作者：祈士真 Casey, John J. 年代：1980
Perhaps it may seem strange to some to talk about effectiveness in relation to philosophy rather than to talk about truth, certainty or meaningfulness, three terms with which philosophy traditionally has been associated. But the idea of the effectiveness of a philosophy cannot be overlooked today given the fact that our modern world is one of philosophical pluralism with its competing systems. Among the various philosophers, we have seen the effectiveness of a number of French existentialists led by Jean Paul Sartre in shaping the minds of their countrymen and beyond the borders of their country the minds of many others as well. And who is not impressed with the expanse of Marxism although well aware that in many cases the freedom to accept or reject the doctrine was not an individual option. So the fact of the matter is that philosophies differ in their effectiveness, that is in the ability of any given one to stimulate the minds of intelligent people to seek rational solutions to contemporary problems in accord with its principles. In view of this, it is easy to see that the question－How effective is contemporary Christian Philosophy? －is indeed a valid query on its own merits and perhaps particularly so to us in the Orient where the outward reach of the Church in mission is a prime concern.
The first problem that arises, of course, is the question of suitable criteria. By what means that you can be reasonably certain are independent of other influences, do you measure the effectiveness of a philosophy? And again, although Marxism's effectiveness may be measured by the number of revolutions it has fostered and existentialism even by the effect it has had on the world of Letters, how does one measure the effectiveness of Christian Philosophy? We shall see that the answer to this question, that is the criteria whereby we might judge the effectiveness of contemporary Christian Philosophy, was one of the prime concerns of that very philosophic movement. As a result, an understanding of what Christian Philosophy in the contemporary sense is, also tells us what the built-in criteria for judging its effectiveness are.
What the name Christian Philosophy indicates might seem obvious at first glance but both within the context of local experience, as well as within the context of general Catholic experience, it can be misunderstood easily. The misunderstanding within the context of local experience can arise from the fact that Buddhism and Taoism in traditional Chinese thinking have been considered to be both religions and philosophies. Therefore it is easy to interpret Christianity in the same way and consider Christian Philosophy as the non-religious part of the total teaching. The misunderstanding within the context of general Catholic experience can arise from thinking of Christian Philosophy as referring to a period long since past in the history of philosophy which covers roughly the thirteenth century and a short period of time immediately after. But in actuality the name Christian Philosophy designates a movement that has been part of the Catholic scene since the beginning of the nineteenth century, waxing and waning with the circumstances of the times. Basically, the movement is the search for a suitable systematic reflective understanding of man that would be acceptable on its own merits to intelligent people of any given culture and at the same time would offer a firm foundation for a presentation of Christian revelation.
The focal point of the Christian Philosophy movement is commonly considered to be the famous Encyclical of Leo XIII, called Aeterni Patris from the first two words of the Latin text but offically sub-titled "On the Restoration in Catholic Schools of Christian Philosophy According to the Mind of the Angelic Doctor, Saint Thomas Aquinas. "(1) Whether one considers the effect of the encyclical either as slowing down the progress of true Christian Philosophy or as rescuing it from chaos and setting it on the right track, one cannot deny its impact. The encyclical explicitly recognized the Christian Philosophy movement which had taken place within the Church and was an obvious attempt to control it by making it an official movement and giving it a norm, namely the mind of Saint Thomas Aquinas.
In content, the encyclical was an optimistic piece whose author reasoned as follows. Of all the periods in the history of the Church, the scholastic period was the most remarkable for the intellectual activity of its ministers. During that time Christian scholars set up a system of thought that was more than a match for the religious, social and political problems of their day. Chief among these scholars was Thomas Aquinas. Given his accomplishment, why could not Christian scholars of the present day follow Thomas Aquinas in their attempt to cope with the religious, social and political problems of the modern era. To help this along, if seminaries and Catholic universities taught according to the mind of Thomas Aquinas, then the pastors and teachers of the future would all speak the same language in addressing the problems of their times and places and seeking solutions to the same.
Leo's optimism grew out of his conviction that there was basically one philosophy in the same sense that we today think there is only one science. That one philosophy is valid at any time or in any place because it is based on reality as it is and not as it is understood. Therefore one need not talk about a European, a Chinese or an Indian philosophy but rather one need only talk about true philosophy and false philosophy just as no one in science talks about a European, a Chinese or an Indian science but rather about real science and charlatanry. So it was, then, that Leo urged seminaries and Catholic universities to get to the task of teaching this true philosophy and developing it' to meet contemporary needs.
