作者：汤汉 Tong, John

(甲) 引言

记得十年前，香港天主教及圣公会经过了差不多两年的磋商，终于在一九七四年三月十五日，假座香港下亚厘毕道一号圣公会会督府小堂，签订了具有历史性的圣洗协议。目的是除了重申双方施行同一圣洗，以避免重洗，并保证该圣事的尊严外，还使双方教会关系增强，在双方对教义的交谈及瞭解上迈进了富有意义的一步。当日，邝广杰主教(尚是牧师)、张绿芗牧师及笔者亦有份参与起草过程，故至今印象仍深。

但是上述圣洗协议的内容，与一九八二年在南美秘鲁利马(LIMA) 所公布的合一文献比较，无论在深度及阔度上均简陋得多。笔者承蒙香港基督教协进会之遨，参与了今年四月廿九日的「合一研讨会」，并对利马文献内所论及圣洗的部份发表一点意见，现把讲话写下，与读者分享，希望收到拋砖引玉之效。

(乙) 文献产生的历史过程

早在一九六三年，当第四届「信仰与教制」(FAITH AND ORDER) 会议在加拿大满地可举行时，参与者已开始研究，如何能在教会观、圣经、传统之关系、教会与牧职、崇拜、洗礼与圣体等重要问题上寻求合一。

一九六七年，参加在英国BRISTOL所举行的「信仰与教制」委员会议的成员，觉得需要把过往数十年之合一讨论综结，亦要将协议的神学论点写出。事实，在会议后，成员随即把「圣体」的协议内容胪列出来。

一九七○年，该委员会成员在瑞士日内瓦举行会议，进一步把「圣洗」初步协议写出。

而在一九七二年，该委员会成员又在法国马赛举行会议，再进一步把「牧职」的神学内容列下。

自一九七四年非洲迦南ACCRA会议始 ，该委员会的核心小组已开始着手把「圣洗」、「圣体」、以及「牧职」三者放在一起草拟，至一九七七年完成。次年，这份集「圣洗、圣体、及牧职」于一身的草稿，得以先在印度BANGALORE会议中接受讨论，继而在一九八二年的秘鲁利马会议中，获得一百多位参加的神学家的修改和一致通过，并予以公布。

由于参加者至少曾参加过上述会议多次，故其临在具有连贯性，而且他们又来自世界各地不同的基督教派，故甚具代表性。因此，各个教会当局，虽尚未视它为教会官方「批准」的文献，但亦至少尊重它，认它教会当局「接纳」的文件；其重要性可见一斑。

(丙) 文献结构及内容分析

利马文献的圣洗论包括五大部份：(一) 圣洗之设立、(二) 圣洗的意义、(三) 圣洗与信心、(四) 圣洗的施行、(五) 圣洗礼的举行。五部份中，以第二部份最长、最重要。这部份不但充满圣经章节，详论圣洗的象征，而且幅度广阔，层次分明，结构紧凑。它首先指出圣洗的意义是：「参与基督的死而复活」(罗．六：3－5；哥．二：12)、「罪的洗净」(格前．六：11)、「重生」(若．三：5)、「基督的光照」(弗．五：14)、「穿上基督」(迦．三：27)、「圣神赐予的更新」(铎．三：5)、「经过洪水而得救的经验」(伯前．三：20－21)、「从奴役中获得霹放」(格前．十：1－2)、「超越性别、种族、社会地位的界限而成为新人」(迦．三：27－28；格前．十二：13)。继而，这第二部份还从圣神的恩赐，说到与基督身体的结合，成为天国的标记。总之，这第二部份，以圣经所描写的不同形象和内涵，生动而活泼地说明了圣洗的意义。因此，这部份可说是整个文献的圣洗论的根基和核心，由此而散发出其他四个部份。

谈到第一部份论「圣洗的设立」，基督宗派对此意见不一。有的认为是耶稣亲自建立了新约的圣洗，连圣洗的外在标记(言语和行动)，也由耶稣自己逐一决定好；有的则认为洗礼在旧约时代已存在，若翰洗者在耶稣传教之前，亦已施行悔改之洗礼，故此基督只给已有之洗礼加上一个新元素，即「圣神的赐予」。面对这种意见纷歧的情况，文献只说：「基督徒的洗礼根源于耶稣的传道工作、受死和复活。」从「根源」(IS ROOTED IN)一词的运用，可以看出与会神学家求同存异的用心；透过这个字眼，他们既不否定，也不偏重上述其中任何一方的意见。

至于第三部份「圣洗与信心」，也值得注意它在整章中的位置和所运用的措词。文献不把信心问题置于第四部份论「圣洗的施行」内，却把它另列，且放在「圣洗之意义」之后，却在论「圣洗之施行」之先。可见与会神学家肯定「信心」对圣洗的必须。但是在肯定了信心的必须后，文献特别强调圣洗不是一个短暂的经验，而是在基督里不断的「成长」，以达到基督「圆满」年龄的程度(弗．四：13)。在谈到「信心」的部份上，文献似乎刻意安排了「成长」及「圆满」两个措词，目的是要开启另一条途径，以便解决一直引起争论的「婴孩洗礼」问题。所以，这里特别提示我们，即使在实施婴孩洗礼的教会内，领洗的婴孩虽然现在没法宣达个人的信德，但父母及团体仍有责任助他成长，使他的信德与日俱增。

而第四部份所论及的「圣洗的施行」，内容着重处理两个棘手问题：(一) 婴孩洗礼问题；(二) 圣洗和坚振的关系。

关于婴孩洗礼问题，利马会议的讨论，先把不同教派的实施归纳成三个模式：(一) 一些教会，由于认为洗礼者必须宣发个人信心，故只准成人领洗。(二) 另一些教会容许婴孩受洗，并不是按照对成人要求的一般标准，而是按照「天主愿意所有人得救」的特殊原则；而且，这些教会还认为，婴孩受洗还可显示出，在使人死而复活的人生路途上，天主的爱作了肇端，以及人类、教会都彼此合成一体。(三) 而第三种教会的做法，则是对于婴孩洗礼的容许，不置可否，在尊重各个教会的不同传统的大前题下，只强调圣洗是一个「过程」，因此，即使领了洗的婴孩待长大后才能表明个人信仰，但是，信心的长进和加深对成人或婴孩都是必须的。利马文献在上述三个实施模式中，推许了第三个模式。

至于圣洗与坚振之关系，文献亦意识到，基督徒对圣神恩赐的标记存有不同的见解。文中说：「为一些人，是水礼本身；为其他人，是傅油与按手，又或者其中一样，即目前很多教会所称的『坚振』或『坚信礼』；又为另些人，是三者俱全，因为他们认为圣神活动于整个礼仪中。无论如何，所有人都同意，基督徒的洗礼是藉水及圣神而施行。」事实，由于不同传统，有些教会视坚振(或坚信礼)为一件圣事，强调圣神的赐予，使圣洗者迈向圆满；另一些教会则只把它当作一项宣认礼，使在婴孩时领了洗的教友，能公开表明个人自己的信心。姑无论不同的教会如何看这个问题，视坚振为一件圣事或只是一项教会仪式，文献只欲以圣经为基础，一方面指出圣洗与坚振两者紧密相连，因为「基督的死而复活」与「圣神降临」不能分开；另一方面又说明圣洗在圆满意义上(IN ITS FULL MEANING) 标志出「基督的死而复活」和「圣神降临」，亦同时产生这两件奥迹的功能。

最后是第五部份论「圣洗礼的举行」。虽然由于各教会的不同传统，使圣洗礼的举行产生很多分歧，但与会神学家仍能达成三个最基本和重要的协议：(一) 「因圣三之名」施行「水洗」；(二) 圣洗在通常情形下，由「圣职人员」施行；(三) 圣洗礼宜于主要的节期，即复活节、圣神降临节及主显节举行。这三项协议的达成，殊不简单，故此，事后有人笑称要分别颁三个金像奖给这三项协议。谈到这里，也值得注意一下，文献对举行圣洗礼所建议的节日中，并未包括圣诞节，因为主显节的神学意义，比圣诞节更广阔、更圆清。试问：假如耶稣基督只降生而不显现于外方人，对我们怎会有很重大的意义？

总括一句，这是一篇划时代的文献，也标志了合一的里程碑。

(丁) 文献对香港基督徒的讯息

笔者以为，上述文献提供给我们香港基督徒三点启发如下：

(一) 交谈精神 合一交谈，并非是唇枪舌剑，而是彼此尊重、聆听。从而共同迈向真理。故此，这种交谈要求我们一方面「求同」，一齐走向圣经；另一方面「存异」，尊重各教会的宝贵传统，务求做到合一非统一、却是合一多元的地步。

(二) 团体意识 文献教导我们，领洗不只是为了使个人得救，也是为加入教会，以天下为家，进入社会，服务人类，见证和参与基督的解放工程，使正义与和平的天国早日临现人间。所以，文献以「人类的解放者」这名号来称呼基督。这样的称呼，相信并非出于偶然。

(三) 牧民实践 利马文献既然是一件十分出色的文献，故牧者应首先把它消化、实践，然后教育教友、慕道者，更应在堂区的礼仪中，依它的指导实行。这样，才不致使一件优美的文献，变成书桌上的装饰品。

(戊) 一些建议

笔者曾请教圣经学家房志荣神父，他指出这件文献虽然优美丰富，但仍不免有一些值得商榷之处，特别是以下两点：

(一) 迦拉达书第三章28节原文说：「不再分犹太人和希腊人，也不再分奴隶和自由人，也不再分男人和女人，因为你们在基督耶稣内已是一个了。」利马文献却把这段圣经的次序调换，先讲「性别」，后提「社会地位」，最后才说及「种族」。请问：为何要把次序如此调换？究竟是不是为了刻意针对性别的区分？

(二) 当这份文献论及「圣洗的意义」时，我们以为不妨在罗．六：3－11；哥．二：13；三：1；弗．二：5－6的圣经章节后，加上弟后．二：11－13。因为这首基督徒古诗歌，不但表现出基督徒信念的坚强，还更进一步阐释死而复活与我们现实生活的关系：「如果我们与祂同死，我们也必与祂同生；如果我们坚信到底，也必与祂一同为王；如果我们否认祂，祂也必要否认我们；如果我们不忠信，祂仍然是忠信的，因为祂不能否认自己。」

附录

利马文献论圣洗（原文）

(一) 圣洗的设立

基督徒的圣洗，根源于耶稣的传道工作、受死和复活。圣洗是与被钉于十字架并复活了的基督结合，也是进入上主与祂子民所立的新盟约中。圣洗是上主给予人类的恩赐，因父、及子，及圣神之名而施行。根据玛窦福音的记载，复活的主差遣门徒到世界各地，为人们施洗(玛．廿八：18－20)新约的书信、宗徒大事录和教父着作，都证明了宗徒时代的教会普遍地施行圣洗。教会继续这样做，视之为一项对施恩之主的承诺礼仪。

(二) 圣洗的意义

圣洗是从耶稣基督里获得新生命的标记。它使受洗者与基督和祂的子民结合。新约圣经和教会礼仪用不同的形象，说明圣洗的意义，表达出基督及其救恩的丰盛。旧约也有用水为标记的记载。圣洗是参与基督的死和复活(罗．六：3－5)；罪的洗净(格前．六：11)；新生(若．三：5)；基督的光照(弗．五：14)；穿上基督(迦．三：27)；圣神赐予的更新(铎．三：5)；经历洪水而获救的经验(伯前．三：20－21)；从奴役中得到释放(格前．十：1－2)；超越性别、种族和社会地位的界限而成为新人(迦．三：27－28；格前，十二：13)。以上不同的形象都说明了同一的事实。

(甲) 参与基督的死和复活

圣洗就是参与耶稣基督的生命、死亡和复活。耶稣为了要完成上主的旨意，曾在约旦河和罪人一起受洗(玛．三：15)。之后，耶稣开始过着受苦仆人的生活：遭遇各样苦难，以至于死，然后复活(谷．十：38－40、45)。藉着圣洗，基督徒加入到基督解放人类的死亡中，把罪恶埋葬了，让「旧亚当」与基督同钉在十字架上，使罪的权势遭到破坏。因此，受洗的人冲破罪的奴役而得到自由，完全与基督一起死亡、埋葬、复活。在耶稣基督复活的大能下，迈向新生，亦清怀信心，期待复活，最后与复活的基督合而为一(罗．六：3－11；哥．二：13：三：1：弗．二：5－6)

(乙) 悔改、赦罪、洁净

圣洗除了使基督徒有份参与耶稣的死而复活外，也含有认罪和内心悔改的意思。若翰的施洗，就是悔改赦罪的洗礼(谷．一：4)。新约亦强调了圣洗的伦理含意，比如：用清洁的水洗净身体、清洁内心的罪、成义(希．十：22；伯前，三：21；宗．廿三：16；格前．六：11)。因此，受洗者都得到基督的赦罪、祝圣。并在圣神的引领下，把新的道德方向作为他们洗礼的部份经验。

(丙) 圣神的恩赐

圣神在人们受洗过程及前后，都在其中工作。同一的圣神当日宣告耶稣为子(谷一：10－11)，也在五旬节日把门徒联合起来(宗．二)。上主把圣神的传油及许诺赐给受洗者，给他们盖上印号，把子女所能承受的初步产业安置在他们心中。之后圣神继续培养他们的信仰生活，直到万民都蒙上主拯救，承受全部产业，颂扬祂的光荣(格后．一：21－22；弗．一：13－14)。

(丁) 与基督的身体结合

依上主的意旨，圣洗是使我们成为信徒的标记和印号。藉着圣洗，基督徒与基督联结，彼此之间联结，也与各时代和各地方的教会联结起来。这种把我们联结到基督的同一洗礼是合一的根基。无论何时何地，我们都成为一个民族，被召去承认和敬拜同一个主。透过洗礼与基督结合，这对基督徒合一百很重要的意义。「只有一个洗礼；只有一个天主和众人之父」(弗．四：4－6)。当圣洗的合一在至一、至圣、至公、从宗徒傅下来的教会实现时，基督徒才真的能见证上主医治人和使人修和的爱心，因此，透过圣洗与基督结合，是对各教会的呼召，叫他们克服分裂，发扬团结精神。

(戊) 天国的标记

圣洗使我们在现世开始新生命，使我们参与圣神的团体。它是天国和来世生命的标记。圣洗使我们的生命充满信望爱，扩展及于普世，期待早日同声承认耶稣是主，并归光荣于父。

(三) 圣洗和信心

圣洗是上主的恩赐，也是人类对这恩赐的回应。圣洗指向成长，达到基督圆满年龄的程度(弗．四：13)。所有教会都承认，接受圣洗带来的救恩，必须具有信心。在基督内成为负责任的成员，必须具有个人的承诺。

圣洗不是短暂的经验，而是一生不断在基督内成长。圣神使受洗的人有基督的形象，因此可以彰显主的荣耀(格后．三：18 )。基督徒的生命，虽面对不少困难，但也不断蒙恩。受洗的人为基督、教会和祂所爱的世界而活，常盼望着上主新天地的来临，届时祂将成为万物的主宰(罗．八；18－24；格前．拾伍：22－28、49－57)。

受洗的信友在基督信仰生活内的不断成长，显示出人类可以重获新生，得到解放。他们有共同的责任，在此时此地，在教会和世界上，为耶稣解放人类的福音作见证。在服务及见证的团契里，基督徒会发现圣洗的圆满意义，视洗礼是上主给予其子民的恩赐。同样，他们也承认，圣洗除了表示与基督一同死亡外，也要求信徒圣洁，在生活的各方面去努力完成上主的旨意(罗．六：9以下；迦．三：27－28；伯前．二：21－四：6)。

(四) 圣洗的施行

(甲) 成人洗礼和婴孩洗礼

宗徒时代可能已有婴儿洗礼，但表明个人信仰的洗礼却是新约最明显证实的模式。

在历史过程中，圣洗的施行曾发展成不同的形式。如果父母或监护人愿意孩童在基督信仰环境下长大，一些教会会为婴孩施洗。而另一些教会则仅为那些会表明个人信仰的人施礼。有些只为成人施洗的教会也鼓励给婴孩行祝福礼，表示感谢上主赐给家庭婴孩，并促使父母答应做真正的基督徒家长。

来自其他宗教或没有宗教的人，只要他们接受基督信仰及参加慕道斑，所有教会都会为他们施洗。

为成人或婴孩施洗，都是在教会内举行。当一个能为自己作出回应的人受洗时，他对个人信仰的表明，便成了圣洗的一部份。而当一个婴孩受洗时，他要待长大后才能作出回应。但两者都要在信仰上长进及加深认识。在领受洗礼时能表明个人信仰的人，需要在个人信仰的回应上不断增长。婴孩自然要待长大后才能宣达个人的信仰，故此需要基督宗教的熏陶，以启发他表明个人的信仰。所有洗礼都植根于和表达出基督到死不渝的忠信。圣洗与教会的生命和信仰有密切开系；透过整个教会的见证，圣洗指向上主的忠信，视上主的忠信为所有信仰生活的根基。在每一次圣洗中，信众重申对主的信仰，也承诺去为主作见证，服务别人。因此，所有圣洗都应在基督团体中举行及发展。

圣洗不可重领，凡可解作是「重洗」的行为，均应避免。

(乙) 圣洗－傅油－坚振

在上主的救恩工程中，基督死而复活的奥迹，与五旬节里圣神的恩赐是连在一起的。同样，参与基督的死而复活，亦与接受圣神分不开。圣洗的圆满意义就标志和产生这两件奥迹。

什么是圣神恩赐的标记？基督徒对这个问题有不同的见解，因而圣神的赐予亦与不同的行动相连。为一些人，是水礼本身；为其他人，是傅油与按手，又或者其中一样，即目前很多教会所称的「坚振」或「坚信礼」；又为另一些人，是三者俱全，因为他们认为圣神活动于整个礼仪中。无论如何，所有人都同意，基督徒的洗礼是藉水及圣神而施行。

(丙) 迈向互相承认圣洗

各教会愈来愈多互相承认圣洗，视之为归依基督的同一个洗礼，要求受洗者宣认基督为救主。至于在婴孩洗礼的情况中，则由教会(父母、监护人、代父母和信众)作出宣信，待婴孩长大后，才由他宣发个人的信仰和许诺。互相承认圣洗，是圣洗赐予我们在基督内合一的重要标记和表达方法。如果可能，各教会应公开表示互相承认。

为克服分歧，施行成人洗礼者和施行婴孩洗礼者，都应重新考虑他们的某些措施。为成人施洗者，要更清楚说明儿童被安置在上主恩宠的保护下；而为婴孩施洗者，不可轻率行事，要多些关心受洗儿童的培育，使他们日后能对基督产生成熟的许诺。

(五) 圣洗的举行

圣洗是以水及因圣父、圣子和圣神之名而施行。

在举行圣洗时，应重视水的标记。浸洗很迫真地表现出基督徒在受洗中参与基督的死亡、埋葬和复活。

正如在初期教会的情况中，圣洗所赐予的圣神可用附加的方式表明，例如：按手、傅油。十字架的标记表示：圣神的恩赐已经开始，又保证上主必将来拯救自己的子民(弗．一：13－14)。重新运用这些活泼的标记，会使礼仪更形丰富。

在任何一完整的圣洗礼中，至少要有以下几项要素：宣读与圣洗有关的圣经；呼求圣神降临；弃绝罪恶；宣认对基督和圣三的信仰；用水；宣布受洗者已获得上主儿女及教会成员的新身份，蒙召为福音作见证。一些教会认为，基督徒入门圣事必须包括圣神的印记和圣体的参与。

在圣洗礼仪中，宜依照圣经解释圣洗的意义(比如：参与基督的死而复活、悔改、赦罪、洁净、圣神的恩赐、与基督的身体结合、天国的标记)。

虽然在某些情况下，任何人皆可为人施洗，但在正常的情况下，圣洗的施行者是领了神品的圣职人员。

圣洗既与教会的团体生活和崇拜有密切关系，在正常情况下，便应在公众崇拜中举行，藉以提醒会众自己已受的洗礼，也使会众欢迎新颁洗者加入团体中，并且负起培育新领洗者的信仰的责任。圣洗圣事宜于主要的节期举行，比如：复活节日、圣神降临占礼、主显节，这正是初期教会的惯例。

(附注译文从略)

作者：吴智勋

(一) 引言

远在上一世纪，教宗良十三已提出「圣经是神学的灵魂」1，其从差不多每位教宗都强调了圣经的重要性2。话虽如此，梵二以前的伦理神学，很少用圣经；虽然它花不少篇幅去讲圣经中的十诫，其实只是用十诫作为一个范畴去讨论伦理问题，并非真正以圣经为基础。间中引用圣经的时候，只把它当作引证文字(PROOF-TEXT)，去证明某一个基于自然律的观点是对的而已。例如：同性恋行为是违反自然律，作者往往引用罗马书去支持此：「他们的女人，把顺性之用变为逆性之用；男人也是如此，放弃了与女人的顺性之用，彼此欲火中烧，男人与男人行了丑事，就在各人身上受到了他们颠倒是非所应得的报应」(罗一：26－27)。看！圣经也证明我们所讲的是对的。不少伦理神学家早已发觉这种方法论不完美，并彻底加以改善。着名赫宁神父的「基督之律」3，可说是新旧伦理神学的分水岭。书名本身是出自圣经：「你们应彼此协助背负重担，这样，你们就满全了基督之律」(迦六：2)。他认为伦理神学主要不再是可做什么，不可做什么，而应集中在基督身上，祂本人就是我们的法律、道路与生命4。这样处理伦理神学才有整体观，不含支离破碎。

梵二重新肯定返回圣经的神学趋势，认定「圣经的研究当视作神学的灵魂」(启示24)，「应特别注意的是改进伦理神学，其科学的体系应受圣经更多的滋养，说明教友在基督内使命的崇高，以及他们在爱德内为世界的生命多结美果的责任」(司铎16)。短短几句已提示了伦理神学的方法和任务。伦理神学不应像从前一样，以法律主义味道甚重的圣教法典为根基，而改以圣经为依归。基督徒的伦理是一个以基督为中心、「在基督内」的伦理，而此伦理基本土是一个召叫、一个使命，而非一条法律。这个使命是一个爱的要求，基督徒的伦理就是连同基督，满全爱的法律，结爱德的果实。梵二以来，不少人着手沿着这个指示而研究，基本上放弃从前「司铎手册」式的方法论。

本文只愿讨论几个初步的问题：为什么伦理神学要用圣经？人的理性不够吗？传统自然律伦理不是在启示之外吗？假定圣经是应该用的，如何用圣经去研究及处理伦理问题？

　

  1：教宗良十三世一八九三年十一月十八日「上智」通谕(Providentissimus Deus)：宗座公报卷二六 (1893－94)，P. 283.

2：E. Hamel. “L’ Ecriture, Ame De La Theologie”, Gregorianum, 52/3, 1971, pp. 511－535. 该文做了详尽的研究，列举了本笃十五世「施慰圣神」通谕(Spiritus Paraclitus, 15、9、1920)，庇护十二世「圣神默示」通谕(Divino Afflante Spiritu, 30、9、1943)，与及「人类」通谕(Humani Generis, 12、8、1950)。

3：Bernard Haring. The Law of Christ. 该书原着为德文，成于一九五四年，并陆续翻译为十四种语言。英译本成于一九六一、六三及六六。中译本成于一九七四至一九七九年间。

4.参Bernard Haring. Free and Faithful in Christ. St. Paul, Vol. I, 1978, P. 5.

