpoint, or method seems to imply a religious dimension which we have called self-transcendence, dimension of depth, standpoint of the whole of reality, directedness towards the unconditional, or ultimate concern. When Mao speaks of the need for the cadre to take the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint he seems to describe a transition into a larger whole within which one finds an anchorage so unshakable that it dispels all fear of disclosing oneself and one's mistakes. The viewpoint of the whole results in an intern- alization of the criterion between right and wrong, good and evil. It does not safeguard from mistakes, but it provides one with the ability to see one's mistakes and the courage to criticize oneself as well as to accept criticism.
Thus the means of social change as understood by Mao seems to involve both the person and a reality that is not alien to the person but beyond the person. The proletariat, the vanguard, and the state are all subordinate to such a reality. From the Marxist-Leninist standpoint, a higher principle or criterion emerges. This principle is not an object of rational knowledge, and it does not result from heredity. It can only be thought of as a gift. One can lay conditions for the emergence of such a principle or criterion, but education alone cannot inculcate it. The "airing of views" within the Party is an important way to enable the emergence of such a criterion. But ultimately, the process does not guarantee such an emergence. Mao's democratic centralism seems to indicate that neither the democratic process nor the centralist form is sufficient to ensure the presence of the higher principle or criterion in the Party, but that both process and form ought to be transcended and united with import and meaning.
From the standpoint of the whole of reality, the self-abnegation that is expected of the vanguard is at the same time the cause of its fulfillment. For, to have structure united with meaning is to invest the vanguard's power with the basis of that power, namely, justice. Such a unity links socialist construction and socialist revolution directly with the origin and the first experiences of the Communist movement in China. In the beginning, the sense of justice provided the driving force for the revolution. If Mao shifted from a reformist position to a revolutionary one, it is only because violence was considered inevitable given the existing structures with all the violence they implied. The revolution was justified, in Mao's view, because of the need of the oppressed masses for liberation. In the unity of power and justice, a proletarian being had emerged.
According to Mao, the same foundation of the power then seized must be the foundation of the power that the vanguard exercises later on. From his viewpoint, it is not only reasonable that the vanguard subordinate itself under a higher principle, but also it is in such a subordination that the vanguard finds its own fulfillment by finding its own reason to be. Moreover, there is greater possibility for the vanguard to reach its strategic and tactical goals upon the basis of the proletarian being since the majority of the nation will then more easily recognize themselves in the vanguard.
The nature of dialectics
In Mao's view of history, freedom as decision, that is, freedom that goes towards the shaping of history is different from a notion of self-sufficiency. The communal decisions for self- reliance as experienced in the Border Region during the War of Resistance involves the notion of responsibility for oneself and for one another. That experience speaks of the need for all involved－－the army, the Party, the people－－to meet survival needs together as a community. It also speaks of the awareness of a people that they had nothing more to lose. This double aspect seems to involve the gaining of a distance from the everyday realities, a distance and an inner freedom which indicate the presence of a religious dimension. Along with the concrete outcome of the communal decision－－increased production, improved technology, better organization, victory in war, etc.－－an answer as to the question of the meaning of life seems to have been experienced, an answer which provides Mao with a vision of the good. Later on, in spite of changed circumstances, his thought remains directed towards the same principle of interdependence.
Self-reliance involving the principle of mass mobilization implies an understanding of reality as a whole. For, different from an atomistic notion of self-sufficiency, self-reliance involves a communal dimension. The 'self ' of the social unit is constituted by different sectors in society relating to one another and bearing the responsibility for one another. The Yenan experience is not designed to fit a preconceived idea of a whole. Circumstances led to it. However, it seems to correspond to Mao's understanding of reality according to which the inter-relatedness of being is an essential element. The experience provides him with an answer as to the question of the meaning of life. In this sense, it has a lasting impact on his thought.