The result of Leo's optimism was a flurry of scholarly research into medieval thought that has helped all of us understand better that remarkable period in the history of philosophy. Such scholarly research also produced materials for seminary and university use from the philosophy course of Desidere Mercier to the Insight of Bernard Lonergan.(2) And yet, withall, the hundredth anniversary of the encyclical passed less than a year ago－August 4, 1979－with hardly a ripple in Catholic scholarly circles. It was not that the movement of Leo XIII lacked success or that Thomism lacked any internal consistency whereby given its common principles, it could not more than hold its own. In fact the encyclical of Leo XIII helped establish Thomism as a respected philosophical position in contemporary philosophy. What happened was that the problems that Leo XIII saw philosophy solving simply had moved off center stage and were replaced by contemporary problems of a different nature.
Leo saw philosophy in relation to the Christian faith as fulfilling several functions. First, he saw philosophy in the traditional scholastic sense of both demonstrating the existence of God and revealing certain things about the nature of God. Second, he saw philosophy as fulfilling an apologetic function whereby belief could be shown to be perfectly reasonable. Third, he saw philosophy as providing the methodology whereby belief could be shown to be perfectly reasonable. Third, he saw philosophy as providing the methodology whereby theology became a true science. And finally, he saw philosophy as the defender of the truths of the Faith and the destroyer of error. In short, Leo saw a world more complex to be sure but still the same world Thomas Aquinas had addressed in his Summa Contra Gentiles. But there were others who saw a world primarily concerned with man and his place in a rapidly expanding universe. These were the ones whose vision set Christian Philosophy on the road it was following, so different from that to which Leo hoped to bring it back.
The initial impetus towards Christian Philosophy in the contemporary sense of the movement was provided by a Frenchman by the name of Louis de Bonald.(3) He had lived through the turbulent period of the French revolution and although his sympathies were with the old order rather than the new, nevertheless he was steeped in the intellectual climate of enlightenment in France with its deep concern for man the social being. At the same time he was a serious Catholic who deplored the divorce of reason from religion. Therefore, when he began to develop his philosophy, it showed two important characteristics drawn from this background. First, it was a social philosophy concentrating on man as a social being and second, it sought to demonstrate the absolute need for God's revelation. The first characteristic would make it relevant to the intellectual climate of the times and the second would make ti specificially Christian.
Taking a page from Descartes, de Bonald proceeded from a basic principle by natural reason alone. But his first principle was not the result of a process like Descartes' famous methodic doubt but rather was an observable fact, namely men speak. On reflecting upon this observation, it became clear to him that Language is indeed the constitutive principle of society in general and therefore of the particular domestic, civil and religious societies. Since it is Language that makes social life possible and therefore society cannot exist without it, Language itself had to begin with society. But what is its origin? It could not be an invention of man because when man reasons, he must use Language. And if he had made up Language himself, then he would have had to reason without using words which is impossible. Therefore, Language had to be a free gift given to man by his creator, God. And because of the necessary connection between language and reason, with this gift also came the figt of Truth. In short, all of this giving is God revealing and therefore a proper understanding of man in society brings us to the absolute necessary of God's revelation.
The philosophy of de Bonald was far more complex and far-reaching than the short summary given above but his idea of a Christian philosophy is clearly delineated in it. His thought provides a rational foundation for God's revelation which in the religious society of Christianity we have in the Scriptures. But it is also easy to see that de Bonald's doctrines are capable of development in several ways, two of which caused difficulty in the Church. On the one hand, if one concentrates on the priority of Language in reasoning－that is, man reasons only through the use of Language－and Language is a gift of God which also contains the gift of truth, and the whole process of God giving language and truth is by definition revelation, then the role of reason in arriving at truth becomes completely overshadowed by revelation. In short, reason becomes unnecessary. On the other hand, if one concentrates on the fact of Revelation, it is quite obvious that God revealing is much broader in its scope than the Christian Scriptures. In fact, the initial Revelation of God, which came long. before the Christian Scriptures, gave us truth. Therefore, what the Christian Scriptures contain is already implicit in what God initially revealed to us and can be arrived at through the use of Language in reason. It was in the light of such interpretations of the Role of Reason and Faith that the statements of the first Vatican Counicl, while somewhat quaint to us today, were so vigorous in their own time.(4) And it was to support in a very practical way the teachings of the first Vatican Council that Leo XIII published his encyclical Aterni Patris in which he attempted to steer the Christian Philosophy movement back into orthodox channels by wedding it to the Thomistic tradition.
