作者：吴智勋

前言

在培育修士成为司铎的过程中，传统认定哲学与神学是不可或缺的。普通的做法是先哲学，后神学，哲学是神学必然的准备；哲学的基础不好，神学也受影响而不稳固。可是，哲学与神学若比较其重要性，主客立见，神学显然是主，哲学只属陪衬，过去就有哲学是「神学的婢女」(ancilla theologiae)的说法。这种讲法，大受哲学家责难，认为有损哲学的独立自主。另一方面，现代的知识有爆炸性的趋势，每门学科都有特飞猛进的发展，对人的行为甚至人的存在本身提供不少可贵的资料。尢其是人类学、社会学、心理学、医学的进步、使人大大增加了对自己及其周围环境的认识。教会不能不对这些学科重新评估：「历代的经验、科学的进步、潜在于各式文化内的宝藏，都是人性所赖以更充份地表达自身，并替人们开拓迈向真理的新途径。1」「攻读哲学、数学、自然科学及艺术，颇有助于提高人类对于真、善、美的理解力，对于普遍价值的判断力。于是人类为那永远与天主同在、并与祂一同治理万物、且活跃于尘寰、欢乐于人间的奇妙智慧，更光明地受到照耀。2」在这个大气候底下，哲学在司铎培育过程中的重要受到考验。哲学是否神学必然的伙伴？它的重要性是否为其他学科削弱或取代？神哲学院是否该增加其他学科的课？这是神哲学院培育者关心的问题。

着名的神学家拉内在梵二后曾出惊人之言：「神学未来的主要交谈伙伴不再是传统意义的哲学，而是非哲学的、多元的学科与及由它们直接或间接带来的对存在的理解。3」拉内的意思自然不是放弃哲学，而是说明仅透过一个哲学架构去研究神学显然不足了，今天的神学需要多种学科的成果。

面对各种学科的挑战，教会没有减轻对哲学在司铎培育中的重视，要求在培育第一期中，哲学是读神学必修的科目4。教宗若望保禄二世1998年颁布他的第十三个通谕《信仰与理性》(Fides et Ratio)有意为哲学定位，希望为哲学带来一个真正的复兴。

《信仰与理性》通谕是教宗良十三世《永恒圣父》通谕(Aeterni Patris 1879)后另一讨论哲学的通谕。从标题及致候词中，教宗若望保禄二世是向天主教内的主教发言；但在内文中，他是向着主教、神学家、哲学家及所有追求真理的人发言。5换句话说，这个通谕其实是向所有人讲的，因为人就有追求真理的本性，不过主教、神学家和哲学家就其本身的角色，更是通谕呼吁的对象。

教宗若望保禄二世本身是一位哲学家，甚受圣十字架若望、谢勒(Max Scheler)及圣多玛斯的影响。6他曾在鲁宾天主教大学(Catholic University of Lublin)哲学系教伦理学，也出版过哲学作品。首先是《爱与责任》(Love and Responsibility, 1960)，其后是他的主要哲学作品《行动的人》(The Acting Person, 1969)。他以哲学家的眼光，看出哲学对人之所以为人的重要、对追求真理的重要、对神学发展的重要、对司铎培育的重要。现代人对生命意义模糊，甚至只追求物欲，不理会生命的终极意义或永恒的价值。人对于真理不是没有兴趣，就是甘心停留于局部的、暂时的真理为满足。神学家不加辨别的引进各式各样的思想也做成一片混乱，令人对是否获得真理失去信心。这些缺失的原因，主要不在神学而在哲学。哲学失去它应有的功能，故必须为哲学定位，才能拨乱反正，恢复人之所以为人、人追求真理、人作神学研究及培育司铎过程中应有的秩序。

　

（一） 哲学与真理

通谕以人作出发点，人与其他受造物不同的地方，就是人有反省问问题的能力。在生命的某一刻，人会问：我是谁？我从何来，往何处去？此生过后又如何？这些问题显示出理性的能力，同时反映出人总是追求生命的意义。人知道有关自己生命的真理后，便能更了解自己、实现自己。哲学就其特殊的方法，表达人这种普遍的渴求，渴求知道自己命运的真理。

通谕特别重视普遍的、绝对的真理：「真理若是真理，必以普遍形象出现，即使它非全部真理。东西若是真的，必定为所有人，在任何时间都是真的。除了这个普遍性外，人们也追求绝对，好使他们的渴求有意义及有答案；这个终点可作所有事物的基础。换句话说，他们追求一个最后的解释，一个最高的价值，以便不再向其他东西索求，同时也结束所有的问题。7」有了这普遍的、绝对的真理，人才达致确定性，不再怀疑。哲学就是把握这种普遍的、绝对的真理的一个途径。

哲学可以找到这种普遍的、绝对的真理吗？通谕认为是肯定的。历代哲人以其理性发现了一些核心的哲学理念：「不矛盾律、目的律、因果律，与及人的概念：人是自由的、理性的主体，有能力认识天主、真理和美善；此外还有一些为所有人共有的基本的伦理规律。8」这是普遍的、绝对的真理的一些例子。这些人所共有的东西，通谕称为「隐含的哲学」(implicit philosophy)，是人类灵性的遗产。理性一旦写定这些存有第一普遍原则，并据此引伸出正确的结论时，它就被称为「正直的理智」(recta ratio)。9哲学既是了悟人生命基本真理的途径，它也成为深入了解信仰不可缺少的帮助。

人的理性本来有一种超越的能力，如他能无限地问问题，他能知道自己知道。天主让人的理性有能力超越感性与料，到达事物的根源－－天主。可是，人的软弱、人的惰性、人的叛逆使这超越性无法发展，反而拘限于感性的、局部的、有限的事物当中。圣保禄早就说明此：「其实，自天主创世以来，他那看不见的美善，即他永远的大能和他为神的本性，都可凭他所做的万物，辨认洞察出来，以致人无可推诿。他们虽然认识了天主，却没有以他为天主而予以光荣或感谢，而他们所思想的，反成了荒谬绝伦的，他们冥顽不灵的心陷入了黑暗。」(罗1:20-21)人的确需要基督的拯救，才可使软弱的理性，恢复它的自由，不再堕入不可知论、相对主义或怀疑主义，使理性超越自己的局限，发现人存在的意义，从而把握人生命最终的真理。

　

（二） 理性与信仰

理性与信仰本在不同的层面运作，各有其自主性。带着超越性的理性本可达致生命最终的真理，但人在世途中，其理性难免受其他俗世因素影响着。科学的成功，大大改善人的生活，这是理性不可磨灭的成就，但也做成理性不可一世的气焰，只相信科学的、实证的东西，扬弃一切形上的、超越的事情。不少哲学家也放弃追求生命终极的真理，不重视永久的承诺，但求主观的确定、眼前的成功，更甚的会认定生命是荒谬的、虚无的。要矫正理性的偏差，信仰非介入不可。

信仰的介入并非消除理性的自主，亦非限制它的活动，而是使脱序的理性纳入有秩序的轨道中。理性要求绝对的独立自主，只做成人孤立自己，自己想成为天主。信仰纠正这个错误，因为信仰要求信任、要求交托。基督信仰的基础就是信赖耶稣基督，相信祂的话，把自己交托给祂。历代的殉道者就是最好的例子，他们相信基督的话，相信生命的真理来自基督，没有东西可以动摇这个确定的信念，他们把自己的生命交付出来，为这个真理作证。通谕把这个理性与信仰的关系讲得很好：「在信仰中，我们相信别人获得的知识。这里包含一种重要的张力。一方面这种由信仰获得的知识好像不完美，要慢慢的通过证据的累积而得到改善；但另一方面，从人性而言，信仰要比证据丰富得多，因为它牵涉人际关系，不光是人认知能力的运作，更是把自己交托给别人这种深入能力的运作。10」的确，由信仰而来的知识，建基于人际间的信赖。基督徒信赖基督的话，相信祂就是「道路、真理、生命」(若14:6)。这个来自启示的真理，光照人的理性，使人发现事物最深入的意义，特别人存在的意义。信仰使理性从迷惘和孤立中走出来。

通谕用两句话连起信仰与理性的关系：「我相信好使我了解」(credo ut intellegam)、「我了解好使我相信」(intellego ut credam)。11这两句话表面上好像包含了恶性循环，实际上，通谕是想强调两者并不对立，而是相辅相成，缺一不可。创造万物的天主与救赎人类的天主是同一的天主，天主保证由理性达致的真理与启示的真理并不矛盾对立。通谕认为缺乏信仰，理性会走旁门左道，有失去自己最终目标的危险；另一方面，缺乏理性，信仰流于讲求感受和经验，有失去普遍命题，堕入神话和迷信的危险。12

通谕历举教会历史上的人物：圣依勒内、圣戴都良、圣犹思定、圣克来孟亚力山卓、奥利振、卡帕多细亚教父、圣奥思定、圣安瑟莫、圣多玛斯等人，他们都认定信仰与理性间的和谐，使信仰与理性对话。信仰信赖理性，不害怕理性，而理性接受信仰的光照，使自己由脆弱及有限中释放出来。

　

（三） 哲学与司铎的培育

在晋铎以前，修士必须经过哲学与神学的培育，这是教会长期以来的传统。教宗在通谕中明显地关心这个传统受到挑战，连在天主教会的学科中，不但士林哲学，而是整个哲学研究本身也有不受重视的趋势，有些神学家干脆对哲学没有兴趣。究其原因，首先是现代哲学放弃形上学对人生最终问题的研究，转而专注于其他局部狭窄的问题。其次是过份着重人类科学而把哲学贬至边缘学科，最后是把兴趣都放在信仰本地化的问题上，这本来是好的，不过必须与哲学探究同步，才能使本土的智慧与福音的宣讲相连。

梵二为教会带来众多的改革，但在司铎的培育上，并无减轻对哲学的重视。修士在开始攻读教会学科之前，自须接受人文与科学的知识；但一踏入教会学科时，哲学就是神学前必然的学科：「哲学课程之讲授，首先应在于领导修生，根据万古常新的真理，对人、对宇宙、和天主，获得一个有根据而又和谐的认识；同时亦应注意当代的哲学潮流，尢其是那些在其本国影响较大。．．．亦应帮助修生自己去瞭解，哲学问题与将来读神学时，在信德的光明下要研究的救赎奥迹中间的关连。13」梵二只是重新肯定这个经历中世纪丰富经验的传统，教会早在1513年拉特朗大公会议第八期会议就已经肯定这个传了。14梵二后，教会训导一再重复这个肯定。当今教宗若望保禄二世《基督徒的智慧》宗座法令、《我要给你们牧者》劝谕、现在的《信仰与理性》通谕就是明显的例子。15

《信仰与理性》通谕不光是申述一个教会的传统，它还给予坚持这个传统的理由。要培育一位司铎作为基督的牧者，必须作多方面的培育，即人格、灵修、知识、牧灵的培育，而它们要连成一个整体。知识的培育当然可有多方面，但以哲学和神学最能配合一位牧者的需要。教宗曾说过；「哲学的研读导人进入对人格，人格的自由，人与世界，人与天主之间的关系，作深入的了解与诠释。适当的哲学训练是必要的，不仅因为重大哲学问题与救恩奥迹有关......只有健全的哲学，才能帮助司铎候选人，发展他对存在于人的心灵与真理间基本关系的醒觉，这真理在耶稣基督内完全启示给我们。16」《信仰与理性》通谕更进一步发挥哲学如何成为神学必然的伙伴。哲学追求人生的终极意义，连高科技的发展也要问终极意义和价值问题，否则它只有暂时的、局部的功用价值而已。哲学证实人有认知真理的能力及得到客观真理的能力。有形上幅度的哲学，在追求真理的途中，能够超越实证与料，到达绝对的、终极的、基础的东西。17这种哲学助人从现象返回根源，从经验走向属灵的核心。神学没有这种带着超越及形上幅度的哲学难以超过宗教经验的分析，或对启示真理的普遍超越价值，难有协调的描述。没有任何其他学科能为神学带来这个效果，故此没有任何学科可取代培育司铎过程中哲学的地位。

神学需要靠语言、概念、思考模式去表达。要了解教会的传统与训导，必须明白教会在那特定时刻所用的哲学系统是甚么。教宗多次声明他无意钦定某一特别的哲学作为教会法定的哲学：「教会没有一个属于她的哲学，也没有在众多哲学中钦定任何一种哲学。18」原因是每种哲学皆有它自己的原则与方法，没有一种哲学拥有真理的全部，没有一种哲学可以不加辨别、不加修饰地应用在不同时代所有神学科目中。连沿用多时的士林哲学也不是教会历史上唯一采用过的哲学系统。

每个神学科目都需要哲学。教义神学需要人的哲学、宇宙哲学、存有哲学。教义需要哲学概念才能解释天主的三位一体、基督是真天主亦真人。伦理神学也需要哲学伦理中有关自由、良心、罪过、责任、规律等概念，才能把道德主体与道德世界讲清楚。基本神学更是关乎信仰与哲学思想间的关系。基本神学表明有些真理早已被理性靠自己本身的能力认知，不过启示使这些真理获得圆满的意义，例如有关天主的自然神学。这些例子，在在说明哲学与神学间的内在关系。其他学科能对神学科目某一问题有帮助，但哲学所提供的整体性、普遍性、超越性、绝对性就不是其他学科所能取代的了。

　

（四）《信仰与理性》通谕的反思

基于导师的责任，教宗在通谕中指出现代神哲学的错失，例如唯信论(fideism)中的圣经主义(Biblicism)，漠视理性与哲学对了解信仰的重要，以阅读及注释圣经为唯一真理的标准，圣传是没有地位。19此外，折衷主义(eclecticism)选取不同哲学系统的思想放在一起，不理会能否有内在的统一性；历史主义(historicism)认为哲学的真理只在某一时代、某一环境是真；科学主义(scientism)认定只有实证科学的知识是可信的；实用主义(pragmatism)做决定时，以大众意见为依归，不理会伦理原则和不变价值；虚无主义(nihilism)反对所有根基或客观真理的存在，亦反对存有本身的意义。20教宗指明神哲学上的错失，并不表示他把哲学固定在一特定的框框里，他只要求哲学必须要与信仰调和。他多次明言哲学必须有它的自主性，有它自己的原则与方法。多玛斯的士林哲学得到他的垂青，是因为圣多玛斯最能把信仰与理性连起来，且能经得起时代的考验。

教宗坚持一个向信仰开放的哲学，我们可从他所推举的人物中，看出多种哲学系统。在教父中，他把奥思定与卡帕多细亚教父额我略．纳祥(Gregory of Nazianzus)并列，后者带诗意的思想与奥思定明显不同。中古的圣安瑟莫、圣文德与圣多玛斯各自有其思想系统；在解释良心时，圣文德有他的「意志说」，而圣多玛斯有他的「理智说」。21从十三到十九世纪，教宗举苏亚雷(Francis Suarez 1548-1617)和巴斯葛(Blaise Pascal 1623-1662)。苏亚雷自成一家之言，他对法律的解释明显与圣多玛斯不同，至今仍为学者津津乐道。22至于巴斯葛的哲学，则带有浓厚的数学及科学的色彩。十九至二十世纪的哲学家，他提及的有由基督教转到天主教的纽曼枢机(John Henry Newman 1801-1890)，有曾为教宗良十三世谴责过的义大利哲人罗斯米尼(Antonio Rosmini 1797-1855)，有法国哲人马里旦(Jacques Maritain 1882-1973)和祁尔松(Etienne Gilson 1884-1978)，有号称第一位俄罗斯哲学家查代耶夫(Petr Chaadaev 1794-1856)及接踵而来的俄罗斯哲人苏罗夫约夫(Vladimir S. Soloviev 1853-1900)、弗罗伦斯基(Pavel A. Florensky 1882-1940)与罗斯基(Vladimir N. Lossky 1870-1965)，也有一位犹太裔的波兰女哲学家斯但因(Edith Stein 1891-1940)，她是加尔默罗会修女，在纳税集中营被煤气毒死。最后连基督教的存在主义哲学家祁克果(Kierkegaard 1813-1855)也受到赏识。这些人中，没有多少个是士林哲学家，他们以不同的哲学思想，把信仰与理性连起来。我们可以结论说：教宗只是推崇一种向信仰开放的哲学。

在向信仰开放的前提下，我们再看看为什么教宗特别推荐圣多玛斯的士林哲学。圣多玛斯生活的第十三世纪是哲学思想的黄金时期，欧洲的大学纷纷成立，人们对五花八门的学术感到兴趣，教会自然受到冲击。圣多玛斯了不起的地方是把神学放到一个高学术水平的层面上，使神学可以和其他学科交谈，在大学里占一重要地位。从这方面来看，他是成功的，奠定神学在欧洲着名大学里有一巩固崇高的地位。既然要和其他学科交谈，他的思想是开放的、活跃的、动态的、在当时是具挑战性的。教会的神学院未能立刻采用他的思想，就是因为它在当时是太新颖了、太开放了。正因为这种开放的灵活性，使教宗特别垂青圣多玛斯的思想。教会的哲学思想已经在学术界退到一个边缘境界，外界大学的哲学系，少有教会哲学立足的地方，神学更不用说了。教宗希望在这所谓后现代时期，人们不满于对真理的模棱两可，能藉着一股多玛斯旋风，像从前新士林哲学一样，把教会的思想，以新的包装带进学术界，带进人群中，而非退缩到教会神哲学院的小天地而已。

有鉴于读教会哲学的人，不少是准备做司铎的，这个通谕第一个接触的对象，就是那些在培育中的修士们。他要修士们重视哲学，不光是因为这是教会的传统，或因为到目前为止还未有一个学科可以取代哲学的地位，成为神学最佳伙伴，而是受信仰光照的哲学碰到人生命的最深处，与人的生命息息相关，激荡着人的心灵，使人产生共鸣。这种哲学，不再是学院式的理智游戏，而是心灵的相通与提升，对理性的信任，对别人的信任。这种哲学是具有生命力，通向真理，通向绝对的。人对哲学文字的表达能因为心理因素而产生厌倦，但哲学所包含理性的活力、真理的渴求、人际关系的建立，却是万古常新的，在培育中的修士应把握此。

中国文化中的诗，以唐诗最受欢迎，最经得考验。新诗的发展已近一百年了，多少诗人竭尽心力去创作，虽然也有成果，但影响力及受欢迎的程度，远远不及唐诗。究其原因，唐诗写得实在太好了，诗人的生命活跃在文字上。文字虽然过了千多年，但我们仍能捉摸到诗人的想像力和生命力，与他心灵相通。修士们若能了悟哲学的生命力，像哲人一样把握到生命的真理，那么，无论那一个时代的哲学，都能助他宣讲生命的福音。



1. 《论教会在现代世界牧职宪章》44。

2. 同上57。

3. Rahner, Karl, "Philosophy and Philosophising in Theology", Theological Investigation, Vol.9, 1972,60.

4. 参教宗若望保禄二世的《基督徒的智慧》宗座法令(Sapientia Christiana 1979), 72 条a 项，亦参圣部为该法令而定下的《实施规则》51 条 1a项。

5. 参《信仰与理性》通谕6。

6. 教宗在罗马Angelicum大学的博士论文就是《圣十字架若望的信仰》。参Buttiglione, Rocco, Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II, (William B.Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, Michigan/Cambridge, U.K., 1997), 45.

7.《信仰与理性》通谕27。

8. 同上4。

9. 参同上4。

10.同上32。

11.这两句话分别是《信仰与理性》通谕第二章及第三章的标题。

12. 参《信仰与理性》通谕48。

13. 《司铎之培养法令》15。

14. 参《信仰与理性》通谕62。

15. 参《基督徒的智慧》宗座法令72-73,79-80；《我要给你们牧者》劝谕51-53,56。

16. 《我要给你们牧者》劝谕52。

17. 参《信仰与理性》通谕81-83。

18. 同上49。

19. 参同上55。

20. 参同上86-90。

21. 参周克勤《道德观要义》上册，台湾商务，1970，202-203。

22. 参吴智勋「从中国人的正统观念看法律的解释问题」，《神学年刊》第十三期，1991-92，23-25。

作者：周景勋

一. 导言：人文主义与教育

谈到「人文主义」（Humanism），我们必须尊重人的生存价值和意义，且肯定人是理性的存有（being），因为「人」本身的生命是分享了天主「美好」的生命，天主用爱充实了人的生命，充实就是「美」１，故人的本性生命是「善」的，有恻忍的仁爱心，有辨别善恶是非的真理心，有羞恶的忏悔心，有辞让的正义心；由于仁爱、真理、忏悔和正义乃出于人的本性，便不属于外在任何的权威，乃由人自主地发挥的，这也是「人文主义」可贵之处，因其主张：「人的理性并不从属于任何外在权威，其目的为将人之大善，体现于有限度的存在之中。2」

我们生长在二十世纪的末期，经验到的是：物质重于生命、功利大过人格、经济发展是权利的基石、金钱可使鬼推磨，形成了心灵的失调，信仰精神的败落，人文精神只是政治手段上的一份施舍。因此，在进入二十一世纪的新纪元，我们应该有新纪元的精神，重新为人的生存价值和意义作定位，即以新纪元的精神来认识自己、认识时代的需要、认识社会的革新方向、认识信仰的落实、认识教会的开放与创新；这是一种积极而进取的态度，更是一种新的教育理念，好能开拓理想的信仰精神和新的文化路向，以建立新基督徒的人文精神。

然而，新的开拓不是无中生有的，而是必须从道统的传承中溯源，以奠定基础；但，在新与旧的交接过程，一定会产生冲突，有其「舍」才能有所「得」。于是，我们强调人文主义教育的重要性，如梵蒂冈第二届大公会议文献中的《天主教教育宣言》中提及：「教育应符合人生目标，又应适于各人性格、性别、文化背景、以及祖国传统，且应向其他民族友爱交往而开放，为能促进世界之精诚团结，和平共处。而真正教育之目的，乃为培养人格，以追求其个人终极目的，同时并追求社会的公益；盖因人乃社会之一员，及其成长，亦应分担社会的职责。」（GE1）可见，人文主义教育重视人性的价值，人性的发展具有其潜质，可以配合天赋的能力，建立「完人」的生活，以人性的圆融、人格的完美，人生的幸福为其终极关怀。3无怪乎，教宗若望保禄二世在谈到天主教大学规程时，也将之与人文主义连贯而言：「在不忽视追求其他有用的知识之外，天主教大学应该以自由追求有关自然、人、神的最后真理为己任，现代的社会正面临着这种服务的殷切需要，也就是说，伸张真理意义的需要，没有它，自由、正义及人性尊严将不复存在。在普遍人文主义下，天主教大学当全力寻求与最高真理((天主有关的一切知识与真理。它将毫无畏惧地，并满怀热忱地去投入各种知识之路。4」

在寻求真理的学习上，人肯定了自我生存的价值，更肯定了人生的精神价值，这份肯定乃人文主义的一大长处。加上人文主义教育也重视人性的种种价值，便说出了，人生的一切努力都在实现一种本身的价值，如：「科学与哲学实现『真』、艺术文学实现『美』、道德教育实现『善或爱』、宗教实现『神圣』、政治实现国家中的『和谐』、经济实现一种社会的『公平』，以至饮食男女名誉权位之要求，都本于一种价值实现的要求，除了实现价值外，人生没有内容了。5」因为每一种的价值实现都能丰富人的生命，完成人的人格，满全人的幸福。可见，人文主义教育重视「人」的教育及其发展，其目的乃「全人的发展」，针对人与人之间的共同性，提高人的德性和智性的开拓，即在提升人的存在意识与生存价值，使真实的生命导引生活中的一切行动与实践。



1. 「充实之谓美」乃出自《四书》中的《孟子尽心篇上》。

2. 陈锦子，《人文主义的教育哲学((以纽曼、赫钦斯、马里旦为例的探讨》见《哲学与文化》288　第廿五卷第五期469页　一九九八年五月出版。

3. 同上，269页。

4. 教宗若望保禄二世，《天主教大学规程》，中文版编译召集人：许诗莉　辅仁大学出版社　3页　一九九二年。

5. 唐君毅，《人生之体验》，人生出版社　一九五六年重印　78页。

二. 现时代的滥人权主义破坏了人文精神的基础

圣经中有言：「真理必会使你们（人）获得自由。6」（若望福音八章32节）人文主义精神也强调人有生存的权力、在真理中有自由的权力、人性尊严的权力、思考的权力、创作的权力、宗教的权力、维护道德的权力、公平竞争的权力，平等民主的权力等，这些权力来自「天赋人权」的思想，相应于一个生存的目的((「幸福的追求」。保障人权，可说是近代民主主义运动的目的，然而此运动的精神不能脱离人文主义的基础精神：保护真理、培养人格和智慧、印证幸福价值、容许宗教自由等。可见，在人文主义下，人权思想是非常可贵的，更是人类文明进步的一个重大标志，亦是人类创造事幸福的一个肯定，但危险的地方在于它慢慢地变了质和被掌权者所压榨，这是时代的悲剧。人权变了质就是人将人权的概念滥用以至失去了人文主义的基本精神，只顾自己的权利，而忘掉了他人及社会的平衡和需要，甚至到达了走火入魔的地步，我们称之为「滥人权主义」，这是时代的盲潮，在思想层面上须有所警惕。在一些落后的地区或暴政的国家，常有压榨人权的现象，故做成了反人权；反人权是历史遗迹，在实践层面上有待清扫。7

在中国的人文主义精神中，易经所强调的生生之变易，在天、地、人三才里是有一份美的大和谐，而天、地、人正代表着自然、社会、人生三个层面的互联互动都能适得其宜，恰到好处地达至中庸之道的美善。于是，中国人文精神在中庸之道与五伦关系的规范下，自然地要求人必须注意修「德」的工夫，便造成了君权至上和父权庄严的现象，故很少谈到人权的问题。人权思想从西方引进中国，能开始落实的时期，可说是从国父孙中山先生发动革命，推翻满清王朝，建立中华民国，以「自由、平等、博爱」的口号救中国为先锋，但由于中国人的传统保守思想，人权思想一直不能普遍地行于中国，再加上受共产主义或中国式的社会主义所影响，在此不必多言。国父的民权精神（其内容不乏人权思想）只流行于中华民国所管治的台湾，以及曾被英国统治，而受西方思想影响的香港，和被葡萄牙政府统治即将回归中国的澳门都很重视人权。

然而，人权思想在未成熟地与人文主义配合之际，现代的社会思潮因太注重物质的享受，已经将人性的伦理道德观念解放，泛起功利与享乐的个人主义，人走向自私自利，只顾自己而不顾及别人的需要和社会的规律，例如：一句歧视或一句为什么不先问我意见便说自己的人权不被尊重。以下数则例子可以表达出滥人权的现象：

1. 在一则国际新闻中说：某一国家订立了一条法则，规定家长若要看子女的学业成绩，只要小孩的年纪到了六岁或以上，就必须经小孩子签名同意，否别就是歧视儿童，侵犯了他的私隐权和人权。

2. 又一位被判刑的强奸犯在法官前的抗辩：「法官大人，这是歧视，为什么那些人结婚就可以？你们为什么阻止我追求快乐！」

3. 最近的一则香港新闻，一名残疾人士控告的士司机有残疾歧视，就是指司机冷言嘲讽而没有给她提供特殊照顾和服务，协助她上车。结果的士司机被法官判罚款，其款项相等于他的三个月收入。这位残疾人士胜诉后，便公开鼓励所有残疾人士要争取自己的权益，和公平待遇。其实帮助与不帮助乃人道原则，不是公平或平等原则；多给爱心的帮助不是公平或平等的问题。

4. 再者，今日的人以「人有出生权」和「人有不出生权」作讨论。现在有很多不良的孩子常问自己的父母：「谁叫你们生了我到世界来？又不是我要到这世界来的！我就是喜欢这样！」如美国校园鎗杀案便是一个例子。8

还有很多滥人权或反人权的例子:「有宗教信仰的自由，也有反对宗教信仰的自由」，「我愿意放纵自己，我愿意吸毒，我愿意((这是我的权利，你们管不了！」这些都是破坏人文精神的常例，显示了滥人权主义对人权的曲解，和不能保障人的幸福，维护真理，培养人格道德的价值等，使自然、社会、人性不能展现其和谐性。