(二) 为什么要用圣经去研究伦理神学？

一个接受了基督福音的信徒，天主的法律不是铭刻在他的心坎吗？旧约已提到：「我要将我的法律放在他们的肺腑里，写在他们的心头上，我要作他们的天主，他们要作我的人民」(耶卅一：33)。新约时代圣保禄讲得更清楚，连不信主的外邦人，也能认识天主美善的本性：「几时，没有法律的外邦人，顺着本性去行法律的事，他们虽然没有法律，但自己对自己就是法律。如此证明了法律的精华已刻在他们的心上，他们的良心也为此作证」(罗二：14－15)。天主既将祂的法律刻在人的良心上，基督徒只要倾听良心的呼声不是够了吗？为什么还要返回圣经？非基督徒随其良心行事，其伦理生活不也是令人起敬，不是比很多基督徒还要好吗？

这里牵涉的问题很多，现在只能作简短的回答。基督徒毕竟仍在世途上，生活在「已经」和「未曾」当中。意思是说，天主的救恩已经来临到他身上，可是还未曾完满。领洗时所领受的圣神，并没有一次过的完全光照良心。圣神的确开始了转变，但此转变仍有待一生不断的继续。铭刻在人心的法律，能因为人的罪恶，弄至模糊不清，甚至有被改变的危险，但圣经忠实地反映天主的圣意；当我们因自己的软弱对爱的实践有缺失时，圣经使我们看清楚天主如何藉基督爱了我们，并帮助我们满全基督爱的法律。推动人心的圣神与默示圣经作者的圣神是同一的，圣经一定能与人内心的法律相辅相承。

传统的天主教伦理可称为自然律伦理。所谓自然律就是人性里面的一个天赋道德秩序，人能在启示外，用理智辨认出来5。既然理性已可以认出自然律，又何必返回圣经？究竟我们应随从自律的理智抑或他律的圣经？有关理智抑或圣经的问题，在基督宗教内有很大的分歧。其中一大类是以天主的启示作为伦理唯一的根基。以下几位是以不同的角度到达同一的结论：

(1) 齐克果(Kierkegard)：

特别强调神的超越性，神的命令完全在人的伦理之上。以亚巴郎祭献儿子为例，人的伦理成为一种诱惑，使亚巴郎不去服从天主的命令。但亚巴郎克服了这种诱惑，服从天主的命令而不服从人伦理的命令。人的伦理在天主的命令前要让步，可见真正的责任，就是实行天主的命令6。

(2) 巴夫(Karl Barth)：

认定离开天主的启示而谈伦理是没有希望的，因为人的理智已为原始堕落及其本罪所败坏。几时人企图用理智去分辨善恶，他只是重蹈原祖的覆辙，要如同天主一样，自己去分辨善恶。故此他认为建立哲学伦理是不可能的，全理智去判断天主的圣言是最基本的亵渎7。如此看来，巴夫会把启示之外的自然律伦理看成是白拉其(PELAGIUS)主义的一种，人企图不要启示恩宠，而用理智去解决所有伦理问题。

(3) 华特(Keith Ward)：

采取较温和的路线，主张人的理智有实际不足之处。人若只靠自己的理智作伦理反省，面对如此众多甚至相反的伦理论调，人怎能达到「正」「误」的协议？倘若按人的需要来探讨伦理，则理智又难以决定什么是人真正的需要。到最后，只靠理智的伦理只能退到一个相对的立场。华特反对相对的伦理，认为解决的办法就是承认圣经为伦理的基础，特别是耶稣道德观点的权威性8。

可是，只要圣经的方法论，在实际应用时亦有行不通之处。不少基督教的伦理学家也同意此9。我们现在就拿山中圣训的例子去说明。

(1)古人说：「不可杀人」，而耶稣说：「凡向自己弟兄发怒的，就要受裁判」(玛五：22)。

(2)古人说：「不可奸淫」，而耶稣说：「凡注视妇女，有意贪恋她的，他已在心里奸淫了她」(玛五：28)。

(3)古人说：「谁若休妻，就该给她休书」，而耶稣说：「除了姘居外，凡休自己的妻子的，便是叫她受奸污；并且谁若娶被休的妇人，就是犯奸淫」(玛五：32－33)。

(4)古人说：「不可发虚誓！要向上主偿还你的誓愿！」而耶稣说：「你们总不可发誓……你们的话该当是：是就说是，非就说非；其他多余的，便是出于邪恶」(玛五：34、37)。

(5)古人说：「以眼还眼，以牙还牙」，而耶稣说：「不要抵抗恶人；而且，若有人掌击你的右颊，你把另一面也转给他」(玛五：39)。

(6)古人说：「你应爱你的近人，恨你的仇人」，而耶稣说：「你们当爱你们的仇人，当为迫害你们的人祈祷」(玛五：44)。

六者外在的形式和情况皆一样，都是先引一段犹太人法律的话，然后耶稣以祂的权威说出基督徒应有的心态与行为。可是，问题来了，按照天主教的传统，(2)(3)的例子，应按字面的意义去解释。教会要人跟随耶稣的教训，心里洁净，不光是外在不做奸淫的行为而已。教会不忠于耶稣的话，认定婚姻不可拆散，不容许离婚。至于其他(1)(4)(5)(6)往往看成是理想。耶稣不但要求人不要去杀人，而且连发怒也不应该，但我们认为发怒有时是可以的，倘若有适当的理由，那便是「义」怒；耶稣叫人不要抵抗恶人，但我们认为自卫正义战争是可以的；耶稣叫人不要发誓，可是我们生活中却又有不少发誓的机会，在法庭上要发誓，在就职时要宣誓，修道生活有誓愿，连童子军也有誓言；耶稣叫人爱仇，而我们往往只要求正义，追讨罪债，认为宽恕恶人只是妇人之仁，是姑息养奸，使善良的人受更多的苦；有人还会说，打击及消灭压迫人的人才是满全爱的要求。总之，我们没有按照字面去理解基督的教训。我们要追问的是：六种教训耶稣都用同一的形式语调说出，为什么(2)(3)我们认定字面的意义就是基督的原意，而其他四者，我们却认为是理想，有时能有例外的可能？为什么不一视同仁？我们这样做，不是因为经过理智判断的过滤吗？可见我们从圣经吸取伦理教训，很难忽略理智。

天主教传统主张人的理智并没有完全为罪所损坏，人的理智能够分辨天主的计划，这就是自然律伦理的基础，即以理智认出天主刻在人心的道德秩序。可是，倘若理智已能分辨善恶，为什么还要圣经？圣经学家告诉我们，圣经上的伦理规律很多是从当时流行的道德规律借过来。十诫的条文不少也能在同期的其他民族的道德规律中发现，圣保禄亦借用了斯多葛派及其他希腊的伦理思想。既然理智也能办到，为什么还要靠启示？梵一及梵二所给的答案是相同的：「关于那些原本为人类的理智，所能通达的天主事理，而在人类现实的状况下，能够容易地、确切地和无讹地被一切人所识，仍当归功于天主的启示」10。

人的理智并非不能错，良心在推理时能以善为恶或以恶为善，伦理学上便有所谓错误良心这个名称。要看清楚天主刻在人性上的道德秩序并非易事。人的私欲和恶习能蒙蔽理智，例如性欲便能使人良心模糊不清。圣保禄曾提到：人本来能从万物中认出天主的美善，但他们的心陷入黑暗，因此，天主任凭他们随从心中的情欲，陷于不洁，去行不正当的事(罗一：18－32)。

圣经是人伦理的一面镜子，因为只有启示才能给予人的生命一个完整的意义。人的伦理中有很多隐晦的成份，要等待启示才使它的意义完全显露。例如以德报怨的爱仇思想是人的理智能认知的。论语宪问提到：「或曰：以德报怨，何如？子曰：何以报德？以直报怨，以德报德」。礼记表记亦有相似的讲法：「子曰：以德报德，则民有所劝；以怨报怨，则民有所惩。……以德报怨，则宽身之仁也,以怨报德，则刑戳之民也」。这里不打算深入探讨为什么儒家如此主张，我只想指出，既然有人能提出「以德报怨」的讲法，即在人的伦理中，爱仇的思想能够为人理智所认识，只因为种种理由，不为儒家所接纳罢了。启示帮助人明白爱仇的基础和整体意义：「你们当爱你们的仇人，当为迫害你们的人祈祷，好使你们成为你们在天之父的子女，因为他使太阳上升，光照恶人，也光照善人；降雨给义人，也给不义的人」(玛五：44－45)。基督当我们还是罪人的时候，就爱了我们，在十字架上时，还呼求天父宽恕杀害祂的人。基督徒就从基督身上，看到爱仇的意义，得到爱仇的动机和执行的力量。

总括来说，人是通过理智去认出天主刻在人心的法律，但此理智必须接受启示的光照与指导，才得到整体、完满的意义。天主教的伦理传统可说是双源的，即启示与理智并重，两者相辅相承，并非两个毫不相关的独立体。启示主要并非提供新的伦理物质内容，而是使人的理智良心更敏锐的去找寻天主的意思，并且更完整地、容易地及无错误地去发现道德规律。理论上，理智可以把握到这些规律，但实际上在具体历史环境中，没有启示人是无法完全地认识它。两者既是伦理生活不可或缺的事，所以「圣经和人的理智，同时是伦理神学的灵魂」11。

　

  5.参拙着「自然律伦理探究」，神学年刊(7)，1983，p.27。

6：S. Kierkegaard. Fear and Trembling, Oxford, 1939, PP. 84－85.

7：Karl Barth. Church Dogmatics Vol. II, Part 2, Edinburgh, 1957, pp. 517FF.

8：Keith Ward. Ethics and Christianity. London, 1970. 以上三者的意见，均见G. J. Hughes. “A Christian Basis for Ethics”. The Heythrop Journal, January, 1972, pp. 27－43.

9：James M. Gustafson. Theology and Christian Ethics. Pilgrim Press, 1974, p. 145.

10：DZ 3005，梵二「启示」宪章，第六节。

11：E.Hamel. “La Theologie Morale Entre L' Ecriture Et La Raison", Gregorianum, 56/2, 1975, P. 319.

(三) 如何从圣经中吸取适用于今天的伦理教训？

圣经是写定的文字，不能再改的，它受到当时的历史、文化、风俗等所影响。要知道圣经原文究竟在说什么，我们要依靠诠释学(EXEGESIS)。可是，这还不足够，我们还要问：圣经原文对今天的我们说什么？这就是释经学(HERMENEUTICS)要处理的问题。释经学是个大学问，本文无意详述它。这里只简略说明它的方法，然后看看如何利用它去吸取适用于今日的圣经伦理。

(1) 释经学的对象是圣经的一段文字(A TEXT)或圣经中某事件(EVENT)。释经学的第一个层次是分析性的，即把该段文字或该事件放到当时的上下文(CONTEXT)里，看看它所包含的真理受到了环境的什么限制。这里要借助不同的学问，如历史学及社会学，以明白当时的政治社会背景。例如：圣保禄要人「服从上级有权柄的人，因为没有权柄不是来自天主的……谁反抗权柄，就是反抗天主的规定」(罗十三：1－2)。可是，默示录却认为圣徒要和来自魔鬼的政治势力搏斗：「谁若该被俘虏，就去受俘虏；谁若该受刀杀，就去受刀杀：圣徒们的坚忍和忠信即在于此」(默十三：10)。上面两段圣经表面的伦理教训是相反的。过去欧洲专制君主往往根据前者而说：「君权神授」，要人民乖乖的做个顺民，否则是相反天主；但亦有人用默示录的话，指出压迫人的政府是魔鬼的工具，必须要和它斗争到底。光看圣经字面实在使人对服从政府与否无所适从。可是，只要我们借重历史学、社会学，便会知道罗马书及默示录都受时代环境所影响。保禄要基督徒服从政府，因那时的罗马政府还未压迫教会，甚至有时出面维持秩序而帮助基督徒。阿哈雅总督加里雍根本不想理犹太人对保禄的攻击：「问题既是关于道理、名目和你们自己的法律的事，你们自己管罢，我不愿作这些事的判官」(宗十八：15)。保禄在耶路撒冷圣殿被犹太人拿住，以为他带外邦人入圣殿，最后要由千夫长带兵把他救出来(宗廿一： 32－36)。后来犹太人又阴谋杀保禄，千夫长动用二百士兵，七十骑兵，二百长枪手把保禄解送到凯撒勒雅去(宗廿三：23－24)。到了默示录的时代，多数学者认为是公元95年，多米仙(DOMITIAN)迫害教会时，作者认定罗马王是魔鬼迫害基督徒的助手，故罗马王的权柄来自魔鬼，非来自天主，基督徒要努力抵抗。

语言学亦能对圣经原文的了解提供宝贵的意见。例如有关离婚的名句：「我却给你们说，除了姘居外(PORNEIA)，凡休自己的妻子的，便是叫她受奸污；并且谁若娶被休的妇人，就是犯奸淫」(玛五：32)。学者对PORNEIA一字，就有不同的看法。有人说是不贞(UNCHASTITY)，有人说是非法同居(CONCUBINAGE)，有人认为是一种近亲的婚配，即乱伦婚配，保禄就曾用此字骂格林多人乱伦的事：「我确实听说在你们中间有淫乱(PORNEIA) 的事，且是这样的淫乱，连在外教人中也没有过，以至有人竟同自己父亲的妻子姘居」(格前五：1)。倘若指的是通奸(ADULTERY)，希腊文应用MOICHEIA。故此，PORNEIA很可能是指非法同居或不合法的近亲婚配，自可把这种不正当的关系中断。当然，另有学者认为玛窦想缓和耶稣严厉的语气，故加上这个例外，其他福音所载才是耶稣的原意。无论如何，学者在圣经文字上的研究，实有助于对作者原意的了解。

对圣经文学类型的注意，亦是不可或缺的事。福音的体裁和书信的体裁不一样，甚至同一福音内也能有不同的体裁。如果以同一的态度去研究阅谊，便会产生误解了。

(2) 第二个层次是综合性的：只停留在分析层次上，最多只得到圣经文字在上下文中的意义，还未涉及圣经的中心讯息。故此，从圣经文字的意思，我们还要追溯耶稣的原意或整个启示的讯息。耶稣的来临主要并非为教伦理，只把祂看成一个道学家便犯了基本上的错误。祂来是为承行天父的旨意及宣扬天主的国。忘记这些，则耶稣和其他古代伦理学家没有很大的分别。法利塞人和经师以为承行天主意旨就是违守法律，耶稣要求门徒超越此：「我告诉你们，除非你们的义德超过经师和法利塞人的义德，你们决进不了天国」(玛五：20－21)。耶稣接受法律，亦宣告法律的不足，把它提到圆满的境界。祂以自己的权威，揭露天主的圣意：「我却对你们说……」。祂要人宽恕、爱仇．不报复，心里要洁净，要忠信等等。因为天国的来临，门徒必须行动，不能抱一观望的态度，必须接受或不接受天主爱的邀请。天国不但要求人行动，亦赋予人完成行动的力量。所以，圣经告诉我们，基督徒的伦理，是一个接触到天主恩宠的人的伦理；因为救恩已来临到他的身上，他才有力量去宽恕，爱仇，去过贞洁忠信的生活。圣经主要不在乎提供新的伦理规律，而在乎给予一个被救赎的新人的形象与远景。

(3) 这是一个圣经作者的世界和我们的世界融和的层面：经过分析与综合这两个阶段，把握到作者的原意与圣经的中心讯息后，我们可回到圣经的个别伦理教导。这些伦理行为，是信徒在信仰的光照下所作的决定，是他对天主爱的邀请在特定的历史环境中所作的回应。让我们以初期教会部份基督徒的行为作例子：「他们专心听取宗徒的训诲，时常团聚、擘饼、祈祷。……凡信了的人，常齐集一处，一切所有皆归公用。他们把产业和财物变卖，按照每人的需要分配」(宗二：42－45)。「众信徒都是一心一意，凡各人所有的，没有人说是自己的，都归公用。……在他们中，没有一个贫乏的人，因为凡有田地和房屋的，卖了以后，都把卖得的价钱带来，放在宗徒们脚前，照每人所需要的分配」(宗四：32－35)。

把财物拿出来公用自然是一个伦理行为。面对着这个圣经中具体的伦理教训，今日的我们应如何回应？经过分析与综合的步骤，我们会发觉作者的原意，并非要建立一个普遍、绝对的模范，要后世所有基督徒去遵循。事实上，教会亦无要求当时的基督徒一律追随。阿纳尼雅夫妇起贪念，要骗伯多禄，只拿出卖田地一部份的价钱，而想分享他人的财物。伯多禄明明的说了：「为什么撒旦充满了你的心，使你欺骗圣神，扣留了田地的价钱呢？田地留下不卖，不是还是你的吗？」(宗五：3－4)。这裹暗示了出卖田地，财物归公，并非一个基督徒必须做的伦理行为。作者的意思是想指出圣神的特殊力量，因圣神的缘故，他们能「一心一德」，即心神彼此合一；因为心神彼此合一，他们才进一步愿意彼此分享所有，作为心神合一的表示。这事件亦指出圣神的能力，圣神充满每人的心，才促使他们有此相称的爱德行为。

我们看这段圣经时，必须先得作者要表达的福音讯息，然后才看那在信仰光照下所作的伦理决定，能否是我们今天表达此信仰和爱最有效的办法。时至今日，仍有人因为圣神的力量，以财物公用来回应天主的召叫，可见圣经上具体的伦理例子并非没有用。但是，勉强别人实行财物公用，却未能把握福音讯息而成为一心一德，便是本末倒置。


(四) 圣经伦理的类型

圣经的伦理指示很多，但它们不属同一类型。圣经学者往往分为三种(注十二)。应用圣经伦理时，该知道那是属于何种类型的：

(1) 末世性的伦理 (Eschatological Type of Morality)：

因着基督的降来，天主的国已经来临了。基督徒在圣神的感召下，接受了末世性的讯息，起了彻底的转变，以新生活去回应。奉献的独身生活是最明显的例子。宗徒回应基督的召叫，舍弃自己的家庭或舍弃组织家庭的愿望，为建立天国而献身。这正是耶稣所说：「有些阉人，却是为了天国，而自阉的」(玛十九：12)，「人为了天主的国舍弃了房屋、或妻子、或兄弟、或父母、或子女，没有不在今世获得多倍，而在来世获得永生的」(路十八：29)。路加比玛窦或马尔谷多了句「舍弃妻子」，成为我们所谓福音劝喻，建议人过一个独身生活。当然，独身生活并非进入天国的条件，而是为那些有特别恩宠的人，为配合新天地的来临，而选择了这种生活方式，因为独身生活最能配合末世天国的本质，那里的人，「不娶也不嫁」(玛廿二：30)。圣保禄清楚的向人推荐独身生活，但他知道那并非基督普遍的要求：「论到童身的人，我没有主的命令，只就我蒙主的仁慈，作为 一个忠信的人，说出我的意见」(格前七：25)。他所推荐的生活方式，是带有末世性的色彩：「时限是短促的……因为这世界的局面正在逝去」(格前七：29－30)。所谓「时限」(KAIROS)是指基督再临前的时期。独身生活正是末世来临最好的准备。从前耶肋米亚先知过守贞生活以表示旧约的末日，与及天主和选民的盟约要终结；现在基督徒的独身生活，是告诉人新约新天地的来临。独身生活给予人一份内在的自由，使人能更「悦乐主」和「专心事主」(格前七：32、35)。

(2) 超越性的伦理 (Transcendental type of morality)：

作为一个基督徒，他的伦理生活和信仰生活不可能是两件毫不相干的事。这就是圣保禄所谓：「如果你们真听过他，按照在耶稣内的真理，在他内受过教，就该脱去你们照从前生活的旧人，就是因顺从享乐的欲念而败坏的旧人，应在心思念虑上改换一新，穿上新人，就是按照天主的肖像所造，具有真实的正义和圣善的新人」(弗四：21－24)。基督徒的信德就是生活的解释，其道德生活就是对基督召叫的回应。基督徒的爱德把人提升，使人产生彻底的变化，给予人实行的力量与动机：「我给你们一条新命令：你们该彼此相爱；如同我爱了你们」(若十三：34)。这里所讲基督徒的信德与爱德，并非指某一特殊的道德规律或行为，它们贯通所有道德行为中，便道德行为深切化，彻底化，并成为个别道德行为的原动力。每一个好行为都具体地把这超越性的信德和爱德表现出来，并重新肯定对基督的回应与抉择。

(3) 实际性的伦理 (Categorical type of morality)：

圣经的伦理很多都属这一类。初期教会因人数越来越多，开始有组织及结构，同时亦需要一些伦理规律去解决疑难，指导信众。这些规律慢慢进入基督徒日常生活里，例如：信友争讼应在教会内求解决(格前六：1－6)，解除信主前的婚姻之保禄特权(格前七：12－15)，对妇女在会堂内的规定(格前十一：2－16)，信友应捐助教会(格前十四：34－35)等。有些规律一直沿用到今天。

总括来说，末世性的圣经伦理，是有天主特别的宠召，并在圣神的恩宠下才可实行的，故我们不能普遍地要求人过真实的贫穷及守贞的生活。超越性的圣经伦理是每位基督徒都要具有的；没有基督徒的信德与爱德，伦理并不能称为「基督徒的」伦理了。至于实际性的圣经伦理，是当时的基督徒，在他们的历史文化背景下，对基督的召叫作具体的回应，以表现自己的信德和爱德。这些实际的伦理行为，我们当然可以借镜，但同时不忘记其有限性。作者的讯息是我们要把握的，而非表面的文字。可见圣经伦理并不能一成不变的套用到今天。

(五) 结语

我们肯定圣经对伦理生活的重要，但应用圣经伦理时，该知道它究竟属于那一类。有人能因为不能做到耶稣对富少年的要求(玛十九：16－26)而耿耿于怀，害怕自己与天国无缘。这就是不了解这个末世性的圣经伦理，是需要有天主特别恩赐才能完成的。不要以为圣经伦理本身已包含了所有今天具体问题的答案，更不能随便翻开圣经某一页，便认为那是天主今日对我的要求。其实，「圣经伦理并不等于基督徒伦理」(注十三)，最少不是所有实际性的圣经伦理，都是今天的基督徒所必须跟随的。我们实需要花点工夫，找出作者藉这些圣经伦理所要表达的意思，再与圣经的中心讯息印证。在启示的光照及教会训导的指示下，我们用理智去决定那些是此时此地，作为回应基督召叫的伦理行为。

实际性的圣经伦理是多元化的，甚至来自非基督徒的泉源，但超越性的圣经伦理却把看似杂乱的多元化伦理连结起来。信德与爱德使人成为基督徒，亦使人的伦理成为基督徒的伦理。基督徒不论是研究伦理神学或实行伦理生活，都不能缺少这个核心。圣经记载着天主如何向人作爱的邀请，而人如何向天主作或不作信德与爱德的回应。在这个救恩史内，伦理才会有根基；在这个上下文中，我们才能说：圣经是伦理神学的灵魂。

作者：黄建国

(甲) 导言

保禄，原名扫禄，是个迫害初期基督徒的人。他认为耶稣只不过是一个被处死了的囚犯，而祂的跟随者却坚持祂从死者中复活，并仍然在他们中生活着。他正往大马士革途中，被一道强光打落马下；当耶稣给他说了以下的话「扫禄，扫禄，你为什么迫害我？」后(宗九：4)，扫禄便皈依成为保禄。他发觉当他迫害基督徒时，就是迫害基督。保禄永远不会忘记大马士革道上的体验和耶稣的那番话，而且他身为基督徒和虔诚使徒的整个生活，可以总括为对这些话的真谛的了解不断地加深。他从神学观点的人类学去发挥他的教会观；因而他惯常(有一百六十四次之多)以一句简单的短语来称述一种新的存在。并不是基督耶稣在基督徒身上发出影响力，而是基督徒进入一种与耶稣合一的本体关系，藉着一种改变把他转化为『一个人，一个身体』(弗三：15－16) 成为基督的身体。保禄写道：

「其实你们众人都藉着对基督耶稣的信仰，成了天主的子女，因为你们凡是领了洗归于基督的，就是穿上了基督：不再分犹太人或希腊人，奴隶或自由人，男人或女人，因为你们众人在基督耶稣内已成了一个。如果你们属于基督，那么，你们就是亚巴郎的后裔，就是按照恩许作承继的人。」(迦三：26－29)

他用如此轻松自然的笔调描述这种在基督内新生命各种不同的层次和阶段。他断言这新生命是极富生气的，需要不断成长，并分个人和团体的层面。严格来说，他没有分明建设起个别基督徒或基督徒的整个团体 教会，因为他视这些为同一现实的两个观点：复活基督的生命，生活在个别基督徒内，也在基督奥体 教会的联合肢体内。他也坚信在基督的身体外是没有真正的圣德或天主的生命的。当个别基督徒，藉着服务他人，在圣德上长进时，整个教会也在圣德上同时长进。

(乙) 「教会」：字义及溯源

保禄书信给我们提供很多有关他对教会的信念及观感的资料。在他的书信中，「教会」(  )一词的出现有达六十次之多。首先让我们研究一下他怎样运用这词。

「教会」 CHURCH的原义渊源于希腊字，此字意指「被拣选者」或「被召唤者」。一般而论，教会是天主由永恒拣选或召唤的全人类所构成的爱和生命的团体。

保禄用「教会」(  )这词时，无论单数或复数，他是描述一个地方的信徒团体。所以他给耕格肋的教会讲话(罗十六：1)；给劳狄刻雅人的教会讲话(哥四：16)；给得撒洛尼人的教会讲话(得前一：1；得后一：1)。他又讲及外邦人的众教会(罗十六：4)；论及迦拉达的众教会(格前十六：1；迦一：2)；提及马其顿的各教会(格后八：1)。他称那些为耶路撒冷贫穷的基督徒带来捐献的人为各教会的使者(格后八：25)；他鼓励格林多人在众教会前证实他们爱情的果实(格后八：24)。他说他把众教会的挂虑放在心上(格后十一：28)。

我们知道，教会初兴时基督徒的团聚不多；直到第三世纪初叶才有教堂的建筑出现。在那些初兴的岁月中，基督徒的聚会是在任何能容纳他们的房舍里举行的。所以，保禄见到「教会」(  )一词，便运用在任何地方一特殊的教会团体身上。因此，他讲及在阿桂拉和普黎斯加家中的教会(罗十六：5；格前十六：19)；他论及与宁法家有关连的劳狄刻雅教会(哥四：15)；提及那在阿尔希颇家中的教会(费2)。

保禄把「教会」(  )这词视作各地方基督徒团聚为举行礼仪或训导的写照。对这词如此的用法和「聚会」很相近。他谈及格林多基督徒聚会时所发生的不如意事件(格前二：18)；他断言先知建立教会(格前十四：4, 5, 12)，评击那些太过看重语言之恩的人，因为在聚会中他宁可以自己的理智说五句训诲人的话，而不愿说一万句语无伦次的话(格前十四：19)。他述及整个教会聚集在一起(格前十四：23)。他又说妇女在集会中应当缄默，因为在集会中发言为女人是很适宜的(格前十四：34, 35)。他又讲及自己在每个教会中所训示的事(格前四：17；十七：17)。在上述的一切光景中，「教会」这词代表耶稣基督的崇拜者，因祂的名而聚集在一起。

最后，保禄用「教会」(  )一词来描绘教会的整体，在每一地方，每一国家中，整个信奉耶稣基督的团体。他替自己辩护时断言：就热忱说，我是一个曾迫害过教会的人(斐三：6)。他讲论藉着教会而得知的天主的各样智慧，能在教会内天主获享光荣(弗三：10, 21)。他说教会服属于基督及基督爱上了教会(弗五：24, 25)。他断称教会为基督的身体(哥一：24)。保禄用「教会」(  ) 这词来概括一总专心致志为基督生活的人。