We do not mean to say that henceforth Mao made Yenan into a structural blueprint to be modeled on all levels of society. Rather, the experience seems to confirm in Mao the understanding of meaning or of wholeness as inseparable from structure. Social structure must embody interdependence in a realistic, not in an abstract or a dogmatic way. This involves a transcendence of self-sufficiency. When this happens, freedom as decision overcomes destiny but destiny is at the same time regarded as the context providing the possibility for freedom to overcome it. The unity of mutually repelling opposites must involve, we assume, a religious dimension. For, what we mean by transcendence is not a shift from freedom to destiny or vice versa. It is the understanding of both as representing but partial meaning that a tending towards integral meaning transcends both while uniting them.
According to Mao, the same law of the unity of opposites between quantitative and qualitative changes applies to both nature and history, though with a difference in the two cases. Three propositions seem to be affirmed by Mao in his view of history. From all three of them, one might infer that a religious dimension is present: (1) Becoming is better than being; (2) Being and becoming are dialectically related; (3) There is no definitive synthesis between being and becoming in history.
Mao's argument regarding the superiority of becoming to being can be formulated as follows: contradictoriness within being leads to becoming and history is propelled forward by becoming. This happens in nature also. If it happens in nature, Mao's argument seems to imply, it must be an objective law. Therefore, it is normal that it should also happen in history. This argument makes it understandable why the qualitative leap which is identified with revolutionary change in history is also used to describe the evolutionary process in nature.
Upon closer examination, however, "qualitative change" or becoming in nature does not cover the same content as when it is used in relation to history. Whereas in nature, the evolutionary process moves on in an infinite succession of forms one higher than the other, in history, the process of becoming follows a more tortuous path. It is partly on account of this difference that Mao offers the model in nature to be followed by the makers of history; that is to say, nature presents a challenge to history to move towards true progress. But 'progress' in the true sense is a prerogative of history although ultimately, that is, from the viewpoint of the unconditional, the two notions of history and of nature seem to merge into one same whole.
As we have discussed above, becoming in history involves a process both similar to and different from natural selection. It is similar to natural selection in that the strong overcome the weak when two forces confront each other in revolutionary wars. It differs from natural selection in that the whole notion of class struggle places the hope and the faith in victory on the side of the proletariat which is the weak, the powerless, and the exploited vis-a-vis the bourgeoisie. Needless to say, the proletariat must organize themselves and build up their power before they can overcome the bourgeoisie. But deep within the Marxist faith and hope is the affirmation that it is the weak that represent the true and the good. A meaning dimension is thus given to becoming in history, a dimension that is lacking in the process of natural selection. Faith and hope imply, it seems, a stance from an ultimate concern directed towards the unconditional making it possible for those grasped by such a faith and such a hope to see what the lay people's eyes do not see.
Characteristic of Mao's thought, one pole is never emphasized to the exclusion of the other. Thus in emphasizing becoming, he makes a strong point that being is not to be neglected. Being and becoming must be held in tension in such a way that both gradualism and adventurism can be overcome. From this, we again infer that a religious dimension is present in his thought allowing him the space and the freedom in which to reconcile the two opposites. Mao does not hesitate to deny a definitive synthesis in history that would abolish all contradictions. His statement to the effect that capitalist ideological influence will definitively be eliminated one day is to be understood, it seems, along with other statements which confirm his belief that there will still be qualitative changes in Communist societies. Given his understanding that qualitative change comes from contradictoriness within, one might conclude that the contradiction in Communist societies, according to him, may not be that between capitalism and socialism, between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, but new ones the nature of which no one can predict.
At this point, history and nature seem to join together in Mao's theory of the dialectics between being and becoming. Without a definitive synthesis in history. Communism is hoped for, not guaranteed, and from Mao's optimism in nature, we might infer that his hope is grounded where nature and history meet. Such a meeting point cannot but be there where both are transcended. The locus of meaning for Mao being both within history－－the superiority of becoming over being sufficiently shows his emphasis on history－－and beyond it is a strong indication of a religious dimension in his thought.