6. 亚里斯多德对幸福的定义：「幸福是在于根据美德而生活的完全一生，以及与由外界环境所适当提供的外在善事物相伴随的完全一生」。见Mortimer J. Adler（蔡坤鸿译），《六大观念：真、善、美、自由、平等、正义》，第十三章　104页　一九八六年　联经出版事业公司（Six Great Ideas）。

7. 李天命主讲（苏剑华记录），《第二盲潮：滥人权主义》见《明报月刊》，一九九九年八月号　第二十四卷第八期　总四零四期　25页。

8. 同上，26-33页。

三. 重整人文精神的价值

「中国的人文主义，乃是精巧而纯正的哲学系统，它明确宣称『人』乃是宇宙间各种活动的创造者及参与者，其生命气象顶天立地，足以浩然与宇宙同流，进而参赞化育，止于至善。9」因着中国人文主义的伟大理想，人的生命便自然地被尊重，生命与生命也有着互联互动的发展，以发展自我的精神生命，务能播种生命之善和融合万物的生命。人努力的发展，都是为实现「真」、「善」、「美」、「爱」、「神圣」、「和谐」和「公平」等价值；这些价值的实现乃在于丰富人的生活，完成人的人格。10人能肯定生命中不同的价值，就是肯定了自我生命的精神价值，这是人文主义的理想和长处。11

然而，人文精神如何落实在新纪元的二十一世纪的中国呢？我们可以反观二十世纪的中国，先从清王朝的解体而由国父倡导的三民主义（民生、民权、民族）所关心的民主、自由、平等、博爱和法治的问题外，也深入探讨人文及社会教育，伦理秩序、道德精神、宗教现象等问题，因而展现了对人文主义的重视和关怀。可悲的是：中国在近百年来没有稳定的社会环境，在二次的大战中，尤其在第二次世界大战和八年的抗日战争中，使国民活在贫苦和被压迫侵略的痛苦里；期后又有国民政府与共产政权的斗争，以至分治台湾和中国大陆；在战争期间，人人生活困苦，自然对人文精神和文化的创作都表现的冷漠和不闻不问；这种心态在分治后，活在社会较安定的知识分子，日渐减少并有改善。再者，「二十世纪的中国，先有新文化运动，后有文化大革命，把宗教和以儒家为主的伦理、道德传统当作与科学、民主对立的迷信；另方面许多搞政治革命的野心家与政客，又把政治权力与统治当作无上的真理与法宝。希望跨入二十一世纪的中国同胞，尽快自科技万能、政治权力至上的迷信或迷思中跳出来，重新秉持科际整合的精神和客观中庸的方法，为科学、政治、经济、伦理秩序、道德精神、宗教信仰等领域定位，使改造、革新、充实中国文化，推动社会完整，全面的社会进步及现代化，谋求全民福利与幸福之理想真正能够实现。12」

事实上，人活在天地间，人观望「天」，始觉「天」何其大；再观看「地」，亦觉「地」何其宽；人在天地间能做什么呢？天地无私地容纳了人，人也本于天性之善，唱出心底本有的爱歌，以回应生命的呼唤。人文精神就是强调了人的本性中有「善」与「爱」，故必尊重生命，发展生命，好能使人人在天地间活出和谐共融，因而实现生命的互相关怀，也就是对社会的关怀，积极参与社会建设，奠定文化价值，使在不同的时代中展现新的面貌。故在面对二十一世纪的新纪元，人人都有任重道远的使命，一方面必须重新寻索生命的活水源头；另一方面则需要推动人与社会的互联互动，发展人与自然的和谐，鼓励人与自我的修和。于是，人人当谨慎地关注到：

－在谈人权时，当注意到滥人权的祸害，以及反人权的不自由。

－人要重新整顿人性尊严的意识，不要让自己成为物质、金钱、名誉和地位的奴隶。

－整个国家社会要注重道德教育、艺术品味以及宗教情操。

－尊重生命，不能使生命物质化，也不能走上精神的极端，多调协人的「物质与精神」生活。

－生存意识的强化，使人人能在「自然、社会、人生」三层面上做到互动互调的平衡。

－经济与科技的发展不能忽略人性的真朴，提高人有否极泰来与物极必反的警觉性，且以中庸之道来调协贫富的均衡。

－政治乃治理人民的事务，使之走上合宜的正轨，而不是权力至上的欺压，让人人能活出真理中的自由。

－新的人文精神当指向心灵的环保、社会的和谐，世界的和平；推而注意生态环保和大自然的保护。

既然我们生在二十世纪结束，二十一世纪的开始，即生在新纪元的时代，我们便要有新纪元的精神，以此来认识新纪元、认识自己、认识社会与自然、认识时代的需要，就是应有一个理想开拓新文化的路向，新人文精神的价值，新的宗教信仰精神。为基督徒来说，就是要建立新的基督徒人文精神；然而，新的开拓是必须反观其根源与基础的，这便是要由「道统的传承」中作新的开展，按照圣经所言，所指：－－

「该脱去你们照从前生活的旧人，就是因顺从享乐的欲念而贩坏的旧人，应在心思念虑上改换一新，穿上新人，就是按照天主的肖像所造，具有真实的正义和圣善的新人。」（弗四:22-24）

除了「除去旧人，穿上新人」外，还要除去使「人、社会、自然」成长的破坏，而穿上珍惜和尊重生命，有心灵环保精神的新人。为此，人必须放眼四方，看看世界的发展，现代人的思维方向，才能了解新时代的需要。要记住，新纪元不是封闭式的人文精神时代，而是开放式的互相交谈与文化互联互动的新时代。加上「今天的时代是世界性的，我们不能关着门不认识这个世界，而来瞭解我们自己的时代，这是不可能的。13」所以，我们不应以旧观念来应付或解释新纪元，要先由自我革新做起，就是要先解放「人心」，使现今物质化了的心，回复自然真朴的善心－－爱。

新世纪给人带来新希望，这希望由二十世纪的战争、科技进步、经济发达、到物质超越精神，金钱挂帅的不同转化，使人心变得物质化了，心也便死了！这一刻，我们要重新在心灵的爱中作反省：

心兮归来！

人啊！你的心跑到那儿去？

　你的精神在物质中被关销了。

是不是要仰天长叹！

谁可以做「世纪良心」呢？

　我希望公平、却是哀号！

　我希望正义，竟是血腥！

　我希望有善心人的帮助，只有贪心害命的人逞强施暴！

孔子死了，却留下了人文主义的善与仁，

老子死了，留下了慈、俭、让三宝，

佛祖死了，开拓了从苦到乐的生命超脱，

耶稣死了，却留下了爱的救恩；且复活了，为人带来了新的祭献和永远的生命；

历代的圣贤，也为了爱而奉献交付，为世界揭开了一份爱的考验和挑战；

给无情的世代，打了响响的一巴掌

但－－

　人依然沉醒不醒

　心也因忙于物质事务而显得心死。

人呀！你的心跑到那儿去！

找回它来，

让爱心常伴你我之旁！

为此，在基督诞生二千年的新纪元，我们要在生存的忧患意识下，发掘生命的警觉性，务使人活出「心灵的环保」，就是免受物质贪婪的污染、不放纵于自私冲突的污染、不以自我为中心的危机的污染，因为人的心灵受到污染，大自然的生态也会受到破坏；更甚的乃破坏了人本身的人性、自身的尊严和使命。于是，警觉性引导人不被物质所牵锁，且能认同生命只有活在真理中才有自由，和信仰的转化，提升人发动为真理自由抗衡的「责任感」；唤起人为建树和谐共融平等的社会而努力的「使命感」；呼吁人人为爱而服务，愿意投入参与保卫社会道德及心灵与生态环保的「参与感」。

从「责任感」、「使命感」和「参与感」，我们可以看出人先天人文的「分别性」，这是自然地肯定人的个体存在，人要自我尊重，也当尊重和欣赏别人的个别存在；同时，人也看到自己是不能单独存在，故人类由后天人文的原故组成了家庭、社会与国家，在其内产生了人伦关系，使人与人互相配搭而有一种「和合性」。人的先天人文的「分别性」要求人有一份修养：「明明德」；而后天人文的「和合性」则强调「亲民」、人要在「明明德」上达到至善境，亦要在「亲民」上达到至善，才能整合先天自然人文和后天人文的融贯：「人类由后天人文所组成的社会，仍并不能离开先天自然而独立，只有在先天自然之上，加进了后天人文，所以先、后天亦应是合一的。这纔是人类天性的完成。这里面包括着分别与和合，在其和合中则仍还有分别。14」

中国文化中的儒家思想影响了历代的中国人，其所关注的「明明德」与「亲民」人文精神，有着共同的目标：「大同」的家庭与世界，这是一个人文精神的重新提升；此刻，人是不会失去天赋人性的分别性，却保存了「人之初、性本善」的价值肯定，也看出其平等性；同时，也强调了后天的导向：「性相近、习相远」，故后天正确的教育是不可忽略的，尤其是「文化教育」与「心灵道德教育」有启导人在「亲民」中走向和合性。

由是，基督信仰中的十字架神学可以作为我的跨进二千新纪元的反思；因为十字架爱的精神正是标记着爱的分别性与和合性的相融；就是说：十字架有「纵的一面」与「横的一面」的相交融。「纵的一面」表达了信仰基督的人要做个脚踏实地，与大地广土的世界有着息息相关的生命气息，和顶天立地的活在地上，不是在虚幻的妄念里，且常仰天盼望，寄望永远生命祝福的基督徒，此际的基督徒必常与天主会晤谈心，务使自己多认识天主和天主的计划。

「横的一面」揭示了基督徒要用只手拥抱世界，将心中的爱倾流与人分享，好导引人相亲相爱，在自我的奉献与祷告中建立共融的教会，和谐的社会，和平的世界。

从十字架神学的反思中、实在要说明：「人类社会的存在，即一本个人求真求美求善之心，当此心真实的表现为一客观的求真求美求善的精神时，刀能创造出文化。((人类心灵求真美善之要求，在实际生活中，在创造人类文化之过程中，有种种不同的表现。((这表现分作九个领域，即知识技术、生存技术、艺术、文学、经济、政治与法律、道德、宗教、教育。总之，人生之一切努力，都为实现一种价值。15」

中国基督徒在儒家的「明明德」和「亲民」以至于大同的至善，正与十字架神学的纵横反思作一个调协，说出了中国基督徒对人对神对各种文化价值都作了一正确的肯定，盼望着人的精神生活与物质生活可以重新整合，使人的心灵得到安定与幸福，因为：「如果丧失了人文精神的支撑，财富的追求欲望就必定会丧为纯利欲的冲动，导致人们动物性的膨涨，人性的泯灭，社会秩序的混乱和财富的浪费。16」



9. 方东美，《中国人生哲学》，黎明文化事业公司　一九八五年二月六版　86页。

10. 同注5。

11. 李震，《理性与信仰：追求完美的双翼》，辅仁大学出版社　一九九九年六月　哲学篇　226页。

12. 同上，《盼中国知识分子之人文主义精神更上层楼》，343页。

13. 钱穆，《从中国历史来看中国民族性及中国文化》，中文大学出版社　一九九三年第一版第八次印　引言　5页。

14. 同上，21-23页。

15. 同注11，210页。

16. 同上，350页。

四. 寄语：中国基督徒在本土文化中活出基督

中国儒家思想「人文精神」的内容强调「德成于内，文见乎外」，就是除了重视礼乐教化外，更注意人与人之间的人伦和谐关系，标立个人的自我道德修养：「明明德」，以及生命发扬之亲爱人人的「亲民」精神。为展示二个不同层面的人文理念之互联互动，我们可以有二点的强调：

其一是在于转化个人的气质，使之合乎伦理道德的规范，成为有道德的人。

其二则规范整个社会、国家的秩序，使之和谐而治，安居乐业。17

这二个中国道统的理念乃奠基于真美善上的，有历久不衰的真理，与基督信仰有着一份融通的开放性，正等待着与基督信仰的介入。笔者深信基督信仰是超越文化的，且基督降生神学有着阔面的思域，即基督的降生是进入文化中，复活后的基督再降生就已经超越了犹太文化，而融为希腊文化、再融合罗马文化，融入世界各民族、各地域... ...也融入中国文化中。这种融通推动了宗教的交谈，教会也欣赏其他宗教，如回教、印度教、佛教、道教、孔教等宗教的真理启导，且能与不同宗教合作，齐心为社会谋求幸福，推广心灵道德的教育，为世界创造和平等，这些思想与行动导使教会落实于本地文化，使不同的文化也能活出基督的真貌。

故此，在新纪元的中国基督徒人文主义必须重新启导人对人性与真我的了解；中国基督徒的人性观基础在基督的爱与中国文化中的强调的仁爱与慈悲：－－

爱是生命的本质

因为天主是爱......

爱也是中国文化的精髓

爱所开显的生命活力就是宽恕

　－－推己及人与正己正人

宽恕为人带来共融与互动

爱的精神是人性尊严的被重视

人性尊严赋予人生存的权力

　让人在「真理」中活现自由

　使人在「生存」上有平等与人权

为尊重人性的真美善

为重视生命的定整

　生命要有觉醒

　人要有受教的心

　精神的跳跃

　发扬生命的光明面

人要不断地更新自己以至发展自己

　创新一切以求进步

指向着－－

　自我生命的超越

　无执于物我

... ...于是

人明白万有总归于基督（弗1:10）

在十字架上作爱的奉献

一个杀身成仁、舍生取义的心－－

中国基督徒的人文精神

超越人、地、事物

默默无言

超越不同民族、社会、文化、万物... ...

静观中的等待

建立世界的和平

　心灵的和谐

　社会的共融

　自然的平衡

「天地之大德曰生」之生生仁德

泽及万有

万有以德配天之通贯相融为准

－－立真处

明善处

知美处

于是，我们本着人文精神，将信仰配合个人的灵修修养，社会与国家的秩序，为自我生命的立德，社会国家的和谐作一些信仰与文化交融的反省：

1. 中国文化中的修养工夫，历代都强调修德成圣，其方法不离反省、改过、静观、返朴归真、养心寡欲、心斋坐忘、明心见性等，这正是灵修的工夫，正等待基督信仰的融入，作一个超越文化的交融。为新纪元的来临，灵修的交融可展现为新时代伦理道德的重整和基督徒人文精神的反思。

2. 我们肯定：在中国人文精神中有其民族性的文化表达，其中的宗教、哲学、文学、历史、艺术等的表达，都记载了中国人的心路历程与文明进步。

3. 基督信仰展示了救恩的临现人间，这救恩是普世性的，如「月印万川」般地覆盖整个世界，融入不同文化中，却保留不同文化的特质和独特性，如道德意识，生活价值等；也显示了信仰与文化的共通性，即在同一的终向下共同朝向一个大目标，相辅相成的交融，使人的生命趋向至真至美至善的境界，所谓「天下殊途而同归、百虑而一致。」

4. 中国文化的开放性远自二千年前已有文化的大综合：原以道德修养为首的儒家思想和以意境消遥为主的道家文化，接纳了从印度传入的佛教，且让佛教的精神融入中国儒道的文化中，故有引道释佛、引儒解佛的现象，形成了中国文化中儒、道、佛的合流互动。今日，我们中国基督徒也以一个开放的态度，以尊重信仰与文化的交融，接纳基督信仰的介入中国文化，引儒解释基督信仰，也引道佛与基督信仰作互动的融通。培育中国基督徒有不断学习的意识，对文化和社会变化有敏锐的应变与回应的能力，视信仰与文化交融为福传基要，亦是每一位基督徒的责任，还要积极参与推进关社的互联互动、关怀弱小贫困的兄弟姊妹；这样，我们要以「基督中国化」的口号落实在中国人的生活里，让世人在中国基督徒身上看到基督，让教会也在中国基督徒身上看中国人。

5. 在新纪元中，我们在生存的忧患意识下，要有生命的警觉性，人不可再被物质所牵锁；要认同生命在真理中的自由，美善中的修和，信仰中的转化，发动为真理自由抗争的「责任感」；唤起心灵美善而为建树和谐、共融、平等的社会共同努力的「使命感」；呼吁人人为爱而服务，愿意投入参与保卫社会道德及心灵上世纪良心与自然生态环保的「参与感」。因为「道与之貌，天与之形，无以好恶内伤其身」（庄子德充符篇）。但，为什么我们都常因自己的好恶而伤害自己的天性，也伤害大自然的和谐与社会的共融呢？中国基督徒的抉择本是积极的；所以，在新纪元的来临，当有一个「爱」与「舍」的抉择：－－

我要将自己的血洒下，

　为换取新生、自由、爱情、平安、宁静...

我要将自己的肉留下，

　作为粉碎虚伪、欺诈、暴政、剥削、不义...的见证。

教宗若望保禄二世在《跨越希望的门槛》书中说：「公元二千年是我们应该更团结的时候，更乐意开步走向基督在受难前夕所祈 祷的那种团结。这种团结的价值无穷，在某种意义上，这涉及世界的未来， 也是天主的国在世上的未来。人类的脆弱和偏见不能破坏天主对世界和对人 类的计划。如果我们确认这一点，我们就能怀着某种乐观的情怀展望未来。 我们也能够全心相信『在我们中间开始这美好工作的那位，必予完成。』（参 阅斐一:6）」

愿我们将自己与社会放在爱的洪流中，得享生命的共融合一：「仁者浑然与天地万物一体」；

愿我们将自己和社会放进希望里，使世界得享幸福与和平；「仁者，天下之正理。失正理则无序而不和」；

愿我们将自己和社会放在朴素里，使大自然的和谐为万有的生命带来生生不息的创新：「天地絪缊，万物化醇」，「万象斐然，永恒不息」；

愿我们的世界，不同民族、不同宗教、不同信仰、不同文化、不同制度、不同理念((都能彼此对话，放下偏见，为真理共同服务，使人人活出真善美圣。「澹然无极而众美从之。此天地之道，圣人之德也。」



　「道者，万物之所由也；庶物失之者死，得之者生。为事逆之则败，顺之则成。 故道之所在，圣人尊之。」（庄子渔父篇）

　「我的肉身和我的心灵虽已憔悴；

　天主却永是我心的福分和盘石。

　看，远离你的人必将趋于沉沦，

　你必消灭一切背弃你的人民。

　亲近天主对我是多么的美好，

　只有上主天主是我避难所。」（咏73:26-28）



17. 《哲学大辞书》，第一册　辅仁大学出版社　一九九三　「人文化成」　69页　「人文化成论」乃唐代吕温之文，大意指依凭人自身之德能，制作一套文化规范，用来教化世人，使之完成文化之要求。

作者：范晋豪

巴柏与柏拉图：

柏拉图理想国的蓝图是开放社会的敌人！？




导言

柏拉图（Plato, 427-347BC）乃古希腊哲学巨匠。他留传下来的着作甚丰，在西方哲学史上影响极为深远，其中《理想国》（Republic）最为人熟悉，也最惹人争议，尤以当中的政治思想，在当代亦激起热烈的讨论。当代哲学家卡尔．巴柏（Karl Popper, 1902-94）虽以科学哲学闻名，然而他在政治哲学上的成就也不容忽略。巴柏对历史主义的批判与及在其巨着《开放社会及其敌人》（The Open Society and its Enemies）对以柏拉图为首的乌托邦政治理想作出极尖锐的批判，其思想对当代政治哲学发展贡献极大。

柏拉图善于以对话方式表达其哲学思想，本文亦尝试把不同时空，地域的柏拉图与巴柏带进作者虚拟的空间进行对话。本文的目的不但希望透过这场对话，评论巴柏对柏拉图理想国的批判公允与否，一窥政治与哲学之关系；此外，作者更希望透过对话的表达方式，在文学上突显作者心目中两位哲人的个性，这是一次把哲学讨论与文学表达综合的尝试。

本文分成四卷，在卷一中，作者尝试交代讨论的原由，提供一个虚构的空间进行讨论；关于巴柏对柏拉图的批评，作者只能在卷二极浓缩地表达出来。碍于篇幅所限，作者只能在散乱而又繁多的批评里，选取较重要和易于掌握的批评。不能全面剖释巴柏对柏拉图之批评是本文一大限制。另外，柏拉图在卷三的自辩，是作者按者《理想国》内容，把他可能的答覆内容和方式设想出来。这是蛮有趣的一卷。至于作者对巴柏论点之批判和柏拉图理想国之理解便要看卷四了。

值得一提的是在文中《理想国》是书名；而理想国则表示其思想，在此声明，避免混淆。

卷一

人物：卡尔．巴柏（以下简称「巴」）

柏拉图（以下简称「柏」）

公证（以下简称「公」）

地点：灵魂移居地1

　

巴：柏里克里斯（Pericles）2说得对！在这里果然找到你！

柏：敢问阁下贵姓大名？找我有何贵干？

巴：我是卡尔．巴柏，不久前我的灵魂才移居到这好。3尊师说得妙极，死亡确是一件兴奋可喜的事！历代哲人济济一堂，实在不愁没有讨论对象。

柏：相信这里的人也有同感，能超越时空和语言限制4向各先哲请教，实是你学习的好机会。

巴：（颇生气）这也是先哲们向我们这些青出于蓝的晚辈学习的良机！前一阵子我才跟赫拉克里图斯（Heraclitus）、黑格尔（Hegel）和马克斯（Marx）5见过面，今回终于轮到你了。

柏：哦！你找我的目的就是要指教我了。

巴：不敢，只是想跟你讨论一下你那本《理想国》罢了。

柏：那么，你想怎样讨论？讨论的内容是什么？讨论的形式又如何？

巴：（想了一想）论题为『柏拉图《理想国》的蓝图是开放社会的敌人』吧！至于讨论的形式，读过你假借师名而写的对话录6，对你的诡辩又怎能不提防？因此，我提议分两回合讨论，第一回合主要是作为正方的我解释这论题，并提出支持论题的理据；第二回合则轮到作为反方的你反驳，指出反对论题的理据。还有，在整个讨论中我们需要一个公证，为我们作判决。在判决前，他要提出其判准的理由。对于这提议，你有没有异议？

柏：听来挺有趣。接着我们要解决的是往哪里找这公证？这公证又要符合什么条件？

巴：这方面你又有何意见？

柏：好，让我们首先剔除一些不适合的，然后再找适合的公证，这样行吗？

巴：行。

柏：我认为有四种人不适合作我们的公证。第一种是西方人，怀德海（Whitehead）认为整个西方哲学史都是我的哲学注脚。虽然他们可能言过其实，但我相信我对西方人的影响也颇大，若找西方人作公证，恐防对你不公。第二种是这里的人，我来了灵魂移居地两千余年，所相识的人不但比初来报到的你较多，也更为熟落。若找他们作公证，难免对我有偏袒之嫌，故此他们也不是最佳人选。第三种是研究我们哲学的专家，这类人可能一早便对我们思想有个人「意见」7，听我们辩论前可能早有定论。相信我们也不想因其个人好恶而左右了辩论结果。最后，我们当然不能选择知识水平太低，不能透过讨论过程分析我们论点的人。你认为这四种人是否不适合当我们的公证？

巴：不适合。换句话说，我们要找还在生的东方人。唔……他还要是大学生，对我们思想既没有深入认识，却拥有基本分析能力。然而，我们往哪找这公证？我们又如何找在生的人作公证呢？

柏：我提议找香港的大学生，香港的大学训练不算好，也不算最差，相信我们也能找到符合条件的公证。至于第二个问题，难道你还没发觉自己拥有一股「新力量」？

柏：这是我们死去的灵魂独有的力量，可以在梦中与人相会。运用这力量，我们便能在梦中找到公证。

巴：挺神奇！

【于是，两人便进入香港中文大学一位学生的梦中，当他了解一切后……】

公：小辈不才，又怎配当两位先哲讨论的公证呢？这事万万不能。

巴：我们既然找了你，就证明你符合条件，难道你以为我们看错不成！？

公：不敢！不过……

柏：（插咀道）无需『不过』了，年轻人，就当这是一个学习机会吧！

公：（迟疑了一会）这实在是向两位先哲学习的好机会。两位既然不嫌小辈不才，小辈必克尽己职，在讨论过程中仔细分析两位先哲的论点，务求作出能力范围内最客观中肯的判准。若小辈有何错漏，还望两位赐教。

巴：好，那么我们开始吧！

柏：乐意奉陪！



  1.这地方是根据柏拉图的《自辩篇》（Apology）40c至41c虚构出来的。

2.他是西元前430年代雅典民主政制的人民、巴柏十分抬举之。详见卡尔巴柏，：《开放社会及其敌人》 上册　庄文端，李英明合译，台北，桂冠图书公司　1985，页11，英文本，Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies vol. 1, (Princeton University Press, 1971) 页7。

3.卡尔巴柏在1994年尾逝世。

4.这是为了方便讨论而设的。

5.这三位和柏拉图一样，在《开放社会及其敌人》上、下册中被巴柏批评的对象。

6.这里巴柏嘲笑柏拉图的对话录以苏格拉底为主角，假借苏格拉底一角表达自己思想。

7.在柏拉图的思想中，「意见」不是真知识，是不实在的，详参《理想国》（Republic）505d。

卷二

公：那么，现在请正方卡尔．巴柏先生首先发言。

柏：严正的公证人！亲爱的巴柏先生，在辩论之前能否让巴柏先生解答我一个问题？

公：（望向巴柏，巴柏点头示意）请发问？

柏：在讨论之先我希望弄清楚你我讨论的动机何在？何以要把我入罪，说成什么开放社会的敌人呢？

巴：柏拉图啊！难道你不知道你在西方思想史上有多么重要的影响力，你的影响力有如「符咒」8一般，对于你的思想，在西方哲学上往往照单全收，缺乏有效的批评。因人们没有正视你思想上危害社会的部份便照单全收，导致今日社会种种问题，我提出这次讨论，就是要对你的社会政治思想提出批评，看看你那幅透过「历史主义」（historicism）建构出来的「乌托邦社会工程」（Utopian Social Engineering）理想国蓝图，如何与进步的「开放社会」（Open Society）9为敌。你作好心理准备没有？

柏：随时奉陪！

巴：柏拉图，你知道你在社会观察上犯了什么错误吗？你的错误就是相信了贫乏的历史主义。「历史主义」所指的是一种研究社会科学的方法，这种方法以历史预测（historical prediction）为目标，并且认为只要发现历史演进底下所隐藏的「律动」（rhythms）、「型式」（pattern）、「法则」（laws）或「趋向」（trends）就可以实现这个目标10。在《理想国》里我们可清楚看到你是一个「历史主义者」（historicist）。观看《理想国》543c-592b，我们便能看到你历史的预测，虽然颇抽象，对政治发展却作出了有系统的陈述。你的设想是悲观的，由哲君（philosopher kings）11统治那与社会原始理型相似之起点，由于受着赫拉克里图斯所谓推动一切的斗争12驱动，国家开始变动，由追求智慧的哲君统治堕化成追求荣誉的「荣誉统治」（timocracy）13，当道德与金钱相争，富人得势建立政权，荣誉统治便堕落为贪财的「寡头政治」（oligarchy）14。当贫富阶级悬殊酿成内战，穷人得胜的话，无节制的「民主政治」（democracy）15便取而代之。最后民主政治的群众领袖更利用国家贫富斗争，建立自己私人武力，肆意发动战争，让人民发觉需要一位统帅，这样，最不幸的暴君政治（tyranny）16便出现了17。根据以上你设想的人类社会五个堕落阶段，我们不难找到你对历史诊断得出的两个政治方案18：一.阻止一切政治的变动，因为变动带来的是罪恶的政制，唯有静止才是最好。二.回到自然，回到先祖时相似原型的统治形式，就是由少数聪明人统治无知者的自然阶级统治时代。（望向柏拉图，自信的笑了一笑）我们的公证，听过以上的证据，柏拉图以历史主义建立自己的社会政治学说不是很清楚吗？

现在，该让我们看看柏拉图所相信的历史主义何等贫乏！何等站不住脚！我只须用简单的五句话就能对历史主义驳斥。留心听着吧：

『（1）人类的历史是强烈地受到人类知识成长的影响。

（2）我们不论用理性的或科学的方法，都无法预测科学知识之未来发展。

（3）因此，我们无法预测人类历史的未来。

（4）这意味着我们必须排斥建立理论历史（theoretical history）的可能性??也就是说要排斥建立和理论物理（theoretical physics）相当的历史社会科学（historical social science）的可能性。我们无法找到任何历史发展的科学理论足以做为历史预测的基础。