而且保禄屡屡清楚表示他不把教会当作只是人的组织或机构。教会和众教会就是天主的教会和众教会。他两次承认自己曾迫害过天主的教会(格前十五：9；迦一：13)。他设法使那些犯了不轨行为的格林多人明瞭他们的做法等于轻视天主的教会(格前十一：22)。当他谴责那些格林多教会争吵的成员时，他说天主的众教会并无这样的风俗(格前十一：16)。他论及在犹太天主的众教会(得前二：14)；他因着得撒洛尼人的良好品行及卓越的信德而感到自豪(得后一：4)。虽然教会由人组成的，但仍不愧为天主的教会。同样他谈及在犹太和在基督内的教会时，也说它们是天主的各教会(得前二：14；迦一：22)。教会是在基督内的，也是属于天主的。

在给格林多人的两封书信中，我们可以看出保禄思想的进展和演变。这两封信是写给在格林多天主的教会的(格前一：2；格后一：1)；基督徒的团体已不再是格林多的教会，正确地说，该是在格林多的天主的教会。在此处我们可见到一个重要观念的开始，就是教会并不是一群乌合之众，或孤立个体的聚合；无论基督徒在何处聚会，天主的教会就在那里。现在已不再称格林多的教会，或迦拉达的教会，或罗马的教会；所有的都是天主的教会。

有两个因素影响保禄的思路朝这方向走。(甲) 在格林多他要应付一连串分裂的问题；又要排解地方聚会分党分派的问题；因为有些声言是属保禄的，另一些人说自己是阿颇罗的人，有些人却公认是刻法的门下(格前一：12)。保禄深信教会是合一的；教会并不是由不同的各教会，派别或党系合成的；依最后分析，教会也并非由不同的会众组成的；无论它在那里，它都常是「天主的教会」。(乙) 可能保禄对罗马帝国1的体验日益成长，使他的思想取道于这方向。在全世界上当时都有罗马的殖民地。罗马殖民地与英属殖民地不同。它不是一种殖民于一不知及未经开拓的地方；也不是先锋部队进入一不认识的地方。罗马有习俗盛行世界各地。罗马有几处军事基地以操纵道路的交界处，而从这些据点控制整个地区。在这些基地罗马惯常任用一小撮市民；通常这些市民乃为退伍军人并已赐予公民权2。这些殖民地就是军事基地的枢纽，并将罗马帝国连贯起来。而殖民地的特色就是，无论位于何地，都要说罗马方言，穿罗马服装；地方官员都须用罗马官名；推行罗马习俗，施行罗马法律。这些殖民地犹如在世界各地的小罗马一样，然而它们却以此为荣。无论它们在什么地方，直至天涯地角，罗马以外的皆被视为蛮夷。所以，保禄见到的教会，无论它在那里，都是天主的教会。教会是一个包容一总国家的整体，无论它的地方性怎样把它局限，它仍是天主的教会。教会合一的思想在保禄心中扎根，逐渐演变及茂盛地成长起来。

还有，「教会」(  )这词并非基督教会的创新。当基督教会为自己特有的目的使用这词时，这词已含有它的历史背景，而且是双重的历史。我们该探讨其双重背景，为能认清这词所附带的联想，及它对听到这词的人所引起的回忆。

首先，这词有一个犹太文化的背景。在「七十贤士译本」，即希伯来圣经的希腊文译本中，「教会」(  )一词是表示聚集的以色列民，即聚集在一起的天主子民。例如，在天主颁布十诫给梅瑟时集合在一起的百姓。申命纪有这样的记载：「……以上所写的，是上主在集会(  )之日，在山上由火中对你们所说的一切话。」(申九：10；十八：16)屡次这词用以表达以色列的「集合」或「聚会」(申卅一：30；民廿：2；撒上十七：47；列上八：14；咏廿二：22)。因此，为一个犹太人这词常有天主召集的子民的意思。在运用这词时就暗示教会是天主的子民。以色列是天主的选民；可是当天主子来到的时候以民却没有承认祂，更没有接纳祂，因此以色列丧失了她的地位及其成为一个国家的特权。真正的以色列，新的以色列，真实的天主子民，真诚的  ，已不再是以色列国家，而是教会。( 这词指示出教会才是天主的工具及代理。

其次，这词又有一个希腊文化的背景。在希腊大民主政体中，统治的机构称为 ，而是由每一个拥有或未经失落公民权的市民组成。其实，在那寡头执政的时代，可能只限用于那些于财产上有资格的人；但在大民主时代，包括一总自由的人或市民。只有，有权选举和罢免地方官员，接纳和遣派使节，并在执行正义及立定法律上有权作最后决断。所以，为一个希腊人讲出了公民权的光荣；而且当基督徒运用这词时，若的成员是一个希腊人时，他会轻易地自然地把自己当作天国的市民。



1. 罗马人的殖民政策参阅「韩承良编著的：新约时代历史背景，香港，一九七九，第五至九四页。」

2. 同上。

(丙) 保禄惯用的术语

现在我们可以描绘出有关教会的基本事实之一，这是一个简而清的事实，但多次却被人遗忘。在新约中我们找不到「教会」这词有建筑物的意思。在新约里「教会」从来不是指由石头和石灰，或砖头和水泥接合而成的建筑物。新约里「教会」常是一群举行礼仪的百姓，他们将自己的心神和生命献给了耶稣基督。就是为了这个缘故，我们才从保禄用来描述教会成员的字句中，找到有关教会真正的特征及使命。以下就是他在书信中惯用的术语。

甲、在基督内3

每位作家或讲者惯常都有些口头惮或术语。他用这些术语时无需思索，而且几乎全不意识到这习惯。保禄的口头惮之一就是「在基督内」。这术语在他的书信中共出现了一百六十五次。

这术语并非保禄神学的骨髓，而是他整套宗教信仰的撮要。「在基督内」这术语对保禄来说，常是基督信仰的摘要讲法。在保禄书信中，只有得撤洛尼人后书中没有引用过这术语。无人会否认，在经年累月中保禄对这术语的意义渐渐加深；其实，这术语及其意义在保禄的心目中，并不是后期突然而来的发现。这术语对他的信仰生活，自始至终都是他信仰体的中心和灵魂。

而且我们要注意，保禄从来没有把这术语描作他自身独有的信仰体验。「在基督内」的体验并非因他在受惠时所享有的东西，也不是因为他在热心虔敬上的提升到一般人所不能企望高攀之境所享有的东西。定是每一个基督徒所知悉所体验的东西。保禄不只会说这「在基督内」的术语是一般基督信仰的实质，而且他也会宣称它是每一个基督徒的信仰核心。

我们也须注意，保禄从未用过「在耶稣内」这术语。他述及生活「在基督内」，「在基督耶稣内」，「在耶稣基督内」，「在主内」，但从没有说「在耶稣」。其意义是说，这术语与复活的基督有着特殊的关系。它并非描述或表达一种时空或物质上的关系，因为这些只基于时空及物性的接触，这样的关系可以找到，也可以失落，如同「在」与「不在」的交替一样。它指的是精神的或属灵的关系，这关系并不依靠时空，是一种与常在及处处都在的复活的主及永生的基督的关系。

现在让我们来看看保禄书信中「在基督内」这术语的真谛。

保禄把教会的整体及每一个别教会视作在基督内的教会。在得撒洛尼的教会是在天主内及在主耶稣基督内的(得前一：1)。犹太境内的各教会是属于在基督内的(迦一：22)。每一个别教会可能形式不一又分散于世界各地，但它们全是在基督内的。教会的生活就是在基督内的生活。

不但各教会是在基督内，连众教会的个别成员也在基督内。斐理伯人被称为斐理伯的众位在基督耶稣内的圣徒(斐一：1)。问候是给在基督耶稣内的每位圣徒的(斐四：21)。在斐理伯的教会成员乃在主内的兄弟(斐一：14)。哥罗森人书是写给在哥罗森的圣徒和在基督内忠信的弟兄的。当厄帕洛狄在罗马病倒后被遣回斐理伯时，他「在主内」被接待(斐二：29)。那些教会中的执权者乃在基督内治理他人(得前五：12)。

一总基督徒在基督内的事实，确是教会内成员的合一根源。所有基督徒藉着对基督耶稣的信德成为天主的子女(迦三：26)，而且因此割损与不割损并不重要(迦五：6)。在基督内没有犹太人或希腊人，男人或女人，自由人或奴隶的区别(迦三：28)。所有基督徒在基督内是一个身体(罗十二：5)。天主的计划就是要把这分离了的宇宙统一起来；而这统一只有在基督内才能实现(厄一：10)。这事在最实际的方式下应行得通。在斐理伯两个发生口角的妇人被催迫在基督内重归旧好(斐四：2)。因为每一教会都是在基督内，所以在真正的各教会中间不能存有分裂。因为每一个基督徒是在基督内，所以在那些真正基督徒之间不能存有任何障碍。他们可以属于不同的国家，肤色，身份，地位，才干，阶级和出生；他们可属于教会内不同的肢体，他们可有不同的语言，政治，方法，仪式，礼仪，行政；若他们都在基督内，这一切分别全没有相干。若人们体味到基督信仰不表示属于一个教会，而是属于一个在基督内的教会，那末教会中的分裂明天便可解除。

乙、圣徒4

在保禄书信中教会的成员称为「圣徒」的共有几乎四十次之多。这字的希腊文是 ，中文的「圣徒」是相当呆板的栩译，但找不到更好的翻译。因为今日一般人认为「圣徒」乃上了祭台被教会立了圣品的人。但基本的意义是与一般常物不同，是将它从常物或一般用途中取出来。所以殿宇是「圣的」，因为它与一般其他建筑物不同；一位司祭是圣的，因为他是被「选出」来的，所以他是有异于其他的人；一个用作祭物的牲畜是神圣的，因为牠被挑出来专为祭祀之用，而与其他牲畜不同；安息日是神圣的，因为它有异于其他的日子；而且天主是至神圣的，因为祂与一总人不同。所以说教会成员是或圣徒，是等于说他与其他的人不同。

讲完了的真正意义，我们还要加多一句。这种不同之处的表达，并不是藉着把自己抽离世界而生活，而是藉着在世界中以不同方式生活。保禄屡屡称那些住在某地区的信徒为。例如，他写书信给所有在罗马的「圣徒」(罗一： 7)；他又论及在耶路撒冷贫苦的圣徒(罗十五：26)；他寄信给阿哈雅的众圣徒(格后一：1)。无论这与众不同之点是什么，这不同点是在日常生活中可找到的，它并非如隐修士修女一样离开俗世而生活。

但究竟这种与众不同点主要是在于什么？不只一次保禄在字上加了一短语。他写信给在斐理伯的众位「在基督耶稣内」的圣徒(斐一：1)，在同一封信中他的结语问候是：「你们要在基督耶稣内问候各位圣徒」(斐四：21)。他又曾写信给在哥罗森的圣徒及在基督内忠信的弟兄(哥一：2)。所以，一个圣徒就是一个在耶稣基督内的人。这字所表示的分别就是：可称为的人常生活在耶稣基督面前，恒常在这临在中醒觉，为能聆听基督的训诲，并随时予以实践。他虽生活在烦嚣的俗务中，但他整个生命都是依照基督的标准，而不是跟随世界的标准。「圣徒」这字的实在意义是「基督的献身子民」。教会的成员就是那些把自己的生命献给基督的人。

丙、弟兄们

在保禄书信中，「弟兄们」这名称用于基督徒身上。给在罗马的基督徒书信中，他用他们的名子致候某些人，然后他附加一句「请问候和他们在一起的弟兄们」(罗十六：14)。谁立恶表就等于得罪了弟兄们(格前八：12)。「所有的弟兄都问候你们」，这是他给格林多人的祝候(格前十六：20)。他又谈及从马其顿来的弟兄们(格后十一：9)。致厄弗所人书信的结尾是这样的：「愿平安赐与众弟兄」(弗六：23)。他对哥罗森人说：「请问候劳狄刻雅的弟兄」(哥四：15)。他给得撒洛尼人书信中有这样的一句：「你们要以圣吻问候所有的弟兄」(得前五：26)。总言之，在保禄书信中「弟兄们」是他对收信人惯用及爱用的称呼。

此处显示了一项真理：教会是由一群弟兄组成的。意思就是：教会是一个天主的大家庭，家中成员皆彼此以手足之情相处。当一个教会在心神方面分裂时，当苦味辛酸侵入彼此的情谊中，当不宽恕的精神造成无可救药的裂痕时，教会已不再是教会，因为除非教会是手足情谊的团体时，已不配称为教会。

丁、信徒

基督徒是「信徒」，即那些有信仰的人。天主是那些有信仰者的父亲(罗四：11)。得撒洛尼人在信德和爱德上可作一总信徒的模范(得前一：7)。换句话说，教会成员就是那些接受耶稣基督所说为真的人，而且他们的生活也符合并支持他们所相信的。基督徒就是深信耶稣基督是救主，并使耶稣基督成为他们生命的主。

所以，对世界来说，教会的一员是不寻常的人，因为他生活于基督面前，并依基督的准绳生活。对他的邻人来说，教会成员是活于手足情谊之中。对耶稣基督来说，教会成员是那接纳基督对他生命所作的施予及要求的人。



3.Cerfaux, Luicen. The Church in the Theology of St. Paul. Herder & Herder, New York, 1959, pp. 207-228.

4.ibid, "Believers" pp. 161-175.　

示编委会「越」 基督信仰新观，香港，1978，第二章第三节「论神圣」。

(丁) 象征教会的图像

现在我们该把注意转移到保禄书信中某些有关教会的着名图像的言论。从其中我们可学到更多有关保禄教会观的思想。但同时我们当小心谨记这些只是图像和喻像而矣；而且我们不该把自己的私意加入其中而太过依赖它们。当我们研究这些图像和喻像时，困难常在于认出或确定几时喻像就是喻像，几时它却是实在上的事实。

甲、教会是一个身体5

我们先以这些图像中最伟大的一个开始，就是教会乃有生命的身体。保禄用「教会作为一个身体」的图像是为强调教会主要的合一。他向罗马的基督徒这样写道：「就如我们在一个身体上有许多肢体，各有．不同的作用或功能；同样，我们众人在基督内，也都是一个身体；彼此之间，每个都是肢体。」(罗十二：4, 5)所以每人当善用天主所给与的恩赐，预言之恩，服务之恩，教导之恩，劝勉之恩，慷慨之恩，监督之恩，慈善之恩(罗十二：7, 8)。现在我们要清楚明白保禄图像是从什么环境产生出来的。保禄只是坚持：人不可把自己估计得太高而过了份；但应按照天主所赋与各人的恩宠为团体共同服务(罗十二：3)。所以教会如一个身体般是一个整体。人不当因天主所赐的恩典而自豪，也不当以为他所受的恩赐最为重要，而夸大举扬它以致忽视他人所受的恩赐。所有恩赐当以谦虚的精神和服务的态度去运用，常要记得我们不应彼此竞赛，但要像一个身体上的肢体一般，一起和谐地相处合作，相依为命。

在格林多人前书第十二章中，保禄详细而生动地把上述图像加以描述。教会如身体一般由许多肢体合成。各肢体都有自己的功用。脚不能没有耳，耳也不能不靠眼。若身体完全只由一种肢体构成，则它会失去其功能。就算隐藏的肢体；甚或那些不好意思提及的肢体，也有它们特殊而不可取代的功能。若一个肢体受苦，它并非独自受苦，因为它的痛苦影响全身，而且必定是由整个身体去分担(格前十二：12－27)。

再者，让我们牢记这图像由来之环境。格林多的教会当时正面临双重分裂的危机。它分裂成党成派，他们将自己依附不同的领导人；这些领袖虽然不需要负起分裂之责任，但他们的名字却被利用作为党派的名字(格前一：12)。而且格林多人前书第十四章也指出，在教会中盛行一种有关神恩的竞争。那些有语言之恩的却以此自傲；甚至那些先知也互相竞争着找机会把自己的讯息宣示。事实上，在格前第十二章中，保禄将各类神恩一一列举出来。从圣神而来的，有智慧的言语，也有知识的言语；有信心之恩，治病的奇恩，也有行奇迹的恩赐；有说先知话的，也有辨别神恩的；有说各种语言的，也有能解释语言的恩赐(格前十二：7－9)。在教会成员的功能中，有些是宗徒、先知、教师，及那些有奇迹、治病、帮助、治理之恩，及说各语言的人(格前十二：28, 29)。困扰格林多的问题就是不把神恩用在合作上而是用在彼此竞争方面。甚至在「主的晚餐」中，格林多的教会也分党分派(格前十一：18)；其效果就是整个圣事的实效被破坏了，因为他们聚在一起，不领悟他们是主的身体，也不够敏感度去醒觉到他们在基督内亲密的结合。

在运用身体的图像时，保禄的直接目的并不是讲论到教会。他只是论及一个特殊会众的生活态度及精神。格林多人在自己的聚会中，从来朱学过要如一个身体般地生活；他们生活得很散漫好像彼此敌对的独立团体；他们运用所受的恩赐来高举自己及彼此斗争；相反，他们原来该生活得如同人体上的肢体那样和谐与亲密。无可否认，这图像本身蕴藏着一个可应用于整个基督教会的观念；但是，首先给人的印象却是一个特别的教会中彼此成长的明争暗斗。

而且教会是身体之意表明它是合一的产生者。论及教会的伟大书信要算是那封写给厄弗所人的书信了。这封书信的主题可这样撮要。我们所见到的世界充盈着战乱的分裂。国与国的战争，信仰与信仰间的斗争，外那人与犹太人的相争，而且在每个人自己内的战乱。天主的计划是要众人和万物在基督内修和，并把他们合而为一(弗一：10)。耶稣基督是天主手中的工具，使一切战乱及分裂的人和事物进入一新的合一境界。藉着自己的生命和死亡，耶稣基督给人类带来了合一的方法。但这些合一的办法应遍及全世界和全人类；这就是教会的工作和使命。在教会中只有一个身体(弗四：4)：基督是人的平安；祂把外邦人和犹太人聚集在教会内；他们中间的围墙已被拆除；他们在教会内彼此修和成为一个身体。换言之，简言之，耶稣基督是天主修和的工具。教会存在的意义就是其本身当是一个完整统一的身体，而且也是人与人间合一的产生者。

但保禄不单只称教会为一个身体，而且他用了最伟大的名字称呼它 基督的身体6。这伟大称号由格前书信开始又透过与遍及厄弗所书和哥罗森人书。保禄说：「你们便是基督的身体，各自都是肢体。」(格前十二：27)。他称教会为基督的身体(弗一：23)：他又论及建树基督的身体(弗四：12 )。他称耶稣基督为这身体的头(哥一：18)，基督的身体就是教会(哥一：24)。

此处我们遇到一个保禄解释上非常真实的疑难。当保禄讲述教会是基督的身体时，对他的意思的瞭解不一。有些人相信「教会是基督的身体」这短语应以神秘的意义去领会，而且当一个人进入基督的教会时，他神秘而玄妙地进入基督的身体。有一名句把教会描作「降生奥迹的延续」，所以一如天主「降生」，在耶稣基督身上取人性，耶稣基督也以「降生奥迹」的方式存在于教会内。另一方面，有些人却认为这短语当以更实的意义去领会，即在它的功能方面去领会。耶稣基督的工程应该继续；但祂自己却不在有形的肉躯内去完成这救世工程；因为祂已回到祂的光荣中。若耶稣基督想教导一个小孩子，祂要找一个男人或女人去教他。若祂想祂的讯息到达那些从来末听过福音的人那里，祂当找一个男人或女人去带送这讯息。若祂想帮助及安慰人类，他当找到甘愿做这工作的人。换句话说，耶稣基督需要教会作为自己的身体，因为在教会中祂当找到人手去做祂的工作，人脚去奔波劳碌，人的声音去把祂的讯息宣示出来。教会应是基督藉以行动的身体。事实上，当然这两种有关「基督的身体」的观点并非互相矛盾，但一个人所强调的重点会造成很不同的结论。

现在让我们暂且搁置对不同意义所产生的问题的答案，而再回到保禄有关教会所引用的图像上。

在厄弗所书及哥罗森人书中，保禄有另一个屡次重复的观念 即基督是教会的头。天主将万有的元首给予教会(弗一：22)。教会的各成员该成长到归于那为元首的基督(弗四：15)。如同丈夫是妻子的头，所以基督也是教会的头(弗五：23)。基督是身体 教会的头(哥一：18)。祂是头，所以全身才能获得滋养而互相连结(哥二：19)。我们也许注意到耶稣基督被称为身体的救主(弗五：23)。

从上述的一切引出了一个结论。若我们用神秘的意义去领会「基督的身体」，若我们把教会视作降生奥迹的延续，那么我们已承认了耶稣基督就是教会。依保禄的看法这是不对的；因为在基督与教会之间常有一个清晰的区别。基督是身体的救主(弗五：23)。教会服属于基督(弗五：24)，身体是头藉以履行其决断及命令的工具；身体是头的代理。若没有身体，头实际上简直一无所助。我们几乎可以毫无疑惑地确定，保禄称教会为基督的身体用意就于此。教会就是基督赖以执行其目的和计划的工具、代理、武器、有机组织。透过教会基督把生命、真光和救恩带给人类。此处便是教会的光荣，因为教会是基督手中不可或缺的工具。

在保禄书信中有两段文字特别指出这点。可能有人会反对说，主张教会是基督赖以实践天主的目的和计划的工具或代理的意见，就等于说耶稣基督要依赖教会。这点可能令人震惊，但这确是保禄所说的。在写信给哥罗森人时保禄说自己在为他们受苦时而感到高兴，而且他为了基督的身体 教会，补充基督的苦难所欠缺的(哥一：24)。说基督的苦难有所欠缺是极不平凡的说法。可是保禄的意思却实在是这样。基督一次过找到了罪的补救方法；但是这补救法需要带给人，使人知道和接近 而这就是保禄的工作，教会的工作。若在基督内把天主所赠予的救恩喜讯带给人类的这份工作含有痛苦的成份，那末这些痛苦大可说是完成基督的痛苦。让我们举一个类比。一个科学家或医生可能会发现种治疗某不治之症的新方法；一个外科医生可能会发现一种新的技术应付某项不可能的手术；但治疗法和技术不但要有人去发现，而且它们也需为那些需要它们的人成为可享用可利用的；使它们成为可利用的或许要付出辛劳、牺牲和思考的代价。事实上，若人一些也不认识不知道，那末基督为人类所作的一切则不能为人所享用；人们不会知道基督的事迹除非教会告诉他们。「但是人若不信他，又怎样呼号他呢？从未听到他，又怎能信他呢？没有宣讲者，又怎能听到呢？」(罗十：14)。基督需要教会把祂赐予的救恩知识带给人类，在这项工作内所含有的痛苦弥补及完成基督的痛苦。再一次我们又逼不得已回到把教会作为基督的工具及代理的观念上。

第二段文字是记载于厄弗所书信中的。在这里有关教会保禄这样写道：「这教会就是基督的身体，就是一切内充满一切者的圆满。」(弗一：23)。这并不是易懂的说法，而且学者对其意义有不同的看法。但是，依我们看来，它的最简单及最自然的意义，据希腊文而论，是这样的。希腊文一字中文译作「圆满」。πληρωμα是名词，从动词而来(意即充满，完成)。而乃当某东西被充满时的效果。比方把一个杯子盛满时可用这字。而且屡次用作描述一船的船员，或一船中的货物。平时自然的用法是把它用作「装满的一篮」或「一盛满东西的手」。再者，在「论政治」一文中，亚里斯多德(ARISTOTLE)描述苏格拉底(SOCRATES)如何简要地概括出一个最简单的城市的组织7。苏格拉底主张，一个最简单的城市当有六种技工：织工，农夫，鞋匠，建筑者，铁匠，牧人；在这六行业中要加入一个商人及一个零售商。亚里斯多德说这些构成一个城市的「圆满」 (  )。没有他们城市不能成立；有了他们城市便有了主要的基础。因此这希腊字就是藉以某东西被充盈之完成物。因此，保禄所说的意即指教会乃基督的「补足物」或「补充物」。教会就是基督的工程赖以完成的东西。我们当分别清楚基督的任务及工程。基督的任务在十字架上一次过完成了，在那里人类的救赎已一次过得到了保障；但基督的救世工程仍待完成，这工程就是使这救赎行动及其效益也为人所认识。而且这基督的工程是要教会去完成。就是在完成这工程上教会是基督的「补充物」，「完成物」。8

我们认为当保禄把教会讲作基督的身体时，他思想主要的重点是在教会作为耶稣基督的工具和代理的功能上，透过这主要的「补足物」基督把祂已完成了的任务让世人知道。就在这里产生了基督身体的另一意义。若教会要去完成那工程，若她堪当这工程，若她应该去做基督愿她做的工作，则她当很接近基督地生活，她该如此存留于基督内，使她与基督的结合如是密切，因此她在神秘的意义上可被称为基督的身体。换言之，为在实际意义上成为基督的身体，教会也该在神秘意义上成为基督的身体。

乙、基督的净配

我们还没有讲完保禄教会观的伟大喻像。保禄书信里这些动人伟大的喻像或图像中，有一个极可爱动人的喻像，就是「基督的净配」。这幅图像在厄弗所书信中描绘得最为精彩(弗五：22－23)，因为它把夫妻间的关系比拟作基督与教会的关系。「你们作丈夫的应该爱妻子如同基督爱了教会」(弗五：25)。这观念的浮现来由表面上并不明显，但若从格后第十一章第二节的观点看去，则非常生动。在那里保禄写信给格林多基督徒解释，他呼吁的逼切需要：「因为我是以天主的妒爱爱护你们。原来我已把你们许配给一个丈夫，把你们当作贞洁的童女献给了基督。」

在犹太的婚礼中10有两位重要的人物，他们称为「新郎的朋友」。其中一位代表新郎，另一位代表新娘。他们担任中间人的角色；他们邀请人客；通常照顾一切事物的安排。但他们最重要的本分就是保证新娘的贞操及新郎的洁德。所以，保禄想及基督为新郎，及把自己当作新郎的朋友，又把格林多教会当作基督准备好了的新娘；而且保禄认为自己有本分把格林多教会如同毫无瑕疵、玉洁冰清的新娘献给基督。