But as mentioned above, changes had already taken place on the world intellectual stage and a return to Thomism could not overthrow these changes. Even de Bonald himself was one of the last who would analyse society from an organic point of view. Those who followed him would tread the positivist path and several became the basic theoreticians of the new science of sociology. Philosophy, for its part, continued to focus more and more on anthropology not as a metaphysical extension of what science had to offer but rather in directions totally its own. The first philosopher to come to grips with the problem of Christian Philosophy within this new context rather than within the context of Leo's encyclical was Maurice Blondel in his famous work L' Action.(5)
Blondel was convinced that creative thinking in the Church must take place within the context of the thought that occupies modern man. Past philosophical systems may solve problems to the satisfaction of specialized groups but in making use of them the group becomes isolated from the wider intellectual community and from the thought patterns of society in general. In short, we end up talking only to ourselves and not to the people to whom we intend to speak. To overcome this defect, he looked for a key notion taken from inner experience as his starting point, a notion understandable and common to everyone. This was the notion of action.
Blondel saw man as both a thinker and a doer and it was always something of a puzzle that there is a dichotomy between what we think and what we do. Indeed the simpler and more straight forward approach to a problem lay in doing rather than in thinking. Thus, if we ask the question－Does man have a destiny? －the more effective way by far of answering that question is to study man doing rather than thinking because it is by action AND NOT thinking that we solve the problem of our destiny. Now the question of man's destiny is the central human problem for Blondel, the focal point of all man's willing and therefore the focal point of all his action. Blondel chose this problem because he saw the question of Destiny as the universal one that could not be avoided. If one tries to suppress it, by so doing he affirms it in its entirety. Nor does the problem have a negative solution since the will for nothingness is a contradiction. The problem of our destiny springs from the deepest source of our willing; it is the principle of our action. What we must do is measure its scope and its scope can be measured because action that is the result of man's willing is determined in so far as it must fall within a certain structure.
Beginning with the more elementary activities of man and continuing to the more complex, we gradually come to understand the inner structure of action and its development. In knowledge, for instance, the most elementary datum is sensation which man recognizes to be beset by inconsistencies. To overcome this defect, man creates science which in turn leads to the action of synthesis. Society begins in the determinism of consciousness which necessarily gives rise of freedom. Freedom in expressing itself in action meets resistence from both the body and the world. The result of this interaction is the individual. Still under the same restraints of his action, the individual seeks a complement outside himself to be a cooperator. This gives rise to deeper unions among individuals from whence comes the various levels of society; family, nation, humanity. Moral action successively passes through a utilitarian ethics and metaphysics to a disinterested ethics based on an absolute that is not yet defined. Finally, there is the action of man seeking self-fulfillment and self-sufficiency. First, he attributes religious values to his natural actions by attaching to experienced finite objects, infinite and absolute characteristics. When he realizes that such superstition involves a contradiction, he is faced with the stark fact that within the natural order, he will never find the self-fulfillment and self-sufficiency that he is seeking. And now comes the ultimate question－How in such a situation can action continue?
In Blondel's reasoning, we have now arrived at the point where action brings us to God. Once man realizes that in the natural order he cannot find what he needs for self-fulfillment, then he is faced with his most important decision－either to accept God or to do without him. But to reject God is the death of action. Therefore, man cannot truely live unless he consents to introduce God into his life. But even when he consents, man is powerless to place God under his control since God is completely beyond man's grasp. In the final analysis, then, man can only reach his destiny by God freely giving himself to man. Man himself can only wait for the unknown Messiah. Philosophy, then, can bring man to the threshold of Christianity but no further. Anything beyond that requires faith and practice.
Although this is a very sketchy summary of Blondel's early thought, we can see contained within it two very clear criteria by which he himself judged the effectiveness of Christian Philosophy. The first is that whatever thought is to be developed in the quest for a genuine Christian Philosophy must be within the mainstream of contemporary thought. And the mainstream of contemporary thought is not the domain of the specialist but the general undercurrent of present thinking. In short, we must think the way that the people of our time think. The second is that whatever philosophy meets this first criterion must truly provide a suitable basis on which to present the Christian faith if that philosophy is to be a Christian philosophy.