The notion of fulfillment
The Chinese Revolution according to Mao struggled on two fronts. First of all, it opposes the feudal structures in the socio-economic, the political, and the cultural realms. To do this, it relies on reason as the critical principle. The land reform is organized on the basis of a rationale and under efficient leadership. It differs in quality from primitive revolts. The peasants especially are taught to transcend personal interest and clan spirit. The process designed to lead the peasants, the workers, and the masses from a class in itself to a class for itself is an educational process based on revolutionary reason, that is, on a critical principle which, by its function, affirms that the principle of justice begins with justice in the economic realm. Social injustices, such as existed with regard to the young, to women, and to the lumpen- proletariat, are also directly or indirectly fought against, and mass participation in class struggle extends the principle of justice into the political arena.
Secondly, the Chinese Revolution according to Mao fights against technical rationality in all its manifestations. Thus class struggle is more than a redistribution of wealth or a reversal of power. A qualitative difference is manifest in that all parts involved participate in the struggle as parts of a whole. The women's liberation is put in the context of responsibility; military work in the context of political work, economic production and scientific experimentation in that of class struggle. The organic view of the whole unites survival needs with meaning needs. The critical principle of rationality gains distance from itself as technical reason in order to criticize itself. This, it seems, is done because in Mao's thought, there is a higher principle which transcends reason, on the one hand, and which resists the emergence of a new feudal power, on the other.
In the light of this higher principle, the depth of tradition is united with the depth of reason through an understanding of justice as the basis of authority. Claims for justice in the form of popular revolts have been numerous in Chinese history. Thus, Mao's thought, because it is directed towards the unconditional, unites the critical principle with the root of the Chinese tradition. Mao's statement to the effect that the Chinese substance－－like his general line is something that cannot be changed supports our interpretation. Elsewhere Mao speaks of the Chinese substance differently. He says:
We must learn many things from foreign countries and master them. We must especially master fundamental theory. Some people advocate 'Chinese learning as the substance, Western learning for practical application.' Is this idea right or wrong? It is wrong. The word learning' in fact refers to fundamental theory. Fundamental theory should be the same in China as in foreign countries. There should be no distinction between Chinese and Western things in fundamental theory.
Marxism is a fundamental theory which was produced in the West .... Marxism is a general truth which has universal application. We must accept it. . . . It was only because the Chinese people accepted Marxism and combined it with the practice of the Chinese revolution that they won victory in the Chinese revolution. 5
In our view, the two statements do not contradict each other. The 'Chinese substance' is given new expression through a Marxist revolution; in the Marxian perspective, Mao finds something that corresponds to the way the Chinese people understand reality and know how they ought to relate to it. Mao seems to be able to unite the Western and the Chinese because both are seen as conditional in the light of an unconditional demand. In this, he shows a religious dimension in his thought.
The availability of truth
In epistemology, Mao's materialistic position puts the emphasis on practice so that reason may be freed from its conditioning factors. But Mao's materialism is dialectical. The revolutionary practice transforming the productive forces does not lead automatically to truth in the superstructure. Practice is both guided by theory and it reflects back on theory. If the step leading from theory to practice is a deepening movement according to Mao, the step from practice back to theory also involves courage and willingness to rectify oneself and one's theory. For, theory and practice as a unity of opposites are not only mutually interdependent, but also mutually conflictual. 6
The fact that Mao's epistemology holds theory and practice in tension implies a transcendence of both in the direction of the unconditional. For, in spite of Mao's understanding of truth as open towards infinite possibilities, there is a fundamental perspective－－that of Marxism-Leninism－－to which he continues to refer, a perspective which continues to grasp him and to change him. At the same time, a good seems to be present that urges him to undertake some of the decisions in spite of the great risks involved. This fundamental perspective with the good it points to in a given situation provide Mao's epistemology with an anchorage in which theory and practice could be united because they are both transcended. And this point of anchorage from which arise unconditional imperatives indicates the presence of the religious dimension. For, unless this point of unity in depth has an opening on the unconditional, it seems that Mao's epistemology would either make Marxism-Leninism into a dogma or relinquish it in favor of an activism in response to some immediate needs thus disregarding the initial concern which had launched theory into practice.