这是一个很古老的观念渊源于旧约时代。先知们把以色列视作天主的新娘。「你的夫君是你的造主；他的名字是万军的上主」(依五四：5)。「你们以色列家对待我，正如对自己良友不忠的妇女 上主的断语」(耶三：20)。这就是为何旧约把神灵的不忠视作奸淫，而且当以色列不忠时，她被指责与异神行淫(出卅四：15, 16：申卅一：16；咏七十三：27：欧九：1)。当耶稣讲及「那邪恶淫乱的世代」时，祂指的就是神灵对天主的不忠(玛十二：39：十六：4：谷八：38)。而且这就是在旧约中天主这么多次被称为妒忌的神的理由(申川二：31：出廿：5：卅四：14：匝八：2)。天主是一个不能容忍劲旅的情人。

我们在此所有的，是基督与教会关系最可爱的描绘喻像。教会是基督的净配；基督与教会关系的密切如同夫妻。

丙、教会是建筑物11

基督徒乃天主家中( ) 的成员。保禄在信中对厄弗所人说，他们不再是外人，而是圣徒们的同胞，是天主的家人(弗二：19)。最令人感到注目的是：天主、教会及基督徒之间的关系是用最亲密的人际关系来表达比拟的，即丈夫妻子和子女间的关系。

有时保禄书信也把教会比作建筑物，是天主所造并为天主而造。「你们是天主的建筑物。」(格前三：9)整个建筑物结构紧凑(弗二：21)。

就是从这概念我们取得「教会如殿宇」 「建立」的观念。那先知宣讲的话把教会建立起来(格前十四：3－5)。这就是为什么基督徒当在神恩上追求超过他人，他们作这事并非为了自己的光荣，而是为了建立教会(格前十四：12)。保禄常竭尽己力把他的天主子民建立起来，而他的权威是天主(格后十二：19；十三：10；十：8)。基督徒的本分是彼此建树(得前五：11)，而且需该追求有助于彼此建立的事(罗十四：19；十五：2)。一切职务及神恩都是白白得来的，全都是为建立教会(弗四：12, 16)；而且基督徒的生活及行为该当全部为了建立教会(弗四：29)。

此处我们要面对两项真理。教会的工作常该是建设而不该是破坏。若破坏是在所难免，若旧的及习染极深的观念一定要被铲除时，常该以新的及更好的去代替。一总教会的训诲及行动，其特色常该是积极的，绝不可只在目标及对象上消极。这表示基督徒绝不该把自己视作一个个体。他是建筑物中的一块石头，一块砖。他存在的目的不在于使人注意他，而是因自己身为建筑物的一部份增强建筑物的力量。他与其他基督徒相连如同一建筑物中每块石头的连结一样密切。

另一项值得注意的事，就是有些圣经章节对这建筑物有明确的指示。教会不单是一座建筑物；她也是「天主的殿宇」。「你们不知道，你们是天主的宫殿吗？」(格前三：16, 17)「天主的殿与偶像有什么相合？」(格后六：16)「整个建筑物结构紧凑，逐渐扩大，成为一座主的圣殿」(弗二：21)。关于教会为建筑物的喻像，有助于说明有关天主子民的统一性和多元性。比如一建筑物的上部构造，要有它的基石，且筑在地基之上。教会亦如此，圣保禄说：「你们是建立在宗徒及先知的根基上，以耶稣基督本身为屋角的基石。」(厄二：20)

这观念虽简单但很伟大。一座殿宇是神在世的住所；而教会不是别的而是天主圣神在世的住所。

保禄书信中还有两个有关建筑物的寓像。首先，基督是教会的根基(格前三：11)；其次基督是教会的主要角石(弗二：20)，就是基督身上整个教会才建立起来，也是藉着基督整个教会的结构才能连结起来，统一起来。

丁、教会是一块农田12

「教会是农田」这喻像在旧约中是很着名的。以色列是天主细心种植的葡萄园，而且它也象征着一株橄榄树。这喻像在默示录中，新约里及初期基督徒的着作里继续生活下去，结出各种不同的果实。这是因为农田的讲法是传统式的，而保禄却利用它而矣。

或许保禄是想起了依撒意亚所说的葡萄园。他在格前第三章这样写道：「我栽植，阿颇罗浇灌，然而使之生长开花结实的却是天主。」(格前三：6－9)在依撒意亚先知书中(也在福音中)是天主在耕种( 三：9)，人只不过是天主的仆人，助手，因为是天主使之生长。这喻像所训示的是指一小撮被选者的兴起，即从格林多人中兴起的那些各团体。他们的教会就是天主的农田。但是，显然地他们的教会只是那块大农田中的一幅地区，全部属于家庭中的父亲的，而这块大农田就是普世教会。既然天主是所有合一的泉源，那么以前彼此间的分界已是不可能，而思想也要提升越过地方的界限去容纳基督徒社会的普世性，就算在文字意义上仍然是指社会中一特殊的部份。

在罗马人书中(罗九：17－24)我们又面临另一问题。就是存在于基督徒核心位置的问题，究竟是犹太基督徒或是外教的皈依者。这里保禄发展了橄榄树的喻像。保禄用了野生橄榄树枝移植到好的橄榄树作比喻。他把外邦人比作野生橄榄树，把犹太人此作好树。他用这种手法说明了外邦人被召的历史经过，这是默示录作者的笔调。但在他思想底处说出了天主子民合一的必要。



  5. σωκα「身体」的观念，保禄用来描述教会在格前十： 7；十二：12－27：罗十二：4－5。在他心目中这些章节所表达的，只是个别的团体。可是明显的把教会视作「神妙身体」的言论却找不到。在格前十二：12中地方教会与人体的比较上，我们注意到「基督也是如此」及在罗十二：5中「所以我们人虽众多，在基督内却是一个身体」。

6.Cerfaux, Luicen. The Church in the Theology of St. Paul. Herder & Herder, New York, 1959, pp. 262-289, "The Body of Christ".

7.Aristotle. The Politics, 4.4.

8.Delling, Gerhard. TDNT Vol. VI pp.302-311.

9.「原来我已把你许配给一个丈夫，把你们当作贞洁的童女献给了基督……」(格后十一：2－4)「新娘」的喻像用来比作团体或民族，在犹太文化中是常见的。

10.de Vaux, Roland. Ancient Israel. DLT, London, 1973, pp. 24-38.

11.这喻像集中在基础及基石的字眼上。建设理想的殿字的图像，在厄则克尔先知书第四十章及以后的章节都有详细的叙述。保禄描绘建筑物时，是把它与庄田或农田相提并论的(格前三：9)。第一眼看去，我们会说保禄是指某建筑物而言。但这建筑物有基督耶稣作为基石，而又使我们想及一座神圣的建筑物，一座殿宇。其实在格前第三章第十六节中，我们才可下此结论。格林多人的团体就是这建筑物，一如殿宇一般。虽说这图像是用来比作格林多教会，但也可普世性地引用。同一的喻像在罗马人书第十五章廿节中也有暗示(而且格后六：16；罗九：32, 33：格前十四：12, 26；格后十二：19：罗十五：2)。

12.「农田」是指耕种之地，按圣经所记载的时期，完全不像今日巴勒斯坦那样从事农耕，广泛无际的大沙漠在那里延展着，野地布满了岩石，陡峭的山坡只适于放牧。藉这一点线索，我们可以了解为何一块肥沃的土地会做教会喻像。

(戊) 天主子民13

保禄既然在犹太神学上受过训练，很可能他在被主召唤后反省过「天主子民」的思想，尤其是在他以「外邦人使徒」自居的观点上。在天主的计划中，以色列与外邦人的关系格外使他感到困惑。在致罗马人书第九章至第十一章中，他对救恩史作了一个独特的探讨。这伟大的观念不可作为起点，因为它的形成是当保禄处于他传教活动的巅峰时代，在他结束了在东罗马帝国的任务后，并目睹外邦人准备相信的心切，又在「莫非天主摈弃了自己的人民？」(罗十一：1)的悬殊观点下写成的。为了协调连犹太本都难以致信的事实，即天主对以色列的承诺及以民大多数人固执成性不信基督的事实，保禄于是很有见地的质问：「这并不是说天主的话落了空(罗九：6)；难道天主不公道吗？(罗九：14)或许天主对以色列的不忠是有责任的，难道无论发生什么天主对以色列的许诺仍会照旧应验？」事虽如此，他警告归了化的外那人不要对以色列人诸多责难，因为以色列虽然大部份为不信之徒，但以色列仍是这橄榄树的根，而外邦人却是接上这树的枝条，天主仍会忠于自己的许诺(罗十一：17－24)。这一切虽是从其一角度的观点，但可从中了解到他传教的体验。所以我们当问保禄对自己为外邦人的圣召有什么积极的评论，及从中他得到怎样的教会观？

关于这点，保禄致迦拉达人书有明确的指示。在书信中保禄郑重维护他的使徒职，即他作为外邦人宗徒的合法权及他与原来的宗徒同等的权利，及他无割损无规条的喜讯，是他无限制的世界性的训导基础。用一种寓言性的说法他把亚巴郎的两个妻子视作自由及奴隶的预像(迦四：21－31)。他将那按肉欲而生的为奴的女人哈加尔比作西乃山盟约，因此而生的却为奴隶；她好比「当时的耶京」，一如她的子女同为奴隶。自由的撒拉却是 「藉恩许」生子，她象征「天上的耶京」，她就是我们的母亲，「你们像依撒格一样，是恩许的子女。」但我们必须记着，保禄当时为了打倒陈旧的法律规条的枷锁，而这又是「当时的耶路撒冷」所依附的，但保禄当时所见所闻的以色列，事实上是如此敌对基督，磨难基督信徒(迦四：29)。这当然与罗马人书第九章至第十一章的观点不同，因为在罗马人书信中只是把「以色列」现象的正面呈示了出来。保禄就是置身于这两种极端中：一方面以色列是天主的子民，当然恩许是有效的；另一方面，犹太教对承继恩许 基督(绝对来说)却表出绝对的不信(迦三：16 )，他们恒存于奴役的法律中，不符合天主的意愿，甚或杀害属于救恩新秩序的基督信徒。可是从这种辩证中，保禄的判断和态度却是心平气和的，并没有针对当时的以色列，引出了他对天主子民的积极观念。这天主子民由以色列及外邦人的信徒所形成，并在基督内成为一全新的个体：「不再分犹太人或希腊人，自由人或为奴的，男人或女人；因为你们众人在基督内已成为一个」(迦三：28)。对保禄来说，一个天主的新百姓取代了旧的，而且虽然这新的是以旧的为依据，只因是在旧的百姓身上有着天主的恩许祝福，但这新的子民却站在新的基础上，因为他们相信继承祝福的嗣子只有一个，及救恩的中保也只有一个，就是基督耶稣。

我们刚看过，保禄把天主的新子民视作「天上的耶路撒冷」(迦四：26)，或它在世的象征(这是基督的母亲)，而且他又称之为「天主的新以色列」(迦六：16)。当然为了更清楚地解释这点，他曾作过另外的尝试；然而对祝福最好的阐释还是以下的论述：「当保禄讲及以下的规则时，大概在他心目中当时有迦拉达的基督徒；他们及整个天主的以色列，无论在什么地方，都从天主那裹得到和平与仁慈的祝福。」保禄宗徒把荣誉的旧衔头转移到那信基督的新社会里。其实这应被视为一种故意的神学步骤；因为类似的事已不只一次地发生在保禄身上：许给亚巴郎令其后裔繁多的祝福，已转移给了基督及藉祂而给一总藉信德及圣洗和祂连结在一起的人(迦三：14, 16, 29)，又在罗马人书中由亚巴郎而来的属灵的后裔，就是那些如亚巴郎一样，让自己藉信成义的人，割损者与不割损者毫无分别(罗四：11－17)。在适宜的地方，保禄还解释「割损」及「犹太人」的意义(罗二：25－29)，或否认一些以色列人的以色列人公民权，及一些亚巴郎后裔的亚巴郎子女的身份(罗九：6－8)。

为他来说，不信的以色列就是「依血统而成的以色列」(格前十：18)，而且他将那些不信的犹太人和希腊人比作反对「天主教会」的人，意即反对基督徒团体的人(格前十：32)。他在初期教会中并非单独持有这观点；连同以色列荣誉的衔头。他还强调断言自己在此教会中的特权，并把教会描作天主旧子民的合法继承人。而且，他尝试为这产业供应一神学的基础；他极力追求承认信耶稣基督的人就是天主的子民，这就等于对旧约的新解释。在这方面，他的而且确提高了初期教会对自己身为独立团体的意识，而且为把基督信徒视作「第三个种族」的观念铺路。

犹太人与希腊人在教会内的契合，在厄弗所书信中描绘得最为深奥。这是「基督的奥秘；这奥秘在以前的世代中，没有告诉过任何人，有如现在一样，藉着圣神已启示给祂的圣宗徒及先知」(弗三：4－13)。透过宣布和平与那些「很遥远」的人(外邦人)及那些「附近」的人(犹太人)的基督，这两种人以前彼此分离敌对，如今在圣神内有同等的方便接近天父(弗二：16)。只有与外邦人的结合，教会末世性的主要图像才可被引出来，而且天主的救恩计划才会达至顶点，「天主的智慧」「透过教会而为上天的率领者和掌权者所认识」，即透过她的现实和她的训诲，它们的权力已被宣布废弃(弗一：21－23；四：8－10)。以这样的远景看去，在天主的救恩计划中教会只可被视作由犹太人及外邦人组成，并由基督悬在十字架的身体所代表，又将之理成「一个新人」(弗二：15)，而为基督所救赎所圣化(弗五：23, 26)；基督的唯一身体由祂指挥及建立，基督是它的头，并使之达到基督圆满年龄的程度(弗四：11－16)

在教会中保禄保证外邦人的自由，这事实是显而易见的。主要的是由于他在「耶路撒冷会议」中，获得了外邦人进入教会而无须行割损或遵守犹太法律。他主张一总人唯一得救的途径，就是信仰耶稣基督；在致迦拉达人书信中他把这思想阐述得如此清晰强烈，而在罗马人书中神学论点的如此明朗，以致他人没有怀疑的余地：「天主的正义，如今在法律之外已显示出来；法律和先知也为此作证；就是天主的正义，因对耶稣基督的信德，毫无区别地赐给了凡信仰的人，因为所有的人都犯了罪，都失掉了天主的光荣，所以众人都因天主白白施给的恩宠，在耶稣基督内蒙救赎，成为义人。」(罗三：21－24)。所以外邦人在基督内有着兄弟般同等的权利，而且也不容许以往的犹太人对外邦的基督徒有任何忽略(参阅迦二：15－18)；另一方面，当然外邦基督徒也不要因旧以色列的失败而鄙视他们(参阅罗九至十一)，同时对这些犹太兄弟深表关怀同情，虽然他们中有些人对于饮食的事良心较为狭窄(参阅罗十四)。因此，保禄劝勉各教会努力促进基督徒的团结，大家一心一意与耶路撒冷教会及出源于她的新教会共融合一。在这一方面，他对形成教会合一及一致性的意识作出了实际而具体的神学上的主要贡献。在人性而论，为何教会恨快扩展而没有分裂的主因之一，可在保禄神学中找到；因为他使一总信众活生生地意识到天主倾注在他们身上的合一及其不容抗拒的一致性：「对主耶稣基督的一个信仰(格前八：5)，一个构成在基督内合一的洗礼(迦三：26；格前二：13；哥三：11；弗四：3－6)，共同分享一个祭饼并因此分享基督的身体，藉此这许多的人却成为一个身体(格前十：16)

从上述看来，保禄曾深省过教会的性质。他认为教会不仅是信基督者的组织或团体，而且的确是新约的天主子民，被提举了的主在世的团体。

  
13.梵二大公会议所论定的，教会为天主的子民；教会宪章以整个第二章去讨论圣经这个概念。基督建立了这项新盟约，就是用祂的血所立的新盟约，祂从犹太人及其他民族中号召祂的子民，使他们因圣神而不是以形体联合起来，成为天主的民族。


(己) 教会是一个奥秘 14

天主的计划是要我们透过祂圣子所建立的团体，去分享祂的爱、喜乐和生命。而保禄却称此计划为「世世代代所隐藏的奥秘」(哥一：26)。奥秘的希腊文是。在希腊的社会中，只有两种奥秘：一是宗教性的，一是文学上的。前者就是把神的生命在礼仪中复苏，使参与者能体验到神的感觉；后者是一种特殊知识只属于特别的，一小部份人的特权。现代的学者不相信保禄的意义来自希腊思想。依保禄之意，就是天主的慈善要我们人藉祂的圣子分享祂的生命；这是隐藏在天主内永恒的意愿，透过天主屡屡介入人类历史，人渐渐预备接受主的恩赐。当天主派圣子到世上来，祂启示了自己的意愿：这奥秘在基督身上启示出来及在我们身上应验 在世上爱的团体，充满爱的生命 天主本身。这奥秘有以下的阶段：(一) 从亘古以来隐藏在天主内；(二) 在基督身上启示出来；(三) 在我们身上应验。

(一) 隐藏在主内的奥秘

保禄把这奥秘视作上天的计划，由爱的催使而成孕，但却不为人所明认。这是上主的旨意要人活祂的生命，透过祂的子，祂自己进入世界为把人与天父结合，就是把整个团体与天父相连。在祂圣子的宝血中，天主与人订立一个新盟约，并形成一个新民族，一个爱的团体。「我们所讲的，乃是那隐的，天主的奥秘的智慧，这智慧是天主在万世之前，为使我们获得光荣所预定的；今世有权势的人中没有一个认识她，因为如果认识了，决不至于将光荣的主钉在十字架上。经上这样记载说：『天主为爱祂的人所准备的，是眼所未见，其所未闻，人心所未想到的。』」(格前二：7－9) 15

为何天主不一开始就把祂的计划 天上爱的团体形成人的爱情团体 启示给人？其实这问题早在我们以前已存在。圣依肋奈也曾问过这问题。保禄的回答可从迦拉达人书第三章廿九节中见到。

天主造我们时教我们祂的存在；在祂与以民立约及订梅瑟法律时，祂告诉我们祂自己的超越性、神圣性及唯一性，并开始使人成为一爱的团体。在基督内及在启示的光照下，天主告诉我们祂自己爱的生命及邀请人，在人的爱情团体中，去分享爱的生命。这爱情团体就是天主所钟爱的子民 教会。

(二) 隐藏在基督内的奥秘

当天主把祂的圣言发出进入世界，藉祂圣子的降生，这奥秘已摆在人的眼前。在祂圣子内，天主要聚集一个团体 教会，依祂自己的肖像，即天上爱情团体的肖像，塑造形成。祂会让人分享祂自己的生命，把他们带进祂亲密的爱中，如同祂的嗣子，祂的子民。保禄说：「……使你们合乎我所传布的福音，和所宣讲的耶稣基督，并合乎所启示的奥秘 这奥秘从永远以来，就是秘而不宣的，现今却彰显了……」(罗十六25－26)。16

(三) 在我们身上应验的奥秘

在哥罗森人书第一章廿五中，保禄告诉他们，「基督在你们内」就是这奥秘。从上下文中可知，保禄是在谈及教会，因为他这样写道：「我可在我的肉身上，……教会……我作了这教会的仆役……。」(哥一：24－27)「基督往你们内」是指教会的成员，在受洗进入基督内之后，接受祂丰富的恩宠成为天主的子女。这奥秘的最后阶段即透过基督天主与人的契合，是从基督开始与人类历史同时进行的。这是最后的时期，教会成为基督的延续及完成，如此基督继续生活、救赎、更新、创造，并把人结合在祂内；所以教会成为在世上爱的团体的中心及泉源(参阅弗三：8－11)。

(庚) 结语

所以，当我们再回顾和反省一下保禄的教会观，我们可得以下的结论。

为保禄来说，教会就是那些把自己的一生奉献了给基督的男女所组成的队伍，他们与基督的关系，有如妻子与丈夫般亲切；他们彼此的关系有如建筑物中的砖石般紧凑联系密切；他们的荣耀就是一个身体，基督的身体，透过此身体基督的救恩及主的慈爱不断在世界显示、实现，直到祂再光荣地降来。



14. Powell, John. The Mystery of the Church. Bruce, New York, 1967, pp.10-19.

15. 关于这点还有以下的章节可参阅：(哥一：25－27；弗一：5－10；三：3－5；8－10)。

16. 关于这点也可参阅(哥一：27；四：3－4；希一：1－2)。

(辛) 附录：保禄思想中「基督的身体」的演进

(一) 迦拉达人书

这书信成书时大概在公元五十四至五十五年间，并在盛怒下写成的。从这封书信中我们清楚知道，有些心怀不轨及误入歧途的犹太皈依者，向那些可怜易受欺骗的迦拉达人说，保禄虽在此处建立了教会，但他自己却不是宗徒，因为他根本没有见过基督或听过祂的宣讲。因此在这书信中，保禄说明自己是宗徒的种种理由证据，然后他便把他的道理做了一个纲要。他坚持说梅瑟法律虽来自天主，但其目的只是暂时的计划，而最后是领人到基督那里。真正的成义(圣德)只能来自信基督，藉圣洗及忠于基督的训诲。这就是在基督内合一的意义(迦三：26－28)。

这里保禄所着重的人在基督内约合一是属过继性的。藉着基督及在基督内，我们成为天主的义子及天主无穷富藏的承继人(迦四：4－7)。

(二) 格林多人前书

当保禄离开格林多时，是在公元五十至五十二年之间，那时他已在那里住了一年半左右，他新建立的格林多教会是他传教事业中至蓬勃之一。(本书信成书时大概是在公元五十七年春)。格林多教会当时继续发展成长了五年后，荆棘开始从玫瑰花中浮现出来。访客由格林多到厄弗所去找他，向他报告那迫使人灰心的分派分党的消息：有人宣称是保禄的门下，有些人却说是属亚波罗的，另一些人则称是伯多禄的人。因此，这封书信对这困扰的教会的讯息是我们在基督内的合一。还有其他的问题，包括不道德的恶表，例如一基督徒公开地与他的后母同居。而基督徒团体以漠不关心的态度接纳这事。基督徒的贞操在格林多这样的气氛下难以保存。就是在这种情境下，保禄于公元五十七年春写了这封书信。(格前六：9－11；15－20)

后来，在同一封书信中，有关参与外教人祭祀的事，保禄警告他们。而且他所持的理由就是在基督内成员的身份和合一。我们「在基督内是一个」，而且当我们在感恩祭中领受主体时，我们与祂及彼此间的契合渐渐加深(格前十：14－17)。

在第十二章第一部份，保禄解释圣神给了教会每成员所坦任的角色及应作的贡献。这里保禄明显地把教会比作一个身体，并详述这寓像的含意(格前十二：12－27)。

保禄此处所要求的是绝对拋弃个人私益及竞争的行为。他很惊奇见到当基督徒只能形成一个基督的身体时，还能在琐碎小事上争吵。

(三) 罗马人书

依年历而论，保禄接着写了罗马人书信(大约在公元五十七至五十八年冬)。表面看来，这封信是写给罗马人的，并告诉他们他访问罗马的心愿。然而他在这里趁机会发挥他十二年热心传教的核心主题及思想：在基督内的合一。对保禄来说，这是他那时有关教会的最基木课题。他最恐惧的专就是犹太人与外邦人基督徒的分裂(罗六：3－11)。

亚当所遗弃了的上天的产业及超性生命，再一次藉基督摆在人的眼前；而且基督把这新的分配恩宠的方式视作再生、重生。基督透过圣洗圣事赋与这新的生命，祂把这新生命灌输给那些与祂同死(于罪恶)的人；藉着恩宠的沟通祂把一个新的民族纳入自己内，形成了奥体。教宗比护十二世这样写道：「因为耶稣的宝血，在十字架上流注，基督平息了天主的义怒，一切天国的宠爱，特别新约中的龙爱，为人类灵魂的获救，最要紧的，还是为了教友的灵魂，流注于地上。是在十字圣架上面，耶稣才占有祂的教会，换句话说，是在十字圣架上面，祂才占有祂的奥体的各个份子，因为不是为了十字圣架的原故，圣洗圣事决不能接纳人类于奥体，合而为一。因为耶稣的圣死，已经把整个人类，完全救赎过来了。」17

后来，在罗马人书信中，保禄对他们说，对那些在基督耶稣内的再也不会有罪可定。而且也劝戒格林多人，要以基督徒的合一为正直道德生活的动机(罗八：9－10)。

不久后他又督促他们对天主的爱要有信心，因为这爱在基督徒与基督结合的过程中显示出来：「天主使一切协助那些爱他的人，就是那些按他的旨意蒙召的人，获得益处，因为他所预选的人，也预定他们与自己的儿子的肖像相同，好使祂在众多弟兄中作长子。」(罗八：28－29)

在这封冗长书信的结尾，保禄要求每一罗马教会的成员接纳自己在教会中的地位，同时又引用生活的身体作为寓像，说明基督徒在基督内的合一(罗十二3－6)。

(四) 哥罗森人书

哥罗森人书是保禄「狱中书信J中的第一封。其实在他写哥罗森人书时，大概在公元六十一至六十三年之间，那时他是在罗马并在罗马兵士的看守下，等候着自己案件的过堂。哥罗森位于厄弗所东面一百一十哩的地方。保禄并没有亲自建立哥罗森的教会。但他曾感化过一个厄伯发人(EPAPHRAS)，很可能他委任此人在其本城哥罗森去建立一个教会。当厄伯发(EPAPHRAS)发觉这新兴教会的处境难以应付时，他便去到罗马向保禄报告一切。结果就是哥罗森人书信的诞生。这年轻教会所面临的危机，是对某些犹太信念及实践的妥协倾向，因为在这些信念和实践中混杂着外教人的气息。保禄这封书信的目的是想刻划出基督超越一切受造物的绝对至高性。(哥一：15－20) (哥一：24－27)

在痛斥那些伪经师的影响时，因为他们明显地影响了哥罗森的教会，保禄有以下的言论：「这样的人妄自尊大而不与头相连接；其实由于头，全身才能赖关节和脉络获得滋养而互相连结，藉天主所的生长力而生长。」(哥二：19)

而且他断言，因为我们一总人在基督内团结一致，我们便是以祂的肖像再被塑造了：「在这点上，已没有希腊人或犹太人，受割损或未受割损的，野蛮人、叔提雅人、奴隶、自由人的分别，而只有是一切并在一切内的基督。」(哥三：11)「还要叫基督的平安，在你们心中作主；你们所以蒙召存于一个身体内，也是为此，所以你们该有感恩之心。」(哥三：15)

(五) 厄弗所书

虽然这封书信命名「致厄弗所人书」，然而说这书信实在是写给厄弗所教会的，确是可疑的(注十八)。今天这问题至普通解决是这样的：保禄发出这封类似通谕式的函件抬一总亚细亚省的教会；这公函包括一切通谕的非个人特色，但它不愧为保禄留给教会最丰富的遗产之一。在这书信中，他重复哥罗森人书的主题，基督的绝对至高性，但却使之充满着基督在教会中的至高性，祂是奥体生活的头，与基督往宇宙中的至高性迥然不同。

一切人类的历史在基督内找到其最完满的意义的说法是正确的。因为基督的人性与天主性密切结合；祂在自己身上，把一切受造物与自己的天主性相连。在这书信中保禄强调说，正如一总受造物与基督相连，那末，所有领过洗的人也亲密地在祂内及偕同祂合成一体。这结合的现实是如此深刻和密切，以致保禄用了一个生活身体的各肢体彼此的结合形成一体，来表达他的思想。在基督内我们人性合一的这端道理不是保禄这封书信的主题，但却渗透了整封书信。以下的章节是他这端道理的纲要，而厄弗所书可说是这道理最完满的表达：(弗一：10；13－14；22－23；二：14－16；三：14－21；四：3－16)。

这封书信的结尾，是保禄有关「教会为基督的身体」的思想发展的最后阶段。他把基督与教会的结合比作夫妻的结合。此处他把教会是「身体」的寓像和「新娘」的寓像放在一起，以显示彼此间最深挚的友谊及爱情。在圣洗的水中，基督沐浴、医治、并转化祂的新娘。教会是祂的新娘，焕发着祂自己的生命(弗五：23－32)



17. 赵尔谦译「论基督身体」P. 11, 香港，一九四九。

(癸) 参考书目

1. 吕大明译「天主的子民」，光启，一九七五。

2. 房志荣编著「保禄使徒的生活、书信及神学」，光启，一九七四。

3. 田永正译，汉斯龚著「教会发微」上册，光启一九七六。

4. 示编委会编译「越 基督信仰新观」示，一九七八。

5. 香港天主教青年联会「教会特辑」，一九七六。

6. 赵尔谦译「论基督身体」香港真理学会，一九四九。

7. 韩承良编著「新约时代历史背景」思高，一九七九。

8. Cerfaux, Lucien. Christ in the Theology of St. Paul. Herder & Herder, New York, 1966

9. Cerfaux, Lucien. The Church in the Theology of St. Paul. Herder & Herder, New York, 1959.

10. Fitzmyer, J. A. “Pauline Theology”, in: Jerome Biblical Commentary. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1968.