Before turning to a contemporary Christian philosopher and subjecting his work to the scrutiny of these criteria, it must be said in all fairness to the Christian Philosophy movement that Blondel's idea of Christian Philosophy although indisputably the contemporary one is not the only one. A second and very different idea of what Christian Philosophy should be was advanced by Etienne Gilson, the historian of philosophy and Thomist.(6) According to Gilson, Blondel's model became the standard model of contemporary Christian Philosophy because of a general misunderstanding of a key phrase in Leo XIII 's encyclical Aeterni Patris. That key phrase was "according to the mind of" Thomas Aquinas. Most interpreted this phrase as referring to content and therefore indicating the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas. This misinterpretation led to the development of what we know of as Neo-Thomism. Actually, according to Gilson, this phrase did not refer to content but to an approach or methodology. Thus, what should have resulted from Leo's encyclical was the study and adoption of Saint Thomas' method.
Gilson summarily stated Aquinas' method as follows. Thomas was a theologian who was interested in making the Faith understandable to the people of his time. To do this, he took the best of the secular knowledge of his time－which was the thought of Aristotle－and adapted it in a striking way to the needs of theology, always beginning from Faith and returning to Faith as the endpoint of each of his investigations. Now it was precisely this procedure which made Aquinas so successful, namely the taking of the best of the science of his day and putting it to the service of the Faith. In Thomas' time, all secular knowledge was one; that is, there was no separation of science and philosophy, physics and metaphysics. This separation began with Descartes and has been plaguing us ever since. But at that time it did not exist. Thus Aquinas could take his questions of Faith and trace their understanding through physics and metaphysics back to theology. What made this possible was the fact that Aristotle's metaphysics was based on his physics, the important link that made secular knowledge one. At the present time, we do not have a contemporary metaphysics drawn from contemporary physics; but nevertheless the best science of our time is contemporary physics. Thus the true Christian Philosophy movement of the present day should be the work of theologians who are also good scientists and who are truely attempting to discover the contemporary metaphysics necessary to synthesize Science and the Faith.
The differences between Blondel's position and that of Gilson are immediately evident and need not be commented upon further. Suffice it to say that the Second Vatican Council in its Decree on the Training of Priests－a direct descendent, to be sure, of Aeterni Patris－gave its blessing to the approach of Blondel. The Council document stated that while students should rely on the philosophical patrimony which is forever valid, they should, nevertheless, become familiar with modern philosophies, particularly the ones that are most influential in their own countries. In learning philosophy, they should be concerned with seeking rational solutions to real problems of life in their time and place. In short, philosophy should enable them to dialogue with the men of their times.
But the Second Vatican Council, unconsciously perhaps, also gave a new impetus to the Christian Philosophy movement in its contemporary approach and this new impetus produced the contemporary Christian Philosophy to be examined in this paper.(7) In the same document mentioned above, an admonition was given to seminary personnel to seek a better integration of theology and philosophy in order that students might understand more clearly how both work together in explaining the mystery of Christ. In fact, says the document, this harmonious interlocking of philosophy and theology should be the subject of a special course to be given to students at the very beginning of their major seminary training. It is easy to see how this admonition challenges scholars to demonstrate, as it were, how a philosophy can offer a rational sub-stratum for the truths of the faith. No one has made a more serious attempt since the second Vatican Council to do just this than Karl Rahner in his work Foundations of Christian Faith.(8) For this reason, we take his as the representative contemporary Philosophy
Rahner approaches the philosophy that will set the stage for Christianity as would Blondel, looking at it not with the eye of the philosophical specialist who together with his fellows has given us a plurality of conflicting starting points, but rather with the eye of the average intelligent person who sees man as the universal problem he is to himself and therefore as the starting point of philosophical speculation. Thus, Rahner defines philosophy as "every theoretical reflection upon and self-interpretation of human existence." But this reflection is not done in isolation from the flow of life but rather in the world, in time and in history. In short, man reflecting upon himself must do so in the context of this world, his times and cultural-historical milieux. What this means in practice is that there is present to each man a ready-made interpretation of what he is, an interpretation springing from the cultural-historical milieux into which he was born. This ready-made interpretation is his historical origin. What he actually does, then, is reflect upon his historical origin to see what it tells him about himself. Once he receives this information, he then asks himself whether this information is still valid within the context of his own self-experience and therefore whether or not he should still remain bound to it.