Soteriology
The epistemological principle and the normative question related to it constitute perhaps the most important issue that can be raised about Mao's thought. Mao's own answer to this issue can be summed up under the category of 'the mass line.' However, this answer would not seem to be satisfactory because the mass line has many concrete manifestations in the economic, the political, and the cultural realms none of which exhausts the answer to the question: Who decides what is the good?
Basically, Mao seems to understand reality to manifest itself in such contradictory ways that the answer cannot be an either/or in issues such as redness versus expertise, democracy versus centralism, raising the standard in art and literature versus popularization. No structure guarantees the correctness of decisions. The mass line as an answer that holds both poles would not seem to be a real answer.
If, however, the mass line is viewed as holding more than principles for ad hoc policy-making and more than abstract ideas deduced from previous decisions made, then the answer it provides to the normative question can be real. The answer contained in the notion of the mass line is a religious answer. For, nowhere else as in this notion does Mao's thought better indicate the presence of a religious dimension.
The mass line draws parts together in the different realms of political life as well as in between the realms. The direction it points to is clearly one of the belongingness and the inter-relatedness of being as over against exclusive self-relatedness. Its integrating tendency in the public realm shows that a faith is involved, a faith that has an opening on ultimate meaning. Without such an opening, it seems that some fragments would have been taken as the whole. It is from the viewpoint of a whole without boundary, metaphorically speaking, that fragments can remain being recognized as fragments, on the one hand, and that each fragment can be seen as vitally important in the light of the boundless whole, on the other. Once again, we hold that Mao's thought as shown in the mass line principle reveals a fundamental assumption as to the unconditional.
The vision of the good that is implied in the mass line－－and for that matter, also implied in the broader category of the Marxist-Leninist perspective－－is an outcome of faith. As Mao himself puts it, the Marxist world view is a matter of belief and to be a real Communist, one must be "reborn." It is clear that individual transformation, according to Mao, involves such a faith, and that social transformation in the sense of an all-round humanization depends much on a vanguard that has such a faith. One might infer from this that even the individual cannot force transformation to come about himself or herself. However, it is important to lay the conditioning factors that would favor such a transformation. For, although structure and process do not guarantee faith, faith must needs be embodied in structure and it often emerges in process.
With the faith dimension of the mass line in view, the answer to the normative question that the mass line provides can perhaps be summarized as follows: (1) In matters of government, the "better" is preferable to the "best"; (2) The ones who make the decision ought to be rooted in the Marxist perspective; (3) The good decision is based on the presupposition that parts of a whole are organically related; (4) "Democracy in full measure" with its ethos of openness, vigor, and liveliness is the environmental requisite of the good; (5) There is no decision-maker so absolute that his or her authority cannot be questioned and severely so. Mao's thought, in teaching these principles to the Party and to the people at large, has the potential, it seems, of creating a people that is conscious of its dignity, unafraid of political participation, and a people who know that they must stay together for their own sakes as well as for the sake of the whole.
In short, the normative question is answered by the mass line principle through its double aspect as a constitutive principle and as a corrective. The fact that it involves a dimension of spirit indicates its 'religious' character. For, to live by the mass line, one must have the ability to step out of the situation, and with a sense of freedom from it take the necessary risks. The mass line is thus indicative of the religious dimension in Mao's thought.
1.Mircea Eliade, Images and Symbols (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969), p. 15.
2.C. Geertz, The interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 126- 27.
3.P. Tillich, What Is Religion? ed. and introduction by James L. Adams (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 160.
4.Ta-chung Liu, "Economic Development of the Chinese Mainland, 1949-1965," in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., China in Crisis (1968) 1, bk. 2: 625.
5.Mao, "Chairman Mao's Talk to Music Workers" (August 24, 1956), pp. 85-86.
6.P. Tillich says in this respect: "Practice resists theory, . . . it demands an activism which cuts off every theoretical investigation before it has come to its end. In practice, one cannot do otherwise, for one must act before one has finished thinking. On the other hand, the infinite horizons of thinking cannot supply the basis for any concrete decision with certainty" (Systematic Theology 1: 93).
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Prepared by: Holy Spirit Seminary College