11. Harrington, W. J. Record of the Fulfilment. Geoffrey Chapman, London and Dublin, 1968.

12. Jacob, Louis. A Jewish Theology. DLT, London, 1973.

13. Kasemann, Ernst. Perspectives on Paul. Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1971.

14. McKenzie, J. L. The Power and the Wisdom. Geoffrey Chapman, London and Dublin, 1966.

15. Powell, John. The Mystery of the Church. Bruce, New York, 1969.

16. Prat, Fernand. The Theology of St. Paul. Newman, Westminster, 1956.

(十七)Schmidt, K.L. art.εμμλησια in TDNT, Vol. III, pp. 501-518.

(十八)Schnackenburg, Rudolf. The Church in The New Testament. Herder & Herder, New York, 1966.

(十九)de Vaux, Roland. Ancient Israel. DLT, London, 1973.

(二十)Taylor, M.J. A Companion to Paul. Alba House, New York, 1975.

(廿一)Zeitler, J., Wetterer, E., Verkamp, B., La Pierre, A. The Church. P. J. Kennedy & Sons. New York, 1964

作者：陈耀鸿 Chan, John  

FAITH AND PRAXIS IN THE POLITICAL THEOLOGIES OF J. B. METZ AND J. MOLTMANN



Political Theology Revisited

Faith, for J.B. Metz, is "a praxis in history and society that is to be understood as hope in solidarity in the God of Jesus as a God of the living and the dead who calls all men to be subjects in his presence".(1) That is, Metz sees Christian praxis, meaning faith, as social praxis which in turn is ethically determined, is accompanied by a making present of a collective historical memory, and is characterised by its pathic structure. This, then, is Metz's understanding of Christian faith in the light of his political theology as a "practical fundamental theology ".

Moltmann, on the other hand, has never claimed to have a "political theology" of his own. Faith for him is "the foundation upon which hope rests,…Without faith's knowledge of Christ, hope becomes a utopia…But without hope, faith falls to pieces".(2) Theology, and in particular political theology, to be responsible, is public. It stands "consciously between the Christian, eschatological message of freedom and the socio-political reality'. (3) Political theology for Moltmann, then, is a "hermeneutical category" defining the context and the medium in which Christian theology is to be articulated today. This is further understood in the assertion that "the new criterion of theology and of faith is to be found in praxis". (4)

Despite the similarity between Metz and Moltmann in their approach to the subject, there are crucial differences in their later developments. We shall return to this point in the fifth section of this paper.

The term "political" theology itself is not without ambiguity and misunderstandings. The traditional usage in Greek philosophy arises from the tripartite division of theology into mythic, natural, and political. Each of the three addresses itself to different gods with the political as inferior to the other two. Roman theology took up this division but with a reversal of priorities. That is, political theology took precedence over the metaphysical and became no more than a theological justification of the primacy of politics. Augustine, in The City of God, criticizes this all too immanent process at the expense of the transcendent. He emphazises the dependence of the political on the mythic and the metaphysical, the three being distinct but interrelated ways of speaking about God. Yet the Roman conception of political theology was revived from the Renaissance onwards to offer support to the uneasy 'marriage' between the church and the state. Political theology thus became, once again, the tool of those in power to justify a "Christendom" from “the right”.

A new political theology for today will have to dissociate itself from any conception of a "Christendom", either of the "Right" or of the “Left”. Political theology, a truly human endeavour, will necessarily be rooted in the world. And yet, as theology, it is at the same time always pointing to that which is beyond the world. A credible political theology will have to maintain a unity between the identity and non-identity of faith and culture, between redemption and human history; that the resurrection hope will not be swallowed up by history as it makes death and guilt transitory. Nor will it swallow up history because a hope based on the cross is fulfilled only when the dead and all creation are returned to the full lordship of God. (5)

While Moltmann sees political theology as no more than a hermeneutical horizon. Metz locates it firmly in the arena of fundamental theology. For Metz, fundamental theology today can no longer simply be a rational justification of faith that is narrowly apologetic in nature. That is, it must not be reduced to a "theological meta-theory" of existing world theories. Rather, it must justify itself as theology by "a return to subjects and the praxis of subjects''…"As such, its task is to evoke and describe a praxis which will resist all evolutionary attempts at reconstruction and any attempt to do away with religious practice as an independent entity or the religious subject as an authentic element in the process of a historical and materialist dialectical system".(6) In other words , the practical fundamental theology devised by Metz is always bound to the act of opposing any attempt to condition religion socially or to reconstruct it theoretically.

  
1)J. B. Metz, Faith in History and Society, Burns & Oates, London, 1980, p. 73. The term “praxis” implies the activity of the whole person, intellectual as well as physical. It is more than what is understood by the term “practice”. Henceforth, the former will be preferred to the latter in this essay. See also Metz’s article, “Political Theology”, in Sacramentum Mundi.

2)J. Moltmann, Theology of Hope, SCM Press, London, 1970, p. 20.

3)Moltmann, "Political Theology", in The Experiment Hope, SCM Press, London, 1975, p. 102.

4)Moltmann, "God in Revolution", in Religion, Revolution and the Future, Charles Scribner's Sons, NY 1969, p.138.

5)Moltmann, "The End of History", in Hope and Planning, SCM Press, London, 1971, p.167f.

6)Metz, 1980, p.7.

Political Theology & Liberation Theology

Political theology, understood in the restricted sense of Metz and Moltmann, is distinct from, though closely related to, the liberation theologies of Latin America. A common distinction made between the two is to consider their different contexts that give rise to their particular mode of theological reflection. This involves three aspects: the secularization of society, the privatization of faith, and the role of theology in the life of the Church. (7)

First, the German political theologians see the process of secularization in a positive light. The separation of church and state, the world ceasing to be the numinous, and the rise of the human subject in the search for emancipation, are key stages in the path to the freedom of faith expressed in human subjectivity. The Latin American liberation theologians criticise this projection as imposing the particular European model of church-state relationship on other regions. For them, the church is still very much bound up with the state. Secularization, while still in its beginning stages, leads not so much to the 'death-of -God' syndrome, but rather to a near schizophrenic dualism of faith and politics.

Second, the concern of political theology in Europe is to offer a critical corrective to the current existential theology which tends to advocate a privatization of faith in the wake of the secularization of society. In a secular society, Christian faith seems to have lost its public dimension except as a minority cult or even as expressions of personal, individual interest. Liberation theology from Latin America, on the other hand, is conceived as a critique of the Catholic liberal developmentalism that has been exported to the third world from the so-called developed countries. The model of development presupposes a social and economic structure that is not only insensitive to the real problems of the host nations, but is also instrumental in preserving the oppressive structures in these nations, thus perpetuating the evils of injustice. Liberation theology seeks to offer a radical break from the status quo based on a Christian foundation.

Third, the nature of political theology, in particular that of Metz and Moltmann, is more in the methodological realm. That is, they see the role of political theology as defining the context and the horizon in the task of doing theology. In their search to elaborate the relationship between religion and society, political theology tends to focus on the dialectics of theory and practices On the other hand, liberation theology seeks to give relevant interpretations of faith symbols of the Christian message of liberation. Their emphasis is less on methodology in the theological task. Rather their interest is centred more on the example of Jesus Christ as a bringer of liberation.

Despite the distinct differences between political theology and liberation theology, theologians from both sides do have a mutual influence on each other. For example, Sobrino’s heavy reliance on Moltmann’s theology of the cross in his Christlolgy at the Crossroads shows the methodological root of most Latin American theologians. Or, Metz’s second formulation of his political theology is the result of the critique of Latin American theologians who saw Metz’s theology of the world as no more than an extension of a form of Kantian political ethics in which the notion of faith is over-and-above and untouched by its historico-social context. (8)

It is not a matter of choosing between the one or the other, of political theology or liberation theology. Both are serious attempts to take theparticularity of history as the starting point for theological reflection. Their individual usefulness is determined more by the relevance of the issues out of which they are developed.

  
7)See F. P. Fiorenza, "Political Theology and Liberation Theology: an inquiry into their fundamental meaning", in Liberation, Revolution & Freedom, ed. by T. E. McFadden, Seabury Press, NY, 1975; also, C. Davis, Theology and Political Society, CUP, Cambridge, 1980, Chapter 1, "From Orthodoxy to Politics".

8)It is difficult to say how the mutual influences between theologians in the two continents are effected. The general impression is that the Latin American theologians depend on their European counterparts for method, while criticising them for not taking "praxis" seriously but of being concerned only with a "theology of praxis''.　

See G. Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, SCM Press, London, 1974.

Metz and Moltmann: their starting points and their objectives

The political theologies of Metz and Moltmann begin with the view that the self-revelation of God takes place primarily in the reality of the history of Jesus Christ. As this history is coextensive with the history of the world, political theology believes that the self-communication of God to man cannot be some timeless, acultural and theologically impartial entity, but has to be inextricably bound up with the discussion of the historico-political expression of faith.

It is, thus, the intention of Metz and Moltmann to counter the tendency to take the discussion of faith and theology out of the realm of the historico-political experience of man. That is not to say that theology before them is not interested in the human pole of God's self-communication. Rather they are adding a corrective to the reaction of theology's previous attempt to answer the challenge of the Enlightenment in Europe. The dualism of faith and history that emerged from that reaction is contributory to the crises of identity and relevance for Christianity. (9)

In Moltmann, we find a re-emphasis on the eschatological dimension of the gospel message. God is not a being totally detached from the world. He is the eschaton, the future which has come near drawing us forward. This imminence of the eschaton means, for Metz, that faith is not a flight from the secular world into the realm of individual piety. Rather, it is within the socio-political reality of this secular world that God encounters man (and woman). To return to an 'authentic' response to this divine condescension, Metz advocates a "de-privatization" of faith.

Thenceforth, Moltmann arrives at the positiion that the God who draws near in history is the revelation of the history of Himself. That is, theology's task in discerning God in history leads us further on to an insight into the history of God. For him, the challenge of political theology can be justified and sustained only because of what it reveals in the trinitarian history of God. Metz, on the other hand, finds that political theology is complete only if it leads to a completely different way of doing theology. He rejects the transcendental-idealistic approach because it fails to exercise its critical function as demanded by the gospel message it proclaims. As an alternative, Metz proposes a "praxical" approach to theology which expresses itself in narratives of painful memories in the history of human liberation and salvation.

  
9)Apart from the two articles on "Political Theology" by Metz and Moltmann mentioned above, see also T. W. Ogletree, "From Anxiety to Responsibility: The Shifting Focus of Theological Reflection", in New Theology No. 6, ed. by Marty & Peerman, Macmillan, NY, 1970.


The Context of Political Theology－Theological and Historical

In this section we will make a deeper analysis of the intentions and issues behind the political theologies of Moltmann and Metz with an attempt to draw out their similarities and differences. As mentioned already, political theology begins, as with all other theologies, in the self-revelation of God In Jesus Christ. This central core of Christian faith is and can never be contested, not even for political theology. What is at issue is the primacy of the form of expression of this faith and thus of Its mode of transmission. Whether this expression is to be characterised principally by the intellect, the will or the all-engaging human act, leads respectively to the corresponding modes of transmission of faith as orthodoxy, orthopoesis and orthopraxy.(10) Much of the controversy over the primacy question is influenced by the historical conditioning of the believer vis-a-vis his basic understanding of himself as human and the understanding of God as the transcendent. Arising thence are secondary questions, which include: the identity and non-identity of faith and that human historical conditioning, the epistemological structure of theology, and the continual discovery of the true character of the original biblical record of God's self-revelation in Christ, all acting as parameters within which the original question on primacy takes shape.

In the existentialist theology of Barth, Bultmann and Rahner, we find three different understandings of faith and its modes of expression. In Barth, the primacy of faith is identified with none of the three modes of expression－neither intellect, will nor praxis. Faith is primarily an act on God's part even in its its human expression. Theology becomes the explication of this divine action in man. The non-identity of faith with man's historical conditioning means that the original Word of God mediated in scripture is above historical criticism. It is only on the secondary level that faith enters as the human acknowledgment of the divine action, and love for one's fellowmen follows the proclamation of the Word.(11)

We find in Bultmann an opposite position. Faith, while acknowledging its ultimate divine origin, Is identified with the historico-existential conditions of man. Primacy is given to a form of orthopoesis whereby knowledge of a new relation with God and with oneself leads to a life of faith characterised by love and freedom. Theology becomes the tool for a continuous correlation between faith and the existential condition of man.

For Rahner, the question of primacy is further identified with the very constitution of man. The 'anonymity' of faith is synonymous with the transcendental subjectivity in man. Theology is thus 'anthropology'; and anthropology is impossible without its theological groundings. The biblical record is understood as the irreversible exemplar of the thematization of this transcendental subjectivity in the God-man Jesus Christ.

It would be unfair to say that in Bultmann and in Rahner there is a simple identification of faith with the human situation. Both writers are aware of the non-identity element, the not-yet of eschatology, in their theology. Yet their treatment of the tension created by this latter element falls into the intellectual trap of reifying history. As a result, Bultmann reduces the human condition to the historicity of man realized in the time-and-again decision of faith. In Rahner, the reality of the ambiguity of the history of religion exists more as an intellectual possibility rather than a fact under the broad vision of the 'anonymity' of faith. This imbalance of Identity over non-identity in Bultmann and Rahner is not a 'watering-down' of faith, but is rather the product of the 'over-spiritualizing' of man. The major weakness in their attempts to explicate faith, and to a similar extent the almost utter non-identity approach in Barth, is to locate the Christian message in some atemporal conception of truth that is accessible to the private, intellectual realm of an individual.

The revival of a praxical understanding of knowledge and truth led to a fresh challenge to Christianity's search for an adequate expression of the original self-revelation of God in Christ. The dissatisfaction with an idealistic conception of man and his history plus the critique of religion as an ideology was the occasion that gave rise to political theology as the answer to the search for a contemporary expression of faith. In the formulations of Moltmann and Metz, political theology emphasizes the critical function of faith. The identity of faith with the idealistic conception of history and humanity found in Bultmann and Rahner and the near non-identity found in Barth are replaced by a more optimum unity of identity and non-identity.

Faith lived as hope recognises the world and its history as the only reality whereby faith finds an expression. The 'already' element of eschatology finds expression in the practice of Christians. At the same time the 'not-yet' element is the ground of the 'already' as eschatology breaks into history and the future into the present. Yet knowledge of the promise of the Risen Christ no longer serves as an explanation of history. It confronts it. Theology becomes an hermeneutical tool to mediate between the practice of faith and political society. It defines the contexts whereby the Christian message of the resurrection of the crucified one takes up history seriously as the voice of the oppressed. The orthodoxy of dogmatic statements gives way to the orthopraxy of Christian "living as the embodiment and expression of the Truth. The biblical record too receives a fresh understanding as a body of faith-stories that seek to preserve the different memories of God's self-communication to man in history. As THEO-logy, these memories become the ground of all other forms of theology. They also give shape to the epistemic structure of a praxis-oriented political theology. In order to perform its role as a critique of society and also of Christianity in its institutions and subjects, political theology can only mediate the Christian message in the form of stories of subversive memories. The hope of the oppressed is thus grounded in the solidarity with Christ who rose from the dead. The history of freedom is thus remembered not as a series of triumphs but rather as stories of sufferings in history. Memory of the non-identity of human sufferings in history becomes the subversive tool of political theology to fulfil its critical function.(12) The need for narrative in political theology avoids the danger of only offering a critique of society on the transcendental-idealistic plane. This latter mode of critique is applicable only when its overall presupposition that society is guided by a rationalistic-idealistic ethic is operative at the time. If this is not the case, the critique will be no more than an academic exercise in the realm of ideas; and runs the risk of exonerating the burden of sufferings in history in exchange for the aesthetic satisfaction of a neat and reified 'history'.

If the negative moments in political theology remind us of the crisis theology of Barth, it is because of their coincidental interest in the non-identity of faith with any 'secular' expression of emancipation and of redemption. Yet there is a crucial difference between them, not only in the degree of non-identity but also in the capacity of the non-identity in their theology. In Barth's crisis theology, the non-identity has its roots in a denial of any form of natural revelation. Faith comes only through a direct proclamation of the Word, because faith is nothing but the adherence to its object, namely the Word of God. Thus the non-identity in Barth is overarching in his theology. It denies the world so that the latter may turn to faith in the search for freedom. In political theology, the non-identity never functions apart from the context of the identity of faith and the world. Faith is neither prior to nor over-and-above the world perceived as history. Faith is found only in and through the world. The non-identity of faith here has its roots in the eschatological contents of the Christian message. The present is always relativised by the future in which God, the 'object' of faith resides. The 'not-yet' of the eschaton is the core of this non-identity that pulls history. That is, God as future is continually beckoning man, symbolized in a praxis, forwards. Thus, faith is always critical of any attempt to remove this forward thrust, whether it is to suppress the pain of suffering thus creating an illusion of a fully realized 'already' or to remove the pull of the future as advent in projecting an eschatology that pretends to comprehend the totality of history. However, this non-identity element in political theology does recognize a genuine movement of letting men be full subjects as part of that eschatological history of man's emancipation in Christ.



  
10)See R. Panikkar, Myth, Faith & Hermeneutics, Paulist Press, 1979, Chapter VI, 2, "Faith as a Constitutive Human Dimension". Metz's understanding of "praxis" is different from that of Panikkar. The former is concerned with the practical side of social praxis, the critical function of memories in history, and the pathic structure of praxis, whereas Panikkar is concerned with finding a general (and acceptable) understanding of faith in a cross-cultural study. His interest in "praxis" as a form of a self-realization of the human agent tends to focus on the moral and anthropological determinant of social praxis. As such, he is really discussing the concept "praxis" rather than "praxis" itself; and his method is more akin to establishing an orthopoesis rather than an orthopraxy, i.e. he emphazises finding the right concept to guide action rather than finding the right activity to rest his reflection upon.

11)References to the conception of faith held by Barth, Bultmann and Rahner, come from: K. Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. IV. i. p. 742; R. Bultmann, Theology of the N. T., vol. 1, Ch. V(C), and also J. Macquarrie's An Existential Theology; K. Rahner, "A Short Formula of Christian Faith", in A Rahner Reader, ed. by G. A. McCool, and also Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith.

12)"Memory" for Metz is not only a "theme" for his practical fundamental theology, but also a "category"; that is, it not only provides the content of his political theology but also the structure and means whereby this theology effects changes. See Metz (1980), Chapters 5, 6 and 11.

A Divergence in Metz and Moltmann

So far, we have covered the common elements in the political theologies of Metz and Moltmann. In their recent development, there is a clear divergence in their orientations. The criterion used in this analysis is based on M. Lamb's division of the different modes of theological methods in the course of the history of the development of theology.(13) Of the five modes mentioned by Lamb, which we have translated into graphic form below (Figure 1, page 87), it is the criticomorphic and the politicomorphic modes that will concern us here. Both seek to arrive at a unity between the identity and non-identity of faith and culture. Unlike the neomorphic mode which favours an identification of faith and culture (e.g. H. Cox's The Secular City) or the fideomorphic which insists on the non-identity of faith and culture (as with Barth), the criticomorphic and the politicomorphic recognise the tension between the transcendent dimension of faith and the historico-political reality of its manifestation. The crucial difference between the two, according to Lamb, which correspondingly distinguishes the 'political' theologies of Moltmann and Metz, lies in the capacity of each to mediate the Christian message from the present into the future. The criticomorphic mode, relying on Scriptures and on a rational conception of the human situation, can only hold a dialogue between faith and an intellectual perception of the reality of man and thus be able to mediate the Christian message from the past to the present. Political theology, as a typical example of the politicomorphic mode of theologizing, takes the present reality, captured in the form of narratives and memories, as its starting point to create a future in and through the critique of faith on human history. As such, the paradigm-shift advocated by Metz in the construction of a praxical fundamental theology puts him one stage beyond the criticomorphic, according to Lamb; whereas the return of Moltmann to a speculative theology of the Trinitarian history of God represents a regress even to that of a more sophisticated form of fideomorphism.

To be fair to Moltmann, we have to point out that he does not confine himself to the realm of political theology. In fact, he has criticised the tendency to reduce political theology to a theology of politics, and of Christian praxis to social activism. He warns: "The modern world's devotion to what is ethical and pragmatic has led to the distintegration of the doctrine of the Trinity in moral monotheism. The reduction of faith to practice has not enriched faith; it has impoverished it.(14) The remedy, says Moltmann, is to take into practice adoration, to liberate practice from activism. This requires us to return to the notion of "knowing In wonder" which is found in the new theology of the Trinity. This new theology includes two histories. The history of God sending forth the Son and the Spirit in the act of self-propagating love reveals to man a God who suffers with his forsaken creation, who suffers because of it and for it. Yet this suffering of God is relativized and measured against the final freedom and perfect liberation of God at the end of history. Thus political theology as a tool to reveal this history of the sending-forth leads to a second history of gathering up and has to be interpreted in and by it. Soteriology, for Moltmann, is never far from doxology. The result of political theology seems to lead to a need to speculate (though not the same as empty abstraction) on the trinitarian nature of the history of God. This new understanding of the Trinity leads us further to the insight that in God, and therefore in man, there is no domination but only participation.

The new emphasis in Moltmann's theology leads him away from praxis to gnosis. In terms of the theory-praxis nexus, his theology is still very much based on that of the Kantian ethical model of theory guiding practice, reason directing action. The fideomorphic model of Barth, which focuses itself primarily on the sovereignty of God and the lordship of Christ in history, is advanced to a compassionate God and the forsaken Son, a shift from lordship to fellowship. The wholly Other of God in Barth and the comparative contingent man is modified into a panentheistic movement of God in human history. This tendency in Moltmann, according to his critics, and Metz in particular, runs the risk of reducing the reality of human history to man’s conception of it. Metz even accuses Moltmann of exonerating the burden of the history of suffering in claiming that the suffering in this world has already been overcome in Christ’s passion. For Metz, the reality of the suffering in society and in history, their non-identity character, is not and cannot be identified with any meaning other than its subversive power as a dangerous memory. Metz feels that Moltmann has confused the negativity of the history of suffering with the “negativity of the dislectically mediated concept of suffering”. (15)

While Metz and Moltmann are both concerned with the offering of a theodicy in face of suffering in the world, Metz feels that an adequate apology of suffering can only be met on its own level, namely in praxis. Thus he criticises Moltmann's attempt as merely giving a rational explanation of suffering and meeting his problem on the level of speculative theology. If Moltmann's political theology of the cross is the beginning of a dialogue between theology and the 'critical theory' of Adorno and Horkhelmer, Metz's political theology as practical fundamental theology is the product of taking this same theme of the cross to its logical (praxical) conclusion.(16) The speculative turn in Moltmann's political theology means that a certain timelessness is unconsciously introduced when suffering is ontologised in the being of God. The in-breaking of eschatology into history, of the future into the present, somehow loses its crisis element because the present so conceived and history thus qualified remain within the realm of what A. Fierro called a "first-stage" theological discourse, i.e. a discourse acceptable only to members of a believing community.(17) The result is a 'Christianization' of the conception of history and of the present, with the subsequent danger of taking lightly the ambiguity of human history.