At this point an important question concerning the validity of philosophic experience arises. Since cultural-historical context differ, will not a person's understanding of man differ in accord with his historical origin? Although Rahner does not specifically ask this question, we know from what he says on cognate points particularly on the relationship between philosophy and theology that his answer would be no. Different cultural-historical contexts simply provide different roads whereby men will arrive at the same destination because that destination is the basic anthropology that underlies any culture. And whether we understand it or not we must act in accord with it. Because all of our cultural-historical constructs have been built on this one anthropology, we can arrive at a clearer understanding of that basic anthropology through reflecting upon any of these constructs in relation to ourselves.
Rahner's reflecting man would, indeed, be very "Western" in the sense that the cultural-historical milieux within which he is going to reflect is a world of advanced science and technology as well as a world of Christianity. Science presents him with an anthropology but this anthropology is one that allows him to experience himself in a number of ways to be sure, but always in ways that are not himself. In other words, science presents man only as an object which can be dissected and studied. And yet only he, the subject, can analyse and study himself as an object. What this means is that he cannot be derived completely from the sciences; there is something more that is uniquely his own and that depends on himself. As a result, he begins to experience himself as subject and person.
From subject and person, man's reflection inevitably leads mim to the experience of transcendence. For Rahner, transcendence is intuited by man when he realizes that although he is limited in his world, time and history, his horizons in both theory and practice are unlimited. Given this intuition, to evade the experience of transcendence is impossible; at best one can only postpone it and if one waits too long, he comes to that most striking experience of transcendence, death itself where the gap between man's infinite horizon and finite reality is most clearly thrust upon him. But in experiencing transcendence, man also intuits himself as responsible and free. He experiences this intuition in relation to his becoming; that is, he experiences himself as both responsible for his own becoming and free to choose within a given range of actions associated with his becoming in his world, time and history. It is easy to see that this experience also carries within it the experience of dependence because in practicing his responsibility and freedom he sees that he is also at the disposal of his world, time and history, a disposal over which he has no control.
Once man experiences what he is－subject and person and therefore transcendent, responsible and free as a result of his transcendence, and finally dependent as to his own disposal－he has arrived at what Rahner calls the presence of mystery. This mystery is basically the vast, silent darkness of what is beyond the feeble light of man's attainment. In short, it is the recognition of the beyond ourselves. Rahner calls this the unthematic or undifferentiated perception of God, and it is this perception that sets the stage for Christianity. As mentioned above, Western man is not only reflecting in a world of advanced science and technology but also in a world where an important part of his historical origin is Christianity. Therefore, as he stands before the unthematic perception of God, he must ask himself is the Christian thematic perception of God still valid within the context of his own self-experience and should he still remain bound to it.
Now it is easy to see that Rahner's thought meets both of the criteria we have taken from Blondel to judge the effectiveness of contemporary Christian Philosophy. In the book in which Rahner states his thought－ Foundations of Christian Faith－the first criterion, namely that Christian Philosophy must be within the general mainstream of current thinking, is theoretically fulfilled. After all, Rahner specifically stated that this is what he set out to do and he gave convincing reasons to show that he had actually done so. The second criterion, that is that the philosophy expounded must offer a suitable basis on which to present the Faith, is not only theoretically fulfilled but also practically fulfilled in this instance. Rahner not only said he was going to show how philosophy and theology complement one another but he actually demonstrates this very claim in the major portion of his book.
But it is clear from the above that we are faced by one problem, and that is how do we know that Rahner's philosophy is indeed within the mainstream of contemporary thought practically as well as theoretically. Probably most would answer by saying that a general survey of contemporary European Philosophy would help remove this problem. But for those of us in the Orient, an example closer to home would be much more welcome. Can we find a Chinese philosopher doing Rahner's kind of thinking? The answer is yes, we have one in Fung Yu-lan (馮友蘭) an outstanding contemporary Chinese philosopher.
Fung Yu-lan, in a brief work entitled A Short History of Chinese Philosophy written just before the Chinese liberation, revealed much of his own thinking on philosophy in the Chinese tradition.(9) To him, philosophy is systematic, reflective thinking on life. Everyone who is not yet dead is in life but only some who are living engage in reflective thinking about life and among these, a smaller number still whose reflection is systematic. These people we call philosophers, that is those who think reflectively on Life and then express their thoughts in a systematic way.