（5）因此历史主义者的方法所想要达到的基本目标乃是一种错误的见解；历史主义于是崩溃。19』

看啊！柏拉图！你所依仗的历史主义是那么不堪一击！不要以为这只是无害的书生议论，它可以成为统治者强而有力的武器！事实上，在《理想国》中我们也可看到你按你理解的历史规律的预测，进一步提供改造社会的全盘计划，这就是我所谓的乌托邦工程20。在368e-543c中我们可以看到你的理想国蓝图。简单来说，你称这个「城邦」（polis）21为「正义」22的、「健康」23的、「理想」24的。它由三种等级组成25：哲君以智慧实行贵族统治；辅助者以勇敢护卫城邦；生产者则以节制服从上级，勤劳供养城邦。「正义在于三种人在国家里各做各的事。26」这种理想可说是整体主义（holism）27，就是个人服膺于整体利益的阶级统治（Class Rule）28。」为着巩固这种阶级统治的理想，你认为统治者可以用政治「宣传的谎言」（prapaganda lie）29，引进「血统与乡土神话」（myth of blood and soil）30「说服」……哈！不如说是诓骗生产者继续接受上层统治31。（柏拉图按奈不住，似乎有话要说）哈！别心急！下一回合才轮到你！（巴柏越加兴高采烈）另外，为着培养新一代的统治阶层，「城邦中大事中最大的事」就是教育32。你更提出一套十分具体的方案以供理想国之需33。此外，为防止贵族政制蜕变贪财的寡头政制，更提倡统治阶层「妇女公有、儿童公有、全部教育公有」34这些政策。

以上，我大约地勾划了柏拉图的蓝图，听起来是多么动听美丽；实行出来却成为开放社会难缠的敌人。接着，我会介绍开放社会的原则，以便指出柏拉图理想国的蓝图在方法和内容上如何与开放社会为敌。我所指的「开放社会」是与信仰巫术禁忌的「封闭社会」35回异，已懂得批判禁忌，依靠理性来做抉择的社会36。在开放社会里，就算是政府政策，也能透过自由讨论予以理性批评。另外，它的制度是为着人民的平等、自由、保护穷人与弱者而设37。关于它们的「开放」（openness）程度与该社会的历史、文化、政治和教育有关。我们可以看到开放社会是变动的，可以变得更好或更坏，最重要的是人能把制度灵活运用38。

基于开放社会相信理性，平等与自由，每个成员对社会也有其责任，因此它提倡的是民主政治39。此外，它扬弃历史主义建立的乌托邦工程，以符合科学方法的「细部社会工程」（Piecemeal Social Engineering）取代之，这方法了解到社会环境之复杂性，主张以渐进和细部的改良方法，逐步改革社会制度，以「灾祸减到最小」40为目的。关于开放社会，我只能说到这儿，但这已是足够把你的理想国蓝图比下去。

现在，让我们看看你的理想国蓝图如何与开放社会相违背？如何与之为敌？

首先从方法上看，如上所说，历史主义根本没有科学理论基础。因此，从中发展出来的乌托邦工程也是反科学的。试想想社会制度的建设是不能忽略具体环境因素，这些因素既复杂且多变，绝对不是抽象的通盘社会计划所能应付的，你的蓝图绝不奏效。相反，开放社会那合符科学的细部社会工程对应具体环境问题进行细部改革，在目标不断调整修正中社会才会逐渐趋向开放和进步。假若笃信并运用你那与科学相违的方法，不但不奏效，更与开放社会背道而驰，成为一股敌挡社会发展及进步的反动41。我们的公证，当我们细心观察他的蓝图时，我们可以看到这反理性，反科学的开放社会敌人若真的实行，它带来的祸患必定是无可估计的。

朝着整体主义的信念，依这蓝图建立的国家必以全体（即国家）的利益为上。于是，无论是向各人民施暴，或攻击其他国家，凡对国家有利，能提高其力量的都是对的，善的42。另外，为了巩固阶级统治，当权的不惜以各种政治「宣传谎言」欺骗国民，如下「猛药」43迷惑他们安于自身阶级，免于与当权竞争，保护统治阶级的利益44。不能不提的是45，这国家必然有种族主义，它赖以立国的神话教导「人类生而不平等」的信条，不同阶级，甚至种族也生而有贵贱之分。那么，卑贱种族的命运便落在统治阶级那高贵种族手上了。这国家当然不信奉民主政制46，更挖苦它为暴民纵欲统治。这样的政府必会以教化人民为己任，视教育为培训统治继承者的政治工具47，它们还会奢望达成「最大多数的最大幸福」这虚拟的妄想，却不懂切实地「将灾祸减到最少」48。

这样的国家，不是曾在本世纪出现过吗？第二次大战时信奉法西斯主义（facism）的纳粹德国不正是依你蓝图建立的「理想国」吗？乌托邦工程师啊！你这种反科学，反理性的政治社会思想，以恐布、谎言、种族歧视建立的国家蓝图，难道不是阻碍开放社会发展的敌人吗？

我们的公证，我已充份指出柏拉图《理想国》蓝图是开放社会的敌人。这是支持我论点的《理想国》文本证据。

相信我们的公证会给予公正的判决。



  8.出自《开放社会及其敌人》上册，页9-10，The Open Society and Its Enemies vol.1，页70。

9.参考了《开放社会及其敌人》上册和卡尔巴柏，《历史定论主义的贫乏》，李丰斌译，台北联经出版社，1981的译名，选用了前者的译名。

10.引自卡尔巴柏，《历史定论主义的贫乏》，页2-3。

11.柏拉图，《理想国》535a-541b。

12.卡尔巴柏，《开放社会及其敌人》上册，页21-30，The Open Society and Its Enemies页11-17。

13.柏拉图《理想国》545c-548a。

14.同上注550c-553a。

15.同上注555b-562a。

16.同上注562a-569c。

17.卡尔巴柏，《开放社会及其敌人》上册，页88-92，The Open Society and Its Enemies vol. 1，页39-42。

18.同上注，中译本，页209；英译本，页86。

19.引录自卡尔巴柏《历史定论主义的贫乏》页VII-VIII；Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (New York: Harper and Rows)，页vi-vii。

20.卡尔巴柏，《历史定论主义的贫乏》，页55；The Poverty of Historicism，页67。

21.柏拉图《理想国》，他的用语不是国家，而是城邦。

22.同上注，《理想国》一书以正义的城邦和正义的人作类比。

23.同上注，373b。

24.同上注，543a。

25.同上注，412b-415d。

26.同上注，441e。

27同注22中译本的译名，详看页62。

28Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism，页49，54。

29卡尔巴柏，《开放社会及其敌人》上册，页323；The Open Society and Its Enemies vol. 1，页141。

30同上注，中译本，页141；英文本，页324。

31同上注，中译本，页141；英文本，页324；指的是《理想国》414b的神话。

32柏拉图《理想国》，535a-541b。

33同上注，543a。

34同上注，543a。

35「开放社会」和「封闭社会」出自柏格森（Henri Bergson）,但巴柏用法有所不同，卡尔巴柏，《开放社会及其敌人》上册。

36同上。

37同上注，庄文端，〈论《理性与开放社会》〉，页16-17。

38同上注，页18-19。

39同上注，页20。

40同上注。

41卡尔巴柏，《历史定论主义的贫乏》，页52-62；Karl Popper: The Poverty of Historicism，页64-75。

42卡尔巴柏，《开放社会及其敌人》上册，页227-235；Karl Popper: The Open Society and Its Enemies vol. 1，页99-106。

43同上注，中译本，页324；英文本，页140。

44同上注，中译本，页100-101，107-108；英文本，页49，54。

45同上注，中译本，页90-93，英文本，页40-43。

46同上注，中译本，页107-108，英文本，页54。

47同上注，中译本，页97。

48参柏拉图，《理想国》，592b。

卷三

【公证仔细看过巴柏呈上的《理想国》，反覆思量了好一会，才开第二回合的讨论。】

公：现在轮到柏拉图前辈发言，可以开始了。

柏：谢谢亲爱的公证。听过巴柏贤弟的滔滔雄辩后，心情实在十分矛盾。一方面惊叹其词锋锐利，才思敏捷；另一方面却暗自担心你对我的控诉，先是「开放社会敌人」还不只！什么「历史主义者」，「乌托邦工程师」的罪名，纷纷为我冠上！不过，在倾听你那醉人的说辞，我幸运地发现一些疑点。让我们讨论讨论，看看是我弄错了你的意思，还是你误解歪曲了我的思想。

（望向巴柏）和你不同，我不喜欢伟论滔滔，我爱对话。因此，我不会像你禁止我答辩，也不会自问自答49，以下的讨论，欢迎你加入。

好，现在我们开始吧！今日讨论的是「柏拉图《理想国》的蓝图是开放社会的敌人」。正方的你为了论题成立必须努力建设支持理据；相反，反方的我只须找你理论的「基石」，把它拆毁。那么，你的论点根基便会动摇，经不起风吹雨打便倒下来。

那么，现在开始我的「拆毁」工程。你认为我的理想国蓝图是由什么人设计的呢？

巴：当然是你这个乌托邦工程师！除了你还有谁？

柏：那么，作为一个工程师，设计蓝图又有何目的呢？他关心的又是什么？

巴：乌托邦工程师设计蓝图的目的是要按照既定计划来重新塑造整个社会，他关心的当然是他的蓝图能否切实地在社会执行，改革社会。

柏：那么，你所指的是工程师设计蓝图，希望藉具体实行蓝图的方针而改进社会，对吗？

巴：没错。

柏：好，现在假设有一幅美丽的图画，它到底从何而来？

巴：当然是由出色画家画出来！你问来干什么？

柏：请你稍安无躁。容我继续问，画家画美丽图画的目的是对美的寻索和表达，还是别的呢？

巴：不是别的，是对美的追求。

柏：那么，画家最重要的工作是要把画画得美，即使所画的在具体世界中不存在也没有关系，对吗？

巴：不错。

柏：依你所说，一个画家的本份是要画好他的画。假若别人批评世界上没有他在画里缯画那么美的女子，甚至他画的世界与这世界相违，这些批评也是不合理的。只要画得好，画得美，就尽了作为画家的本份。对吗？

巴：对。

柏：那么，你一定接受工程师和画家有以下分别：工程师设计蓝图不能天马行空，而是要对应具体环境以及真实的需要而定，相反，画家绘画是一种对美的追求，假若现实不美，他不需要照着画，当他脑中浮现出现实生活中不可能存在的美，即这世界不可能见到，他也有责任把它画出来。

巴：是又怎样？不要带我们绕圈子！快说回主题！

柏：什么？我不是一直努力为自己辩护吗？难道你不发现我的苦心吗？以上我们已看到工程师的蓝图与画家的画有何分别，现在我要问：我到底是画家？抑或工程师？理想国是图画？抑或蓝图？

巴：那还用说？难道你没听清楚我的辩辞吗？让我再重覆一次，你是乌托邦工程师，理想国当然是你的乌托邦蓝图了。

柏：你说得这么言之凿凿，难道你在《理想国》中找到我自认为工程师，把理想国喻为蓝图的证据吗？

巴：你虽然没有这样写出来，但很明显是建设理想城邦的蓝图。

柏：我既然没有这样写，你又怎能用这种坚定的语调说我是乌托邦工程师呢？看来，把理想国视为蓝图只是你的猜测罢了。相反，在《理想国》500d-502c，我不是清清楚楚地把理想国比喻为一幅由「制度画家」所画「最好的图画」吗50？难道你看不见吗？还是你明知我的理想国是图画，却硬要把它视为蓝图，借助打击我来抨击你不满的政权，杆卫你深爱的开放社会？

巴：别胡扯了！你的确有作为政治方案，改进社会制度的动机！

柏：那么，你怎样理解书中以下的对话：

『格：我知道合意的城邦你是指我们在理论中建立起来的那个城邦。但是我想这种城邦在地球上是找不到的。

苏：或许天上建有它的一个原型，让凡是希望看见它的人能看到自己在那里定居下来。至于它是现在存在还是将来才能存在，都没关系。反正他（哲君）只有在这种城邦才能参加政治，而不能在别的任何国家参加。』51（巴柏没有回答）

柏：既然你不回答，那唯有我代答吧！显然，我绘画理想国这幅最美最善的图画，重点并不在乎它能否在现实世界中的实现，它到底是现在还是将来才能在现实世界存在都没有关系，而是因为它的美和善，我才把它绘画出来。其实，理想国成为改进社会的蓝图不是不可能，问题是没有这样的需要。对我来说，历史发展是悲观的，当这些理想的政策制度真的在这变动的世界中实施，完美的哲君统治也会变坏，甚至堕落为暴君统治，正如你所描述那法西斯主义的纳粹德国一样。因为，绘画这幅图画的原因是要把理想国建立在天上，这些完美理型不须实现，而是作为衡量和批评现实世界的准则，这才是它的真正目的。

以上，我们清楚看到理想国是一幅制度画家画的最好的画；把理想国歪曲为蓝图只是巴柏贤弟一厢情愿罢了！那么，既然理想国是图画而非蓝图，便没有什么「柏拉图理想国的蓝图」这回事。既然没有这么一个蓝图存在过，「柏拉图理想国的蓝图是开放社会的敌人」这一辩题又怎能成立呢？（望向公证）我们亲爱严明的公证啊！希望你能仔细分析，到底谁是谁非？

公：放心！我会尽力寻求一个客观合理的判准。

巴：不管怎样，按你的理想国思想只能发展出二次大战时那种暴虐的纳粹统治，对于这一点，你是难辞其咎的！

柏：真是喘不过气来！满以为刚洗脱了开放社会的敌人这罪名，谁知又陷入了教唆后辈建立暴虐政权这罪名。对于这样的指控，我认为是基于巴柏贤弟对理想国的误解。

巴：什么？你说是我对你的误解！

柏：没错，是误解，你以为我的理想国是建立在种族主义与政治宣传谎言之上，用以压制人民，谋取上层利益，理想国可以发动战争，情况就如那纳粹德国一样52。你是否这样认为？

巴：事实如此，不容狡辩。

柏：然而，事实并非如此。设若理想国真的是种族主义，为何选择新一代护卫者不以血统世袭，而是选择有智慧、有能力、真正关心国家利益者呢53？设若理想国的高贵谎言真是政治宣传谎言，那么，为何它的对象不是其他种族或被统治的人民，而是护卫者本身呢54？设若理想国的阶级统治是压制人民，谋取上层利益，那么，为何他们的子女未必能继任为护卫者55？为何护卫者不能像普通人那样获得土地，不能拥有金银财宝，不能过奢侈的生活呢56？设若理想国为了整体利益而开战，那么，为何我又自相矛盾地主张「战争使城邦在公私两面遭到极大的灾难」57？（巴柏没有回答）【柏拉图拿起一本《理想国》，圈了以上引用的内容，递给公证。】

柏：我们亲爱严明的公证，请仔细看看我的《理想国》吧！事实上任何仔细阅读本书的人也不会把它和法西斯主义拉在一起！设若法西斯主义是开放社会的敌人，我的理想国理念也绝不会是他的共犯。既然与法西斯主义没有关系，教唆后辈建立暴虐政权这罪名也不应成立。以上，我已尽力为巴柏贤弟的两项控诉自辩，以求摆脱开放社会的敌人这污名，唯盼我们亲爱严明的公证能明察秋毫，教我洗脱罪名，沉冤得雪。



  49在本文第一回讨论中，卡尔巴柏经常自问自答。

50柏拉图《理想国》，500d-502c。

51柏拉图《理想国》，412e；John Wild, 'Popper's Interpretation of Plato, (The Philosophy of Karl Popper, Paul Arthur Schilpp, ed, La Salle: Open Court, 1974) 页863-864。

52柏拉图《理想国》，414d; John Wild: 'Popper's Interpretation of Plato'，页865。

53参柏拉图，《理想国》，412e; John Wild: 'Popper's Interpretation of Plato'，页865。

54参柏拉图，《理想国》，419b; John Wild: 'Popper's Interpretation of Plato'，页866-867。

55参柏拉图，《理想国》，313e。

56同上注，419。

57同上注，373e。

卷四

公：（想了一想才开声道）听毕两位先哲的讨论，现在该是小辈履行公证职务之时，换句话说，我须要仔细分析两位的论点，以后作出能力范围内最客观中肯的判准。然而，唯恐有负所托，在分析之先，小辈希望弄清楚有没有误解两位的意思。若有错漏，务请指正。

（望向巴柏）在第一回合，巴柏前辈把柏拉图理想国视为按着历史主义以作为建设理想国蓝图背后的理论根据；接着，前辈又批评以这贫乏理论建立起来的乌托邦工程式理想国蓝图在方法上与开放社会细部工程相违背，既反科学又阻碍开放社会的进步；最后，前辈更把法西斯主义的纳粹德国视为二十世纪实行理想国蓝图的例子，进一步指控柏拉图理想国蓝图是开放社会的敌人。前辈，这是否你的意思呢？

巴：大概如是。

公：（望向柏拉图）那么，在第二回合，柏拉图前辈指出巴柏前辈的指控是基于两个误解，第一是误把图画视为蓝图，第二是误读理想国内容，硬把法西斯主义和理想国混为一谈。前辈指出的第一个澄清，否定了「柏拉图理想国蓝图」的存在，指出视不存在的「东西」为开放社会敌人的荒谬。在第二次澄清，前辈指称理想国图画跟法西斯主义绝无关系，理想国图画并没有教唆后辈发展法西斯主义，不应被视为开放社会的敌人。前辈，这是否你原来的意思？

柏：唔。

公：谢谢两位前辈的忍耐。综观两回合的讨论，小辈认为判准的关键在于哪位前辈对理想国的理解较为恰当。显然，两位前辈对理想国的理解截然不同。换言之，巴柏前辈以社会政治向度（social-political approach）注释理想国为蓝图；而柏拉图前辈则从哲学关怀（philosophical concern）解释自身的理想国为图画。要知道是蓝图还是图画，便要好好审查。

首先，我们看看巴柏前辈的理解有没有问题。巴柏前辈把柏拉图理想国的建立，视为从社会政治发展观察得出的历史预测，设计出对应历史规则的政治方案和社会建设蓝图，对于前辈这样的理解和批评，我们可以提出两个问题：前辈从社会政治角度下的批评是否公允？以社会政治角度理解理想国，视它为蓝图有没有可靠的原典证据支持？

第一个问题可说是对巴柏社会政治向度作出内部批判。以下，小辈尝试以三个例子指出巴柏前辈对柏拉图理想国批评本身有何矛盾和错误。

【例一】前辈对历史主义的批判极其量只能指出历史规律不是严格的因果律，这不表示它不存在。因为并不能说明从观察社会现象反映出来的历史趋势，不是一种规律。故前辈只是指出其有限性，没有把它击溃，对柏拉图的历史主义批判显然是言过其辞。

【例二】前辈指斥理想国蓝图反民主，是开放社会敌人。这妄视了柏拉图前辈所反对的民主制与现代民主制之间的区别。柏拉图前辈反对的是雅典当时民智未成熟而实行的直接民主制（direct democracy）58；而巴柏前辈所指的是现今西方预设了民智成熟而推行的代议民主制（representative democracy）。两者无论在形式和民智方面也有不同。巴柏前辈以现代观点批判理想国的反民主无疑是基于对柏拉图前辈所处环境和思想误解或歪曲。这批评显然是错误和不公允的。

【例三】前辈把理想国的哲君统治和法西斯主义的专制统治联在一起，同样犯了【例二】的错误。我们仔细翻阅《理想国》，也能看到当中的护卫者跟法西斯的独裁者相去千余里，批评明显是对柏拉图前辈理想国的误解。从以上的例子，我们可以回答第一条问题：巴柏前辈以社会政治向度提出对理想国蓝图的批评并不公允，是基于对理想国的误解和歪曲。

第二个问题就是寻找「理想国蓝图」的文本支持。诚然，我们不能排除柏拉图前辈有提供社会政治方案蓝图的动机，然而在文本中，不能找到足够证据去支持；相反，把理想国视为图画却有典可考。因此，把理想国视为蓝图，只能算是巴柏前辈一厢情愿的猜测；如柏拉图前辈所言，把理想国视为图画似乎更为恰当。以上，我们解决了视理想国为蓝图或图画，何者较为恰当的问题，现在我们要问的是：柏拉图前辈是否真的以哲学关怀角度绘画理想国图画？而非从社会政治向度建构蓝图？

如前辈在第二回合所说，理想国图画建立在天上的目的，是作为一种批判现实世界的理型，作为现实世界衡量的基准。显然，这图画的存在目的和形式不是改良现实社会的具体社会政治方案，它存在的目的是作为对现实社会制度作出反省，批判的方向。另外，在前辈的历史主义中我们也可看见其哲学的关怀。根据《理想国》描写的「人类政制堕落史」我们可以看到前辈不是以观察历史演进过程来找出这个历史堕落规律，前辈是根据逻辑原理，层层推理而发展出这历史规律的。故此，我们有理由相信柏拉图前辈绘画这幅「图画」是基于其哲学的关怀。

柏：巴柏贤弟，这次讨论的结果似乎十分明显了。

公：的确，巴柏前辈提出的辩题是基于对柏拉图前辈理想国的误解，确是不能成立的。然而巴柏前辈在讨论中的意见对小辈也有很大的提醒。

巴：（面有不悦之色）是吗？说来听听！

公：虽然柏拉图前辈并没有把理想国图画视为蓝图，但巴柏前辈的讨论提醒我们，设若硬把从哲学关怀出发的理想国图画解读为社会政治变革的具体蓝图，可能带来的灾祸是不可估计。另外，从巴柏前辈对伟大的思想领导者柏拉图前辈的抨击中，小辈可以学习到一种开放批判精神；学习到不应盲目顺从伟人的思想，须知道越伟大的人犯的错则越可怕，影响也越大。故此，常以开放批判的眼界去看世界，可免于迷信59。

柏：哈！看来这次讨论中，你也获益良多。

公：不止如此，在整个讨论过程中，小辈更学习到人与人沟通所产生的误解，往往是基于对同一事物的不同理解和诠释、却又不自知所致。真正的对话是从这个「自知」开始，寻求进一步的共识，否则，彼此的误解只会造成纷争和混乱，不会达到真正的知识。

巴：唔……

公：言归正传。作为公证人，我希望对「柏拉图《理想国》的蓝图是开放社会的敌人」提出修正，把它改为「柏拉图《理想国》的图画被歪曲为一套具体的社会政治蓝图的话，它可能成为开放社会的敌人」。两位前辈认为如何？

巴：我没有意见。

柏：我们亲爱严明的公证，就按你的意思修正吧。

【接着，他们又谈了一回，柏拉图和巴柏也教导了公证好些东西，随着梦醒，公证回到人间，而这场超时空界限的讨论就此结束。】



58参邝健行在「苏格拉底辩词」注解70和71，柏拉图，《柏拉图三书》，邝健行译，香港学津书店，1993，页152-153。

59卡尔巴柏，《开放社会及其敌人》上册，页1。

Gianni Criveller （柯毅霖）

A Historical Review of the Concept of Revelation


FIRST PART The Postmodern Condition

An Introduction to Postmodernism

'Postmodern' means different things to different people1, so that it is difficult to define. More than a clear-cut movement of thought, postmodern can be defined as a 'mood', an 'atmosphere', in which different strategies or approaches coexist and overlap2. The postmodern world is composed of a number of self-meaning-generating agencies, without horizontal or vertical order, which do not claim supracommunal authority. Postmodern thought is then irrevocably and irreducibly pluralistic, complex, contradictory and destabilizing. Therefore, the word 'bewilderment' (spaesamento)3 has been used to describe the condition of the postmodern person. 'Fragmentation' is another term often connected with the postmodern condition, and certainly is one of its key characteristics.

The use of the term 'postmodernism' may be traced back to as early as the 1880s, when it was used by the British artist John Watkins Chapman. In 1917 Rudolf Pannwitz again used this term.4 In the 1930s the term was employed to describe the major historical transition already under way and the latest developments in the arts in reaction to modernism. The use of 'posts', as in post-impressionism (1880s) and post-industrial (1914-22), developed steadily in the 1960s, when the 'posts' were multiplied: post-structuralism; post-anthropological, post-metaphysical, post-rationalistic, post-ideologies, post-Marxism, post-Christianity etc... These 'posts' were used to designate the radical changes that were taking place first of all in architecture, and subsequently in the various arts, in literature, social thought, economics, science, philosophy and religion. The concept of postmodernism gained widespread attention as a broader cultural phenomenon in the 1970s.

According to Charles Jencks, the most influential authority on architectural postmodernism, Postmodernism was born in St. Louis, Missouri, on July 15, 1972, at 3:32 p.m.5 The Pruitt-Igoe housing project was more than a landmark of modern architecture, it was a symbol that epitomized "modernity itself in its goal of employing technology to create a utopian society for the benefit of all."6 The government, however, could not prevent the buildings from being vandalized and could not renovate the project, in spite of much effort and the millions of dollars put into the plan. In an era of symbols, the razing of the housing project symbolizes the death of modernism and birth of post-modernism.

In this article I distinguish between postmodernism and postmodernity. The first is the intellectual development that, as the name obviously indicates, goes beyond modernism. Post-modernity indicates the historical phase that succeeds the age universally called 'modernity.' 'Postmodern' is a general term that, in my presentation, comprises both the concept of postmodernism and of postmodernity.

Modern and Postmodern

If postmodern is defined in relation to the modern, we should first define what 'modern' means. But this task would take too much of our time here. While I take the complex notion of modernity as understood, I simply summarize some of its content as follows. 'Modern' means: 1. The absolutization of human reason as the only and supreme subject of knowledge; the modern subject is self-grounded and self-understanding, the principle of totality; 2. The emancipation of the individual from any constraint which limits his/her supreme freedom and dignity, or, in other words, modernity is the process in which the ultimate liberation of the human being unfolds; 3. Opposition to tradition and to the church as the chief enemies of emancipation and freedom; 4. Nationalism and statism as the sovereign regulative principles of human existence and co-existence; 5. Unlimited trust in science, economic and technological expansion, industrialism.

Postmodernism is described not by what it is, but what it is not: it is not modern. What does 'it is not modern' mean? Is the postmodern a result of modernism? Or is it the aftermath of modernism? Or the afterbirth of modernism? Is postmodernism a development of modernism? Or its denial? Or the rejection of modernism, or its surrogate? Is it a form of late-modernism? Is postmodernism all these things together?

Postmodernism may find it uncomfortable to define itself negatively in reference to modernism. If modern (from Latin modo: just now, presently) means what is happening now, then it will be, by definition, modern until the end of history. But modernism, like the Pruitt-Igoe project, is falling apart and unable to meet the challenges of a new epoch. Modernism, addicted to the defensive-conservative illusion that nothing will transcend itself, is finally waning.7 What is waning is the presumption, implied in the very word 'modernism', that modernity is the definitive emancipation of the human condition and an irreversible process. There is no choice, until a more suitable term is found, but to call such a phenomenon post-modernism, since whatever outlasts modernity is, by linguistic definition, postmodern. At the same time postmodernism expresses a cry of protest against the pretence of modernism to be the ultimate category of the human spirit and of history.

The Postmodern Condition

The Postmodern Condition by French philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard is the title of a short book which appeared in 1979 and which put postmodernism into the arena of philosophical debate.8 Postmodernity is characterized, according to Lyotard, by incredulity toward metanarratives, the grand narratives of history. The 'great stories' of progress were based on the modern postulate that history is moving toward a positive end, as indicated by the emancipation of the various political movements. After Lyotard, others have tried to describe the features of the unfolding of postmodern society and the complexity of the postmodern condition. The contemporary world is still in the turmoil of the transition, unable to propose a new project. From the status quo into which modern history had fallen, the postmodern is still in a fluxus quo, in the process of deconstructing history, its determinateness and finality. The status quo of modernity, imbued with historical determinateness and finality,9 generated the various totalitarian ideologies and political tyrannies.