In the political theology of Metz, the "negative" character of critical theory is clearly manifested. Despite the accusations of Schillebeeckx, Metz is not making a simple identification of Christian liberation with the emancipation of the Critical School.(18) Methodologically speaking, Metz does pattern his own on those of the early critical theorists. However in terms of content, he is at pains to note the non-identity of faith with the emancipation of the Frankfurt School, which F. Fiorenza, on the other hand, sees as a close parallel to a reinterpretation of atonement and redemption in Christology.(19) Metz's strong reliance on memory as a category of his narrative-practical theology shows his debt to Marcuse. His persistent denial of any attempt to ontologize suffering can be traced to Benjamin's understanding of the history of suffering and to Adorno's immanent critique of ontology.(20) But that is as far as any direct parallel between Metz's political theology and the critical school goes. He is fully aware of the Christian character of any political theology. Yet, unlike Moltmann, he does not want to interpret political society in terms of the political dimension of the cross. Rather he concentrates on the critical function of political theology and directs it at the crisis of Christianity in its institutions and subjects.

For Metz, the Church Is the institutionalization of the dangerous memory of Christ. This dangerous memory, to be truly Christian, is more than a mere recalling of the history of suffering. It is at the same time the very expression of the eschatological hope of faith. Nevertheless, it is not simply an eschatology that only lends meaning to history. Rather its principal task is to remove any sense of timelessness from our understanding of history by providing an "apocalyptic ‘sting’" of the "not-yet" of the Eschaton. With Moltmann, Metz asserts that political theology relativizes all ideology and political system in that none of them is or can be identified with the subject of faith, the believing subject. This is not to say that Metz too is reverting to a fideomorphic dichotomy of faith and history. Rather the basis of non-identity of the subject with any socio-political class is rooted in the critical nature of faith. To identify the believing subject with any social class will simultaneously marginalize other classes and return to a form of Christendom-type political theology. The negative content of political theology is to highlight the urgency of the Christian message to thwart any false security arising from a complacent and misguided view of pluralism. Metz is not claiming that the believing subject exists in a social vacuum. Quite the opposite, Metz believes that political theology can only be practised in an institutionalised form. The Church is or should be this vehicle whereby the critical function of faith is exercised. Even the very notion of the "imitation of Christ" is to be institutionalized and is exemplified in the religious orders within the Roman Catholic Church. (21)

By institutionalization, Metz is not advocating a simple view of building a 'superstructure' for faith. Rather it is the recognition of the socio-political reality of the believing subjects that the community of the Church is inseparable from the praxis of faith. Political theology can only be practised within the Church if it is to be Christian at all. It provides the hermeneutical horizon for the believing community to justify their faith by exercising that critical function in face of any structure that prevents persons from becoming subjects. It is not a political ethics, so it does not provide concrete guidelines for action. Rather its function is theological, which includes the critique of any theology that incorrectly identifies faith with any ideology or philosophy, the keeping alive and relevant that original truth intention of the biblical testimony to the memory of the raising of Christ from the dead, and the pursuing of the task of solidarity in hope with all men who are called to be subjects in the presence of God. All these Metz sees as the reasons for a continuous dialogue and exchange between theology and the other sciences and philosophies in the development of a "praxical" form of theology, and thus his commitment to the inter-disciplinary project at the Institute of Theological Research in Bielefeld.



  
13)See M. Lamb, History, Method, and Theology: A dialectical comparison of Wilhem Dilthey’s critique of Historical Reason and Bernard Lonergan’s Meta-Methodology, Scholar Press, Montana, 1978. And also his article in CTSA Proceedings, vol. 31, 1976, “The Theory-Praxis Relationship in Contemporary Christian Theologies”.

14)Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, SCM Press, London, 1981, p.8.

15)Metz, 1980, p.l32. The term "non-identity" is used in this paper to denote both, following the method adopted by Metz and Moltmann. See Metz, 1980, Chapter 7, and also Moltmann, The Crucified God, SCM Press, 1974, Chapter 1.

16)On Critical Theory, see D. Held, Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas, Hutchinson, London, 1980.

17)A. Fierro, The Militant Gospel: A Critical Introduction to Political Theologies, Orbis, Maryknoll, 1977.

18)E. Schillebeeckx, The Understanding of Faith, S. & W., London, 1974, Chs. 6 & 7.

19)F. P. Fiorenza, "Critical Social Theory and Christology: Toward an Understanding of Atonement and Redemption as Emancipatory Solidarity", CTSA Proceedings, 1975.

20)See T. W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, RKP, London, 1973, Part One, II., and W. Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History", 1940.

21)See Metz, Followers of Christ, Burns & Oates, London, 1978.

The Concluding Problem

The negative character of political theology forms the basis of a fresh problem vis-a-vis its role in the path to knowledge and truths. Does it have any positive content apart from its negative and critical function in society and in the Church? Despite the fact of faith as praxis in Christians who "are always carrying in the body the death of Jesus", will political theology have room to behold the freedom and glory of the kingdom? How does it deal with the stories of the joy of the disciples when they met the Risen Lord in view of the memory of the crucified one? Will political theology admit of a variety of levels of theological discourse, some narrative and some speculative? As every praxis has its moments of transcendental reflection, can political theology be an exception? These are indeed the key issues in the debate within political theology and its relation with the rest of the theological world. To substantiate its claim as the hermeneutical horizon and the fundamental task in contemporary theology, political theology must expound its positive relation with other theological tasks and elucidate the conditions of its truthfulness.

As Metz has pointed out, "the political tendency of a political theology can only be accepted as valid if its theological tendency is valid. The reverse is not true".(22) And how, one may ask, is one to judge the "theological tendency" but in the light of coherence with the body of theological discourses. One is tempted to conclude with the remark that, if Barth's crisis theology revolutionised contemporary ways of theologising by introducing the Trinity to the fore, Metz and Moltmann embody this crisis in the praxis of theology by bringing the Trinity to the fore of revolution.

Figure 1

22)Metz, 1980, p. 49.

Francis Xavier Zhu S. J. 著 B. J. Shields S. J. 施惠淳译

AN OUTSTANDING PALAEONTOLOGIST WHO DISCOVERED PEKING MAN



I Introduction

I have already selected and translated seven or eight conversation pieces recording conversations with some famous, contemporary French scientists. Science made them realize that science is not almighty, that science and religion each has its own sphere. Not only do they not clash with each other; on the contrary, they can give each other mutual assistance. Science also makes them strengthen or gain faith.

Now once again to introduce someone famous all over the world, the great palaeontologist and palaeanthropologist who discovered "Peking Man", Father Teilhard de Chardin.

This year is the centenary of his birth. African scientific circles and UNESCO have suggested arranging a solemn commemoration of the French palaeanthropologist, Fr. Teilhard de Chardin. This summer meetings will be held over a period of three months at the Catholic University in Paris, France, the Institut Catholique de Paris; academic papers and commemorative essays will be delivered.

The quarterly Daziran, published by the Association of Chinese Natural Science Museums, the Chinese Society for Environmental Science and the Beijing Museum of Natural Science, in its first issue for 1981 published an article written by Zhen Shuonan and Huang Weiwen, "Recalling the French Palaeontologist Teilhard de Chardin's Time in China", in which they lauded to the skies the scientific contributions of their teacher and his human qualities.

Rev. Father Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, S. J. was a Frenchman, born in 1881, who later entered the Society of Jesus and was ordained a priest in 1912. He came to our country twice; the first time in 1923 for just a year; the second time in 1926, this time staying for twenty years. In 1946 he returned to Paris; he died in the U. S. A. in 1955.

In 1941 I was returning from Northern China to Shanghai; while passing through Tianjin, I met him. His humility, his warmth and his kindness were very moving. He brought us to visit the Beijiang (Northern Frontier) Museum, explained to us the fossils of the "Ordos culture", and then explained to us about the tools used by Peking Man which were exhibited in the parlour of his residence. At the time we really did not dare to believe that the simple, unpretentious, humble, sincere person standing before us was the discoverer of Peking Man, famous throughout the contemporary world.

II First Visit to China (1923-24) (Investigating "Ordos culture", Discovering "Ordos Man")

Before him, another Jesuit, Father Emile Licent, had investigated and collected primitive vertebrate animals and early human fossils in Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Ningxia, Shaanxi and Gansu Provinces. He also founded the "Museum for the Palaeontology of the Huanghe and Baihe Basins". The Chinese name is the Northern Frontier Museum. It was part of the Ecole des Hautes Etudes set up in Tianjin by the Jesuits.

In 1920 Fr. Licent had discovered the first early stone tool to be found in an authenticated place and position in our country, in the yellow mud of the Xinjia River in Qingyang County, Northern Gansu Province (near Inner Mongolia). This was the dawn of discovery of human fossils. In order to expand the scope and results of the investigations, Fr. Teilhard was invited to come to China to help and assist.

"Teilhard at that time had already become a scientist of international reputation because of his work in identifying and reconstructing the famous Eocene animals of Northern France. Dedicated to clarifying the history of the dawn of the human race, he perseveringly abandoned the comfortable life of Paris and came to China which was then extremely poor and backwards" (Daziran, loc. cit.)

Fr. Teilhard arrived in Tianjin in May 1923 and met Fr. Licent. Disregarding whole oceans of difficulties the two Fathers set out at once, took the train to Baotou. From Baotou they began the labours of their long expedition.

Setting out from Baotou (now Inner Mongolia), they travelled west along the northern bank of the Yellow River. This stretch of the Yellow River suddenly turns north from Lanzhou.

Passing through Ningxia, it turns east for some distance, then suddenly south again, forming a U shapes. The upper reaches are called the Ordos region. Then at the eastern foot of Langshan, i.e. where the Yellow River changes direction, they went south still following the Yellow River and reached Yinchuan in Ningxia. From there they crossed the Yellow River towards the east, reaching Hengcheng on the opposite bank and then went east along the Great Wall. This is the former site of the "Ordos culture" and they found a large quantity of the remains of ancient stone tools. The two Fathers stayed for some time at Shuidong stream, within the borders of Lingwu, thirty Chinese miles to the south-east of Heng- cheng. Here is situated the centre of the Ordos culture.

Then they travelled east along the Great Wall, surveying and excavating as they went, and reached Jingbian County in Shaanxi Province, staying at the church of the Belgian Fathers beside Xiaoqiao (they are the Fathers of the Immaculate Heart of Mary, CICM).

In that area they found a rich collection of fossils of mammals. "This makes clear that the Ordos people of that time could already hunt in groups. As to stone tools, they discovered tools which were sharp-pointed, flaked and chipped, and provided precious material for studying the early production methods of the children of the Yellow River." (ibid.)

In this region they did not find many human fossils. But they did however make one startling discovery: In the fossil of an antelope which had been excavated by Fr. Licent the previous year, they identified the Incisor tooth of a late "Homo Sapiens''. "At the time it had not been recognized but only because of Teilhard's serious attitude to work and high powers of identification－'the perceptive mind knows the hero'－could this priceless treasure come to the light of day and shed a strange light. This tooth identified by Teilhard and called "Ordos Man" is the first human fossil to be found in China…It gave a very great impetus to the excavation of the site of 'Peking Man' which was later to become famous." (ibid.)

Having been only one year in China, he had discovered "Ordos Man".

In 1924 he returned to France; he was already a world-renowned scientist, the president of the French Geological Society and only forty-two years of age!

III On Second Visit to China He Stayed Twenty Years (1926-46), Discovered Peking Man"

From 1926 to 1946 Teilhard spent twenty years in China. Living in the China of the old days the conditions were very difficult; doing scientific work in the wilds was extremely trying…With extreme dedication and side-by-side with Chinese scientists who were then young and in order to awaken from their slumber the palaeo-vertebrates sleeping in the soil of China, so that they would voice the truth about the evolution of life and the history of the Earth, he zealously probed the mysteries of natures" (ibid.)

During these twenty years, the feet of Fr. Teilhard traversed both sides of the Great River, inside and outside the Great Wall. He not only went to the North-West plateau but also to the North-East, such an important place for fossils. But his greatest and most important merit was to excavate Peking Man together with Yang Zhongjian and Pei Wenzhong. He also made appeals abroad so as to collect funds for the large-scale excavations at Zhoukoudian.

"Peking Man" was discovered in the district of Zhoukoudian to the south of Beijing, in all seventeen or eighteen male and female skeletons, a large number of stone tools and traces of the use of "fire", together with signs of religion. "Peking Man" was the earliest ancestor of the Chinese, separated from today by about 600,000 to 1,000,000 years. According to what Fr. Teilhard emphasized to me in Tianjin, Peking Man already had traces of religious belief.

The scholarly writings of Fr. Teilhard are today still indispensable reference books for the study of vertebrate palaeontology and palaeoanthropology. "These scholarly articles provide extremely reliable material for understanding the mammals of the Mid-Pleistocene Age and the living conditions of 'Peking Man's" (ibid.)

Fr. Teilhard for a lengthy period undertook the work of consultant in Beijing to the Cenozoic laboratory of the Chinese Geological Survey Institute. During that time, in collaboration with Yang Zhongjian and Pei Wenzhong, he wrote quite a few articles on the geology of the Cenozoic Era in Northern China and the Zhoukoudian site.

"In 1942 he wrote in collaboration with others the volume Chinese Fossil Mammals. Up to now this work is an indispensable handbook for anyone studying the mammals of our country. Nowadays whenever one consults the writings of Teilhard, he would be deeply conscious that he was an early ‘trail-blazer’ in China for the investigation of vertebrates." (ibid.)

IV A Good Teacher and Helpful Friend, Whose Memory is to be Cherished

Fr. Teilhard was humble, sincere, kindly, enthusiastic. Now let us listen to the personal statements of his colleagues and students.

"But among all the foreign scientists, Teilhard de Chardin was the one who had the most harmonious relations with the Chinese scientists. He never gave himself the airs of a 'foreign grandee', but always as a friend of the Chinese citizens got on well with Yang Zhongjian and Pei Wenzhong who were then still very young. According to what Prof. Yang Zhongjian told the writer of this article before his death, Teilhard in scholarly matters always treated him and Pei Wenzhong on equal terms. Although at the time Teilhard was a scientist with an international name, he still gave me the impression of being unassuming and easy to approach."

"Regarding Teilhard's Intimate and unreserved friendship with Chinese scientists, there is a detailed account in Yang Zhongjian's The North-East in Cross-section (1931)…On four expeditions he always travelled with Teilhard; as a man he was sincere and kindly, penetrating in his observation of nature, careful in his scholarly research, as well as his great and rich erudition, so that one could not only get much help in knowledge but also be deeply changed for the better morally. To travel with him was really a pleasure and would make one forget the hardships of the dusty roads."

"In this book Yang Zhongjian again several times refers to how he and Teilhard shared sorrows and joys while travelling in different provinces of the North-West and different place in the North-East and gives moving examples of brotherly affection. When they were making geological observations within the borders of Shanxi Province on 2nd September 1929, Yang Zhongjian got the 'flu and had a high fever; because of eating something dirty, he got an acute infection. But Teilhard was not afraid of being infected and stayed by his side night and day to nurse him..."

"Yang Zhongjian was returning to Beijing ahead of time by making a detour through the Soviet Union and before departing went to take leave of Teilhard. He wrote: On the morning of the 10th I went again to Teilhard, since I was about to leave, but neither of us wanted to part from the other…to separate and go made one unhappy… Through the friendship of Yang Zhongjian and Teilhard one could also see the lofty character of Teilhard, this wanderer in a strange land, his will set on the scientific exploration of nature."

"In midsummer 1980 the famous archeologist Prof. Jia Lanpo led a team of researchers in geology and palaeobotany; despite the steamy summer heat and travel-stained, they arrived at Shuidong stream, within the borders of Lingwu in Ningxia Province (thirty Chinese miles to the south of Hengcheng). Mr. Jia stopped in front of a broken-down house, thinking of an unforgettable visitor from the history of science. In that 'cottage of Zhang San' there had lived the world-famous scholar of the science of vertebrates, the friend of the Chinese people, Teilhard de Chardin. The visitors with a spirit of reverence cherished the memory of that French scholar who had probed into nature in China for a long period and made important contributions." (ibid.)

That Fr. Teilhard should thus receive the respect, veneration and affection of his colleagues and students was because of his spirit of strong perseverance and disregard of suffering and his noble character of humility, deference, humanity and sincerity. This proves that his accomplishments were developing continuously. And the source, motive and protection of all this was because he had a religious faith, he was a priest, he was a Jesuit. He drew all his strength from his religious faith, from Christ.

V Spirit of Scientific Research

To do research in science, his fearlessly great spirit of not being afraid of suffering and being patient with all kinds of annoyances astonished his companions. "With dedication to clarify the history of the dawn of the human race, he perseveringly abandoned the comfortable life of Paris and came to China which was then extremely poor and backward." "Living in the China of the old days, the conditions were very difficult; doing scientific research in the wilds was extremely trying. If Teilhard had not possessed a burning dedication and a spirit of sacrificing himself for science, he could have sat down quietly in a church and announced 'the Word of God' according to the book. But he did not choose that way of life. But with extreme devotion and side-by-side with Chinese scientists who were then young…"

One of Fr. Teilhard's special merits was to cultivate, guide and assist the younger generation of rising scientists, "to help our country to cultivate a generation of scholars in vertebrate palaeontology and palaeo-anthropology. Especially during World War II, all scientific research work in northern China had ceased, but Teilhard stayed on in Beijing, occupied by the Japanese army of invasion, and perseveringly carried on with his research work under extremely difficult conditions."

Fr. Teilhard helped young scientists, gave them guidance and encouragement. "Yang Zhongjian discovered in the Dongshan mountains in Shaanxi not far from the Shenmu county capital the footprint of an animal and for the moment could not make out which animal had made it. Teilhard at once determined that it was the footprint of an iguanodon and picked up this specimen. This was the first discovery in China of a dinosaur's footprint. When they returned, they wrote a research report on it…Yang Zhongjian then really experienced that one could learn many things when with Teilhard and enjoy together the enormous pleasure of making scientific discoveries."

Beside, while helping the young generation of scientists to write scientific reports, he and Yang Zhongjian and Pel Wenzhong wrote many reports on "Peking Man" and "the Zhoukoudian caves".

"When Teilhard and young Chinese scientists were jointly writing articles, it was serious work, no detail was unimportant; he became their good teacher and helpful friend. After Teilhard had carefully corrected the draft of the article, a part of it was kept in the Institute for Vertebrate Palaeontology and Palaeo-anthropology of the Academia Sinica."

VI Science, Truth Have No "National Boundaries"

The study and Interchange of science and truth have no national boundaries or class limits. When Fr. Teilhard came to China to do scientific research, his colleagues and students welcomed him warmly, looked up to him with gratitude and love and respected him.

"There was a basic difference between him and the imperialistic elements that invaded China. Chinese people can distinguish friends and wolves, and cannot forget this French friend who was a wanderer in a strange land, his will set on recording a scientific 'Book of Genesis', and made a contribution to the study of the vertebrate palaeontology and palaeo-anthropology of China…"

"In 1930 Yang Zhongjian and Teilhard took part as representatives of their respective countries in a Chinese-French team for scientific observation. When the Chinese and French were exploring in the North-West, differences arose several times. The basic reason for this was that on the French side there was a group with strong imperialistic ideas; they did not respect Chinese sovereignty and despised Chinese people. At that time Teilhard still got on very well with the Chinese and respected the opinions of the Chinese. Yang Zhongjian wrote that Teilhard and he had worked together for three years and that he was a kindly and lovable man, he himself being intoxicated by science."

"Yang Zhongjian was a man of extreme racial pride who possessed a very strong sense of patriotism; he had never cringed or lowered himself before foreigners, but as to those foreign scientists who sincerely treated Chinese people as friends, he respected them greatly."

That a foreigner who was also an authority in science could respect Chinese people and had absolutely no attitude of putting on airs and insulting others was certainly something unusual. To be able not to have any trace of imperialism was also something precious and hard to find.

His colleagues and students drew a very accurate conclusion.

"Today when we are just making advances towards modern science, we should make a just evaluation of Teilhard and also of the original facts of history. To treat an enemy as a friend is of course dangerous; to falsely accuse a friend of being an enemy is obviously damaging. Towards those who hoist the banner of science but specialize in carrying on robbing activities in China and form a gang of imperialistic invaders, we should scorn them to their faces. As to Teilhard, a good teacher and helpful friend of this sort, we should always think with affection of his kindness and merits."

"We should adopt the attitude of historical materialism, seek truth from facts in treating foreign scientists who have worked in China, and in this way it will benefit the future development of cooperation and friendship between Chinese and foreign scientists." (ibid.)

The evaluation of Fr. Teilhard by these palaeon-tologists and palaeo-anthropologists and their attitude towards Chinese and foreign scientific cooperation is extremely accurate, unlike some ignorant and incompetent people or scientists who are dabblers, and who have a narrow racialism or nationalism and indiscriminately oppose all international cooperation. Science and truth have no national boundaries, they are classless. Ethics and morality, religion and faith have also no national boundaries and are classless. Science and truth, ethics and religion absolutely require intercommunication and assistance between different countries. Fr. Teilhard's coming to China and helping to excavate "Ordos Man" and "Peking Man" is the best example of this.

The Catholic religion is for the whole human race. It is for every region, for every race, It assimilates the traditional culture of every region and every race, purifies it and sanctifies it. The culture and thought of every region and race is of use to the whole Church, can make it more rich and varied and can enable the Church to proclaim to every race and every region a Christian spirit and work of redemption more appropriate to that region and that race.

VII Another Galileo?

The scientists of the twentieth century see more clearly that there is no contradiction between science and religion, each has its own domain, one cannot replace the other, but they can coexist and co-prosper together, they can even complement each other. Fr. Teilhard was an outstanding scientist in palaeontology and palaeo-anthropology. He investigated fossils－the direct proof of biological evolution－, and at the same time he had a profound belief that God created the world, he was a believer in God. He was also a member of the Jesuit religious order (the Jesuit order in the Catholic Church has always been maligned by the enemies of religion as being the most reactionary, the most conservative). In the person of Fr. Teilhard, science and religion were in intimate harmony.

1) New Things are Formed Gradually

New things do not fall from heaven in one piece, ready-made. They grow and develop gradually, are gradually accepted. Old things are also gradually eliminated and destroyed. "At the sound of exploding crackers the old is eliminated; with peach-wood charms all nature is made new"－the changeover from old to new can certainly not be solved like that, overnight. The revolutionary movement must face extreme opposition, must pass through dramatic struggle.

The new things, people will not understand at once, and the new things themselves must also go through a lengthy and thorough scrutiny and testing before they can be proved true. A newly produced medicine, must it not be tested for a time? Evolution cannot be an exception. To use evolution to explain the Bible cannot be an exception either; if it meets with opposition, that is not something surprising.

2) To Move Forward with Firm Step

As regards the question of religious faith and the whole question of the Church, hasty action is certainly not possible, nor is it possible to go back on one's word or make unpredictable changes. Therefore, the Church is always prudent and earnest, it goes through lengthy study, consultation and consideration before it can make the final decision.

To beatify or canonize someone requires a lengthy period of investigation and thorough discussion.

The miracles worked at Lourdes have to be thoroughly observed, diagnosed, the illness must not recur for at least two years after being cured, solemn procedures must have been carried out before it is officially proclaimed as a miracle.

Our Lady's appearances at Lourdes and at Fatima had to go through lengthy investigation and study before they were recognized by the Church. The miraculous events at Zose, the Church also must submit to lengthy investigation and study.

Fr. Teilhard's explanations took a period of time before they received a just and due evaluation on the part of the Church. (Fr. Teilhard's courageous spirit of scientific investigation was highly praised by the present Pope in June 1981.)

3) Evolution and Religion

When Darwin founded evolution, from first to last he retained his religious faith and was a believer in God. Natural selection, the survival of the fittest in no way contradicted the position of religion.

However, the article published in the periodical Daziran by Zhen Shuonan and Huang Weiwen has as sub-title, "The French Palaeontologist Teilhard de Chardin in China" but the main title is "The Exiled Priest".

It is written in the article: "He superstitiously believed in the error that 'God made man', but also accepted the truth of evolution. The idealist world-view of the Catholic and the materialist attitude towards research of the scientist led to the clash of extreme contradictions in the person of Teilhard de Chardin. But after all he is a specialist in the study of natural history, his object of study－fossils－is the direct proof of the evolution of living things.

Therefore, at the same time as he was propagating Catholic doctrine to the members of the Church he was also propagating some aspects of evolution. This was considered by the Church to be 'rebellion and sedition' and his right to work as a priest in France was withdrawn. In 1925 Teilhard was exiled and came back again to China…

Because he had a tendency towards "evolution", Fr. Teilhard had his right to work as a priest in France withdrawn and he was exiled in 1926.

Is Fr. Teilhard another Galileo?

As to this matter, how is it to be understood and dealt with correctly?

The Church (the Bible) propagates to men God's holy Word, the work of redemption, and does not directly discuss science. What the Church emphasizes is: All things have a first origin, all things have a creator, man is composed of soul and body. So long as science does not deny these points, as regards the description and explanation of the earliest period of the universe and the human race, the Church gives complete freedom and certainly does not interfere. Religion and science each has its own domain!