When one reflects on Life, he sees that part of the universal experience of man is that of transcendence and to Fung Yu-lan this creates a major problem in relation to his historical origin in this world and at this time. He is aware of the fact that in the West, the transcendental experience has been a major force in the stability of a strong religious tradition. On the other hand, Westerners looking at the cultural-historical reality of China see the Chinese as less concerned than they are with religion. And, indeed, Fung Yu-lan recognizes this as a fact. But what does this mean? Does it mean that the Chinese man simply denies the transcendental experience and as a result there is no spiritual basis in Chinese civilization?
Fung Yu-lan's reflection on the kind of a man he is in relation to his own historical origin leads him to assert that the Chinese man does not deny the transcendental experience but rather expresses it differently from the Western man. To clarify this, he analyses religion and philosophy. His analysis brings him to the conclusion that the heart of the matter is a question of values. Religion is thought to give one super-moral values while philosophy only moral values. Love of God, for instance, is a super-moral value while love of man is a moral value. Does this mean, then, that the Chinese are not conscious of those values that are higher than moral ones? The answer to this question is, of course, no. The reason is that the Chinese man satisfies his craving for transcendental experience in philosophy in a way that would be very similar to the love of what Rahner would call the non-thematic God. So therefore, in philosophy he has the super-moral values expressed and appreciated and in living according to philosophy these super-moral values are experienced.
In reading Fung Yu-lan, we find a number of peculiar prejudices and preconceptions expressed concerning religion in general and Christianity in particular that are not incorporated into the above summary. But they are no more surprising than similar Western thought concerning Chinese religion and institutions. But what we do see quite clearly is a good practical example of a Chinese philosopher going the same kind of philosophizing that Karl Rahner is doing and from this we can judge that Rahner's Christian philosophy would be effective in this context. In short, Rahner and Fung Yu-lan would be perfectly capable of dialogue, one with the other.
What we have seen above is only one example taken from the oriental context. Unfortunately, the exclusiveness of Marxist thought in China precludes free interaction of philosophical opinion, particularly on the important point of human transcendence. But the one example we have is clear enough to give a strong indication that the kind of philosophizing the contemporary Christian Philosophy movement is engaged in is effective in addressing itself to the intelligent, thinking person.
1.AETERNI PATRIS may be found in Etienne Gilson, THE CHURCH SPEAKS TO THE MODERN WORLD. THE SOCIAL TEACHINGS OF LEO XIII (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1954), pp. 31-51.
2.Lonergan saw his work as contributing to the movement of Leo XIII. In INSIGHT (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), p. 747, he says as much. However, his later work METHOD IN THEOLOGY (New York: The Seabury Press, 1979), shows a shift away from this position towards what we call in this paper Contemporary Christian Philosophy.
3.De Bonald's works have not been put into English. However clear presentations of his thought may be found in Mary Hall Quinlan, HISTORICAL THOUGHT OF THE VICOMPTE DE BONALD (Washington: CUA, 1953) and Etienne Gilson et al., RECENT PHILOSOPHY: HEGEL TO THE PRESENT (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 209-214, 714-718.
4.See CONCILIORUM OECUMENICORUM DECRETA (Rome: Herder, 1962), pp. 780-787.
5.A complete analysis of Blondel's work is contained in Henri Bouillard, BLONDEL AND CHRISTIANITY (Washington: Corpus Books, 1969).
6.Gilson explains his position at length in his work THE PHILOSOPHERS AND THEOLOGY (NewYork: Random House, 1962).
7.Clear documentation is contained in Austin Flannery, O.P., ed., VATICAN COUNCIL II THE CONCILIAR AND POST CONCILIAR DOCUMENTS (Northport: Costello Publishing Company, 1975).
8.Karl Rahner, FOUNDATIONS OF CHRISTIAN FAITH (New York: The Seabury Press, 1978). The theoretical content of Rahner's Christian Philosophy is found primarily in the first forty-three pages of the work. The rest of the book is devoted to the practical application of this philosophy to the understanding of the Faith.
9.Fung Yu-lan, A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY (New York: The Free Press, 1966). The work was originally written in 1947 and the author saw it as an opportunity to explain both his own philosophy and Chinese philosophy in general to an English -speaking audience. He does this primarily in the first chapter of the book.