With the dissolution of history and its linear meaning, we entered into a society saturated with communication, in which the mass media play a decisive role. The uninterrupted flux of information seems to make society more complex, confused, chaotic and oscillating. Society seems now made to the measure of the mass media, history has disappeared: what remains is spectacle. We live in 'hyperreality',10 where everything is in excess of itself, piles of images that represent nothing but themselves, in which reality and truth have become irrelevant. The generalized communication and proliferation of images generates, by means of disorientation,11 a multicultural and pluralist world. An infinite number of other possibilities of existence become part of our daily experience, so that 'otherness' is realized before our own eyes. "To live in this pluralistic world means to experience freedom as continual oscillation between belonging and disorientation."12 According to Gianni Vattimo it is exactly from these characteristics of chaos and oscillation that the hope for a society finally human derives.13

Postmodern Arts

As has been mentioned above, architecture played a pivotal role in the affirmation of the postmodern mentality. The postmodern architects' harsh criticism of modern architecture set an intellectual trend which many exponents of other artistic, cultural and scientific disciplines would soon follow. Postmodern architects advocated not simply a change of direction, but "a refusal, a rapture, a renouncement" of modern architecture, whose "main article was precisely an annihilation of tradition, the obligatory renewal, the theology for the new, (...) the perpetual invention of and search for the new at all costs".14 Postmodern architects denounce the dogmas of functionalism, anti-traditionalism and technologism, which reduce Modern Architecture to being an accomplice of bureaucracy and totalitarianism. Thomas Oden15 has offered an illuminating scheme to summarize the characteristics of the transition from modern to postmodern architecture, as described by postmodern architects, especially Jencks. The scheme is basically applicable to other arts which have made the transition to the postmodern: Music, Painting, Literature, Theater, Photography, Film, Television, Dance, Fashion etc...16The scheme corresponds surprisingly to the transitions being experienced in other fields, including theology.

Modern Architecture Postmodern Architecture
Utopian popular
Idealist pluralist
Zeitgeist (spirit of the time) traditional
Purist eclectic
Anti-ornamental ornamental
Anti-representational representational
Anti-metaphor pro-metaphor
Anti-historical memory pro-historical memory
Anti-humor pro-humor
Anti-symbolic pro-symbolic

Postmodern arts, however, do not escape the decadent and nihilistic inclination of postmodernity. On a critical note, Fred Lawrence accuses postmodern artistic trends of having reached the reductio ad absurdum of Romantic expressionism. Postmodern art promotes "promiscuity in styles and codes, mixing parody, pastiche, irony, and playfulness, and insisting on the absence of depth and the paradoxical importance of superficiality."17

Postmodern Science

Even science, whose ultimate power to explain and solve all problems was one of the strongest beliefs and fundamental pillars of modernity, is under severe criticism. People realize that science cannot be the only language to describe reality. Life becomes meaningful and beautiful thanks to values, ideas, hopes and aims that go beyond the achievements of science. Moreover the postmoderns question whether science and technology are, instead of being the solution to every human problem, the principal danger to humanity. Scientific and technological development has been poisonous to humanity, generating a worsening of the quality of life, uncontrolled genetic engineering, weapons of mass destruction, resource imbalances and shortages, environmental damage that has reached the point of no return. A growing number of people and groups call for a return to nature and a rejection of modern science since the very possibility of a future on the planet has been endangered. Ever larger groups of naturalists repudiate the modernist project of employing science as the instrument for making human beings "the masters and possessors of nature" (Descartes). 18They accuse the scientists of practicing terrorism against defenseless nature, the experts and technologists of being the modern inquisitors of the authoritarian rule of science and technology.19 Ecology has become the 'ideology' of many postmoderns, who no longer dream about the future earth, the fruit of the progress, but rather lament the earth of the 'good old days,' when it was still uncontaminated by human manipulation. In the postmodern age, conservation is preferred to change, the green colour of nature is preferred to the red colour of revolution. If people in the sixties believed in a better future (see the New Frontier of Kennedy), people in the nineties believe that, thanks to the impending nuclear and ecological menaces, there might be no future at all. The science that should have liberated humanity created the means to destroy it, and the technology that should have humanized nature, devastated it.

One of the claims of postmodernist scientists is that modern Western scientific knowledge is culturally influenced, that is, it is not purely objective. The entire world picture described by modern physics, such as the view that time is linear or the belief that reality is purely physical, is a culturally specific way of looking at reality.20 Philosophers of science are now claiming that many indigenous knowledge systems, such as those of the Australian Yolngu Aborigines, the Yoruba of Nigeria or the Native American Blackfeet, include a genuine alternative scientific understanding of the world.21 This being the case, "science turns out to be a term as multifaceted and problematic as religion" affirms philosopher of science Margaret Wertheim.22

The quantum theory offers a radical new way of understanding the nature of reality, which according to its supporters, often baffles and bemuses mainstream modern scientists.23 Quantum physics challenges the materialistic vision of the world, formulating the theory that everything we perceive and experience is not pieces of matter but living energy, emitted in nonlinear waves or particles. Einstein called this non-continuous emission of energy packets quanta. According to the scientists who developed this theory, the nature of the quantum (particle-wave) is indeterminate, undefinable, and they postulated the phenomenon of the 'wave packet', wherein the subatomic particles are neither particles nor waves. The wave packet defies precise measurement, so that uncertainty and probability are the qualities of this deeper quantum level. The wave function can simultaneously offer several different possibilities, but when observation has been made, only one of these possibilities materializes. The perception of reality can be described as a set of relationships, so that the observer will always influence the process of observing and the object observed. In quantum theory there is no such thing as objective reality. On the contrary, the observer becomes not only part of the process, but he or she brings about what is being observed. We are in a participatory universe, and, according to some of the advocates of quantum theory (the so-called School of Copenhagen), we create our own reality, we are the masters of creation. Other quantum 'scientists' recently overcame the concept of humans as creators of the universe, which still postulates a dualism between observer and being observed, and expanded 'wholistic consciousness.' Everything is interpreted according to a complex model of giving and receiving, observing and being observed, so that the concept of relationship becomes central in the co-creative process of the universe, in which humans are not masters but participators.24 The modern scientific model of cause and effect and determinism is severely rebuffed by 'postmodern' quantum theory.

The Philosophy of Postmodernism

Some authors, like Hugh J. Silverman, Gregory B. Smith and F. F. Centore, think that postmodernism is not simply the refusal to accept modernist principles and perspectives; it is rather its straightforward extension,25 its extreme result, "the latest and most intense form of modern self-dissatisfaction",26 a distorted form of hyper-modernism.27 Other theoreticians define this time as 'late-modernity', or modernity which has come to reflect on itself.28 Among them Jesus Ballesteros, Robert Spaemann and Alejandro Llano especially distinguish the concepts of postmodernity from late-modernity.29 While the first term indicates a genuine epochal turn, the second refers to the attempt of powerful political and cultural centers to delay the death of the Enlightenment and of the subsequent ideologies. According to them (Ballesteros, Spaemann and Llano), thinkers like Rorty, Derrida, Deluze, Foucault, Vattimo, Borges, Habermas and Apel are not postmodern but rather late-modern. In the same line of thought, Gianfranco Morra notes that both modernity and postmodernity are atheist, and as a consequence he states that postmodernity is not a new era, not after-modernity, but rather modernity of the after, modernity in its dissolving and nihilistic phase.30

If the line of demarcation between modernism and postmodernism is not well defined for the theoreticians mentioned above, such a line is much clearer for other authors, like Todd Gitlin, who claims that "postmodernism is more than a buzzword or an esthetic (...). It is a way of seeing, a view of the human spirit and an attitude toward political as well as cultural possibilities."31 Thomas Oden salutes postmodernism as the liberator from oppressive modernism, which is the mother of all modern disasters and sufferings. The Italian philosopher Augusto Del Noce, who anticipated the collapse of Marxism when it was still glorified by the mainstream culture, defines modernity as the age of 'catastrophe,' in its literal meaning of 'turning upside down.' The thesis that Del Noce calls the 'heterogenesis of the ends' (eterogenesi dei fini) states that the ends of modernity produced results which were the exact opposite of the original intentions.32 The totalitarian ideologies that aimed to liberate human beings from religions turned themselves into 'secular religions.' The evils and horrors that followed are there for everyone to see.

My assumption in this study is that postmodernism has brought the modernist philosophical hegemony to a close. Postmodernism reveals the outcome of the 'parable' of modernity. The modern emancipated adult reason, which was at once the agent and the aim of modernity, finds itself in a grave crisis.

Where modernism asserts centering, focusing and continuity, postmodernism is fragmented, de-centered, discontinuous, multiple, dispersed, without identity and unity.33 "Contemporary postmodernism is fundamentally a sign of disintegration, of transition, of waning faith in the modern ideas of Reason and Progress,"34 the heritage of the Enlightenment. The modern confidence about the subject's ability to dominate and change the world has vanished, and no other 'strong thoughts' seem to be available. This disintegration characterizes this age with irrationalism, anxiety and lost hope. Such a condition was powerfully anticipated by (pre post-?) modern authors when they described these as times of 'dis-aster' -without guiding stars- (Maurice Blanchot), 'the lands of sunset', from which 'gods have fled' (Martin Heidegger), where 'everything is born without reason, prolongs itself out of weakness, and dies by chance' (Jean-Paul Sartre).35 This nihilistic stance provides an explanation of the attitude of indifference and avoidance. In the age of generalized communication, in the society of the mass media and fiction, the postmoderns live in a world of abstractions, where the concrete world withdraws and triviality reigns. Gianfranco Morra calls it the culture of the 'fourth man.'36 After the man of the Greek culture, the man of Christianity, the man of Modernity, the 'fourth man' is the man of consumerism, of the mass-media, of the esthetic. The fourth man does not reject religion, science and philosophy, but rather considers them linguistic games of knowledge without real consistency. Milan Kundera seems to have captured such a situation with the striking phrase 'the unbearable lightness of being', the title of his successful (postmodern?) novel.37

The postmodern respond to this 'condition' by adopting a defensive posture, an attitude of detachment, a nihilistic stance. The crisis of modern reason shows itself mainly in the shape of a 'collapse of meaning': whereas enlightened reason had clear and obvious solutions worked out within the context of an all-comprehensive and transparent meaning, postmodern thinking rediscovers the dark recalcitrance of life with respect to any ideal clarification. The outcome of modern reason's crisis is a farewell to security, a reinstatement of death, the abandoning of any basis, in order to voyage towards the unknown, towards nothingness, even finally liberation from the lure of a meaning.38

Three principal postmodern philosophers, Michael Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Richard Rorty, develop their thought in the footsteps of their modern philosophical mentors: respectively Friedrick Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger and John Dewey, whose thought leads directly to contemporary skepticism. Foucault, echoing Nietzsche's proclamation of the death of God, declares the 'end of man', which follows the eclipse of man as a ground of thought. Derrida's deconstruction, in opposition to and overcoming structuralism, takes place since differance will never disappear wherever there 'is' something. In such a way the texts are liberated from any ontological foundation, from any concept of embodied meaning derived by western logocentrism. Deconstruction points toward that which philosophy is unable to say. Rorty's neo-pragmatism, elaborated around the concepts of contingency and irony, constitutes a postmodern development of Dewey's thought. 'Ironic' is the person who does not take anything too seriously, not even him/herself, since he or she is too conscious of the linguistic contingency of all affirmations.39

Postmodern thinkers, like their modern precursors, have rejected the modern reigning epistemological principle of the 'correspondence' between language and the world it represents. Consequently postmodern people have given up the search for universal and objective truth. "They are convinced that there is nothing more to find than a host of conflicting interpretations or an infinity of linguistically created worlds."40 The denial of the 'ontological' God as the extreme consequence of the rejection of the 'correspondence theory' was anticipated by Nietzsche: "Alas, I fear we still believe in God because we still believe in grammar."41 The Italian postmodern philosopher, Gianni Vattimo, proposes the adoption of a 'weak thought,' (pensiero debole) against all the unjustified and outdated pretences of the 'strong thoughts.'42 'Weak thought,' which I would call the 'philosophical heart of postmodernism' taking over from the failure of enlightened identity, seems to result in an utter collapse, in a permanent fall into the void. A weak thought can be defined as the position that one holds valid as long as it is useful here and now. Such a position might not be good for another person, it might not be good for tomorrow. The postmodernists deliver no message, bear no truth, bring no revelation, and do not speak for those who remain in silence. While modern ideologies were revolutionary, weak thought represents something that is not worth fighting for, since it is not valid for others, not something that one wants or should impose on others. We have entered into the age of the 'ontology of decline,' as another Italian philosopher, Pier Angelo Rovatti, put it. This decline is best described in the successful 'postmodern' novel of Umberto Eco The Name of the Rose: "the mission of those who love mankind is to make people laugh at the truth, to make the truth laugh, because the only truth lies in learning to free ourselves from the insane passion for the truth."43 Eco here gives what is possibly the best description of the 'ironic individual' of Richard Rorty.

Postmodernity as the Post-ideological Era

According to Arnold Toynbee, postmodernity is the fourth and last phase of Western history: postmodernity is the name given to the epoch that succeeded modernity. As mentioned above, postmodernity overcomes the status quo into which modernity has fallen: if modernity means what is happening now, then it will be modern until the end of time. Francis Fukuyama reaches the epitome of the thesis that there is nothing beyond modernity with his theory of the 'End of History'.44 With the collapse of Marxist communism, liberal capitalism has achieved a global victory, signaling nothing less than the end of history. But postmodern thinkers refuse to take modernity as the final expression of history, as the ultimate, irreversible, untranscendable stage of historical progress.45 They reject the notion that we have arrived at the inevitable end of history. But they also reject, especially with Lyotard, the 'metanarratives,' the dogma that states that history is linear, unitary and progresses toward its destined end.46

If postmodernism was born in St Louis on July 15th 1972, postmodernity was born 17 years later, in Berlin, on November 9, 1989. The fall of the Berlin Wall symbolized the collapse of the last ideology still dominating Europe. This date signaled the end of the 'short century', which started with the First World War (1914). Postmodernity means very much post-Marxism, as the book of the (post-) Marxist sociologist Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity (1992), is meant to demonstrate. The collapse of communism in 1989 is actually the end of modernity "because what collapsed was the most decisive attempt to make modernity work; and it failed. It failed as blatantly as the attempt was blatant."47 The crisis of ideologies was the inevitable consequence of the crisis of modern reason. The 'short century' witnessed both the triumph and the collapse of the political ideologies, in 1945 the demise of the Right, in 1989 that of the Left.

The post-ideological outcome of postmodernity highlights the rejection of the Hegelian program of totality and the Marxist ideological attempt to reduce reality to Hegelian idealism, suppressing contradictions and difference as the residue of negativiness. The crisis of modern ideologies is rooted exactly in the presumption of the absoluteness of the will to power of the subjects who endowed themselves with the historical mission of synthesizing the ideal and the real: emancipated reason, emancipated ideology, emancipated party and state. The program of forcing the ideal to be real inevitably ended up in the violent totalitarianism of a party which claimed to combine in itself society, the state and knowledge. The ideological pre-comprehension of the real in the name of the programmed ideal produced new totalities, which we have already described above as 'secular religions.' They proved to be extremely costly, in human as well as in social and ecological terms.



    1. Bauman, Z. (1992) Intimations of Postmodernity. London: Routledge, p. vii.

2. Tosolini, T. (1998) Postmodernity and Mission, offprint of a lecture given by the author in Arriccia (Rome), p. 1.

3. Mucci, G. (1997) Il Postmoderno e la Compagnia della Cultura Cristiana. La Civilta Cattolica II, p. 236.

4. Appignanesi, R. and Garatt, C. (1995) Postmodernism for Beginners. Cambridge: Icon Books, p. 3.

5. Jenks, C. (1984) The Language of Post-Modern Architecture. London: Academy Editions, p. 9.

6. Grenz, S. J. (1996) A Primer on Postmodernism. Grand Rapids, Michigan / Cambridge U. K.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, p. 11.

7. Oden, T. C. (1990) Agenda for Theology. After Modernity...What? Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, p. 76.

8. Lyotard, J. F. (1984) The Postmodern Condition: a Report on Knowledge. Trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

9. Tracy, D. (1994) On Naming the Present. God, Hermeneutics and Church. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, pp. 14-15.

10. Baudrillard, J. (1988) Simulacra and Simulation. In M. Poster (ed.), Selected Writings. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 170.

11. Vattimo, G. (1992) The Transparent Society. Trans. David Webb. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 8.

12. Ibid., p. 10.

13. Ibid., pp. 4-11.

14. Portoghesi, P. (1982) After Modern Architecture. New York: Rizzoli, p. 7.

15. Oden. Agenda for Theology, p. 73.

16. Silverman, H. J. (1990) Postmodernism - Philosophy and the Arts. New York and London: Routledge.

17. Lawrence, F. (1993) The Fragility of Consciousness: Lonergan and the Postmodern Concern for the Other. Theological Studies 54, p. 55.

18. Ibid., pp. 57-58.

19. Messori, V. (1992) Pensare La Storia. Milano: Edizioni Paoline, p. 396. Mucci, G. (1997) L'Assenza di Dio nel Postmoderno. La Civilta Cattolica XI, pp. 544-545.

20. Wertheim, M. (1999) The Odd Couple. The Sciences, March/April, p. 42.

21. Ibid. p. 43.

22. Ibid.

23. 'O Murchu, D. (1998) Qantum Theology. Spiritual Implication of the New Physics. New York: Crossroad, p. 27.

24. For this presentation of quantum theory I referred to ibid., pp. 27-36 and Wentzel Van Huyssteen, J. (1998) Duet or Duel, Theology and Science in a Postmodern World. Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Trinitarian Press International, pp. 58-68.

25. Smith, G. B. (1996) Nietzche, Heidegger, and the Transition to Postmodernity. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, p. 6.

26. Ibid. p. 8.

27. Centore, F. F. (1991) Being and Becoming, A Critique of Post-Modernism. New York / Westport, Connecticut / London: Greenwood Press, p. xii.

28. Junker-Kenny, M. (1999) Church, Modernity and Postmodernity. Concilium 1, pp. 94-95.

29. Mucci, G. (1997) La Postmodernita Buona. La Civilta Cattolica I, pp. 435-443.

30. Morra, G. (1994) Dio nella Filosofia Post-moderna. Studi Cattolici 38, pp. 620-626.

31. Gitlin, T. (1988) Hip-Deep in Post-modernism (Book Review). New York Times November 6. Quoted by Silverman, H. J. The Philosophy of Postmodernism. In Silverman, Postmodernism - Philosophy and the Arts, p. 8.

32. Del Noce, A. (1978) Il Suicidio della Rivoluzione. Milano: Jaca Book. Quoted by Messori, Pensare La Storia, pp. 661-671.

33. Silverman, The Philosophy of Postmodernism, p. 5.

34. Smith, Nietzche, Heidegger, and the Transition to Postmodernity, p. 8.

35. See Tosolini, Postmodernity and Mission, p. 19.

36. Morra, G. (1996) Il Quarto Uomo. Postmodernita o Crisi della Modernita? Roma: Armando, pp. 11-23.

37. Ibid. p. 10.

38. Forte, B. (1997) Speaking of God in Post-modern Europe. Religion and Culture 2, pp. 210-211.

39. Rorty, R. (1989) Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

40. Grenz, A Primer on Postmodernism, p. 163.

41. Quoted by MacKenna, J. (1997) Derrida, Death, and Forgiveness. First Things 71, p. 34.

42. Vattimo, G. (1983) Il Pensiero Debole. Milano: Feltrinelli.

43. Eco, U. (1984) The Name of the Rose. Trans. W. Weaver. Picador, p. 491.

44. Fukuyama, F. (1992) The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Basic Books.

45. Oden, Agenda for Theology after Modernity, p. 76.

46. Vattimo, G. (1988) The End of Modernity. Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Postmodern Culture. Trans. John R. Snyder. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 7-13.

47. Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity, p. 222. See also Blanquart, P. (1992) 'Post-Marxism and Post-Modernity': What is the Church's Presence? Concilium. 6, pp. 115-123.

SECOND PART Postmodernism and Christianity

Long-standing Catholic Criticism of Modernity

Catholicism and Reformed Christianity had a very different relationship with modernity. Protestantism, in a very important sense, maintained close ties with modernity. The Reformation and the modern age were born about the same time from the same intellectual premises, for example, the anti-traditional and anti-authority attitude which favoured the primacy of subjectivity. Hegel affirmed that Protestant Christianity is the religion of modernity because it is also the religion of freedom.48 Modernity and Evangelism, although not always in agreement (as in the cases of Pietism, of Karl Barth's criticism of Liberal Theology, and of evangelical opposition to secularism), were partners and friends in the shaping of the modern world. Liberal Theology and the demythologization of Rudolf Bultmann are examples of theological expressions of modernism.

If Reformed Christianity was considered capable of integration into the modern world, Catholicism was, on the contrary, often reviled as anti-modern and reactionary. According to a model often called 'intransigent Catholicism', the Catholic Church is generally believed to have condemned and rejected modernity, at least until Vatican Council II.49

I would just mention three major clashes of the Catholic Church with modernity: the Galileo Galilei case (1615-1640), the Syllabus of Errors of Pius IX (1864) and the fierce anti-modernist campaign of Pius X (1901-1914). An attentive study of the three cases will reveal that some of the pronouncements of Catholic authorities correspond closely to the post-modern critique of modernism I summarily illustrated above.

Although Church theologians erred in their formal condemnation of Galileo's scientific opinions (a condemnation that was merely temporary - donec corrigatur - until it is corrected), they were right to refuse to turn a mere hypothesis into a fact to be accepted uncritically, even at the cost of rejecting the then common interpretation of the Scriptures. The famous sentence about the meaning of the Bible, which is about how to go to Heaven and not about how heaven goes, comes not from Galileo, but from Cardinal Baronio. What Galileo was asked by remarkable scholars like Bellarmine and Baronio was, in the first instance, not to renounce his theories, but simply to hold them as hypotheses, since in those days they could not be considered otherwise. It well known, in fact, that the only evidence that Galileo was able to produce (the cause of the tides) was wrong, while his opponents were right. Galileo tried also to impose a vision of nature based on mathematical principles, so that the inner workings of nature can be expressed only in mathematical language. Anything which was not to be expressed mathematically was considered secondary, subjective or non-existent. This approach, which can be considered the origin of modern scientific arrogance, is, in fact, the denial of the possibility of natural philosophy and theology.

Pius IX effectively denounced the totalitarism of the 'order of reason' in the Syllabus, possibly the earliest and most fully articulated anti-modern document. Among the modern errors he included the assertion that "human reason is the principal norm by which man can and must attain knowledge of all truths of any kind whatsoever" (No. 4). In propositions No. 28-38 Pius IX denounces the totalitarianism of the state, considered by modernists as the origin and font of all rights (No. 39), to which the Church should submit herself and give up her legitimate rights. Among the rights the state reserves for itself are: to give permission to bishops to promulgate apostolic letters (No. 28); the establishment of national Churches independent of the Roman Pontiff (No. 37); to fix the method of studies used in seminaries (No. 46); to prevent bishops and faithful from communicating with the Pope (No. 49); to present, install and depose bishops (No. 50-51); to permit admission to solemn religious vows (No. 52). One cannot but notice that contemporary 'modern' totalitarianisms are imposing the same arbitrary restrictions on the Church.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries modernism developed within the Catholic Church, prompting a forceful reaction from Pius X, who called modernism 'the synthesis of all heresies' in two documents issued in 1907 (Lamentabili and Pascendi). Influenced by Kantianism, which advocated the subjective nature of natural knowledge and the unknowableness of God by natural reason, the modernists considered religion a matter of 'feelings', of personal and collective experience, a 'motion of the heart' not expressible intellectually. As a consequence some extreme modernists denied revelation in favor of immanentism, the authority of the magisterium of the Church and the divinity of Jesus. They also reduced Scripture to literature and the Church to a sociological institution undermining the credibility of the Christian faith as supported by historical documentation and miracles.

The three major episodes of anti-modernist polemics, which show that time proves that going against the current is not necessarily a sign that one is reactionary or obtuse, can be considered an anticipation of the collapse of modern thought. Defenders of the Catholic Church do not, however, rejoice at the intellectual victory over modernism. No one has any illusions that the postmodern condition will necessarily bring success to Catholicism.

Post-Modernity and Post-Christianity

The present religious situation in Europe and North America is often described as secular, where many people no longer believe, and therefore are defined as post-Christians.50 Post-Christianity is an expression to describe a 'secular' status in which Christianity is losing its central role in shaping the lives of the people. Although the majority is baptized, only a minority retains meaningful ties with the traditional Churches. Most people live their lives independently of the Christian faith and the teachings of the Churches they (used to) belong to. The churches have become extraneous to them. Someone has noticed a 'submerged schism', particularly within the Catholic Church: a significant number among those still practicing, silently (or in a few cases openly), distance themselves from doctrines and moral obligations required by the ecclesiastical authorities. The estrangement of Christian faith from the world is the outcome of modern positivism, which reduced religion to the degraded sphere of the emotions and feelings. Religion was considered by modern critical reason pre-, extra-, or anti-scientific, something unworthy of the emancipated and adult subject. The only admissible authorities were those of science and of the avant-guard party, the necessary instrument that would transform the (ideological) ideal into (political) reality. In the modern era religions and churches have become superfluous.

The post-Christian situation is however a not an unfamiliar one for the Church. Throughout the two thousand years of its existence, the Church has often experienced the dolorous passage of peoples and nations from the Christian faith to other beliefs. Christian communities founded by Paul himself, some of the Churches of the Fathers or great saints like Augustine, have almost disappeared. Syria was the first and a glorious Christian nation, which sent missionaries to the entire East and as far as China, but the number of Christians has been drastically reduced there. The diminishing of Christianity in one place does not mean a crisis of Christianity as such. In fact, history shows that when Christianity was losing somewhere, it was gaining elsewhere. This is very much in evidence today as well.

The significance of the departure of Western people from the traditional Christian denominations should not, however, be overestimated. These Churches show signs of crisis, but are far from near total collapse. In several cases they are holding their ground, if not advancing.51 Powerful evidence can be found in the Catholic Church. Never in history has a Pope attracted such worldwide attention and respect, or drawn such vast crowds of people from various nations, races, languages, cultures, and even religious beliefs as the present Pope John Paul II. Never has a Pope exercised such an indirect but profound influence on the unfolding of secular events. From being a victim of political pressure and even oppression in past centuries the Pope has, in the last few decades, acquired probably the highest moral and independent authority on the planet.

The postmodern condition is not, by any means, a post-religious age. Quite the contrary, postmodernity is witnessing the resurgence of the religious sense, which was thought to be dead along with the proclamation of the death of God. In the sixties, radical theologians such as William Hamilton, Thomas J. Altizer and Harvey Cox had developed the theology of the 'death of God' and of the 'secular city.' These theologians were prophesying the 'eclipse of the sacred' following the lead of the Marxists. But the decline of religion did not come about. On the contrary, while Marxism is dead, there is a growing expansion of religious practice. But the religious revival is not necessarily a Christian revival or even the return of God within the human horizon. The powerful spread of the religious spirit can be classified under various categories: 1. Neo-fundamentalist Christianity; 2. Neo-Orientalism; 3. Various forms of human potential movements and forms of trans-personal psychology influenced by both Oriental and Christian fundamentalist religious thought. In such a context the New Age movement has a special influence and relevance. The New Age movement can be considered the religious expression of Postmodernity. I will dedicate another study to this theme.

Postmodern Theological Challenges

The debate on modernity and post-modernity that is characterizing the end of this century has an immediate relevance to the fate of Christianity in the contemporary world. In fact, the debate is not only sociological, philosophical or historical: it has become a theological one. The fragmentation of postmodernism has been experienced through the fragmentation of the 'religious' science of theology. In the last three decades, starting from the Second Vatican Council in the case of the Catholic Church, much of the theological development seems to lack a common ground. The significance of theology as comprehensive discourse on the faith of the Church, once guaranteed by the uniformity of the neo-thomist treatises, has been lost. We have witnessed instead the bringing forth of a large number of theologies of the 'of' type', of the particular, of the fragment. For instance, the theology of Secularism, of Religions, of Liberation, of Inculturation, of Interreligious Dialogue, of Feminism, of the Environment, of Ecology, of Creation, etc...

Perusing the immense output of contemporary theologians, one is puzzled by the method and the research object of some of them. It seems, in fact, that much of this enterprise is not properly theo-logy (discourse on God) any longer, but rather an exaltation of modern or postmodern themes, to which theological discourse should readily adapt itself. What really matters to a number of contemporary theologians is not faithfulness to the sources and nature of theological discourse, but rather the reinterpretation of postmodern phenomena in a somewhat vague religious mode. The variegated and scattered status of theological research might hint at the existence of a post-modern condition in Christianity. The conflict between a number of (postmodern?) theologians and the ecclesiastical authorities might give a glimpse of the complexity and disunity of the postmodern (post-Christian?) condition of the Church.