4) Fr. Teilhard was a Good Priest and a Good Religious

Other people have availed of this opportunity to attack the Church for exiling Fr. Teilhard and say that he is the Galileo of the twentieth century who suffered and was banned for science. In his person it could again be seen that the Church is behind the times, opposes science and obstructs progress.

But what about Fr. Teilhard himself? He knew that the new ideas would not be accepted at once, but would have to go through a period of misunderstanding, prejudice and lack of trust. He happily left France in 1926 and came to northern China. If this unpleasant thing had not happened and he had not come to China, there would also have been no discovery of "Peking Man", it would have been a very great loss for the science of anthropology. "When the old frontiersman lost his horse, who could have known that it was a blessing in disguise?" From an unfortunate affair to get such a startling benefit! The plans and arrangements of the Lord, how great and marvellous they are, making man gasp with astonishment and utter praise! Fr. Teilhard de Chardin could humbly follow God's will, blaming neither God nor man, "He has regarded his low estate…He who is mighty has done great things for me…henceforth all generations will "nil me blessed."

　

  
* Translator's Note:

Fr. F.X. Zhu Shude earned a Ph.D. in Geography from the Sorbonne, Paris, in 1949. Arrested in his native Shanghai in 1953, he spent almost 30 years in prisons and labour camps until his death on 29 Dec., 1983. He had been released briefly in 1980-81. This article appear「哲學與文化」(Universitas), No. 102 (Nov. 1982), pp. 759-765, and is translated here by the editor's kind permission. Mr. M. S. Cheung of Wah Yan College, Hong Kong, has kindly helped to interpret certain expressions.

作者：Hon, Savio 韩大辉

AN INITIAL CRITICO-INTEGRAL ESSAY ON KANT'S APPROACH TO THE POSSIBILITY OF METAPHYSIC



1. INTRODUCTION

The problem of metaphysics, dressed in whatever form, is as old as human history, and yet it is an ever new problem which must somehow or other be confronted by anyone who reflects in depth on the vital issues of human life. The literature on the issue is amazingly abundant and this fact affords ample evidence that it is still in vogue. Many great thinkers have racked their brains in an attempt to find, once and for all, a definite solution, but more often than not they discovered more its mysteriousness than revealed the mystery itself.


Kant has certainly contributed a great deal to the history of reflection upon one fundamental issue, whether Metaphysics can be a Science. The Critique of Pure Reason, he says, "was intended to discuss the possibility of metaphysics". (1)


The title of this essay, hence, may appear at first sight to be immensely vast, for it almost includes the major part, if not the whole, of Kant's philosophy. However, what I want to stress here is his approach, by which I mean his initial preoccupation or disposition towards metaphysics and the way he adopted the primary assumptions for establishing the doctrine of the unknowability (of the thing-in-itself). With this new epistemological paradigm, Kant concludes that no metaphysics can attain to the status of Science. Such a claim, as I shall demonstrate, is grounded in his transcendental faith that the mind cannot even reach the existence of the thing-in-itself. This is to destroy every possibility of ontology, the study of being as being. I shall criticize the tenability of his agnostic position to see If any affirmation of being-in-itself is possible. This is crucial to the point at issue, for metaphysics without a solid ontology would be precarious. Thus at the end I try to show that his transcendental method (or approach) can be somehow integrated and lends itself to a sort of intuition of being which is a key to open the mysterious realm of beings-in-themselves.


Hundreds of commentators have made long and detailed comments on Kant's philosophy but the disputes among them show no guarantee that they understand him perfectly. There is still room for further clarification. Hence this essay, with its accent more on a synthetic than analytic presentation, aims at providing an initial step into the discussion of the point at issue.

2. KANT'S INITIAL PREOCCUPATION

In order to understand Kant's approach properly, we have to determine what sort of problem he has in mind to deal with. "A search for truth" would be far too general an answer. In the present context, I would confine myself to his initial preoccupation: The Critique "will therefore decide as to the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics in general, and determine its sources, its extent, and its limits－all in accordance with principles" (Axii) (2). This implies that Kant actually starts with an epistemological inquiry about the possibility of validly establishing some true metaphysical claims.


2.1 The Difficulty in Distinguishing between Metaphysical and Epistemological Inquiries
It is often said that everyone has his own view of metaphysics. William James, for example, regards it as an unusual obstinate effort to think clearly.(3) Not many people think likewise. Aristotelian metaphysicians would say that it is the science of being as being. Kant himself uses the term "metaphysics" in different senses. In a wider sense, it means the Transcendental Philosophy itself, while in a stricter sense it is understood as a Transcendental Science with objects of its own beyond the possibility of sense-experience (cf. B869-B870). Kant identifies the latter with Baumgarten's metaphysics, which Is defined as "Scientia prima cognitionis humanae principia continens''(4) It is the Science which contains the first principles of that which is within the comprehension of our knowledge. The chief objects of such a speculative metaphysics, for Kant, are the things-in-themselves and in particular, God, freedom and the immortality of the soul (cf. R874).


Now there arises immediately another problem: to what extent can we attain the truth from an inquiry into what-things-in-themselves-are? This at once becomes an epistemological problem which is concerned with the justification of our knowledge of what-things-are. In other words, the epistemologists are anxious to inquire about "what can I know?". This question, in its turn, arouses at once the metaphysical inquiry about "what is the foundation of the real?". Unless the latter inquiry is answered, we cannot even pose the question "to what extent do I know what is real?". However if I am not sure of this, how can I claim to know the foundation of the real? The vicious circle, as it were, seems to trap us into a perpetual self-closed skepticism. The distinction is not easy to draw between metaphysical and epistemological inquiries. They are so inextricably interwoven that in the discussion of one the other is bound to enter. Kant wants to find a breakthrough of this impasse.


2.2 The Disputes among Metephysicians
Kant shows that, throughout its history, philosophy has been onesidedly concerned with the metaphysical problem of what-things-are and keeps neglecting the problem of their knowability. Men have always been absorbed in the perennial wonder about what the universe as a whole is like. They have looked to speculative reason for light on this and each one has arrived at his own conclusion. There is not a single metaphysical view, as Kant points out, which all unanimously accept. Hence metaphysics appears to be an arena for endless combats, whereas Mathematics and Physical Sciences have, by and large, advanced more smoothly. However hard the metaphysicians try to replace the systems of others with what they think is genuine knowledge, such attempts, for Kant, have been doomed to failure, because the source of the disputes is still very problematic, especially regarding the assessment of the nature of genuine knowledge.


Knowledge in Kant's context is something more than mere beliefs.
"If our holding of the judgment be only subjectively sufficient, and is at the same time taken as being objectively insufficient, we have what is termed believing…when the holding of a thing to be true is sufficient both subjectively and objectively, it is knowledge" (B850).


In the Prolegomena, he further states that "everything to be known a priori (must be) apodictically certain", …and hence ought not contain probable but perfectly certain judgments'. (5)
According to Kant, never has there been any metaphysics that contains judgments so perfect that it is not challenged by the skeptics or can be completely exempted from doubt.


2.3 Kant's Aim of Settling the Disputes
However, the skeptics have also been unable to prevent philosophers from attempting metaphysics anew, because skepticism itself is incapable of being established authoritatively (cf. B388ff). Hence the combat between dogmaticism (metaphysical theories) and skepticism would seem to have been unending until Kant's criticism appeared.


Kant divides his philosophical development into three stages; dogmaticism, skepticism and criticism, as he sees these phases exemplified not only in the historical process in general but also in his own mental evolution. He begins with the dogmatic rationalism of Leibniz and Wolff, then calls this doctrine in question with the aid of Hume's empirical skepticism and gradually arrives at his own critical standpoint.:


Metaphysics, Kant holds, after having for so many centuries been nothing but a process of merely random groping, has not yet had the good fortune to enter upon the secure path of a science (cf. Bxivf).
For Kant, the best way to settle the disputes among metaphysicians is to determine the limits of knowledge beyond which the human mind cannot go. Hence he sets forth the problem in question in the Critique as: "How is metaphysics, as science, possible?" (B22). Note that his primary concern is not only with the truth or falsity of a particular system of metaphysics but also with the possibility of discovering how the truth or falsity of any metaphysical claim whatsoever can be sustained.



  
NOTES:


1.KANT, I., Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, transl. By L. W. BECK (New York 1961), Appendix p. 121.

2.KANT, I., Critique of Pure Reason, transl. by N. KEMP SMITH (London 1964) Axii. This number refers to the original pagination of the Kritik der reiner Vernunft. "A" is for the first edition and "B" for the second. I will use this pagination for references to the Critique.

3.Cf. JAMES, W., Some problems of Philosophy: A Beginning of an Introduction to Philosophy, (New York 1911).

4.BAUMGARTEN, A. G., Metaphysics, (Halle 2nd ed. 1743) #1. Baumgarten's method is to start with general definitions and proceed to more particular propositions. This is along the line of Leibniz-Wolffian methodology.

5.Prolegomena, #369-370.


3. KANT'S PRIMARY ASSUMPTIONS

In order to tackle the above-mentioned problem, Kant sets out his first Critique on a twofold logical basis. In fact it is only one basis considered from two different aspects. First of all, Kant transforms the hylomorphic structure of individual things held by Aristotelian metaphysicians into the hylomorphic structure of knowledge; that is, he distinguishes matter and form in knowledge. The external objects constituting the matter are to be conformed to the mental forms of the knower. Secondly, another aspect of the same assumption can also be traced in the logical characteristics of judgments which are synthetic and a priori. The synthetic element is the matter whereas the a priori elements are mental forms. The first aspect is derived from the Copernican Revolution and the second from the theory of judgment.


3.1 Conpernican Revolution
In order to determine the truth or falsity of any metaphysical claim, Kant deliberately sets out to bring about a revolution in our way of thinking about the relationship between mind and thing. It has been assumed in the traditional realistic thesis that truth simply consists in the conformity of mind to thing. Hence the thing is taken as the standard, and the mind is denominated "true", when it submits to this standard and really does describe the independent nature of the thing. Such a thesis is, of course, a plausible one but, Kant contends, it cannot escape the force of Hume's skepticism.


For Hume, if the mind in order to know must conform itself to objects, then it cannot discover any necessary connection between the objects. It thus becomes impossible to explain how we can make any necessary and universal judgments. However it is not merely that we find, for instance, that experienced events have causes, we also know in advance (a priori) that every event must have a cause. An event may happen with an unknown cause but it is surely not causeless. If everything is reduced to the merely empirically given, we cannot discover that there exists a causal relation. Hence, it is impossible to explain the knowledge of causality on the hypothesis that knowledge consists in the mind's conforming to objects. If the mind stands to the objects as the measured to the measure, it is impossible to determine the a priori conditions that govern the objectivity of knowledge. The a priori portion of the cognition cannot be derived from mere sense-experience.


Hume, then, denies the a priori elements in knowledge but explains the discovery of the causal connection in terms of the subjective association of ideas due to some sort of habit. Experience shows A to have been frequently followed by B and never to have occurred without B. The idea of B is therefore associated with A in a way in which no other idea is. It is by a customary association reinforced evermore by repetition that one has the "feeling" of the necessary connection between A and B. This is the origin of the idea of causality.


Kant is not satisfied with this and critizes Hume's emprical premise insofar as the latter does not distinguish well enough the two distinct functions of human cognitive faculties, namely, sensibility and understanding. Kant's distinction is a sort of combination of rationalism and empiricism. He locates the difference between the two faculties not merely in their operative stages but also in the origin of their presentations. Granted that the sensibility is the faculty of receiving impressions, sensation consists In the mind's being-affected-through-senses and the diversity of the sensations is due to the "stuff" given In experience. Kant, then, finds no other way of saving the distinct a prior element In knowledge than by attributing its origin to the faculty of understanding itself. In Kant's terminology, the sense-manifold of intuition is a posteriori, contingent and derived from experience whereas the subsumption of the intuitional data under the a priori categories provided by understanding renders our knowledge a priori, necessary and underived from experience. However It is noteworthy that Kant also assigns the a priori elements not only to the understanding but also to sensibility; hence the a priori forms of space and time also constitute pure sense intuitions which are not contingent.


This compels Kant to reverse the relation between mind and thing so that scientific truth may depend, somehow, upon the conformity of the thing with the mind. In other words, reliable knowledge is restricted to things as they appear, in conformity with our mental forms. Kant, therefore makes the Copernican Revolution:


"Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them a priori, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge. This would agree better with what is desired, namely, that it should be possible to have knowledge of objects a priori, determining something in regard to them prior to their being given. We should then be proceeding precisely on the lines of Copernicus ' primary hypothesis (mit den erten Gedanken des Kopernikus)" (Bxvi).


3.2 The Theory of Judgment
This Is the other aspect of Kant's assumption. In the philosophy of Leibniz, the principle of sufficient reason is considered the grandest axiom of the entire rationalistic system. The principle, in its most general logical form, states that "the content of the subject must always include that of the predicate in such a way that if one understands perfectly the concept of the subject, he will know that the predicate appertains to it also''.(7)


Kant, in his pre-critical period, is puzzled with this analytical requirement for all true propositions or judgments, especially when they state something about fact and existence. This leads Kant eventually to revise the theory of judgment.


He follows rationalism in making a distinction between a posteriori and a priori judgments, and empricism in making one between synthetic and analytic judgments. The distinction of the first pair is in view of their derivation from experiences. The a posteriori judgments are derived from experience, whereas the a priori are not. The distinction of the second pair is in view of the subject-predicate relation: a judgment is synthetic when the concept of the predicate is not contained in the concept of subject, and is called analytic when the predicate is so contained,. On finding that some recognized general scientific propositions are necessary and universal, Kant concludes that we do possess a pure, a priori element of knowledge.


Concerning the a priori characteristic of knowledge, Kant radically diverges from the traditional realistic thesis which states that "universality" and "necessity" are found to be real traits in the essential structure of nature and that our intellect cooperating with senses can penetrate into the essence of things. However Kant's new conformity-theory of knowledge compels him to deny such penetration. He attributes all the epistemologically warranted, formal and determinate elements in knowledge to the cognitive faculty of the knower.


Within the framework of a priori knowledge, Kant finds difficulty, not with the analytic a priori judgments, but with the synthetic a priori ones. The latter are used to extend our scientific knowledge. Now metaphysics, if it be science at all and can yield true knowledge, ought to contain synthetic a priori knowledge.


"For its business is not merely to analyze concepts which we make for ourselves a priori of things, and thereby to clarify them analytically, but to extend our a priori knowledge" (Bl8).


Thus metaphysics consists, at least in intention, entirely in the task of searching for synthetic a priori judgments. Since Kant holds that the direct object of our knowledge consists in the mind's being-affected-through-senses, the chasm between things-in-themselves and mental contents becomes insurmountable. On this premise, Kant has already undermined the possibility of metaphysics.


3.3 The Bearings of the Assumptions
Just as Copernicus attributes observed movements, not to the heavenly bodies, but to the condition of the observer, so Kant attributes certain ways in which objects appear to the knower to his subjective a priori conditions or mental forms (cf. Bxxii and the note). This is similar to a man who sees the world as red because he is wearing a pair of red-tinted spectacles. The world which presents itself to him in the sense-experience is a red world but whether the world outside of his experience is red ot not is another question. The man knows the red-colour only insofar as he encounters something in the experience of vision.


Space and time, for example, are not pertinent to the thing-in-itself but are a priori forms of sensibility. Whenever the external objects appear to us, they must have been temporalized and spatialized. They constitute the framework, as it were, in which the manifold of sensation is ordered and arranged. This is an example concerning the level of sensibility.


Another example concerns the understanding. Kant holds that we certainly do know a priori that every event must have a cause. Why? Objects must be subjected to the a priori concepts of categories of the human understanding of which causality is one.


However the Copernican Revolution does not imply that the entire reality is reduced to a mental construction or our thinking of them. Kant is not an idealist (at least not in this sense). It means rather that the mind imposes, as it were, on the material or the "stuff" of experience its own focus of cognition, determined by the structure of human sensibility and understanding and that objects cannot be known except through the medium of these forms.



  
NOTES:

6.Cf. DRYER, D. P., Kant ' s Solution for Verification in Metaphysics, (London 1966) p. 17.

7.LEIBNIZ, G.W., Discourse on Metaphysics, (Wiener 1961) p.93.

. THE REJECTION OF METAPHYSICS

It is not difficult to see how Kant, with the above-mentioned premises, comes to the conclusion of a doctrine of unknowability which pre-determines the fate of metaphysics.


4.1 The Doctrine of Unknowability (of Things-in-themselves)


4.l.l The "Reference" of Appearance
Kant distinguishes the matter and the form of knowledge. The matter is said to be the object of representation given from without and is received passively through the senses, whereas that which so determines the manifold of the representation that it allows of being ordered in certain relations is called the form of appearance (cf. B34).


At the end of the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements in the Critique he concludes that categories of understanding, taken by themselves, yield no knowledge, and that the schematized categories can yield knowledge only insofar as they are applied to the data of intuition, namely, the appearances (cf. A568 B596). Hence appearances are naturally described as sense-representations which are the modifications of the subject's mind but not as objects independent of the mind. Paradoxically, appearances are often called objects and regarded as external, spatially distinct from the knowing subject and his ideas (cf. B34; A109).


It seems that Kant makes a distinction between the object and the representation of the object. Appearances are referred to both the objects and representations. In order to reconcile this twofold reference, we have to resort to his Transcendental-Empirical distinction.


4.l.2 Transcendental-Empirical Distinction
Kant makes a distinction between transcendental and empirical objects, transcendental and empirical selves. The central issue of this distinction is to separate two kinds of inquiry or claim. Neither of them is supposed to refer to two different entities but to two different ways of talking about one and the same thing.


The transcendental inquiries concern the a priori possibility of knowledge or its employment. For instance, the transcendental logic concerns the scope, the origin and objective validity of "the laws of understanding and reason solely in so far as they relate a priori to objects''. (B81f). Transcendental philosophy concerns the mode of knowledge, especially regarding its combination of matter and form; as Kant says, "I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects insofar as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori" (B25). Hence the transcendental claims are about the a priori elements in the knowing subject and method of his pure reason. With this in mind, Kant concludes that our knowledge of objects holds valid only within the appearances, namely, within the sphere in which we are being-affected-through-senses in cooperation with our a priori elements in the mind.


Kant also allows empirical inquiries to be admitted in the appearances in which the objects of experience are considered spatially distinct, external to the inquirers. Hence we can treat all external objects in the field of experience as things-in-themselves, insofar as appearances are concerned, without troubling ourselves about the primary ground of their possibility as appearances.


By virtue of this distinction, Kant is able to make different claims on the following statements: first, that there are external objects of which we have knowledge; second, that we are immediately aware of our ideas, or representations. The first is a transcendental falsity but an empirical truth, whereas the second is a transcendental truth but an empirical falsity. Transcendentally speaking, knowledge of objects is subject to a priori conditions on the part of the knowing subject, and thus is only applicable to representational objects or contents given in experience. In other words, appearances are contents of our mental representations in the transcendental sense. Empirically speaking, the objects of experience are considered as external objects spatially distinct from the knower. (8)


The most obvious exemplification is that of space and time. They are regarded as transcendentally ideal because they are the a priori forms of intuitions. Since the sense-manifold is given in the inner experience of succession and the outer experience of space, we can be certain that they are our a priori forms with which we spatialize and temporalize the given "stuff" or the "sense-manifold" in a specific arrangement. But the question whether they, in fact, belong to the realm of the thing-in-itself is entirely beyond our sensibility and hence our a priori forms cannot be applied to that realm. On the other hand, they are empirically real because they always hold good for the experienced objects which are spatially distinct from and external to us.


Up to here Kant has only made this distinction between the two inquiries, but to advance beyond the limit or bound of sensuous intuitions and to ask the ground for the possibility of appearances in the transcendental sense, the concept of a transcendental object would be required. Note that Kant says that the concept, not the existence, of transcendental objects is required. In point of fact, Kant has simply inserted it Into the world of Noumenon and the concept of Noumenon is a limiting concept (Grenzbegriff) demanded by the concept of Phenomenon as the correlate of the latter.


4.1.3 The Transcendental Object and Noumenon
First of all Kant explicitly mentions that the idea of appearances involves the idea of something that appears (cf. Al04). In other words, if we try to abstract from all that which in the object has reference to the a priori conditions of knowledge, namely, the possibility of objects of knowledge, we arrive at the idea of Transcendental Object, "the completely indeterminate thought of something in general" (A253).


Since all sense manifold representations are related by the understanding to the transcendental object which signifies only a something-X, the transcendental object cannot be insulated in thought.


However, not satisfied with this substrate of sensibility (cf. A251), Kant proceeds to transform the notion of transcendental object into the concept Noumenon In view of the latter's etymological significance. Noumenon means objects of thought or of understanding, namely, as intuited or apprehended in a non-sensuous fashion. In order to form the positive concept of Noumenon, Kant assumes the possibility of an intellectual intuition in which the thing-in-itself is directly apprehended.


By way of hypothesis, Kant attributes this intellectual intuition to the "Intellectus Archetypus" (cf. A695 B723) which belongs to the Divine Mind. It is also called creative intuition, for it is wholly active and productive source of creation. Hence God directly apprehends the real essence of the thing-in-itself without the aid of sensuous intuition because God has created all this. Sensuous intuition is ascribed to "Intellectus Ectypus" which belongs to human finite minds in the sense that finite minds are affected by extra-mental things (through senses) whose existence is supposed rather than created by them. All cognition worked out through the human mind, therefore, has to begin with sensuous intuition. The Noumenon in its positive notion, thus, means the object of intellectual intuition and hence things-in-themselves are objects of God's creation and knowledge and not objects of human cognition. In its negative sense, it is not-the-object-of-sensuous-intuition and in point of fact the entire Transcendental Doctrine of Elements is entertaining the negative concept of Noumenon. The introduction of Noumenon, Kant insists, is meant to keep a strict hold of the critical teaching, namely, that both sensibility and understanding are only applicable to the Phenomenon.


Therefore, the concept of Noumenon is only a problematic one not assertoric (cf. A254 B310), because Kant believes that we have no means of asserting its objective reality for the very thought of its real existence involves the existence-category. Hence it is a limiting concept for its function is only to limit the pretensions of sensibility.(9)


4.2 The Failure of Every Metaphysics (as Transcendent Science)
With the above doctrine in mind, we can see easily that the general ground for Kant's own rejection of metaphysics is not difficult to state. The Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic taken together can lead to the conclusion of the unknowability of the thing-in-itself which destroys every possibility of speculative and transcendent metaphysics.


Kant has first argued that the objects of speculative metaphysics are basically transcending from sense-intuition. Secondly metaphysicians, at least in intention, have to establish the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments in metaphysics. However the very question of how such judgments are possible yields the transcendental (matter-form) theory of knowledge. No knowledge of objects is possible except insofar as it is related to the a priori conditions on the part of the knowing subject. Hence knowledge is only restricted to things as they appear, in conformity with our mental forms, and does not reach things-in-themselves. This claim is fatal to all metaphysical theories.


Furthermore, Kant makes it perfectly clear that the principles of understanding can have a very limited application, namely, their objective reference is confined to phenomena alone. If there were any metaphysical doctrines, they would have been supposed to be independent of sensuous intuition altogether and to be established by intellectual intuition which we unfortunately do not possess. In the absence of intellectual intuition, the doctrine of unknowability is founded. In any case, it appears that, whether in fact or in principle, speculative metaphysics cannot be made up of synthetic a priori truths. Thus Kant rejects every possibility of metaphysics as a transcendent science.


  
NOTES:

8.Cf. BIRD, G., Kant's Theory of Knowledge, (London 2nd Impression 1965) p. 44f.

9.Cf. PATON, H. J., Kant’s Metaphysics of Experience, (London 1951) Vol. 2, chs. LV & LVI, pp. 442, 450ff.

5. EVALUATION

My evaluation of Kant's approach will proceed as follows. We shall first see whether the doctrine of unknowability is tenable within Kant's context. Consequently, is Kant able to do away with all the possibility of metaphysics? If not, then in the second point we shall see whether Kant's assumption, the Copernican Revolution, needs any further modification. Can it yield another insight different from that of Kant?


5.1 Criticism of the Tenability of the Doctrine of Unknowability
It seems that Kant wishes to remain in an agnostic position. For he believes that we can neither assert nor deny the existence of any object in the Noumenal world and a fortiori, cannot speak of the knowledge of its nature or essence.


However Kant does not seem to me consistent in remaining in such an agnostic position. For, concerning the problems of the transcendental self and the transcendental object, Kant has not been able to give a satisfactory account. Furthermore, his "Refutation of Idealism" confirms my belief that Kant cannot help but retain the existence of the thing-in-itself.


5.l.l The Paradox of the Transcendental Self and Transcendental Object
In the Transcendental Analytic, Kant claims that the sense-manifold of the intuition is to be subsumed under the a priori categories provided by the understanding through the schemata of imagination; and that only the schematized categories can yield knowledge.


However the relation between sensation and intellection presupposes a principle of unification which is the unity of the Consciousness-in-general: the Ultimate a priori ground for the sense-manifold being synthesized and brought into an intelligible unity under the categories of understanding. Kant puts it this way:
"It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations" (B131).
Thus the "I think" constitutes the "Transcendental unity of Apperception" to which Kant attributes the framework of objectivity and the possibility of experience in general (cf. Bl32). Now the subject of the unity must be capable of self-consciousness so that the knowing subject can be aware of his own unity between the perceiving and thinking subject. In other words, the self-consciousness enables the subject to be aware of the fact that the self is the source of the unity. Hence on the occasion of experience, the existence of a transcendental ego reveals itself to the subject. As a pure and original unity, the self, in some way precedes experience precisely because it is the a priori condition for the possibility of experience. In this way the "Self" cannot be referred to an empirical self. For the empirical self is only what is known in appearance, it cannot be the bearer of the appearance(10). Kant, then, admits the existence of the transcendental self, at least implicitly. For he puts it this way:
"Certainly, the representation 'I am', which expresses the consciousness that can accompany all thought, immediately includes in itself the existence of a subject" (B277).


On the other hand Kant is aware that such addmittance would be an illicit inference. Hence in B422 he warns us not to mistake the subject as if it were an object of thought under its process of caterigorization. He wants, therefore, to maintain that its existence cannot be asserted for such an assertion would involve the categorization of the understanding. Kant's position seems to be this: one thing is that we have to think of the transcendental self as existing; another is that we do not know whether this ought-to-think-it-as-existing entails its objective existence.


This position is agnostic on one hand but paradoxical on another. I do not know how it is possible that Kant, on the one hand, asserts transcendentally that the "possibility of the experience" Is grounded in the transcendental unity of apperception while, on the other hand, holding that existence of the transcendental self that constitutes the transcendental unity of apperception is entirely unknown. For me it is, at least, co-known or co-affirmed though in an unthematical way. We shall dwell on this point later.


As we have observed in connection with B277, Kant's early doctrine of the transcendental object has developed in somewhat a close parallelism with that of the transcendental unity of apperception(11). The concept of transcendental object is used to account for the diversity of sensations and for the objects of representations. By this, Kant means that the thing-in-itself is the object which appears to us but it never appears to us as it is in itself. Its appearance has already been re-organized by the a priori elements of our cognitive faculties. The existence of the thing-in-itself seems to be inevitable, but Kant wants to remain agnostic, again, about this transcendental object, for the same reason as that mentioned above. Hence he runs into the same inconsistency as with the transcendental self(12).


There is another similar reason to explain why Kant cannot remain consistent in his agnostic position. The first Critique (as well as the doctrine of unknowability)is intended to set a limit to the validity of human knowledge. Within the area of this limit, namely, within the phenomena, our knowledge, such as that of Mathematics and Physical Sciences, is proved to be valid and reliable, whereas beyond this limit we, in principle, cannot claim any knowledge. However one cannot draw such a limit, unless one presumably knows (a priori) that there exists something noumenal which is beyond the limit. On the other hand, if we claim to know that there exists a noumenal world, the thing-in-itself, the knowledge of this claim will no longer be valid because this claim is mediated by our a priori catergories.


Kant, says P. F. Strawson, "seeks to draw the bounds of sense from a point outside them, a point which, if they are rightly drawn, cannot exist"(13). Indeed, F. H. Jacobi, the contemporary of Kant, has well remarked that without the idea of the thing-in-itself, we cannot enter the world of the Critique of Pure Reason, but with it neither can we remain inside(14).


5.1.2 Kant's Refutation of Idealism
Kant's refutation of Idealism provides further evidence to confirm my belief that Kant cannot remain agnostic but is, at heart, a realist who asserts the existence of the thing-in-itself. He puts the argument this way:
"I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time. All determination of time presupposes something permanent in perception…Thus perception of this permanent is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me; and consequently the determination of my existence in time is possible only through the existence of actual things which I perceive outside me…In other words, the consciousness of my existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me" (B276).


There is a great dispute among the commentators whether Kant is here referring the existence of the actual things outside oneself to the thing-in-itself, even though in his introduction (cf. Bxxxix and the note) Kant has explicitly maintained that the independent existence of the object is to be understood in the empirical sense(15). I also doubt whether this argument in such an emphatic form does not constitute a Transcendental Realism. For, if the consciousness of my existence is referred to the transcendental ego which reveals itself to the subject on the occasion of experience, the object of experience must be in some way the non-ego of the non-empirical reality. Of course, this does not rule out the possibility that the non-ego, the object of experience, is, after all, a mere construction of the mind. But does Kant possibly mean this? Definitely not! He certainly thought it absurd to reduce all reality to mere mental construction of the subject, else he would have been no better than Berkeley whose idealism maintains that only the mind and what the mind perceives exist. Therefore, Kant has to look on the retention of the existence of the thing-in-itself as a matter of common sense. Besides, if the thing-in-itself is totally eliminated, the phenomena would be identified with the thing-in-itself; and consequently Kant's philosophy would, at once, have become full-blown metaphysical system.


Granted that he has retained the thing-in-itself, does it follow that his rejection of metaphysics is automatically self-invalidated? Not necessarily, although the strength of his rejection is now much reduced. For, at least, it is, in principle, possible for man to know the existence of the thing-in-itself.


However the Copernican Hypothesis can still enable Kant to remain subjectivistic regarding the nature or essence of the thing-in-itself. He can still possibly deny that the human mind can ever penetrate into the essence of the natural things themselves. Now it is time to discuss his assumptions.


5.2 Criticism of the Copernican Revolution
I think I have explained earlier why Kant opts for this assumption, hence I do not want to repeat myself here. What I wish to point out here Is that Copernicus' doctrine of motion (cf. Bxxii), taken in itself as a scientific theory, does not confirm Kant's philosophical conclusion.


Copernicus explained that the observation of motions of the heavenly bodies must be in view of the motion of the observer on earth. This actually is derived from the Aristotelian principle of relative motion. For Copernicus holds that if the observed objects are moving in the same direction with equal velocity, no motion can be observed. If any movement is ascribed to the earth, that notion will generate appearance of itself In all things which are external to it, though as occurring in the opposite direction, as if everything were passing across the earth.(16)


Now Kant employs the same analogy in his theory of knowledge that the apparent characteristic of reality is due to the mind of the knower(17). If the knowledge of objects is due to the structure of the cognitive faculty, then the mind can never penetrate into reality beyond its appearances. Consequently no transcendent metaphysics is possible.


I think the key-point is that our observation of the external world, at least insofar as motion is concerned, is always relative to the situation of the observer. The relativity can be further confirmed by Einstein's theory about the simultaneity of time. According to him, when events happen at different places, they can be called simultaneous only in a relative sense. For it is empirically possible that according to one observer event A happens before event B; according to another, B may precede A; whereas a third observer may call them simultaneous., There seems, therefore, to be no universal "before" and "after" in time, insofar as observers are concerned. Hence observations, as far as motion and time are concerned, are always relative to the observers.


However does this consequently confirm Kant's belief that knowledge consists in the conformity of objects to the situation (mental forms) of the knower? Does it follow that we can observe objects in space and time owing to our a priori forms of sensibility with which we spatialize and temporalize the sense-manifold? Does it further entail that it is our mind that imposes the principle of causality on the phenomenal world rather than penetrates into the real nature of the world by abstraction? I do not think that it is necessarily so.


The presence of this relativity does not entail the non-penetrability of things in themselves by the mind, and the awareness of the relativity just presupposes the contrary. The very possibility of detecting the relativity and subjectivity of our sense-perception reveals to us that we are some way given an absolute datum in our experience against which we can pinpoint the fact of relativity. The consciousness of this absolute datum vindicates the penetrability of the thing-in-itself by the mind. To what extent? I do not know, but it is, in principle, possible.


Of course such a remark would not by itself necessitate an abandonment of the general standpoint represented by Kant's theory of experience because his new conformity-theory of knowledge may serve him as an absolute datum, a point of departure, which taken as vindication does not require any demonstrated proof and consequently be rationally defensible.


Besides, Kant's Copernican Revolution is an initial asumption designed to explain the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments on the supposition that they could not be explained otherwise. However to postulate the assumption in this way is not uncontroversial. For example, it is still relevant to ask if there is in fact any synthetic a priori knowledge. Secondly, if we agree that there is, we can still ask whether its possibility cannot be explained in ways other than Kant's.


The above remark indicates there is a certain amount of arbitrariness, if not bias, in Kant's initial option with which he has already undermined a priori the possibility of transcendent metaphysics at the very outset. I doubt whether this is the best option, if there is any, to settle the dispute among the metaphysicians.


Two important remarks can be made here. First, with his epistemology Kant has not succeeded in remaining consistently in the agnostic position. I am inclined to think that he, at heart, belongs to Transcendental Realism which, at least in principle, concedes a sort of immediate, intuitive or unthematic co-knowledge of the objective existence of thing-in-itself. This arouses a certain hope for the revival of metaphysics. Secondly, granted that Kant has full right to opt for his initial assumption (Copernican Revolution) and the transcendental method, he can arrive at the awareness of relativity which, indeed, tames every wild dogmaticism. However he cannot ignore that this awareness precisely presupposes something absolute concomitantly given there in the cognitive experience.


Now I would like to dwell on, at some length, this absolute datum to see if it can bridge the chasm between the thing-in-itself and the so-called "mental contents" of the knower, and to see if it can furnish a new insight for an alternative approach to the possibility of metaphysics.



  
NOTES:

10.Cf. KEMP SMITH, N., A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, (New York 2nd edition 1962) pp. 321-331.
11.Cf. IBID.
12.Some commentators would not consider Kant's agnostic position as inconsistent. For, on the part of the subject, one can be certain of or experience the existence of the thing-in-itself, but it does not follow that one knows that it objectively exists. The concept of Noumenon is demanded as the correlate of the concept of Phenomenon, The word "correlate" is used just to avoid asserting the cause-effect relation between two concepts. The term "correlate" simply means that the concept cannot be insulated in thought insofar as we have the concept of phenomenon.　
In my view, this position is not tenable. For, as soon as one grasps the existence of something one should not remain agnostic about its objectivity. This is an intuitive knowledge and not merely a subjective certainty. I will dwell on this point later.

13.STRAWSON, P. F., The Bounds of Sense, (London 1966) p.12.

14.Cf. WALSH, W.H., Kant Immanuel, In P.EWARDS (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London 1976) Vol. 4, p.315.

15.Cf. EWING, A. C., A Short Commentary on Kart's Critique of Pure Reason, (London reprinted 1961) pp. 176-187.
16.Cf. KEMP SMITH, N., op. cit., pp.23-25.
17.Cf. PATON, H. J., op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 75-76.

6. PERSPECTIVES AND CONCLUSION


6.1 The Awareness of Relativity Presupposes the Intuition of Being
The "awareness of relativity", for Kant, is a clue discovering the limitation of human knowledge. It restricts whatever we know to appearances. He says very well that knowledge must begin with sense-experience, at the same time that sense-experience will not be possible unless it is submitted to the a priori forms of sensibility. Hence these two premises taken jointly make it impossible for man to attain any knowledge beyond the so-called senseintuition. Note that the abandonment of the speculative use of reason is due to the absence of the intellectual intuition on the part of man rather than the objects of this intuition, namely, the transcendental self and the transcendental object.


In my opinion, the objects of this intuition should be not considered things out of which we, as it were, try hard to dig the essence. On the contrary, as Fichte has pointed out, the said object, the transcendental ego, is an act rather than a things(18). According to him, to ascribe the transcendental ego to the ultimate ground of the unity of consciousness implies that the pure ego, namely, the transcendental ego is considered an activity within consciousness. For example, I am now thinking an object A. Then, I can think the "me" that thinks an object A. Obviously I objectify the "me" that thinks an object A, in the sense that I make it object-for-subject. Hence the process can go on infinitely, namely, that I think the "me" that thinks the "me" that thinks…ad infinitum. However hard I try, the Ego transcends objectification and is itself the condition of all objectifiability and of the unity of consciousness(19). Fichte, hence, insists that we must have the intellectual intuition of the transcendental ego as an act within consciousness and that this is not a mystic experience for the privileged few. Nevertheless Fichte has taken this primordial intuition as his first principle or truth in philosophy and develops a system of Idealistic Metaphysics.


I am not interested in his idealism but rather in his primordial intellectual intuition. Its central issue is: what is intuited is not an objectified essence but an act. The mentioning of Fichte shows that in spite of Kant's denial of intellectual intuition, a Kantian philosopher could also preserve the validity of the intellectual intuition of the pure ego as an activity within consciousness. This could be a starting point for the possibility of metaphysics.


Some Neo-Thomists actually follow a similiar line of thought regarding the so-called Intuition of Being. They distinguish a simple apprehension of the "essences of things" from an intuition of Being (namely, Actus Essendi or act of existing). The former can be explained in terms of an essential judgment that describes the essence of the object concerned, for example, "This is so-and-so", whereas the latter is to be explained in terms of an existential judgment concerning the act of existing, namely, "This IS". The former judgment presupposes the latter, for the former would be meaningless if we cannot affirm the latter a priori.


Moreover, we need to make another distinction between the concept of existence and the intuition of hems (an immediate affirmation of Actus Essendi ). When we say that “A is being” in the former sense, we mentally attribute the concept of existence to A; when “A is being” in the latter sense, we affirm a pure Actus Essendi disregardins what A is, whether it be my mental product or what-not.


In fact, when Kant says that “existence” is one of the a priori categories, he uses “existence” as a concept with which we think. Hence in an existential statement like "God, as a necessary being, exists, (ontological argument), we, in Kant, s context, are objectifying the necessary being as object of thought and in the meantime we can’t help but think the necessary being as existing, insofar as a necessary being is conceiveable. In this case, we are just passing from one concept (of existence) to another (of necessary being) or the other way round, but we cannot leap from the conceptual order to existential order. The leap is illicit. Kant, indeed, is right in refuting the ontological argument but is wrong in neglecting that apart from the concept of existence we still have the intuition of being. I do not mean we can intuit directly God’s existence but rather mean that we are able to affirm intuitively the Actus Essendi, no matter what this Actus Essendi may be. That is to say the intuition that “something exists” is it is primarily given disregarding what this something is. We simply encounter the Actus Essendi which is delivered to us as an absolute datum in the experience.


However Kant was not completely unaware of this. For example, his desperate effort of insisting on the unity of apperception as a fundamental experience is precisely a confirmation of the apprehension of something existent as an unity. Kant’s denial of intellectual intuition does not exclude the intuition of being. Indeed the “awareness of relativity” presupposes it.


6.2 The Transcendental Method and the Intuition of Being
A thorough and attentive study of Kant’s position shows that his transcendental method is by no means restricted to the concrete conclusion of the Critique.
The interesting study of O. Muck on the transcendental method reveals that "during the last forty years the numbers of neo-scholastics have grown who consider the so-called ‘transcendental method’ the way to reach the goal set by contemporary neo-scholasticism, viz., a response of the scholastic tradition to the contemporary philosophical problemtic”,(20). Joseph Marechal for instance, was one of the first pioneers who deliberately adopted the transcendental method as a fruitful tool for the aims of scholastic philosophy(21).


However I would like to have recourse to Emerich Coreth, one of the most prominent contemporary transcendental Thomists, who has succeeded in showing the richness of the intuition of being by means of the transcendental method. His investigation of the condition of possibility of the act of knowledge leads to a dialectical development of philosophy which is in essential agreement with Thomism in terms of its results, but which goes deeper with respect to its foundation(22).


For him the task of metaphysics is provided by the transcendental method, which he defines in the words of Kant, "I call every knowledge transcendental, which occupies itself not so much with objects, but rather with our way of knowing objects, insofar as this is to be possible a priori"(23).


The method refers to inquiries into the a priori conditions under which metaphysical claims may be true. It starts with the inquirer's experience of being conscious (in Coreth's case, it is the questioning itself). Within this horizon, a twofold constant and interactive movement of thought, namely, reduction and deduction, is employed so as to uncover thematically the immediate, unthematized and pre-philosophical data in the initial awareness which furnish the a priori conditions of the total reality of being conscious (as this reality presents itself in the act of knowing) and then "from this previous datum, uncovered reductively, (there is deduced) a priori the empirical act of consciousness, its nature, its possibility and its necessity. Whereas reduction proceeds from a particular experience to the conditions of its possibility, deduction goes from these conditions to the essential structures of the same experience''. This is to mediate the immediate knowledge, from the unthematic to the themtic. Thus it reverses the process of universal doubt by going beyond the merely factual state-of-affairs pointing to the vindication of something unquestionably absolute which is being as the foundation and horizon of metaphysics in germ.(24)


As B. Lonergan remarks, in his critique of Coreth's original German work(25) under the significant title "Metaphysics as Horizon"(26), for Coreth the basis of transcendental method, applied to any judgment, lies not in the content of the judgment but in its possibility and its functions by reductio ad absurdum;
"The main task of the metaphysician is not to reveal or prove what is new and unknown; it is to give scientific expression to what already is implicitly acknowledged without being explicitly recognized"(27).
The trouble with Kant, Coreth says, is that:
"…he did not go far back enough when looking for the conditions of possibility of human knowledge. He stopped at the finite subject, he did not reach an absolute horizon of validity, and thus he eliminated all possibility of metaphysical knowledge. Only if we can, against Kant and proceeding beyond him, show that our a priori knowledge is metaphysical knowledge of being, which opens for us the absolute horizon of being as such, shall we be able to validate metaphysics critically and methodically. This task has been clearly recognized within the neo- Scholastic school, especially since the pioneering work of Joseph Marechal''(28).


His starting point is the conscious, concrete activity of the human mind asking a question. Lonergan remarks that to doubt questioning is to involve oneself in a counterposition, and so questioning is beyond the doubter’s capacity to doubt coherently(29).


"When we question the question, our attention is forced to proceed beyond the explicit knowledge presented by the content into the implicit knowledge contained in the act of questioning itself. Thus when I ask what things I can question, the very act of asking this question supplies an answer to it. For I can ask questions about absolutely everything. Should somebody suggest that there might be limits to my power of questioning, I shall ask questions about these limits, and by this very fact proceed beyond them. The fact that I can question absolutely everything is unthematically contained in the very act of questioning. If I inquire what this "absolutely everything" about which I can ask questions really is, the answer to this question is likewise unthematically or implicitly contained in the question itself. For I always ask what everything IS. Hence I know that everything about which I ask questions IS and that the range of my inquiring is the unlimited horizon of being.


We have here a continual interaction, a dialectic between concept and act, between pensee pensee and pensee pensante, between the conceptualized, explicit, thematic content of our knowledge and the unthematic, pre-reflexive, implicit knowledge that is co-affirmed with the act of knowing itself. The interaction results in what the German language calls Volizugswissen" (30).Therefore the co-affirmation or co-knowledge of being is concomitant to every act of consciousness though in an unthematic way. A rejection of the possibility of metaphysics implies a contradiction between the denial and the act by means of which one denies, between the thematic content of the act and the unthematically co-affirmed and presupposed conditions of its possibility(31).


The very possibility of questioning, as Lonergan remarks, (or of any conscious activity, we may add) is being, and this being is being (Actus Essendi) in its unqualified sense, being-in-itself (An-sich-Sein). The process of bringing out this intuition of being is a process of a mediated immediacy (vermittelte Unmittelbarkeit), through the transcendental method that points to the interaction between "concept" and "act" (Vollzug, or "performance" in Lonergan's translation)., Kant failed to get hold of the intuition of being, because his use of the transcendental method consists in the dialectic between concept and concept (categorized) and not between concept and act. His contradiction, as Lonergan remarks, lies not in the formal entity (Ich denke) that merely thinks thoughts, but in a concrete intelligence that by its performance means and by its uttered contents denies that we know what really and truly is so (32).


6.3 An Alternative Approach to Metaphysics: The Intuition of Being
I have reason for the preference of this intution of being as a new approach to metaphysics. I am convinced that a good approach should not be located merely in the epistemological inquiry, as Kant located it. For we will have difficulty In bridging the chasm between the thing-in-itself (the uncategorized stuff) and the mental contents (categorized concepts). This actually re-echoes the difficulty of drawing the distinction between epistemological and metaphysical inquiries mentioned earlier. For they are so interwoven that it is difficult to decide which should take the precedence. The intuition serves precisely as a primordial datum that transcends and precedes both inquiries. In other words, if you do not start with "something exists", then you start with a nought. And nothing comes from nothing!


Coreth would also consider that the intuition of being is something to be presupposed by an inquiry:
"Questioning or inquiring presupposes some knowledge about being. But this knowledge…is not a knowledge which possesses that which is known, but a knowledge which projects that which can be known. This presupposes that we already know about being or about the meaning of being. The origin of this knowledge lies in the act of questioning itself. Whenever we question, we know that we question, that we are the inquirer, that we perform the act of inquiring. In every act of inquiring or knowing, some being is given which coincides immediately with knowing, which knows itself as being. The act knows itself as being. Being knows itself as act. We have an immediate unity of being and knowing in the very act of knowing"(33).


Following the same line of reason, Muck remarks also:
"Since the act of questioning knowledge has shown itself to be finite and conditioned by pointing beyond itself to the absolute, we ask again how the finite act stands with respect to the finite subject and how it is made possible by it. This leads to the development of being and acting, being and essence, and the universal laws of being. However, not every act is a question. This leads us to the conditions of the act of intellection in which being as such is disclosed, and to the immanent exposition of being according to its transcendental determinations (in the classical sense). However, this step does not explain why the intellectual act of man is questioning and not simply the possesion of knowledge. This void leads to the foundation of a metaphysics of the material world and of sense experience, as well as of human being in the world (including interpersonal relationships and the moral order of human activity). It also leads to the determination of the relations of questioning to the absolute as religion, and this absolute as God"(34).


This intuition of being, as many thinkers confirm, is always present in our experience whether it be sensible, intellectual, moral, mystic or religious etc. provided that we make a reflection upon it. I think that Kant also had a similiar intuition in his moral experience. The moral agent is conscious of the "duty", the "ought", the "categorical imperative"! How, Kant asks, is this categorical imperative possible? In reply to this, he finds that its possibility is grounded in the idea of freedom of the will. If freedom were illusory, the entire moral experience would be deceptive. But since moral experience, for Kant, is incontrovertible, "Freedom", though belonging to the noumenal world, is necessarily required as the a priori ultimate ground for the possibility of moral experience and categorical imperative. As a consequence the categorical imperative is not possible, unless the moral agent, man himself, is at once a member both of the phenomenal and noumenal world. This is the theory of Two Standpoints. The empirical self belongs to the former world, hence its action follows the law of causality that governs the phenomena, and it is also liable to deviate from the way in which it would act as a member of the noumenal world. And the moral law is legislated by the free will of the transcendental self upon the empirical self as Imperative.(35) The Two Standpoints theory presupposes the intuition of the moral activity within the consciousness. The moral experience demands or "posits" an Ego as a member of the two worlds. This leads to the bi-polarity of the intuition of being, namely, man (as moral subject) being-in-the-world. This strikes the same tone of the intuition of being.


Hence the intuition is a good starting point for the journey to metaphysics for it opens a new possibility to the thing-in-itself. If this intuition imposes an ineluctable urge on us, an urge that urges for self-openness to the real and absolute, then we must admit that it is an intuitive knowledge. If this is knowledge, it follows that our mind, to a certain extent, has the possibility of attaining to the knowledge of the thing-in-itself. It assures us of the fact that our mind is open to truth.


In conclusion, I admire Kant's effort and seriousness in tackling the possibility of metaphysics but I disagree with his way of adopting the initial assumptions that lead him to an agnostic position (for his inconsistency). His intention of settling the metaphysical disputes is good but leads him to the extreme position of denying every possibility of metaphysics. I am conscious that there are still many difficulties in the attempt to build metaphysical system(s), but Kant's transcendental method is very highlighting in this regard. Finally, if metaphysics has as its object the fundamental explanation of all things, considered in their entirety, such an inquiry must be grounded in the intuition of being as an absolute datum. Hence the reinstatement of the possibility of metaphysics depends on whether or not one has the experience of the Actus Essendi and whether one considers it an intuitive knowledge. This is the initial option we have to decide upon, just as we have to decide whether man is rational, and whether he is able to philosophize with his rationality.



  
NOTES:

18.Cf. Sammtliche Werk, ed. by I. H. FICHTE, 8 Vols. (Berlin 1845-46) Vol. 1, pp. 463ff.

19.Cf. IBID.

20.MUCK, O., The Transcendental Method, transl. By W. D. SEIDENSTICKER (New York 1968) p. 19.

21.Cf. van RIET, G., Thomistic Epistemology, transl. by G.FRANKS, 2 Vols. (London 1963) Vol. 1, pp. 236-271.

22.Cf. MUCK, O., op. cit., pp.285-306.

23.CORETH, E., Metaphysics, transl. by J.DONCEEL, with a critique by B. J. F. LONERGAN (London 1968) p. 35.

24.Cf. IBID., pp.31-44. The exact quotation is from p. 37.

25.It appeared in Gregorianum 44(1963) pp.307-318 and as an appendix to J. Donceel's translation, pp. l97-219. The quotation used is according to the latter.

26.Lonergan explains that "a horizon is a maximum field of vision from a determinate standpoint. In a generalized sense, a horizon is specified by two poles, one objective and the other subjective, with each pole conditioning the other. Hence, the objective pole is taken, not materially, but like the formal object sub ratione sub qua attingitur (under that aspect which the activity specifically regards); similiarly the subjective pole is considered, not materially, but in its relation to the objective pole. Thus, the horizon of Pure Reason is specified when one states that its objective pole is possible being as determined by relations of possibility and necessity obtaining between concepts, and that its subjective pole is logical thinking as determining what can be and what must be. Similarly, in the horizon of critical idealism, the objective pole is the world of experience as appearance, and the subjective pole is the set of a priori conditions of the possibility of such a world. Again, in the horizon of the expert, the objective pole is his restricted domain as attained by accepted scientific methods, and the subjective pole is the expert practising those methods; but in the horizon of the wise man, the philosopher of the Aristotelian tradition, the objective pole is an unrestricted domain, and the subjective pole is the philosopher practising transcendental method, namely, the method that determines the ultimate and so basic whole" (IBID., pp.211f).

27.LONERGAN, B. J. F., IBID., p.200.

28.CORETH, E., op. cit., p. 36f.

29.Cf. LONERGAN, B. J. F., op. cit., p. 210.

30.CORETH. E., op. cit., pp. 39f.

31.Cf. IBID., p. 35.
32.Cf. LONERGAN, B. J. F., op. cit., p. 205.

33.CORETH, E., op. cit., p. 69f.

34.MUCK, O., op. cit., pp. 304f.

35.Cf. PATON, H. J., Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (New York 1964) pp. 114-131.