A very recent example of what I am referring to here is the work of Diarmuid , Quantum Theology, in which the quantum theory of physics is exalted as one of the most ingenious scientific discoveries of our times. Fr.  elevates this theory into a 'theological norm' and emphatically declares that theology has no choice but to submit to it. The resemblance of  'theological invitation' to the New Age religious program is quite startling: "Bring all the reserves you can of imagination, intuition, creativity, and your capacity to marvel. And please bring along your wild (wo)man, your deep feminine part, your hurt child, your wounded parent, and, above all your flamboyant artist."52 The 'theological implications' illustrated by , which are as old as Gnosticism, would need to be analyzed in a separate study devoted to New Age and Christianity. Here I anticipate just few of them:53

-God and the divine (terms used indifferently and sparingly because these are just human constructs) are described as creative energy.

-In the divine-human unfolding of co-creation, light and shadow always intermingle. Quantum theology seeks to outgrow all dualisms, especially that of good against evil.

-Each religion is a particular crystallization of divine revelation. Revelation is ongoing process that cannot be subsumed under any religion.

-The doctrine of the Trinity is a human attempt to describe God's fundamental relational nature.

-Sin is a destructive collusion between people and systems. The major sin of our time is specieism, the assumption that humans are the ultimate form of life under God and are entitled to lord it over the rest of creation.

-We live in a world without beginning and end. Our dead ones are all around us, living within a different plane of existence.

-Resurrection/reincarnation are not facts, but mental/spiritual constructs.

-Theology no longer belongs to Christianity; it has become an agent for global transformation.

If 'O Murchu can be described as a post-modern post-Christian New Age type of theologian, there are 'conservative' theologians who see in postmodernism a chance to reinstate evangelical orthodoxy. Thomas Oden salutes with enthusiasm postmodernity as a liberator from deceptive modernity, mother of all evils, including liberal theology. According to Oden evangelical orthodoxy is finally vindicated by postmodernism as the only way forward. His proposed postmodern orthodoxy is contiguous to the countercultural resistance to modernity expressed by Reformation orthodoxy, the Counter Reformation and Pietism. He accuses the postmodern philosophers who do not even take into consideration his proposal (postmodernism = pre-modern orthodoxy) to be, in fact, 'ultra-modernist', guilty of the same arrogance as modernity.54

Mark C. Taylor, who is a philosopher, professor of religion and humanities and theologian, attempted a Postmodern A/theology, as he calls it.55 Taylor elaborates the theological implications of the principal philosophical tenets of postmodernism: the Death of God, the Disappearance of the Self, the End of History, the crisis of the authority of the Bible (the Closure of the Book).56 But he especially tried to develop a decontructive theology based on Derrida's literary critical theory of deconstruction. Taylor exposes the faults of the totalizing structures of truth of modern philosophical projects, and explores their remains. From this perspective of 'otherness' offered by the deconstructing mode, Taylor reconsiders errant notions. In a subsequent article, The End(s) of Theology57 Taylor takes issue with the development of theology in the 20th century, which has been wavering between divine transcendence, carried to extremes, according to Taylor, by Karl Barth and divine immanence, carried to extremes by Thomas Altizer. In response to this dilemma Taylor again proposes a deconstructing mode which keeps "open to a difference we cannot control and another we can never master."58 Such a mode can be thought of if there is a 'nondialectical third that lies between the dialectic of either/or and both/and' transcendence and immanence. "Might this third be neither transcendent nor immanent? Does this neither/nor open the time-space of a different difference and another other - a difference and an other that not merely invert but actually subvert the polarities of Western philosophical and theological reaction."59 One notices here how Derrida's deconstruction program has acquired a theological dignity.

Other theologians perceive postmodernism as an opportunity to renovate the preaching of the gospel, and to reaffirm the apologetic function of theology. Among them, Stanley Grenz has a quite optimistic approach to postmodernism, which is perceived as an opportunity to Christians to present the gospel in a post-individualistic, post-rationalistic, post-dualistic and post-neoticentric fashion. Consequently Grenz advocates a preaching of the gospel communitarianism, the intellectual dimension of human experience, the holistic vision of the human being in relation, and the attainment of inner wisdom.60

Paul Lakeland investigates how to reaffirm Christian identity in the fragmented age of Postmodernity. Taking up three key philosophical issues of postmodern thought; subjectivity, relativism and otherness, Lakeland examines how to speak of God, church and Christ in such a context. He resumes the apologetic discourse as the way in which theological tradition and the postmodern world should meet. The initiative for this meeting lies in the Church's irrenounceable mission. The language to be used should be that of the postmodern world, such as the concepts of otherness and difference, which the Church should therefore assume in its evangelization of the 'postmodern'.

Lesslie Newbigin, who is, together with David Bosch, the most important Protestant missiologist, is the first of a series of theologians who look on postmodernism not with contempt, but certainly with apprehension. Newbigin is concerned with the collapse of divine authority in the postmodern vacuum and proposes, as a response, all four aspects of authority: the Bible, tradition, reason and experience.61 The four must be kept together if one wishes to avoid the kind of abusive authority that postmodern thought rejects. Experience alone, without the discernment of the other three, can validate any religious behavior. Reason when considered autonomous excludes diversity and wholeness and becomes a tyranny as modern reason has proved. Tradition must be rooted in Scripture if it does not want to wander away, while Scripture must be read into the living experience of the Body of Christ led by the Holy Spirit, otherwise it will become a dead and oppressive letter.62

The problem of the authority of the Bible as the Word of God in a postmodern age is also a theme debated by Terence Fretheim and Karlfried Froehlich.63 Fretheim notices that in the postmodern context the authority of the Bible suffers along with the crisis of authority of the culture, the churches and the academy. At the end of a lengthy piece of reasoning Fretheim affirms that in the postmodern context the Church cannot demonstrate the authority of the Bible, but can call people to enter into living communities where the Word of God is thought and lived. Only then, affirms Fretheim, will the Bible be seen as having an authority worthy of our attention. In his response Froehlich defends the Bible as the Word of God, questioning the legitimacy of the postmodern hermeneutic attack on the authority of the Bible. Froehlich concedes that the Bible might have became an embarrassment for the postmoderns, so that they would prefer to emigrate into women-church, New Age communities and other hosts who promise more access to the Spirit who is obscured in the Book. But for his part, Froehlich would still consider it a privilege to struggle with the instrument that God has chosen to initiate an eternal dialogue for our benefit.

A serious dialogue with postmodernism, without any ingenuous submissions or prejudicial rejection, is offered in the theological reasoning of David Tracy. According to Tracy, Christian theology in the postmodern era is challenged to take seriously the category of 'present', definable as interruptive eschatological time before the living God.64 The message of the gospel is not modern, anti-modern or post-modern, but rather the healing and transformative message of justice and liberation for historical subjects living in the concrete present. The postmodern era is the time in which Christian theology must listen to the voices of the 'others.' Otherness and difference are two features of the postmodern condition, and are two challenges both promising and threatening the growth of Christian theology. The promise resides in the necessity of having progressive theologies which meet the challenges of the pluralistic world. The threat is that the postmodern Christian generation might sever itself from the resources of tradition, from their identity and from the incarnational and sacramental forms of Christian life. Tracy also invites the Church to reevaluate a mystical and apophatic approach as a suitable one to understand and present Christianity in the postmodern age.65

Mark Kline Taylor, a Liberation theologian in dialogue with North American cultural challenges, identifies three major traits in postmodern thought, from which he delineates a theological trilemma. Acknowledgment of one's own tradition, celebrations of plurality, and resistance to domination are three elements which must stay together in postmodern theologizing. Tradition alone might turn into traditionalism; plurality alone might turn into nihilism; resistance to dominance alone might fail to actualize, or turn into another domination.66 One notes that this approach is similar, although independently developed, to that of Newbigin described above.

Jonathan Wilson67 argues that fragmentation is the distinctive characteristic of postmodernism and a difficult challenge to the Church and her mission. In fact, the postmodern forces are so radical that the Church herself runs the risk of being changed. Together with John Hall,68 Wilbert Shenk69 and Alan Roxburgh,70 Wilson calls for a new monasticism, as a time of dis-engagement and re-forming. The purpose is not an exit from the world but an authentic re-engagement. The unification of the 'daily common life' principle and monastic element is the proposal of Pierangelo Sequeri for a spirituality in the postmodern age.71 Sequeri suggests that monasticism should overcome the gnostic temptation of separation from the world, while the Christian 'daily common life' should be one of evangelical radicalism. Frankly, I find the proposal of Sequeri, illustrated after a long and difficult elaboration, quite disappointing. I wonder when was Christian monasticism polluted with gnosticism, did Sequeri ever hear of the 'ora et labora' of Benedict? Is the vocation to evangelical radicalism in the daily life of non-consecrated Christians a discovery of our age?

Jack A. Bonsor asserts that the postmodern perspective can help towards stressing the historical character of Christian truth.72 According to Bonsor, who developed his reasoning from the thought of Hans-Georg Gadamer, the postmodern point of view helps theologians to make a more modest claim about how much we know. It also reminds us "that the divine Word spoken into history remains a mystery, a mystery only history can disclose."73 The long and exacting study of Bonsor is meant to respond to Thomas Guarino (see below) and to the 1989 document of the International Theological Commission On the Interpretation of Dogmas.

Tiziano Tosolini analyzes the challenges of postmodernism from a missiological point of view.74 The 'nomadic' nature of postmodernism "allows the world to speak for itself, to give voice to specific demands, to liberate diversity, singularity and multiplicity"75 against the presumption of the grand theories. The postmodern context gives the church the framework to meet the other in his/her otherness and uniqueness. Quoting St. Paul (1 Cor 9:19-27) Tosolini proposes the "evangelization of the fragment": "it is by sharing the 'nomadic' journey without certanties and reassurance, without preconceived answers and ready-made solutions, that we come to appreciate unexpected solidarities and gratuitous expressions of love."76 But, reaffirms Tosolini, the Word of God, which is essentially love, is not dispelled in the fragment, the Word retains its capacity for judgment, criticism and liberation.

Fred Lawrence, in a long and exacting study, finds that the thought of Bernard Lonergan shares many of the deepest concerns of postmodernism.77 Lawrence claims that the radical decentering of the modern subject carried out by postmodern philosophers has to be taken seriously by Christian theology. These deconstructivist strategies offer to Christianity an opportunity to display concern, respect and love for the 'other:' the other of nature, of fellow human beings, and of God. Similar views are expressed by Maureen Junker-Kenny, who re-interprets the notions of 'difference' (Derrida) and 'alterity' (Lyotard) in the light of the paradoxical message of the gospel.78

David Bosch, the author of the 'summa missiologica' Transforming Mission, illustrates his concerns with mission in the postmodern context in two of his writings: chapter 10 (The Emergence of a Postmodern Paradigm) of Transforming Mission79 and Believing in The Future.80 Postmodernity is a time of crisis, without sense of past or future and is not interested in the classic grand ideologies. The programmed society is run under the direction of teams of technocrats. Various forms of Christianity ambiguously cohabit with such a context, often camouflaged under harmless forms of civil religion, in which the moral imperative is overridden by relativism and indiscriminateness.81

A severe criticism of postmodernism has also been launched by J. Buttom. According to him postmodernism is still in line with modernism, "as rebellion against rebellion is still rebellion, as an attack on the constraint of grammar must still be written in grammatical sentences, as a skeptical argument against the structures of rationality must still be put rationally."82 Moreover, the postmodern critique of modernity tends to reject rationality instead of surpassing it. Christians, however, should not come to the help of a modernity that is bankrupt and which despises them anyway. Buttom sees in the postmodern theoretical deconstruction of modern anti-Christian assumptions a vindication of the rightness of Christian thought, although Christian postmodern views come to radically different conclusions. The postmodern critique has reopened the debate on several basic questions. For instance, the very possibility of knowledge without God and the question of truth that rests on a faith that has itself been the object of attack in modern times. Postmodernism reopens also the problem that, when God is denied, what remains is the will of power and consequently that "every attempt to call something true or beautiful or good is actually an attempt to compel other people to agree."83 Thomas Guarino also rejects the idea that postmodernism, with its emphasis on the historicity of knowledge, can in any way serve Christian theology, which is based on foundational points offered by revelation. Postmodern hermeneutical theories are therefore inconsistent with Christianity's truth claim.84

Gustavo Gutierez is quite plain in denouncing the progressivist theologies of the postmodernity. The points of departure of Liberation Theology and postmodernism are not the same; they are, in fact, contradictory. The postmodern world is not the real world of the suffering and oppression of the poor, from which the Theology of Liberation moves. "To speak of 'the postmodern world' is a superficial response and of little help."85

Very critical is the approach of the Italian theologian Bruno Forte. He harbors no illusions about postmodernism, and proves to be as critical of postmodernity as he is of modernity. According to Forte, the loss of meaning, which stems from the crisis of the totalizing answers of modem reason, is carried forward in postmodern thought on waves of refusal and increasingly becomes a loss of the desire even to put the question of meaning. What is in dispute is not so much the answer as the very legitimacy of the questioning. Indifference or disinterest in even asking about meaning, rather than the actual lack of a meaning, seems to be the 'mortal illness' that pervades Western societies at the end of this millennium.

Forte declares that "when a strong, ideological foundation, all-inclusive and reassuring, collapses and gives way to a complete absence of critical foundations, the result is no less vast and total. (...) The future once again loses its obscurity: it will be a continuation of the present, a perpetuation of weakness, a free fall simply prolonged. 'Weak thought' deduces the future from the present in an equally totalitarian way as 'strong thought' identifies real history and the ideal world. It is incapable of any wonder or of any receptiveness to the new, and insofar as it remains incapable of these, manifests the same totalizing presumption as ideological reason."86

Forte affirms that the new and non-deducible traits of the future call, then, for a different kind of thinking, one which is able to leave behind the prisons of ideology, but is also alert enough not to fall into the trap of its own nihilist reversal. To open oneself up to such a way of thinking involves relying on the very newness of the future. Theological thought - in so far as it assumes a reason open precisely to things both last ('eschata') and new ('novissima') and is rooted in the 'memoria futuri', grounded in the promise of God's revelation - could present itself with a surprising actuality and could exercise a strong critical reserve in relation to the crisis of modernity and its nihilist results. The crisis of modem reason and the weakness of post-modem 'decadence' challenge theology to think of a God who is beyond all closed horizons of completeness as the only possible alternative to the triumph of nothingness. God beyond God, or - more precisely - God beyond the God ideologically captured and beyond the negative God of nihilism.87

Theology as a 'new thinking,' open to the non-programmed and non-deducible newness of the future is the thought that can break the impasse of critical reason. The question of the future gives new vigor to all aspects of theological investigation and invites it to tackle what overcomes both strong and weak reason. Karl Barth, continues Forte, must be credited with having rediscovered the eschatological content of Christian faith in all its objectivity: against the presumptions of liberal theology. The ultimate source of the absolute primacy of the eschatological element - against the totalizing presumptions of ideological reason - lies in the transcendent God, in his being the living God, not reducible to the limits of the investigating human subject. Christianity is completely and in every dimension eschatological, insofar as it has to do in every way with the ungraspable sovereignty of the God of revelation, who communicates himself to humankind under the form of promise and of hope. God's self-communication breaks the closed horizon of idealistic totality as well as of every possible triumphant nothingness. God is the wholly Other, standing over against the human subject and not reducible to it. Ideological reason captures the divine within its own limits. Theological thought keeps the mind and the heart open to listen to the Word of the living God.88

So the present time is marked by the dialectical tension between the "already" revealed, and the "not yet" accomplished, of God's work in history. Therefore, the meaning which theology offers is neither a tranquillizing certitude nor an illusory possession, but challenge and trust, struggle and contemplation, watchfulness and hope. To think of God between critical reason and the crisis of reason means to exercise a kind of 'docta spes,' a new thought open through continuous self-transcendence to God's eschatological self-communication.89

Postmodern and the Everlasting Good News of the Gospel

I have analyzed above a range of theological reactions to postmodernism. From a total submission of theology to the 'postmodern-new age' scientific theory of 'O Murchu to a rejection of post-modernity by Forte who, in the name of the irreducibly eschatological reserve, accuses postmodernism of being as ideological as modernism since it (postmodernism) deduces the (impossibility of) the future from the (nothingness of) the present. 'O Murchu' s redundant enthusiasm for the 'scientific discoveries' of quantum physics reminds us a little of Galileo's case, when a scientific hypothesis was assumed to be an obvious fact to which biblical hermeneutics and theology had to pay devout respect. Even more startling, and frankly upsetting, is the total disregard for 'theological method', for the specific statute of theological discourse. 'O Murchu's theology has nothing to do with the sources of any Christian theology, the faith of the people of God as witnessed in the Bible and Tradition. Theology is not a participation in the mission of the community of Christ, but rather an exploratory journey into the vast postmodern lands of the New Age. What matters is not loyalty to the Christian faith received in the Church while struggling to make it intelligible (and not necessarily acceptable) to our fellow women and men, which I still believe is the only reason why one should bother to do theology, but rather to dissolve exhaustively any Christian intimations into the eternal flux of energies.

While I agree with Forte's exacting and dense theological critique of postmodernism in the name of the future of God, I would also dare to assume the hypothesis that postmodernism is not only hyper-modernism, but an epochal turn with challenges and opportunities. Strong thoughts that seemed to have conquered the masses of the world have indeed been finally wiped away. Postmodernity, declaring the end of ideological certainties, is looking for new directions. Theology is called to renew the effort to meet the quest for new directions. The climate seems favorable for speaking about God without defensiveness and self-consciousness, and for escaping the modern dogma that politics is the fundamental category to which religion has to submit.90 Postmodernism seems to allow more cultural room for Christianity than the rationalistic tyranny of modernism. "Postmodernism unmasks problems that modernism tried to hide, but postmodernism can by no mean solve them."91 We should try to approach postmodernism without ingenuousness and submissive devotion, always keeping in mind that the task of theology is not to satisfy the spirit of the times, but rather the ever-challenging apologetic effort to make faith understandable. The mission of theology is to be missionary theology. If postmodern relativism and nihilism are unacceptable by Christian theology, still the questions raised need to be engaged. Christian theology should explore a path that "takes relativity seriously, without being relativistic; and takes the absurdity and apparently random and chaotic dimensions of our world experience fully seriously without capitulating to nihilism in any form."92 In fact, in a time of distrust of human rationality, Christian theology is called to reaffirm the positive capability of human thought to contrast irrationality and nihilism. Christian thought does not condemn human rationality (as postmodernism does), but rather the pretension of (modern) rationality, which arrogated the right to be the only foundation of knowledge and value, becoming then omnipervasive and totalitarian.

A path on which Christian theologians might be willing to venture is to rethink the category of Christian faith as a mystery. In modern times theology has spent much energy on the task of defending and demonstrating the credibility of the Christian faith to a culture that glorifies reason and science. Therefore theology has often privileged the intellectual approach and rational argumentation to appeal to the reasonableness of Christian tenets in order to answer modern challenges. The excessive emphasis on the 'ontological' idea of God led to Nietzsche's proclamation of the death of God. The postmodern context calls Christian theology to go beyond a rationalistic presentation of Christian doctrine. The understanding of Christian faith as mystery might become a category of dialogue with postmodern thought.

While Christian tradition has always attested to the doctrine of the incomprehensible God who comes to us as a mystery, in the context of modern challenges there was the danger of regarding the mystery of God as something that can be understood through the objective doctrine taught by the Church; there was the tendency to subject God to systematization. But reason does not have all the answers. Rason itself wants to remain reasonable, acknowledges its limits, and opens itself to the transcendent dimension. The effort that is required here is the same for any person in the world, no matter where or when he or she lives: to investigate the mystery by using reason, and to accept a mystery that goes beyond the capacity of human understanding and explanation. Mystery is a complex concept. It must be perceived not simply as something profound and difficult, but also as a fascinating religious experience that leads into a new dimension of living: a life of faith. The perception of mystery both attracts the person to the religious sense of life and transcends his or her terrestrial horizons.

Theology in the postmodern age can assume the characteristics already mentioned by Oden: popular, pluralist, traditional, eclectic, spiritual, ornamental, representational, pro-metaphor, pro-historical memory, pro-symbolic. A presentation of Christian faith as mystery can meet the quest for values and meanings beyond the critical reason and strong ideologies. Postmodern criticism of logocentrism (Derrida) might help Christian theology to re-discover non-rationalistic, parabolic approaches to the reality as was initiated in the tradition of the negative theology. The inapprehension of God was emphasized in this century especially by Karl Barth: "God's hiddenness tells us that God does not belong to the object which we can always subjugate to the process of our viewing, conceiving, and expressing."93

Postmodern theology might be more attentive to dimensions, values and meanings neglected by modernity: beauty, freedom, happiness, spirituality, symbolism, harmony, suffering, death and destiny. It is time to re-discover the value of religious sense and experience, in particular the contemplative and joyful aspect of the life of faith; the profound significance of signs, symbols, rites and celebrations, which point to beyond-rational realities; the rich humanity of popular expressions of faith; Christian existence as communitarian existence; the basic human need of belonging and participation; the source of traditions and tradition; the preciousness of enthusiasm and charisma. Again, while modernity built on concepts like unity, agreement, universalism and reason, postmodern theology might elaborate on concepts like difference and others, dissent and plurality.

Postmodernism fills up the void left by the failure of modernity and replaces the narrative of the death of God with a spectacular resurgence of a vast, confused, syncretistic religious spirit. The 'weak thought' gave way to various irrational forms of religiosity, from the mythic-magic to the astral and signic-symbolic of the horoscope. But there is no cause for celebration for an attentive Christian. In fact, most of the postmodern religious revival has post-Christian characteristics. Here lies one of the most serious challenges of postmodern thought: to reduce Christianity to a gnosis, where the salvation of Christ is transformed into the mysterious almost occult and gnostic-like process of elevating the human mind. This is the basic post-Christian answer to postmodern thought offered by the variegated nebula of the New Age and the new religions. Christian faith will always remain something before, and more than an answer to, human needs. Christian faith is an unexpected, overabundant, and gratuitous grace from above, which transcends and subverts human expectations and questions and is accepted by the free obedience of human beings.

The gospel announced with frankness by Christians can never be reduced merely to being an answer that gives meaning to a generation that has lost it; it eschews imprisonment into systems, ideological or anti-ideological; it always challenges the darkness of nihilism. The gospel reaffirms its gratuity, its novelty, its capacity for wonder and surprise. As consequence, the theologies of the postmodern era should never reduce the Christian faith to the filling up of the void of the postmodern condition and of the lonely hearts of contemporary men and women. Christian faith should never be reduced to psychologism, the empowerment of human capacity, the radicalization and extension of the human spirit.

Theologizing in a postmodern context might require reflection upon the meaning but also on the ambiguity of religion. A distinction between theological faith and religious phenomena might be helpful in delineating the limits and denouncing the mystification and abuses of religion. In this respect the contribution of the Theology of the Cross and the Liberation Theology remain very precious.

The theology of the Cross, the bulwark of Christology and the most paradoxical of all theologies, will always function as the critical standpoint which distinguishes religious ambiguity and deception from true faith. The cross, on which Jesus hung as an enemy of religion and political powers, transcends any religious particularity, at the same time attracting, judging and cleansing them. In the postmodern debate the distinction between religion and faith might assume a new light and relevance. This distinction might in fact help theology to engage challenges from postmodern intimations such as 'difference', 'otherness,' 'alterity.' As some authors mentioned above have already noticed, there is room here for the paradoxical and radical message of the gospel. Some interpreters have proposed that Christianity is the religion 'of the departure from religion.'94

The Theology of the Cross remains the most radical critical challenge to the postmodern-New Age atmosphere which overemphasizes the beauty of nature, the harmonious order of the universe, the human logos and wisdom. But nature can be cruel, and the Cross on which Jesus was abandoned by friends and felt abandoned by God Himself, is a very disharmonious drama. On the Cross human abilities, wisdom, expectations and performances are contradicted, confused and denied rather then affirmed. The Cross of Jesus will never be domesticated into ontological or grand narrative schemes. We cannot elaborate the conception of God and the idea of history of salvation from a standpoint different from that of Calvary. Jesus has identified himself with the victims of evil, with those who are relegated to the 'reverse side of history.' On this point, the Theology of the Cross might find common ground with the postmodern opposition to ideological metanarratives.

The postmodern gnostic religious atmosphere, where individual emotional welfare is paramount, runs the risk of resulting in a bourgeois exercise of harmonization, solipsism and selfishness. The Theology of the Cross and the Liberation Theology provoke us to reject any presumptuous 'end of history,' which might sound absurd and a mockery to those who are victims of history, poverty and oppression. I mentioned above the missionary character of any Christian theology. The ultimate task of theology is not making the Christian faith acceptable whatever the cost. The Christian message of the Cross and Liberation will always be a scandal and foolishness, even in the postmodern world, as it was in ancient and in modern times.

The parable of modernity shows that systems of thought, historical phases and phenomena pass, but the Gospel always remains good news, ever fascinating women and men with its simple yet demanding message. The Gospel keeps, as ever, its freshness and novelty, attracting new disciples of Jesus generation after generation. The gospel of Jesus is very much alive in the world. This is a simple phenomenological consideration. But it is also a consideration of faith. The Gospel that the Church has transmitted and does not cease to proclaim, is coming from afar, and has resisted all sorts of human upheavals. In an age that declares the end of the metanarrative of history, the central message of the Gospel is Jesus Christ, who is the same yesterday, today and for ever. The witness of the Gospel has survived the declaration of the death of God, the death of man, and will survive the death of history, of truth, reason, morality and reality. Believers "will even survive the death of postmodernism,"95 when it comes.

In fact, the very same assumption that history must be classified and divided into periods is a modernist dogma that a genuine postmodernist should reject. It was modernism which created the notion of 'the middle ages,' arrogantly attaching a sinister connotation to them. The theology of history, which moves from the Christian notion of 'history of salvation', has become central since Irenaeus, who introduced the distinction between the history of humankind and the history of Salvation. A postmodern theology of history should be elaborated beyond arbitrary and artificial divisions of the history of humankind typical of modernity.

A theology of history from the standpoint of the Cross rejects any facile optimism about the progress of humanity. Jesus himself seemed to be anti-metanarrative: "When the Son of Man comes, will he find faith on Earth? (Luke, 18:8). Not a few theologians claim that it is not possible to narrate the 'great stories' of the theology of history after Auschwitz. The concept of the 'history of salvation' might be re-elaborated also in the light of the fact that many people have only recently adhered to the biblical faith while glorious ancient churches, as I mentioned earlier, have been reduce to 'little flocks.' Most of the theology of history and mission up to the XVI century was elaborated according the theory of 'mission accomplished,' that Christianity and the world were one and the same.

The theology of history should underline a profound unity of humankind, a unity which certainly is not given by a succession of successes and does not produce uniformity. It is a unity generated, first of all, by the Trinitarian origin of the dialogue between God and humanity. As consequences, the very trans-epocal and trans-national presence of the universal church among women and men of time and space can be understood as a notable symbol of the Trinitarian origin of our salvation. Against the counter-positions of modernity and the fragmentation of postmodernity, the universal Church, spread through history and throughout the globe, is a symbol of deep unity and conciliation. In the midst of the diversities in the history of humankind, the Church stands out as "a sign of contradiction confounding the pretensions of modernists and postmodernists alike."96 Moreover, if the story of modernism and postmodernism is, generally speaking, a phenomenon of Western societies, the Christian Gospel has proved, for two thousand years, to be of universal significance. People of every culture and language on the planet have been able to accept the Christian message, a sign of freshness and newness lasting for 2000 years. Christian faith is by no means at the mercy of the development of Western civilization. Christianity preceded and will outlive the various developments of Western history.



    48. See Principles of the Philosophy of Right, § 124 and 185, quoted by Jeanrond W. G. (1992) Between Praxis and Theory: Theology in a Crisis over Orientation. Concilium 6, p. 109. Freedom, in the Hegelian context, means essentially emancipation.

49. For this discussion see Poulat, E. (1992) Catholicism and Modernity: A Process of Mutual Exclusion. Concilium 6, pp. 10-16.

50. For this debate see Milbank, J. (1992) The End of Enlightenment: Post-Modern or Post-Secular. Concilium 6, pp. 39-47.

51. This point is well illustrated by Italian sociologist Garelli, F. (1996) Forza della Religione e Debolezza della Fede. Bologna: Il Mulino.

52. 'O Murchu, Quantum Theology, p. 5.

53. Ibid., pp. 197-203.

54. Oden, After Modernity...What?, pp. 76-77.

55. Taylor, M. C. (1984) Erring. A Postmodern A/Theology. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

56. See also previous work by Taylor, M. C. (1982) Deconstructing Theology. New York: Crossroad and Scholar Press.

57. Taylor, M. C. (1991) The End(s) of Theology. In S. Davaney (ed.), Theology and the End of Modernity. Philadelphia, PA: Trinity University Press.

58. Taylor, The End(s) of Theology, p. 242.

59. Ibid.

60. Grenz, A Primer on Postmodernism, pp. 161-174.

61. Newbigin, L. (1996) Truth and Authority in Modernity. Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International.

62. Lee Hertig, P. and Y. (1999) "The Christian Mission and Modern Culture" Trinity Press International Series. Missiology: An International Review 2, pp. 261-262.

63. Fretheim, T. E and Froehlich, K. (1998) The Bible as the Word of God In a Postmodern Age. Minneapolis: Fortress Press.

64. Tracy, On Naming the Present, pp. 18-19.

65. Ibid., p. 10.

66. Taylor, M. K. (1990) Remembering Esperanza, A Cultural-Political Theology for North American Praxis. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, pp. 23-45.

67. Wilson, J. R. (1997) Living Faithfully in a Fragmented World. Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International.

68. Hall D. J. (1997) The End of Christendom and the Future of Christianity. Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International.

69. Shenk, W. R. (1995) Write the Vision: The Church Renewed. Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International.

70. Roxburgh, A. J. (1997) The Missionary Congregation, Leadership, and Limitality. Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International.

71. Sequeri, P. (1998) La Spiritualita nel Postmoderno. Il Regno-Attualita 18, pp. 637-643.

72. Bonsor, J. A. (1994) History, Dogma, and Nature: further Reflections on Postmodernism and Theology. Theological Studies 55, pp. 295-313.

73. Ibid. p. 297.

74. Tosolini's thought is expanded in his book, (1997) To Speak of God in the Twilight. Toward a Theology of Mission in the Postmodern World. Leominster: GraceWing.

75. Tosolini, Postmodernity and Mission, p. 18.

76. Ibid.

77. Lawrence, The Fragility of Consciousness, pp. 55-94.

78. Junker-Kenny, Church, Modernity and Postmodernity, pp. 93-99.

79. David J. Bosch, Transforming Mission, Paradigm Shift in Theology of Mission, Orbis Book, Maryknoll, NY, 1991, pp. 349-367.

80. Bosch, D. J. (1995) Believing in The Future: Toward a Missiology of Western Culture. Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International.

81. Lee Hertig, "The Christian Mission and Modern Culture", pp. 266-267.

82. Bottum, J. (1994) Christians and Postmoderns. First Things 40, p. 28.

83. Ibid. p. 31.

84. Guarino, T. (1993) Between Foundationalism and Nihilism: Is Phronesis the Via Media for Theology? Theological Studies 54, pp. 37-54.

85. Gutierrez, G. (1988) The Power of the Poor in History. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, p. 213.

86. Forte, Speaking God in Post-modern Europe, p. 212.

87. Ibid., pp. 212-213.

88. Ibid., pp. 213-222.

89. Ibid.

90. Bottum, Christians and Postmoderns, p. 31.

91. McClay, W. M (1994) After Modernity, What? Book Review of Veith, G. E. Postmodern Times: A Christian Guide to Contemporary Thought and Culture. First Things 12, p. 55.

92. Lawrence, The Fragility of Consciousness, p. 56.

93. Quoted by McKenna, Derrida, Death, and Forgiveness, p. 35.

94. See Geffre C. and Jossua, J. P. (1992) Towards a Theological Interpretation of Modernity. Concilium 6, p. viii.

95. Himmelfarb, G. (1992) Tradition and Creativity in the Writing of History. First Thing 11, p. 36.

96. MacClay, After Modernity, What?, p. 55.

Conclusions

After re-reading this study of mine I realize that it is very 'fragmented,' in a perfect postmodern fashion! I recognize that not all the questions which I have gradually opened were later developed. In the first part, I pointed to some major elements in art, science, culture, philosophy and history of such a complex and variegated phenomenon as postmodernism. In the second part I tried to exemplify conflicts between Catholicism and Modernism, conflicts that are relevant to the postmodern debate. Then followed an ample presentation of different theological approaches, which range from enthusiastic acceptance of postmodern tenets to a severe criticism of them. Then I added some personal provisory and disorganized intimations, hoping that some readers, or I myself, will be able in future to formulate a more organic reflection on postmodernism and Christianity.

As conclusions I will just try to summarize aspects of my thought in two points.

1. Postmodernity, like everything worldly, is an ambivalent phenomenon, presenting positive and negative aspects. The positive aspect is the overcoming of the arrogant pretensions of modern reason, science and ideologies. The negative aspect of postmodernism is its resemblance, under too many aspects, to a late-modern phenomena, the logical outcome of the premises of modernism. This is noticeable especially in the inclination toward decadence, nihilism and death of the late/post-modern generation.

2. Postmodernity both challenges and is challenged by Christianity. Postmodernity challenges Christianity with its pluralism and relativism, a pluralism and relativism which are not only of fact, but also of right, before the state, culture and society. Christianity cannot be accredited as the true religion in the public forum. The existence or not of God are considered equally indifferent options, which enjoy the same irrelevant plausibility in the pluralistic and relativistic postmodern condition. Rational discourse about the existence of God does not appeal to the postmodern man and woman. In such a context Christianity is challenged to re-discover the weakness of its faith 'from the Cross,' its defenseless proclamation of the paradoxical gospel of liberation and to contemplate God who gratuitously comes to us as mystery.

At the same time Christianity challenges postmodern dark pessimism with the joy of its enduring good news, which is timeless and boundary-less. Christian theology is called to renovate its apologetic mission to announce a refreshing and joyful message which is rational but not only rational, which is spiritual but also historical and concrete, which meets the deep aspirations of human heart, but also provokes, subverts and challenges them.

by Yip Hing Wah (叶庆华)

After Marcel: Ricoeur's Reconstruction of the Dialectic of Mystery and Problem


In response to a question in a recent interview concerning his use of analytic philosophy in the book Oneself as Another, Ricoeur says that a passage through the outside is necessary, given the intimist tendency of phenomenology. It is a passage justified by the fundamental fact that the body is both my body and a body among bodies; therefore, the approach of objectification is not to be ignored.1 If the analytic tradition, which Ricoeur calls "the thought from outside" (la pensee du dehors) is so important, one cannot help but ask: why his comments in the book on analytic philosophy are far more negative than positive? Why his point is always to show its inadequacy with regard to the understanding of the self? On the other hand, is the double reading of the corporeal phenomenon not already suggested by Gabriel Marcel whom Ricoeur always regards as his master? Does Gabriel Marcel not see body in terms of mystery-that in which the distinction between the interior and the exterior loses its meaning? Could a deeper understanding of Oneself as Another be attained by a detour through Ricoeur's interpretation of Marcel's distinction between mystery and problem?

This essay is written precisely with the purpose of examining Ricoeur's main works on Marcel, in order to demonstrate that there is really a significant connection between Marcel's thought and Oneself as Another, so that a Marcelian reading of Ricoeur through the latter's own account of the former may be established. To accomplish this goal, I shall consider in depth the critical remarks made by Ricoeur in "Gabriel Marcel and Phenomenology" in the 70s and then relate them to his argument in " primaire et  seconde chez Gabriel Marcel" (Primary Reflection and Secondary Reflection in Gabriel Marcel) written later in the 80s before Oneself as Another was published. Ricoeur's earliest work Gabriel Marcel et Karl Kaspers (Gabriel Marcel and Karl Jaspers) will also be consulted on certain points.2 Both of the aforementioned articles are concluded with the suggestion that the relation between mystery and problem has to be understood in terms of the dialectic between secondary reflection and primary reflection. My contention is that this suggestion is in fact the principle of Ricoeur's methodology in Oneself as Another; it allows us to see more about the necessity of the analytic philosophy in the book. Along the way of my exposition, I also want to show that there are other important features in Oneself as Another which can be traced back to Marcel's philosophy.

From the Characterizable to the Uncharacterizable

The most important comments of Ricoeur on Marcel's philosophy are found in the article entitled "Gabriel Marcel and Phenomenology", originally presented in a colloquium on Marcel's philosophy in 1973 just a few months before Marcel's death. In this article, Ricoeur compares Marcel's philosophical method with Husserl's. The focus of his exposition is on Marcel's attitude towards conceptualization. He starts with the point that both Marcel and Husserl maintain the value of conceptualization. In both philosophies, there is an inherent tendency of refusing any "system", but at the same time there is a persistent concern for subtle distinctions and clarity of thought. In order to make comparison with Husserl, Ricoeur brings up Marcel's "Outlines of a Phenomenology of Having" in Being and Having where he distinguishes "what one has" from "what one is". Ricoeur remarks that by trying to make conceptual distinctions between these two phenomena, Marcel shows the non-psychological character of his approach which is not unlike that of Husserl's. In Marcel's attempt to clarify the notion of having-as-possession (l'avoir-possession), a genuinely eidetic style of analysis can be observed in which meaning is directly read from well-chosen examples. Ricoeur also indicates that in his distinction between the qui and the quid, Marcel does not fail to take advantage of the significant relations suggested by ordinary language (GMP 473/55).

All the above features in Marcel's phenomenology of having enable us to put him on the same track as Husserl's until at a point in the text where Marcel speaks about "reduction".3 Marcel states that the point of his analysis is not a reduction, rather it has to do with the presence of an opaque and irreducible datum which resists our full possession. This little word "reduction", marks the profound difference Marcel and Husserl, according to Ricoeur. He admits that in the context where the word appears, "reduction" does not convey the same meaning as in Husserl. The irreducible of Marcel is the primordial dimension of being which "eludes the framework of an idea that one can have and therefore can circumscribe and dominate intellectually" (GMP 473/55), whereas in Husserl reduction is a notion connected with the epoche and designates the subject's withdrawal of his or her natural attitude to the world. Yet such an idea of the irreducible, which arises from the opposition of being and having, has the effect of moving the whole analysis "away from the plane of notional distinctions-from the eidetic plane, in Husserl's terms-to a more existential plane" (GMP 473/55).

For Marcel, "having" denotes a global way of being which is made possible by one's own body. My body, as the mediation between myself and the world, creates a tension between interiority and exteriority, manifested by the link between the desire to have and the fear to lose. But what I claim to possess and attach to exercises a tyranny over me; it devours me eventually. "Having as such seems to have a tendency to destroy and lose itself in the very thing it began by possessing, but which now absorbs the master who thought he controlled it" (Marcel, Being and Having, 164). Among my possessions are my own body, things, ideas and opinions-even characterization is a kind of possession. The findings of the phenomenology of having drive it to a reflection on the conditions of characterization in general: what makes characterization possible? An object can be characterized only when it is placed at a certain distance in front of an uninvolved observer. Hence, characterization relies on a pretension of being able to cut oneself off from the living links with things and stand before them as mere observer and dominator. Nevertheless, this is precisely the condition under which eidetic description operates. Therefore, Ricoeur remarks that "the idea that being is uncharacterizable brings an end to eidetic phenomenology, which cannot help appearing to be prompted by the will to characterize" (GMP 474/56).

This divergence from eidetic phenomenology continues in the famous distinction between mystery and problem. Treating something as a problem is to see it as data placed before me as if I were not implied in it. Mystery is rather that in which the distinction between in me and before me loses its meaning. Hence, we have the having, the characterizable and the problematizable on the one hand, and being, the uncharacterizable and mystery on the other; but the relation between them is again not characterizable. In Marcel's phenomenology, there is an ascending dialectic from the examination of examples to the recognition of the irreducible-irreducible to characterization (GMP 475/57). Ricoeur mentions that although Marcel's phenomenology stays close to Husserl's in the use of description, eidetic analysis and even imaginative variations, but this inward transcending movement from the characterizable towards the uncharacterizable seems to be lacking in Husserl's phenomenology. Marcel's phenomenology of having starts with examples and descriptions but the internal dialectic of the inquiry eventually turns back upon the conditions under which the whole inquiry begins. This ascending dialectic is for Ricoeur the most essential feature of the Marcelian style of thought which he illustrates with a quotation from "On the Ontological Mystery": "A mystery is a problem which encroaches upon its own data, invading them, as it were, and thereby transcending itself as a simple problem".4 This quotation is so dear to Ricoeur that it appears in almost all of his works on Marcel (GMP 475/57, GMKJ 361, L2 66, 95). And it is also in the interpretation of this statement that I discover the major disagreement between Marcel and Ricoeur; it shows both Ricoeur's dependence on Marcel and his critique of the master. This point will be further elaborated as my exposition proceeds. An initial comparison of the two possible interpretations of the quotation can be made by a detour through the way how the master and the disciple understand the term "transcendence". A more Marcelian interpretation may be established on the meaning of the word "transcendence" which Marcel himself defines in Being and Having as " rather than Aufhebung" (Marcel, Being and Having, 119). In that case, the statement quoted above would be the last one we can make before ending up with the ineffable. On the other hand, referring to the same passage in an early work, namely Gabriel Marcel et Karl Jaspers, Ricoeur remarks that if transcendence is seen as "rather than Aufhebung", then metaphysics would be a discipline that "does not aspire to maintain a tension, but to solve it" (GMKJ 269). Later we will see that the difference between Marcel and Ricoeur lies precisely in whether a certain tension should be acknowledged between the lower and the higher levels of transcendence, and whether the relation between problem and mystery is just a simple either-or.

Ricoeur explains the difference between the two philosophers in terms of their "initial gestures" by which they enter into philosophy. For Husserl, the initial gesture is reduction whereby the subject suspends its belief of the natural world. The benefit of reduction is twofold. First, the objectivity of the object is revealed as the identical meaning towards which different intentional aims of consciousness converge. Secondly, the subjectivity of the subject is revealed as an intentional consciousness that is caught up in a temporal flux in which it is capable of retaining and anticipating its own identity in the flux. This twofold benefit of reduction characterizes the phenomenology of the early Husserl as "a kind of reflection, a descriptive analysis, applied to the correlations established between the structures of the object and those of the subject" (GMP 476/58). The object, or noema, is that which intended by the mind; the subject, or noesis, is that which signifies by intending meaning. Ricoeur remarks that Husserl's initial gesture of reduction, which favours a clear distinction between the subject and the object, is diametrically opposed to Marcel's. The latter starts with "situation" which he defines in the beginning of The Mystery of Being as "something in which I find myself involved".5 For Ricoeur, to be involved excludes first and fundamentally "both the distance characteristic of reduction and the promotion of a 'disinterested spectator', the very subject of phenomenology" (GMP 476/58). The situation does not only affect the subject from outside but also qualifies it from within. The opposition of the outer and the inner loses its meaning, and along with it, the typically Husserlian correlation of the noematic and the noetic is called into question. One may notice that in Ricoeur's Oneself as Another, the process of the determination of the self also begins with a situation, namely, the situation of interlocution. The self first appears as the one of whom the interlocutors speak (OA 31/44)





    1."Paul Ricoeur: Reflexions sur la philosophie morale", interview by Monique Canto-Sperber, Magazine litteraire, no. 361 (January 1998): 39.

2.RICOEUR, P. (1949) Gabriel marcel et Karl Jaspers. Paris. Editions du Temps Present Cited as GMKJ.

RICOEUR, P. (1976) Gabriel Marcel et la phenomenologie. In: M. Belay et al. (eds). Entretiens autour de Gabriel Marcel. Neuchatel. La Baconniere. Pp. 53-94. Cited as GMP.

RICOEUR, P. (1984) Gabriel Marcel and Phenomenology. In: P.A. SCHILPP and L. E.HAHN (eds) THE Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel. Chicago. Open Court. Pp. 471-498.

RICOEUR, P. (1984) Reflexion primaire et reflexion second chez Gabriel marcel. In: P. RICOEUR (1992) Lectures 2. Paris, Editions de Seuil. Pp. 49-67. Cited as L2.

RICOEUR, P. (1990) Soi meme comme un autre. Paris. Editions de Seuil. English translation: K.

BLAMEY (1992) O neself As Another. Chicago. The University of Chicago Press. Cited as ON.

For tFor texts that have a standard English translation, all page references are first to the English translation and then to the French text. For texts that do not have an English translation, all translations are my own.

3.GMP 473; Gabriel Marcel, Being and Having: An Existentialist Diary (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 157.

4.Gabriel Marcel, "On the Ontological Mystery", The Philosophy of Existentialism, trans. Manya Harari (New York: Citadel Press, 1956), 19.

5.GMP 476/58; Gabriel Marcel, The Mystery of Being, trans. Rene Hague (Chicago: Regnery, 1960), 1:10.

Subject, Object and "You"

Hereafter, Ricoeur proceeds to compare Marcel and Husserl according to the position of the object, the position of the subject, and their correlation. The part on the object mainly has to do with the way we see the world. Ricoeur first defines the term "object" as "the ensemble of distinctive characteristics underlying things we can name, and these things in turn give to the logical subject a basis for attribution in perceptual judgements and in scientific knowledge" (GMP 477/58). Hence, object has to do with the characteristics of things in the face of a logical subject which looks at them from the perspective of scientific knowledge. The definition of object provides a kind of background for Ricoeur's introduction of Marcel's critique of the primacy of objectivity in "Existence and Objectivity" published at the end of his Metaphysical Journal. Marcel's movement from objectivity to existence is for Ricoeur the opposite of Husserl's movement from natural belief to the structure of meaning. Marcel's anti-Cartesian arguments in the essay are equally anti-Husserlian. While the term "existence" appears to be quite elusive in Marcel's text, Ricoeur gives it a rather clear definition: "Existence designates the fund of massive, indivisible, undeniable presence attested to by the sensuous presence of the world at the most radical level of feeling" (GMP 477/59). Experience of the world is therefore inextricably bound up with my embodiment. Existence is a global experience of the world in which the embodied subject is indivisibly involved; existence is felt rather than rationally thought, and it is the massive and dense assurance of existence that qualifies its indisputability. Ricoeur describes it in Marcelian terms as the "absolute presence" and the "nonproblematic" (GMP 479/61). More importantly, this sensuous presence of the world to an incarnate person is what first allows an "object" to be present to a spectator. Ricoeur indicates that it is a return to an indubitable foundation, "not in the sense of something resisting doubt or subsisting after doubt, but in the sense of a presence precluding doubt; what is indubitably given to me is the confused and global experience of the world as existing" (GMP 477/59). Existence, as opposed to objectivity, has also a different sort of certainty. This observation is helpful for understanding the distinction between "truth" () and "veracity" () which Ricoeur uses-without much explanation-to criticize both Descartes and the analytic philosophers in Oneself as Another (OA 22/34, 72/91). In the case of Descartes, the first "truth" of the cogito is contrasted with the "veracity" of God. In commenting on the analytic approach, he contrasts the "truth" of description with the "veracity" of attestation. I would suggest that "truth" is understood in terms of validity; it is that which resists doubt or subsists after doubt-doubt that presupposes the distance of a spectator. "Veracity" refers to the evidence that is based on a preceding relation of participation in which the subject has always been involved; it is something to be recognized rather than to be proved.

With regard to the position of the subject, Ricoeur notices that what Marcel defends is the primacy of being over knowledge to the effect that knowledge is enveloped by being and is in some way within being (GMP 480/62). When the modern self-affirming cogito sets itself up as the guarantee of objectivity, the meaning of the subject is greatly impoverished. It is also from this perspective that Husserl falls under Marcel's critique of the cogito (ibid). While Marcel is concerned with justifying human existence, Husserl, like the modern philosophers, strives to found scientific knowledge (GMP 481/63). The "I" resulting from the reduction is a thinking I, situated at the opposite pole of a thinkable object. Unlike Kant, the thinking I born of reduction is an individual and retains all features of singularity in accordance with the temporal flux; on the other hand, the subject also bears the mark of universality since it has the role of providing the final justification of knowledge. Nevertheless, the universal validity of knowledge cannot be guaranteed by the singular cogito alone, therefore, Husserl needs a philosophy of the alter ego in order to complete his philosophy of the ego. A community of subjects that share the same perceived world is what Husserl seeks to establish in order to ground the universality of science. This is what we find in the famous fifth Cartesian Meditation. For Ricoeur, the solipsistic starting point of the whole project presents an intractable difficulty which resembles that of "the squaring of a circle" (GMP 65/483). I shall not go into the details of Ricoeur's analysis of Husserl's arguments but just want to make one point: according to Ricoeur, the problem of solipsism is the summary of all other discordance between Marcel and Husserl and it is a basic difference that arises from the initial gestures of the two philosophers. His point is that "if one does not start from the undeniable presence of the other, one will never overtake this presence" (GMP 65/483).

But what does it mean to recognize the presence of the other? With this question Ricoeur turns to Marcel's theory of intersubjectivity. In the encounter with other people, Marcel speaks of "recognition". It is not a mode of knowledge through object, but what arises in the experiences of love and fidelity which presuppose one's dynamic openness to other people. The one whom I love is a "you" (toi) and not a "him/her" (lui). The third person vocabulary is the means of objectification, the beginning of reducing the other into some sort of information amenable to characterization. Further, Marcel rejects any derivation of the other from the certainty of the cogito. For him, the other is already present in the "first surging forth of existence"; the you is there in the initial situation from which any philosophical reflection begins. Thus, "the first ontological position is neither I existing nor you existing but the co-esse-the being-with-that engenders us simultaneously" (GMP 484/66). That is to say, in the affirmation of my existence, the existence of you is co-affirmed. The you is "not only before me, he is also within me-or, rather, these categories are transcended, they have no longer any meaning" (GMP 484/66; Marcel, "Ontological Mystery", 38). This is precisely what Marcel means by mystery, and that is why the co-esse is "the nonproblematic par excellence" (GMP 485/66).

How is Mystery to be Recognized?

At the end of his account of the two thinkers' approaches to phenomenology, Ricoeur admits that although it may give an impression that he is more sympathetic to Marcel than to Husserl, Marcel's approach does not leave him without any question. And this eventually leads him to reconsider the work of Husserl. But let us first look at Ricoeur's criticism of Marcel. In the foregoing comparison, his emphasis has always been on the intellectualistic distinction of subject and object. Husserl's way of reduction favours such a distinction and the spectator's perspective that follows, whereas Marcel's insistence on starting with a situation forbids both: existence and co-esse are non-problematizable. The movement from problem to mystery requires a "complete reversal of the question" (GMP 485/66). This is also where Ricoeur's criticism comes in:

The fundamental difficulty that has continually beset Marcel's existential ontology concerns the status of its own statements. In this regard a simple, non-dialectical opposition between mystery and problem could not be established without immediately destroying the philosophical enterprise as such, threatened with a shift to a philosophico-religious fideism...If the ontological affirmation were in no way an intellectual act, then it could not be elevated to philosophical discourse (GMP 498/70).

Here Ricoeur suggests a kind of dialectical relation between mystery and problem. How this dialectical relation is to be conceived is precisely my concern. But before we can go to that point, we should first understand better the question raised by Ricoeur. Just as the intellectualists have to face the questions posed to them by the existentialists, the reverse is also unavoidable. The strictly anti-epistemological approach of Marcel will finally leads to the question of its own truth. In fact, Ricoeur asks the intellectualists' questions already in his earliest book Gabriel Marcel et Karl Jaspers (78) in 1947: how would Marcel respond "to the criticism of subjectivism in the experiences of existence and to that of fideism in the experiences of transcendence"? The first question is not asked any more in "Gabriel Marcel and Phenomenology", probably because Marcel himself addressed the question of universality later in The Mystery of Being which was originally delivered as the Gifford Lectures in 1949. With regard to the charge of fideism, Ricoeur's point is that if the recognition of transcendence is not an intellectual act, it can hardly be handled by philosophical discourse. In order to avoid all sorts of fatal duality, Marcel takes the confused and global situation of existence as the point of departure. The basic insight that being is uncharacterizable protects mystery from turning into problem. However, this manoeuvre of overcoming oppositions institutes by itself a new opposition, namely the opposition between problem and mystery. Difficulties now arise not so much with undue distinctions as with insufficient distinctions which may lead to the question of how misunderstandings of being can be avoided.　

Indeed if being is the uncharacterizable, "the unqualified par excellence", how is it possible that it is not also the pure indeterminate (Being and Having 36)? In Marcel's work this difficulty assumes a specific form; the global affirmation of existence can, indeed, be indistinctly that of my embodiment, that of the universe taken in a global and undivided way, and that of God called the Supreme You. Although Marcel has not ignored this difficulty, he attributes it to the affirmation of being in general in neo-Thomism (ibid 27-40). But could this not be turned around? What distinguishes the immanence of thought to being from the immanence to the whole of the world's existence, which is, as in Heidegger, the horizon of every determined object? Marcel admits: "The uneasiness I feel on these subjects is partly due to my old difficulty in seeing the relation between being and existing" (ibid 37). And indeed the same philosophy of the uncharacterizable holds for "my body", for "you", and for "God". Existence is what revealed by feeling as well as by fidelity and by the recourse to being as opposed to despair (GMP 489/71).

The critical comments made by Ricoeur here appear already in Gabriel Marcel et Karl Jaspers, and the connection of these comments with the themes in Oneself as Another is not to be taken lightly (Cf. GMKJ 355). The comments here include an ontological question and an epistemological question; the two are closely bound up with each other. The ontological question is the relation between being and existence which is the source of Marcel's difficulties; the epistemological question is about the implementation of "secondary reflection" which, according to Ricoeur, is the proper Marcelian solution to the problem of fideism. In "Gabriel Marcel and Phenomenology" Ricoeur treats only the epistemological question and it occupies the rest of the article after the passage quoted above. With regard to the ontological question of being and existence, he does not write anything further. The following account of Ricoeur's view on these two questions is reconstructed from different works of his.

The Ontological Question: Existence and Being

Let us look at the ontological question first. According to Ricoeur's reading, the difference between existence and being is the difference between the human condition and transcendence; the latter leads finally to God. They are the two foci of Marcel's thought (GMKJ 32, 218, 265). Existence designates our human condition in the world which is embodied, free and dialoguing with others. But existence is not being; it is not transcendence. Existence comes about only by virtue of being, and this is how the idea of participation comes in. It is only in the case of authentic existence-one which recognizes the fullness of transcendence-that existence is indistinguishable from being (Cf. Marcel, Mystery of Being, 2:31). Once this distinction is made, the idea that the same uncharacterizable covers both existence and being in an undifferentiated way is not without difficulty. In an interview with Marcel, Ricoeur brings up this question and makes a further clarification of the terms. He notices that in Marcel's thought, existence and being easily overlap one another, but they can be distinguished in terms of the different preoccupations of Marcel. The question of existence is raised in relation to that of objectivity; it is the zone where doubt is no longer possible. The question of being is raised from the perspective of ontological exigence which, according to Marcel, bears us towards a fullness that resists functional and abstract determinations.6

In Gabriel Marcel et Karl Jaspers Ricoeur attempts to trace the source of Marcel's difficulty. He begins with an examination of the first part of Being and Having where Marcel explains why he accepts the neo-Thomistic affirmation of being in general (GMKJ 352-358; Being and Having 27-40). Ricoeur indicates that the whole struggle of Marcel starts with his determination to break with idealism. He has now a deep conviction that we are linked to being and not just to ideas. Upon reading Garrigou-Lagrange's book on God, he agrees with the author that the affirmation of being in general explains the structure of thought in our relation to being. The neo-Thomistic view that we affirm being in general every time when we affirm any particular thing shows the immanence of thought to being; it is in this light that a necessary relation can be conceived between existence and being, between the individual and transcendence. After a reflection on the principle of identity, Marcel is further convinced that this formal affirmation is not just a kind of "rule of the game" which thought must observe in order to function. Rather, it states the fact that thought is not a relation with itself; it transcends itself in knowing something.

But Ricoeur observes that very soon Marcel comes up with a real difficulty: how can one be sure that this being in general is a positive infinite, an ens realissimum which would be the height of the determined and not the pure indeterminate, the apeiron of the ancients, of which one can hardly say it is such or such? It is only in the first case that the principle of identity can assure us of the ontological meaning mentioned above. Ricoeur draws attention to the hesitations of Marcel in Being and Having and to fact that in spite of certain rectifications, the problem is not completely solved. All the other formulations do not exceed the vague knowledge of the self-transcendence of thought. It is difficult to tell whether being in general is a pure indeterminate or an ens realissimum which possesses all reality. Even if it can be shown to be the latter, question still remains as to whether it transcends the world as a whole or not. This is probably the point of Ricoeur when he asks for the difference between the immanence of thought to being and the immanence of thought to the "world" understood in the Heideggerian sense. Ricoeur ascribes the difficulty of Marcel concerning this distinction to the "purely logical path" inherent in the Thomistic affirmation of being (GMKJ 355). Marcel does try other way out, such as the distinction between thinking (penser) and thinking of (penser ), and it is finally incorporated into Marcel's notion of "fidelity" which is introduced in Being and Having precisely after his reflections on the Thomistic understanding of being in general. The notion of fidelity, according to Ricoeur, represents Marcel's true reaction to the difficulties met by a reflection that is based on the form of thought alone.

The whole problem arises from the fact that Marcel needs an ontological background against which the existing individual stands, but at the same time he does not want this background to be mutilated by objective and functional categories. This explains the hesitations and tensions in Being and Having between the abstract approach of being in general and the concrete path of fidelity. The question whether there can be a way of understanding the ontological ground so that both of Marcel's conditions can be safeguarded brings us back to the epistemological question.　

6.Gabriel Marcel, Tragic Wisdom and Beyond (including conversations between Paul Ricoeur and Gabriel Marcel), trans. Stephen Jolin and Peter McCormick (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 225.

The Epistemological Question: Primary and Secondary Reflection

While in Thomistic philosophy being is affirmed implicitly and formally every time when we affirm something of the particular, in Marcel, it is affirmed in concrete experiences like fidelity, hope and love. I affirm being when I stop treating my body as something external to me but recognize that I am my body; I affirm being when I stop treating my friend as an object but recognize him as a presence and be open for him; I affirm being when I resolve to have hope in the depths of my despair. Ricoeur's question is whether one can explain in intelligible terms how the ontological affirmation is made. Indeed, if being is uncharacterizable, how can I be sure of what I affirm in these experiences? This question is particularly crucial in an ontology like Marcel's in which being is less observed () than recognized (GMKJ 78). A potential fideism is inherent in this way of philosophizing.

Ricoeur deems that each of the experiences of existence in fact has a structure that distinguishes it from others and renders it thinkable. Following Kant's distinction between reason and understanding, he proposes that the work of determination, which belongs to reason, should not be confused with that of objectification performed by understanding (GMP 489/71). Ricoeur is sympathetic with Marcel's reservations about this approach because a rationality that would not be understanding, would not be the rationality of objectifying science can hardly be found today. That is why any re-conquest of the ontological dimension has to be made against the propensity to problematize and to characterize. But Ricoeur finds that in order to render the ontological affirmation understandable we have no other way but to deliver reason from its modern reduction. The production of limit-concepts (concepts-limite) by reason should be encouraged and be considered as inseparable from the strategies of negating the objective view and making positive global affirmations. This suggestion, Ricoeur claims, is not without roots in Marcel: "My critique is therefore not outside Marcel's work. I would even say that it has an ally in his work" (GMP 490/72). He seems to suggest that in Marcel's philosophy there is already the apparatus to articulate in a more intellectual way how mystery is recognized in our experience, but just Marcel has not taken full advantage of it. The method that Ricoeur refers to is "secondary reflection". It provides us with a kind of rationality which is not an expression of having, that is, not a totalizing rationality, so that we can speak about mystery without reducing it to the content of a concept.

First of all, the term reflection is understood by Ricoeur as "a return to (retour sur) the experiences of transcendence with a view to understanding and articulating them" (GMP 489/71); more specifically it is "a return to the conditions of affirmation" (GMKJ 80). In this sense all metaphysics is reflection, and being is the real stake (enjeu) of reflection (GMKJ 80, 34). Ricoeur observes that Marcel is concerned more with the conditions of affirmation than with the structure of being. In this connection, Marcel remains faithful to his idealist formation, since the Greek and the medieval philosophers pay more attention to the being that is affirmed than to the immanent conditions of affirmation (GMKJ 363). Reflections are of two kinds which correspond to two levels of affirmation: primary and secondary. In Gabriel Marcel et Karl Jaspers, Ricoeur explains primary reflection in terms of the Kantian "understanding": it looks for the a priori conditions of the validity of objective knowledge in the impersonal subject from which embodiment and social condition have been stripped off (GMKJ 80-81). Primary reflection reduces the object to the subject-who is now the master of the objective world-but pays the price of detaching both from existence. Primary reflection is identified with the objective way of thinking and the hardening of the self. On the other hand, secondary reflection is a recuperation of the concrete, a reflection of the integral "I" in its concrete links. Secondary reflection reconsiders the very conditions of primary reflection; it exposes its purity as exile, as loss of existence and its mastery as a triumph in the void. In this sense Ricoeur defines the dialectical nature of secondary reflection as a "reversal" (retournement), as an "overflowing from inside" (debordement par l'interieur) where the subject of affirmation finds itself betrayed by its own affirmation (GMKJ 81). At the same time, this overflowing of the immanence from inside is what Marcel means by transcendence (GMKJ 363). It is being itself that rejects any reductive formulation from inside; and secondary reflection is the manifestation of this protest. Secondary reflection is therefore the epistemological condition of transcendence.

The dialectical character of secondary reflection is further illustrated in Gabriel Marcel et Karl Jaspers in a rather Hegelian fashion by the fact that it is negative. It indicates that being is not objective, not problematic, not representable, not characterizable etc. Nevertheless, these negations are made against a reduction, a reduction in the sense of a denial of participated existence; they resist a resistance and deny a negation-"it is this double negation that conjures rationally a fullness of presence" (GMKJ 82). Two things are said in this statement: first, by virtue of its laborious process of double negation secondary reflection proves itself to be a rational act; secondly, secondary reflection is not purely negation of objectivity, for it is founded on an immediate positive experience of "presence". The negation of negation is supported by something that is not negative, but positive, namely the intuition of being. Ricoeur is not interested in the neo-Thomistic affirmation of being which he considers to be purely logical, but he admires very much the idea of "original affirmation" (l'affirmation originaire)-coined by Jean Nabert who comes from the French reflective tradition. When Ricoeur speaks about intuition of being, he speaks in terms of Nabert's "original affirmation" or Marcel's "presence" which are associated with concrete human experiences. That ontology begins with an intuition of being is one of Ricoeur's earliest convictions; being is the ultimate principle which the mind posits without being able to grasp it like things.7

It is in this positive dimension of secondary reflection that a strong link between secondary reflection and mystery can be seen. This relation is visible already in Marcel's own work, but Ricoeur clarifies it, structuralizes it and stabilizes it. The original affirmation is indeed a "blind intuition" (intuition aveugle); mystery is that which cannot be captured in front of me for my description. The question is how the transition between problem and mystery can be understood without being seen as a kind of philosophical fideism; and here the dialectic of primary and secondary reflection provides a clue. We have to admit that secondary reflection is a reflexive motion of the mind and not a heuristic process, as Marcel himself holds; it confirms being without being able to display it in a clear vision; the intuition remains blind (Marcel, Being and Having, 121). However, a rigorous labour of thought-negation of negation, resistance of resistance-is required before that blind intuition can be posited. This is how Ricoeur understands Marcel's point that "in order to begin understanding again, we are always bound to refer back to the order of the problematic" (GMP 491/73; Being and Having 112). [YHW1]Mystery as "metaproblematic" can only be recognized as such in the very process of overpassing the problematic; mystery is the problem that is turned inside out by a reflection that examines its very condition of possibility. And in this dialectical relation, the importance of the work of concept is finally re-established.　

7. Paul Ricoeur, "Renouveau de l'ontologie", Encyclopedie francaise XIX, Philosophie et religion (Paris: Larousse, 1957), 19.16-15.


Secondary Reflection and the Discontinuity of Experiences

The idea of secondary reflection is further developed by Ricoeur in his another article on Marcel published some ten years later in 1984 entitled "Reflexion primaire et reflexion seconde chez Gabriel Marcel". This essay was written at a time when Ricoeur had just finished writing Time and Narrative and before the writing of Oneself as Another. The chronological order is noteworthy because the major themes that Ricoeur treats in this article appear again in Oneself as Another and the related essays. These themes, as Ricoeur himself discloses, are the results of his recent reading of Marcel's works (L2 51). Right in the beginning of the article, secondary reflection is introduced as "constitutive of the properly philosophical moment of Marcelian thought" (L2 49). It is described as a labour of thought and a work of rectification that consists in an unceasing attempt to suggest the closest concepts and the less inadequate words in order to reproduce the reflective equivalence of the ontological experiences (L2 50). That secondary reflection is a work of concept and language aiming at reconstructing the experiences where the ontological affirmation is made brings the relationship between secondary reflection and these experiences to the focus of inquiry, and it is precisely from this very perspective that the full meaning of secondary reflection can be defined.

The experiences of transcendence are now called "foundational experiences", "cardinal experiences", "major experiences" or "nucleuses-experiences" (); the change in terminology already suggests that these experiences are taken here as the ground, the foundation or the nucleus of something; and that something is secondary reflection. The recuperative work of secondary reflection is guaranteed () or magnetized () by these experiences held to be irreducible (L2 50, 51, 55). As foundations, these foundational experiences are the sole reason for the different locations where the resistance of primary reflection and its critical moments take place; and the ontological weight of the foundational experiences provides the sole dynamism that presides over the transition from primary reflection to secondary reflection. The significance of this understanding is that it excludes two sorts of deductive reasoning. First, there is not any connection of implication between the different places of emergence of the foundational experiences where the dialectic of primary and secondary reflection operates. Secondly, it is not by any deduction or restrictive implication that one passes from primary reflection to secondary reflection; the critique of primary reflection is provoked solely by the irreducible fullness that the foundational experiences unfold. This view of the foundational experiences allows Ricoeur to argue for the "discontinuous character of philosophical front" which is for him the key point in Marcel's non-systematic approach (L2 51). The foundational experiences that Ricoeur analyses in this essay, namely embodiment, freedom as gift and invocation, are discontinuous or "incoordonnable"; they do not form a systematic whole in which every element are linked to one another by implication. Thus, "there is not experience, but experiences, multiple experiences" (L2 64). The fact that secondary reflection is in every case just a localized and recuperative operation prevents it from developing into a totalizing rationality. However, Ricoeur also admits that experiences participate in one another: there are bridging experiences that permit certain connections and thereby certain tensions between the foundational experiences. It is the job of secondary reflection both to restore the foundational experiences and to discern the bridging experiences. Most of Ricoeur's effort in this essay is invested in illustrating the discontinuous feature found both on the level of existence and between existence and being, and how secondary reflection functions in each of the foundational experience discussed.　

The Experiences of Existence

Three major Marcelian themes of the human condition are chosen by Ricoeur. The first one is Marcel's evaluation of the Cartesian cogito which is read through Kant and is considered to be the ancestor of all modern idealism. The transcendental subject claims itself to be the master of meaning and the ground of objectivity, but this critical approach is based on the subject-object relation. Marcel's critique, now a critique of critique, consists in showing the primacy of embodiment and feeling which all idealism neglects. He seeks to reveal their mistake of seeing sensation as a message to be captured by a disinterested subject and the body as an instrument which an uprooted subject can claim to manipulate from nowhere (L2 55). The task of secondary reflection is to recuperate the foundational experience of "indubitable existence" from the cogito. But just as in the previous article, Ricoeur criticizes Marcel's whole statement () on existence as extremely fragile and that it runs the risk of passing into silence (L2 54). Thus, the following comment becomes ambiguous: "The indubitable can only be recovered by oratio obliqua, that is, by showing the inconsistency of every reformulation in terms of transcendental objectivity and of subjectivity (they are the same), and of sensation and of one's own body" (ibid). The emphasis made in last part of the sentence may certainly refer to the view of sensation and body prescribed by the subject-object relation, but it may also refer to the unsatisfactory formulations of sensation and body suggested by Marcel! It is possible that both meanings are intended by Ricoeur. If this is true, then secondary reflection is not just a critique of primary reflection as previously understood, but also a critique of any attempt to formulate the foundational experiences by means of concepts, including Marcel's own. It seems that Ricoeur has come up with the idea that the critique of inconsistency or inadequacy is the central mechanism of secondary reflection: "In this sense, a certain obligation of not to contradict oneself, of keeping a coherent discourse is always presupposed. If it is required of the thesis of the cogito and of its correlate, namely objectivism, it is no less required of the thought that aims at accounting for, or making sense of the nucleuses-experiences" (L2 55). If language and concepts are just approximations of the original affirmation of being, the latter remains the ultimate condition of any ontological statement; it overflows from inside of any particular formulation and exposes its inadequacy. Reflection as the return to the condition of affirmation is inescapably an effort without end.

The second theme is that of freedom. On this point, Marcel attacks Kant's notion of autonomy by challenging the very alternative of autonomy and heteronomy. For Marcel, freedom is essentially the joyful response to the liberating appeal rather than the anxious power of choosing between alternatives. Freedom is defined by and ordained to the transcendence that takes hold of me (GMKJ 224-225, 297). The internal critique of the idea of autonomy goes together with the evidence that freedom as gift has the primacy over freedom as choice. Secondary reflection consists in pulling together all the experiences, such as readiness, admiration, consent, that bear witness to freedom as gift and in the attempt of articulating them conceptually. On the negative side, as resistance to resistance, secondary reflection seeks to show that the autoposition of the free action is destructive in the sense that it is the gesture of cutting myself off from the creative powers in which I participate and of which I am not the master. But once again, the requirement of consistency turns back against Marcel in the sense that the vocabulary of freedom as choice is hardly avoidable in the transition between despair and hope, and between betrayal and fidelity in his own philosophy.

The third theme has to do with the tension between the you (toi) and the him/her (lui). The same rhythm of recuperating the foundational experience and resisting the resistance operates here. The attestation of the second person has to be re-conquered unceasingly from the reduction of the you to the him/her-understood as a repertoire of information or an inventory of predicates. Since much has been said about the mechanism already in the previous two examples, Ricoeur moves his focus to the discontinuity of front. In a certain sense, the reduction of the you to the him/her might be considered as a case of objectification which brings the question of the second person close to the recovery of existence from objectivity, but there are specific differences between the two types of concrete approaches. The theme of feeling concerns the gnoseological question, whereas the theme of other people has to do with the dramatic aspect of existence (dramaturgie de l'existence) which is first explored by Marcel in theatre before being re-inscribed in philosophical reflection (L2 58-59). There exists no compelling implication that leads the theme of feeling to that of other people, but only a parallelism in the dialectical treatment. It is not the indubitable experienced in the global existence or in my embodiment that resists the resistance in the case of the second person; it is an evidence of another kind, namely the reciprocity in the relation between question and response. Ricoeur even says, "I insist here: one cannot say that the you is indubitable; a source of doubt other than that proceeds from the thought of object erodes the confidence (confiance) in other people" (L2 59). The order of the "indubitable" is not the same as that of "confidence"; the latter hinges upon my openness to the capacity of other people to respond to me and to respond to me sincerely (L2 60).

Drawing upon the kind of proportionality expressed in Marcel's statement that "the you is to invocation what the object is to judgement", Ricoeur argues for a "dialectical parallelism" that links the diverse orders of investigation without confusing them (L2 62). In all these investigations, there is the same localized procedure of critique of resistance, emergence of major experiences that incites the investigations and their restoration in secondary reflection. Some reciprocal reinforcement between the recuperative attempt on the different fronts is also conceivable owing to the similarity of style. Having established the discontinuity between the different major experiences on the plane of human existence, Ricoeur proceeds to deal with Marcel's difficulty of the relation between existence and being in a similar way.　

The Discontinuity between Existence and Being

The three themes of existence, taken together, or as a whole, are bound up with a movement of transcendence that drives them to a philosophy of being in which participation plays a crucial role. Nevertheless, no matter how close they intertwine with one another, one cannot ignore the fact that they are two different planes of inquiry in Marcel. The question of being is inspired by the question of God. It has the starting point in the negative experiences where one suffers from despair, betrayal or the reduction of human relation to utility. The meaning of being is the reply to these temptations. Already at the time of Gabriel Marcel et Karl Jaspers Ricoeur speaks of three levels of transcendence according to an ascending dialectic. The "I" is transcended from below (par en bas) towards my nourishing and enigmatic body, then transcended at the sides (par les cotes) towards my friends and anyone who may become for me a you, and finally transcended from above (par en haut) towards the supreme You (GMKJ 26). The overpassing of existence is "a gesture of reconciliation in view of renewing a pact, of retaking roots and of recovering the sources" (GMKJ 27). But now referring to the same schematization in "Reflexion primaire et reflexion seconde chez Gabriel Marcel", he sees it as a way of systematization and warns that it could be detrimental to each of the terms. His point is that when one reads the schema as a Platonic ascending movement that goes from the lower to the higher, it may create a wrong impression that the lower stages are lower in value and hence dispensable. However, our own body is not a tomb; fidelity and hope are not ways of escape from life; each of the terms bears its own ontological weight and its own specificity. "It is therefore necessary to leave the relation between existence and being undecided and refuse all that could be put together in a systematization which may transform the surpassed regions into abandoned sites" (L2 64). Once again, Ricoeur insists that all the fronts are important; they are parallel experiences and there is no way of sacrificing any one of them for the sake of another.

Now, if the foundational experiences are independent from one another and a dialectical parallelism is the only relation between them, they would come very close to Leibnizian monads; but Ricoeur has not gone as far as that. On the basis of the respect of a certain heterogeneity of the foundational experiences, he admits some "bridging experiences" (experiences-passerelles) that mediate between them (ibid). Between feeling and the transcendence of being, there is the experience of test or temptation (); it is the link between the despair arises in our embodied condition and the resources of hope. On the other hand, feeling also has a bearing on intersubjectivity: embodiment provides a "space", a "milieu" of hospitality which is expressed by the preposition "at" chez (chez moi, chez toi), joined by the "in" (dans) of incarnation and the "with" (avec) of communication (L2 65). The third example of bridging experience is attestation; it joins the me who attests, the you who is called to bear witness and being that is attested. To trace these bridging experiences is again the role of secondary reflection, but unfortunately, Ricoeur's exposition of the bridging experiences is very brief and no further explanation is given about this new function of secondary reflection. According to the foregoing study, secondary reflection is the critique of a previous reduction in a primary reflection. However, the restoration of the foundational experiences is already the result of the recuperative secondary reflection. Ricoeur does say that the effort of secondary reflection is an endless one, but it is mainly due to the deep-rootedness of the resistance of primary reflection (L2 53, 57). It seems to me that this new task of uncovering the bridging experience is in fact a recuperation of recuperation-to regain connections between foundational experiences after the first recuperation of their irreducibility that favours a discontinuity. Ricoeur is careful not to leave any irreconcilable opposition.

Just as the major experiences in Marcel are discontinuous, the series of studies in Oneself as Another are held to be "fragmentary" by Ricoeur (OA 19/30). We find there the same antipathy of system and of undue simplicity. The different ways of asking the question "who?" (with respect to speaking, doing, narrating etc.) present a certain "contingency of questioning" that comes from the contingency inherent in the grammar of natural languages and the historicity of questioning. Having a fragmentary feature seems to be an inescapable consequence of any inquiry by way of "concrete approaches" which Marcel advocates. However, given the fact that all the studies centre around the theme of action, the author of Oneself as Another admits a thematic unity-one which does not give rise to an abstract deductive system. The logic of continuity and discontinuity inherent in Oneself as Another is made even more evident by Ricoeur in his recent article "From metaphysics to Morality Philosophy" where the relation between ontological experience and moral experience is at stake.8 It seems to me that this style of investigation is what allows Ricoeur to pull together theories from a variety of schools and recontextualize them in the hermeneutics of the self. For him, borrowing theories from other traditions is not a question, the essential thing is to have a "proper rule of coherence" or a firm "line of construction".9


8.Paul Ricoeur, "From Metaphysics to Moral Philosophy", Philosophy Today (Winter 1996): 443-458; "De la metaphysique a la morale", Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale 4 (1993): 455-477.

9."Paul Ricoeur: Reflexions sur la philosophie morale", interview by Monique Canto-Sperber, Magazine litteraire, no. 361 (January 1998): 39.

The Dialectic of Mystery and Problem

Same as in "Gabriel Marcel and Phneomenology", Ricoeur concludes the essay "Reflexions primaire et reflexion seconde chez Gabriel Marcel" with the theme of the dialectic of problem and mystery, but this time in even more powerful terms. Ricoeur's contention is that this dialectic is inseparable from that of primary reflection and secondary reflection otherwise its dialectical nature will be destroyed and substituted by an impoverishing disjunction. Mystery has to be held as a term of secondary reflection and it is only in this sense that a non-dogmatic discourse of being can be proposed. Ricoeur takes two points from Marcel's work to conclude his interpretation. Referring to Marcel's argument in "On the Ontological Mystery" that the recognition of being is made in an affirmation which I am rather than I utter, and that by uttering it I break it and on the point of betraying it, Ricoeur states firmly, "And nevertheless, I utter it, but in secondary reflection; by doing so, I re-inscribe it in discourse as meta-problematic" (L2 66). There can be a discourse of mystery in terms of the overpassing of the problematic. It is by bringing the problematic to the point of rupture that the primacy of the original affirmation is recognized. Then, drawing upon his favourite words of Marcel's that a mystery is a problem which encroaches upon its own data, invading them and thereby transcending itself as a simple problem, Ricoeur reinstates his position that the detour of the problematic is indispensable for the question of being. The position of mystery, though remains a blinded intuition, can only be attested to in the struggle of recovering from problematization and with the resources of this problematization (L2 66-67). Hence, the problematic is not the same kind of negativity as the Heideggerian das Man, which, when overcome, does not contribute to the authentic awareness of being. For Ricoeur, the problematic is not to be overcome and thrown away; it is just brought to its limit by secondary reflection and it is precisely by looking with the resources of the problematic which have been brought to the limit that we have a hint of mystery. This process is what allows the transition from problem to mystery to be verbally articulated and stabilized.

To sum up, the dialectic of secondary reflection on which the dialectic of mystery and problem is built is in its essence an internal critique: it challenges from inside of any conceptual formulation of our fundamental experience of being with regard to its adequacy; it repudiates any formulation that do not do justice to the original affirmation of being. The mystery of being is recuperated as mystery only in and through this labour of thought. In both articles we have read, Ricoeur applies the same internal critique to Marcel's own theory as well. This has already been felt in the early comments on the discrepancy between the neo-Thomistic view of being in general and the concrete approaches to being, and in the criticism of the incoherence between the insistence on the uncharacterizable and the suggestion of secondary reflection. All through the two articles, he argues in Marcel's own terms to show the necessity of going through conceptualization and the problematic before mystery can be posited.

Conclusion: Towards a Marcelian Reading of Oneself as Another

The foregoing account covers the main views of Ricoeur's on Marcel's philosophy from the early period of his career up till the 80s. The main concern of Ricoeur has always been the way how the original intuitive affirmation of being can be intelligibly retrieved. The dialectic of problem and mystery which is supported by the dialectic of primary reflection and secondary reflection is what he obtains from his critical reading of Marcel's works. This dialectic provides the necessary background for understanding the use of analytic philosophy in Oneself as Another.

In Oneself as Another, Ricoeur sets for himself the aim of a hermeneutics of the self which is characterized by the "indirect manner of positing the self" (OA 17/29). The self understands itself only via certain detours and never directly as in the case of Descartes. The basic methodological detour is "reflection by way of analysis". It is a detour taken by all the studies of the book that belong to what he calls the first order discourse, namely those which have the accent on the phenomenological aspects of the self. But what does it mean by reflection by way of analysis? And why is it necessary? I think an adequate answer can only be found on the basis of the dialectic of mystery and problem. The relation between reflection and analysis as a "constructive confrontation" or a "competition" is not different from the relation between primary reflection and secondary reflection as presented above (OA 17/29).

The work of "analysis" is carried out with the help of analytic philosophy which is precisely the kind of philosophy well known to be committed to the analysis of language and concepts; and even more importantly, it is the method that treats action as thing-like objects which can be observed and characterized from a neutral point of view. The aim of analysis in the hermeneutics of the self, as is indicated in the beginning of the first study, is precisely to "determine" the self according to a "general framework" () based on Strawson's theory of basic particulars-an approach which would be rejected by Marcel as treating existence like a problem (OA 31/43). In Ricoeur's earliest work on Marcel, namely in Gabriel Marcel et Karl Jaspers, language does not receive particular attention; but in the later ones which are analysed above, language is always the issue. I admit that the reconstruction of the dialectic of mystery and problem and the underlying dialectic of primary and secondary reflection are affected by Ricoeur's analytic turn which took place in the early 70s. But the use of the latter cannot be understood without the former. The reason is that Oneself as Another is not a work that just uses analytic philosophy, but rather a critique of the latter. It is exactly by virtue of this critique that the deeper reality of the self can be recognized. In the book, Ricoeur does not juxtapose the interior view with the exterior view, but sets them in a dialectic, so that the being of the self can be reached only when the exterior view is overpassed in a secondary reflection.

With regard to the meaning of "reflection", it has a lot to do with Ricoeur's understanding of what reflection means in Marcel. As mentioned above, reflection designates the reconsideration of the conditions of affirmation-but affirmation of what? In Oneself as Another, it is the affirmation of action and its agent. As his critique of the Cartesian cogito in the "Introduction" shows, Ricoeur is faithful to Marcel's insight about the embodied nature of the self. According to Marcel, reflection is to be performed either on feeling or on action.10 While Marcel reflects more on feeling, Ricoeur puts the emphasis on action, and the self is reflexively implied in its action. I think this decision on the part of Ricoeur is not without reason, since feeling is less amenable to objective analysis. Furthermore, a reflection on action may also include that of feeling but not the other way round, as there can be feeling without action but rarely action without feeling. The theme of action may do a better job than that of feeling in providing a dynamic philosophy of being which Marcel himself favours. In what sense is the reflection in Oneself as Another a recourse to the conditions of affirmation of action and person? A brief overview of how Ricoeur introduces the task of the first two groups of studies may illustrate.

The whole inquiry of the self has the question "who?" as the guiding thread; but the identification of someone starts with the identification of something in general, be it a person or an object. The Strawsonian concept of basic particular is introduced in the first subset (study 1 and 2) as that without which "nothing at all can be identified" (OA 31/43). Ricoeur refers explicitly to Kant, the critical philosopher, for the necessity of this step: "What we are going to undertake is indeed a sort of transcendental deduction of the notion of person, by showing that if we did not have available to us the schema of thought that defines this notion, we could not engage in the empirical description that we make in this regard in ordinary conversation and in the human sciences" (OA 31/43). Therefore, the conceptual framework of basic particulars has a "transcendental status"; it prescribes the condition of possibility of any statement about an individual. In the second subset of studies (study 3 and 4) the theme is theory of action. Ricoeur speaks of a conceptual schema that consists of notions like circumstance, intentions, motives, deliberations, voluntary or involuntary motions etc. which form a "network" of intersignifying terms. This conceptual network of action "shares the same transcendental status as the conceptual framework of basic particulars...the entire network serves to determine what 'count as' an action" (OA 58/75). That means one cannot make sense of an action without referring to this conceptual framework of action. Therefore, reflection is first of all the reflection on these conceptual frameworks which are the conditions of any knowledge of the person and its action. These two examples do not only show what reflection means in Oneself as Another, but also illustrate what is called primary reflection, given the fact that they presuppose the subject-object relation. The conceptual frameworks are taken as that by means of which the person and its action can be grasped objectively. In this connection, the question "who?" is the question of secondary reflection; it keeps challenging the different analytic approaches of person and action, exposing their incoherence [YHW2]and the difficulties they create. Oneself as Another demonstrates how the self is recuperated through a critique of the analytic tradition and in the process enriched by its linguistic resources.

10."C'est ainsi que le role de la reflexion-qu'elle s'exerce sur le sentir ou sur l'agir-consiste non point a morceler, a demembrer..." Gabriel Marcel, Journal metaphysique (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1927), 324.

by Stephen Tong S.J.

A Rahnerian Appropriation To The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification


A. Introduction

In 1997, the Catholic Church and Lutheran Churches successfully articulated and issued the final version of a Joint Declaration on the doctrine of Justification (JD) after long years of preparation and discussion.1 Though admitting nuances in understanding the doctrine, the Churches achieved a consensus on its basic truth, which is presented in seven assertive statements. This achievement serves as a milestone in ecumenism.

The doctrine of Justification has become the divisive cause and the crux of all theological disputes since the Reformation. Any attempt towards reconciliation inevitably brings this Pauline doctrine to the forefront. There may be two ways of releasing the tension. First, by setting this doctrine within a greater and more integrated whole so that its divisive significance diminishes. According to contemporary theological understanding, Justification is only one among other Pauline doctrines, and it may not even be the most important one.2 Secondly, by viewing this doctrine from a higher viewpoint so that its problems and difficulties are not solved but dissolved. The following attempt to interpret the meaning of the seven assertions in the Joint Declaration adopts this latter approach. The higher viewpoint, I think Rahner would agree, is the theo-anthropological understanding of the human being. Theology is also anthropology. Many disputes and arguments can, it would appear, be attributed to our compartmentalized understanding of God and human beings. Here, Rahner will be our competent guide in discovering that anthropocentricism is not necessarily incongruent with theocentricism. From here, our journey begins.

The first part of this paper is dedicated to delineating Rahner's anthropology and his view on the development of dogma. The underlying contention is that misunderstandings often come from a lack of clarification of some basic terminology, which is taken for granted as some congealed form of ideas. In the issue of justification, the protagonist is the human being. So, to understand what it means to be human is crucial. The second part of the paper presents an interpretation of the Joint Declaration and an attempt to dialogue with the latest comments on it by the Catholic Church3 and the Lutheran circle.4 I hope that the Doctrine and the Joint Declaration will be understood more coherently and be given a wider perspective than the actual text provides.



    1. The actual process is succinctly outlined in #3 of the Joint Declaration

2. Cf. FITZMYER, J.A. (1988). Pauline Theology. In: R.E. BROWN, J.A. FITZMYER and R.E. MURPHY (eds) The New Jerome Biblical Commentary. Englewood Cliffs N.J. Prentice Hall. #82. Fitzmyer lists ten effects of the Christ event in Paul, namely, justification, salvation, reconciliation, expiation, redemption, freedom, sanctification, transformation, new creation, glorification.

3. Response of The Catholic Church To The Joint Declaration of The Catholic Church And The Lutheran World Federation On The Doctrine of Justification" (RCC.).

B. The Rahnerian Horizon

1. The human being as person and subject

From ancient times, human beings have wondered about the fundamental question, "What am I?" or "Who am I?" One of the classical answers tells us that the human being is a rational animal. As sciences progress, modern science, anthropologies, whether physics, chemistry, biology, sociology, cultural anthropology, psychology, offer various approaches and standpoints from which to define their distinctive characteristics so that common features and patterns of behavior among human beings can be explained more accurately. Their basic attention and methodology focus on certain modes of cause and effect. However, the factors they consider are outside the human self, no matter how great their influence is on the person, for example, parents, social environment, cultural background. These, however, cannot tackle the fact that it is the human being as person and subject who is collecting all the data and considering various factors about the self, aiming towards understanding the self's totality and unity.

Therefore, being human means exactly to transcend all compartmentalized standpoints which seek to understand the self from external factors and elements. We may state this in a Kantian question, namely, what is the condition of possibility that renders human beings capable of making inquiry of any kind? Undoubtedly, what influences human beings can be understood quite well by experimental approaches in analyzing our world and history. These approaches, however, cannot illuminate the unity and totality of the self. Human beings can transcend all particulars and raise the question of questioning itself. Therefore the human being as person and subject is not some objective data awaiting analysis, but the center of existence which takes "self-possession as such in a conscious and free relationship to the totality of itself."5

2. The human being as transcendent being

The human being as person and subject aims to grasp the self in its totality, yet at the same time everyone experiences his or her own finitude and fragility in daily life. These two aspects make up the paradox that human beings intend transcendence, an infinite horizon which surpasses any complacency of finite achievement, whether in knowledge or action. Every answer is just the beginning of a new question, so the human being is always on the way to self-transcendence. In the dimension of acting, we experience the intentionality of higher values. Weak as we all are, surprisingly we have also heard the inner invitation towards higher values, though remaining with the lower ones is much more enticing to our spontaneous appetite. If we respond to this inner voice, it may imply struggle, sacrifice, misunderstanding, marginalization, suffering, persecution or even death. This kind of endurance for the higher reveals the human capacity for self-transcendence towards something or someone, named or unnamed, other than the self. Of course, one can choose to ignore or evade this intentionality, interpreting it as absurd or unanswerable, sticking to one's workaday life and let its current carry one along. This possibility relates to human freedom and will be elaborated later. However, our interest here is to raise the question, namely, what is the condition of possibility for this ongoing transcendence in human beings?

Rahner tells us that "the movement of transcendence is not the subject creating its own unlimiting space as though it had an absolute power over being, but is the infinite horizon of being making itself manifest."6 In other words, in our incessant questioning we experience ourselves as one who receives being, which is grace in our Christian sense, and which renders the person capable of transcending every complacency in order continually to discover the objective world and categorical truths. Serving as mystery, this infinite horizon of being remains hidden within the human being. One can only open up to its revelation in silence and reverence, where one becomes conscious of oneself as person and subject.　

3. The human being as responsible and free

A person who is open to the undetermined possibilities of self-transcendence immediately experiences, thematically or unthematically, the freedom within and at the same time responsible for the self. That is, one takes one's destiny in one's own hands, not only in acquiring knowledge, but also in decision and action. We cannot deny that modern discoveries and research in human sciences render human freedom very controversial, since human behavior seems to be explained away by cause and effect in the world. All choices can be traced back to some original and relative factors. Therefore, what comes from the human free will seems almost a mere illusion. According to Rahner, our "responsibility and freedom are not a particular, empirical datum in human reality alongside other data."7 Therefore, there is no need to find their proof in empirical science. Rather, they emerge when the "I" experiences the self as the subject who is given over to oneself. But what does this mean?

First, freedom does not remain hidden in an interior disposition, but is always mediated by the concrete reality of time and space, by the subject's history in the world. Second, freedom is a fundamental characteristic of a personal existent, in contrast to being a neutral power that one has and possesses as something different from oneself, especially when the subject experiences that one has to give an account and is responsible for what one does. Here, the subject takes a stance towards oneself and the world, or even makes some movement towards the ultimate transcendence and mystery, whether in acceptance or in rejection. This stance is the expression of one's transcendental freedom, though Rahner reminds us that it is not without ambiguity in our reflection and objectification. So, even if one uses all the evidence of cause and effect to try to deny oneself as a free subject, one is actually affirming one's freedom as a subject who is given over to oneself in this stance. Therefore, freedom is understood not so much as power to do this or that but as the power to decide about oneself and to actualize oneself.　

4. The human being is dependent as a creature

This is the other side of being free and responsible. In our transcendental experience and Christian faith, we human beings discover that we are free to open up towards an absolute being and mystery, which is the ground of every knowing and action. This infinite horizon and abyss, being silent and spiritual, is thus infinitely different from the knowing subject and finite known object. In this sense, God is absolutely different from the world and from us. In other words, we are a genuine reality different from God. This difference implies two points of understanding. First, human beings and this world are both God's creation. Our creatureliness is not just expressed in some remote origin and causality in time, but in the experience of both transcendence and historical conditionedness, which are experienced every moment. Second, human transcendentality is not established by one's own power, but is experienced as something established by and at the disposal of another as the abyss of mystery. We always find our subjectivity as a historical conditioned and we never completely realize our possibilities in the world and in history. What overcomes this finitude is not leaving it behind or being free from its constraint, since that is never possible. On the way towards the definite moment of death, however, every person draws from God the power as source and infinite horizon to pursue knowledge and action in freedom. In this sense, the human being is totally dependent on God.8　

5. The human being as a being threatened radically by guilt

As we have already noted, the human being is free and responsible, not in the sense of being a neutral subject as if one could choose and act among some categorical possibilities while remaining uninfluenced oneself. Rather, being free and responsible is experienced as something final and definitive for the subject. In freedom, one does not do something, but does oneself. However, as a person, everyone is subject to openness to the infinite horizon and mystery that constitute oneself so that one's freedom should correspond to this movement. This holy mystery mediates itself in finite and created reality, in the spectrum of categorical and hierarchical values in the world. In this sense, the human being is supposed to open up to these categorical values, from lower to higher, in responding to a vocation as genuine person and subject. Yet, because of freedom, the human being in reality may say "yes" or "no" to this call. A person who says "no" experiences something which contradicts the human constitution as oriented towards the ultimate mystery, and this is guilt in the Christian perspective.

Of course, according to Rahner, in reflection no one can be fully transparent whether in one's categorical choices one is saying a definite "no" to this infinite horizon or mystery, which is God. Yet it always remains a possibility. So, "we never know with ultimate certainty whether we really are sinners, we do know with ultimate certainty that we really can be sinners."9 "Sinner" here does not mean just committing some moral wrong but is taken in a definite and final sense. As we progress towards death, our categorical options in values will finally make an eternal stance as "yes" or "no" to God.　

6. The human being as the event of God's free and forgiving self-communication

What was discussed above gradually converges to this assertion. Rahner tells us that "God's self communication means that what is communicated in grace is really God in his own being, and in this way it is a communication for the sake of knowing and possessing God in immediate vision and love.".10 In this sense, there is no understanding of the human being in so-called "pure nature". Existentially, the human being cannot but enjoy the supernatural dimension of the human constitution, not simply as one characteristic alongside but permeating the whole human being. Therefore, the human being is a supernatural existential. That is, the human being fundamentally participates in the divine, in God-self.　

Rahner clarifies the word of "God". This word

"says nothing about what it means, nor can it simply function like an index finger which points to something encountered immediately outside ... In any case, the present form of the word reflects what the word refers to: the 'ineffable one', the 'nameless one' who does not enter the world we can name as a part of it. It means the 'silent one' who is always there, and yet can always be overlooked, unheard, and, because it expresses the whole in its unity and totality, can be passed over as meaningless."11

The key words here are unity and totality. Rahner leads us to ponder what would happen if this word "God" or its equivalent ceased to be in our language. Then one would never again face the totality of the world and the unity of oneself. At most, one could indulge in wonder at all things around, but would be incapable of wondering at this wondering. One would then regress to the level of a clever animal. In short, we cannot imagine ourselves being human without this intentionality of God, where "God" does not mean some kind of transcendental being apart from us, but is the source and horizon in which we can aim towards the totality of the world and the unity of ourselves.

To follow this understanding, we can infer that if, as supernatural existential, the human being is fundamentally called to be divine, though in freedom one can say "no" to it and make an absolute contradiction of one's existence, then the acceptance of God's self-communication is still based upon God's offer itself. That is exactly what we understand theologically by the notion of grace. "The giver in his own being is the gift... the giver gives himself to creatures as their own fulfillment."12 When one responds with "yes" to this offer in a concrete situation, one becomes a justified person, a being justified by God. In congruence with traditional teaching, this grace is absolutely gratuitous as "unmerited", initiated by God's highest personal freedom, different from what we experience in tangible causes, which produce a necessary effect. This grace is originally implicit and unthematized in our daily life. Through our reflection in concrete experiences we discover certain incarnated effects of this grace, but not the grace as such. For Rahner, grace is the unthematized horizon of transcendence in which we try to thematize certain appropriations to understand and ponder this grace as such, but never in its totality. In our perspective, grace is as wide as God's presence.

The word "grace", on the other hand, makes our relationship with God thematic, namely, the total gratuity of God to us that we have no merit to deserve or earn. This giver as gift produces the emptiness in the human being that only the fullness of God can fill. It is also prior to human freedom. When human freedom mediates through actualizing categorical values, this self-communication appears at least as an offer in an unthematic way, inviting the person towards the absolute mystery in knowledge and love. Therefore, in transcendental experience and freedom, a potential sinner who has rejected the genuine freedom mediated in categorical values, though not in reflective clearness, can return to the invitation of this mystery immediately, an experience of conversion and forgiveness in love. This ability to come back is already due to the grace itself which grants the subject the "re"-cognition of his own infinite horizon towards the truth and love itself.　

7. The development of dogma

Dogma is the formulation of faith in the Church and in her history. It represents Christians' understanding of the original revelation of Jesus Christ in their historicity, under the stamp and authority of the Church. Its existence already betrays the necessity of development in understanding God's revelation in Christ. This fact is not due to God as speaker acting freely in history, but is due to the fact that the human being as listener is a historical being. As long as human beings further their own history, there must be a history of dogma, even though revelation is complete. Accepting this fact, we face rather the challenge of finding new formulations of dogma congruent with the original doctrine in Scriptures and Church's authoritative teaching. This process can be compared to a young man who has fallen in love and tries to articulate the experience and understanding of his love in clearer and clearer terms and propositions, yet remaining faithful to the richness of the original and global experience. Theologians are doing a similar thing in articulating faith in and love of Christ in contemporary terms. The basic requirement is that the new formulation should not undo the past, but should explicate more what is still implicit in the old. Second, there is no surpassing of the revelation in Christ, which is closed in its plenitude. Finally, the development of dogma involves necessarily a unity of all elements constituting its development as revelation, such as spirit and grace, the Church, tradition.13

The Joint Declaration on the Dogma of Justification represents the development of the understanding of justification from St. Paul to the time of Luther and the Council of Trent, and down to the present moment. The seven points in the formulation, which represent the common effort and good will between the two Churches, have provided a greater space of dialogue in clarifying certain stances and terminology, and recognizing some different emphases between them. Yet, from a Rahnerian point of view, there are some areas which need to be clarified and re-interpreted in contemporary terms so that the doctrine itself can shed more light and meaning on our Christian faith.　



    5. RAHNER, K. (1976). Foundations of Christian Faith. NY: The Crossroad Publishing Company. p. 30.

6. Ibid. p. 34.

7. Ibid. p. 36.

8. Cf. ibid. p. 42-43.

9. Ibid. p. 104.

10. Ibid. p. 118.

11. Ibid. p. 46.

12. Ibid. p. 120.

13. Cf. ROBERTS, L. (1967). The Achievement of Karl Rahner. NY. Herder & Herder. p. 67.

C. A Rahnerian Hermeneutics on the Joint Declaration

1. Human Powerlessness and Sin in Relation to Justification (JD 4.1)

We confess together that all persons depend completely on the saving grace of God for their salvation. The freedom they possess in relation to persons and the things of this world is no freedom in relation to salvation, for as sinners they stand under God's judgment and are incapable of turning by themselves to God to seek deliverance, of meriting their justification before God, or of attaining salvation by their own abilities. Justification takes place solely by God's grace.

Rahner would certainly agree that all persons as creatures are totally dependent on God. This creatureliness is specially experienced in every effort towards transcendence in knowledge and exigency in categorical values, though it is not necessarily conscious or thematic. This is a moment of grace, but this grace is not an external offer as seemingly implied in the statement above. It is the infinite horizon implied in every questioning and effort in life. The point of departure may be the notion of "pure nature". It might be conceptually convenient to describe the daily banality of the human situation in the world as pure nature, in contrast to the total gratuity of the order of grace from God. However, can a person be existentially conceived of as living in a natural order, while all the transcendent experiences are extrinsically delivered to him from the supernatural one?14 Hardly! As Gaudium et spes (#22) affirms, ".... the Holy Spirit in a manner known only to God offers to every man the possibility of being associated with the paschal mystery." Rahner goes even further to believe that the human being is a supernatural existential, as we have already noted, who enjoys the self-communication of God in the very constitution of a human being. In other words, the human being potentially participates in the divine and supernatural realm in pre-freedom towards the infinite horizon and categorical values.

This statement also distinguishes two types of freedom, namely, freedom of choice, related to things and persons in daily life, and the transcendental freedom to decide one's stance towards God and to accept God, that is, one's salvation. If our reading above is correct, freedom of choice may simply be an illusion and explained away by modern science through cause and effect. Therefore, it is certainly right to say that it has nothing to do with human salvation. Moreover, the more one is wrongly and distortedly conditioned in the generic process of growth, the less one is capable of turning to God by oneself, and the easier one would understand God's unmerited grace in one's conversion. On the other hand, in one's unthematic effort towards categorical values and knowledge, in other words towards justification, one is already opening up to and enjoying God's self-communication. There is no such thing as pure human effort. Therefore, it is absolutely right to claim that justification takes place solely by God's grace.

It is noteworthy that such terms as "solely" or "only" always imply a solid mysterious dimension in Catholic tradition. That is, they involve the tension of paradox, the tension of motherhood and virginity in Mary, of the scandal and glorification of the cross, of bread and Christ's presence in the host. We might use the word "solely" to emphasis one dimension of any pair, but we can never ignore the mysterious other. This applies similarly to the dynamic between God's omnipotence and human cooperation. Therefore, "solely by God's grace" does not cancel out human effort in the history of salvation.

No doubt, this simple analogy cannot dispel the tension and disturbance felt by both Churches concerning their different attitudes towards the human role in cooperating with God in the work of salvation.15 It seems that, with our certain limitation in language or thinking, we are still under the spell of either of the two distinct levels of truth in Platonism, namely the shadow and the really real, or even worse, the Cartesian Cogito, Ergo Sum. Both of them share the same thrust to emphasize one side of reality as independent and self-subsisting. Even in the traditional proof of God's existence, the closing line is self-subsisting Being. The limitation of ratio of this kind, apart from possible loopholes which have left it open to attack since Modernism, has to be complemented by the dimension of revelation, whose fundamental truth is that God, apart from self-subsistence, is also relation. Accepting humbly the limitation of human discourse, we have to say that God is One but also Three, though we may easily fall prey to rigorous human logic. In this sense, a certain tension and paradox in our ratio cannot but be the point of departure in theology. Nowadays, saying that the Father creates, the Son redeems and the Holy Spirit sanctifies, cannot any longer hold ground in serious discourse, though it is still a convenient and practical way in which to bring out different emphases. God's every action is always Trinitarian, in other words, in relation. As St. Augustine has already said, "In God there is no accident, but only substance and relation."16 Therefore, any metaphysics of substance must be accompanied by a metaphysics of the I-Thou. From this entry point, in line with Rahner's transcendental anthropology, Gen 1:27 and the Incarnation propose a possibility of discourse on "cooperation" for humanity as such. Of course, a qualification must be made here that, while Jesus possessed this unity with God by nature, we do so by God's unmerited grace. Furthermore, the tricky point, as recognized by the LTS commentary, seems to be the weight of human sinful nature, but this reality, Rahner might argue, is not as basic as the human constitution seen as supernatural existential. At least the latter can never be entirely overpowered and consumed by the former. The human being still has the capacity to say yes' to God due to God's prior self-communication.　

2. Justification as Forgiveness of Sins and Making Righteous (JD 4.2)

We confess together that God forgives sin by grace and at the same time frees human beings from sin's enslaving power and imparts the gift of new life in Christ. When persons come by faith to share in Christ, God no longer imputes to them their sin and through the Holy Spirit effects in them an active love. These two aspects of God's gracious action are not to be separated, for persons are by faith united with Christ, who in his person is our righteousness (1Cor 1:30): both the forgiveness of sin and the saving presence of God himself.

The main point of this statement is that the two aspects of God's gracious action, namely forgiveness of sin and the gift of new life, are not to be separated. This goes back to the controversy over the understanding of imputation justice at the Reformation. According to former Lutheran teaching, God declares the forgiveness of sins towards the sinner because of Christ's merit. That is, God no longer imputes sins to the sinner, and yet the sins actually remain. The action of forgiveness is thereby totally one-sided: it causes no change in the person. Now, a new insight seems to come from a better understanding of God's word and action. In contrast to human limitation and fragility, there is no discrepancy between what God speaks and acts. "God said, 'Let there be light,' and there was light..." (Gen 1:3ff). If God declares a person to be just in Christ, that person is also made righteous in his or her actual being. Therefore, "the restoration of the relationship between humanity and God, and of restoration of human life often named sanctification" (LTS commentary, comments on 4.2) are two sides of the same coin, namely, justification by God. Nobody comes to faith in Christ in the abstract. In exercising personal transcendental freedom, a person responds to the call to be a supernatural existential by actualizing the exigency of categorical values in concrete situations. This achievement is what the Catholic Church understands by human virtue, being righteous before God, without ignoring the fact that this initiation to be virtuous comes from God's self-communication in the first place. Rahner would probably go further and say that this sharing in Christ by faith may not be thematic or reflective in one's life, even when one is open to the calling as supernatural existential. This has nothing to do with watering down the role and importance of Christ in salvation history, because God's self communication always involves the Trinitarian dimension. In human language, from eternity the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are communicating their selves to each other in their immanence. In other words, the Father always forgives through the Son in their common expression and revelation in the economy of salvation. This forgiveness is fully known and grasped by human beings through the Son, through his participation in human history.

3. Justification by Faith and through Grace (JD 4.3)

We confess together that sinners are justified by faith in the saving action of God in Christ. By the action of the Holy Spirit in Baptism, they are granted the gift of salvation, which lays the basis for the whole Christian life. They place their trust in God's gracious promise by justifying faith, which includes hope in God and love for him. Such a faith is active in love and thus the Christiancannot and should not remain without works. But whatever in the justified precedes or follows the free gift of faith is neither the basis of justification nor merits it.

This statement mainly discusses the dynamics between faith and work. In the Catholic tradition, in contrast to the Lutheran sola fide, there is little inclination to discuss faith, hope and love independently. These three supernatural virtues are always seen as an organic whole in constituting a justified person. A Rahnerian horizon seems to be conducive to dissolving the tension between faith and work.

The confusion comes from the preoccupation to decide the causative relationship between the two, whether justification by faith leads to good works or good works render a person justified. The temporal sequence is implicitly indicated here, too.

So, we raise the question, namely, what does having faith in God mean in the first place? To have faith is to entrust oneself totally to God,17 the ineffable or nameless one. This commitment is an act of one's transcendental freedom in deciding about oneself as who one definitively is, though it is not completely transparent in reflective consciousness. This ineffable one, we have already noted, is not some transcendental being totally apart from us, but is the source and horizon in which we can aim towards the totality of the world and the unity of the self. The person recognizes the presence of the possibility of this totality and unity as the heart and ultimate meaning of all categorical values in a trans-categorical intuition, though not necessarily in a thematic way. The actualization of these categorical values is what we mean by good works. In this sense, surrendering oneself to the ineffable one and performing good works are intimately united. They both come from God's self communication in the first place, and there is no temporal priority between the two.

Paul says that "we are justified from the faith of Christ" [Gal 2:16]. Contemporary exegetes tell us that this phrase, "the faith of Christ", is more probably a subjective rather than an objective genitive. That is, it means the faith or faithfulness of Jesus Christ rather than (our) faith in Christ.18 Therefore, believers are justified through and on the basis of Christ's faith. In this sense, Lutherans are certainly right to say that God alone effects faith (JD, #26) since Christ himself is the prototype of faith itself in his submission to the Father. Similarly, with reference to the human relationship with God, Catholics are also correct in seeing faith in God and good works going hand in hand, as demonstrated by the Rahnerian perspective set out in the previous paragraph.

Noteworthy also in the statement is the assertion "By the action of the Holy Spirit in Baptism, they are granted the gift of salvation." Rahner would argue that "membership in the Church is not only a means for the purpose of attaining salvation, but rather it receives its own meaning from baptism."19 Actually, the purpose of salvation is often achieved without the tangible intervention of the Church, though it is oriented towards her by God's command and will in history. Yet, in the concrete there is one thing that is not possible without the Church and sacraments, namely, "the grace of God in Christ ... present in the world as an event, as an ongoing event with historical tangibility and with incarnational corporeality."20 In other words, the meaning of baptism is better understood as making the baptized person a messenger of the word, a witness of the truth, and a representative of the grace of Christ in the world, which has already implicitly enjoyed God self-communication and love.

Moreover, the statement above is mainly confined to the Christian circle. If the logic of our foregoing discussion is acceptable, the unity of faith and work can also be applied to people not explicitly sharing our Christian expression of faith because God's self-communication is the constitution of every human being, who is always potentially capable of surrendering to the ineffable one in categorical values.

4. The Justified as Sinner (JD 4.4)

We confess together that in Baptism the Holy Spirit unites one with Christ, justifies, and truly renews the person. But the justified must all through life constantly look to God's unconditional justifying grace. They also are continuously exposed to the power of sin still pressing its attack (cf. Rom 6:12-14) and are not exempt from a life-long struggle against the contradiction to God within the selfish desires of the old Adam (cf. Gal 5:16; Rom 7:7-10). The justified also must ask God daily for forgiveness as in the Lord's Prayer (Mt 6:12; 1Jn 1:9), are ever again called to conversion and penance, and are ever again granted forgiveness.

As we have already noted, the human being is radically threatened by guilt, a constant possibility of saying "no" to God in one's attitude and action with reference to categorical values. The human being as person and subject is an evolving process, from the peripheral level to that deepest level which constitutes a person as such. In this process of life-long growth and struggle, one cannot, because of the influence of concupiscence,21 constantly respond absolutely to categorical values, which call upon one's personhood. In this sense, one remains a sinner though justified, but not in the definitive or final sense that only happens at the time of death. Since God's self-communication is the basic constitution of human being, so the Lutheran rightly emphasizes that, "despite sin, the Christian is no longer separated from God." (Joint Declaration, #29) When one turns to the ineffable one implied in one's actualizing of categorical values, one is forgiven, in the sense that one comes once again to harmony and congruence with one's fundamental constitution in transcendental freedom.

In the Catholic tradition, this call to conversion and penance is explicitly established in the sacrament of reconciliation, whose prototype and source is Jesus' unconditioned and irrevocable love and forgiveness towards us in the historic event of the cross. Now, this love and forgiveness are uttered through the Church and her representatives, an efficacious sign of God's tangible presence in history, and thus this utterance becomes an event again when an individual seeks this sacrament to be reconciled to the holy mystery, the human community and the world.

However, the latest statement by the Catholic Church (RCC #1, 2) openly expresses dissatisfaction over certain terminology used by the Lutheran churches and still appearing in the Joint Declaration; "The Justified as Sinner"(JD, 4.4), "Believers are totally righteous .... they remain also totally sinners"(JD, #29), "Opposition to God"(JD, #29).

The Catholic Church feels that these words seem to overlook or bypass the transformed and elevated reality experienced by the sinner in conversion, signified in the sacraments of Baptism and Reconciliation. On the other hand, the LTS commentary on JD, 4.4 expresses satisfaction that simul justus et peccator and its significance have been maintained.

Here we see clearly the two different emphases concerning justification and sin. While Catholics focus more on the objective effect of grace and sacraments, Lutherans focus more on subjective experience similar to that of St. Paul in Rom 7:17, 20. Thinking in terms of God's unity in word and action as explained above, and of the Father-children relationship resumed by grace, Catholics are more consistent in seeing human transformation through the Holy Spirit (Rom 8:14-17, Gal 4:4-7, RCC #7). Not denying this objective status and transformation by justification, however, the Lutheran tradition attains a very deep insight into the human and personal condition radically threatened by guilt, inherited by Luther from the experience of St. Paul, St. Augustine. This insight overcomes the somehow too one-sided and physical understanding of sin in the Catholic tradition as something from which to be cleansed, like dirt. It is still possible for any Christian to say a definite "no" to God, absolutely contradicting his own constitution, though this may not be transparent in his reflective consciousness and only disclosed at the time of death. Here, a common effort has to be made to clarify more the mutual understanding of the meaning of "concupiscence" and "ruled sin". Or, can the tension between "The Justified as Sinner" be resolved by the category of "already but not yet" as expounded by Vat. II in her self-understanding of the Church from the Catholic perspective?　

5. Law and Gospel (JD 4.5)

We confess together that persons are justified by faith in the Gospel "apart from works prescribed by the law" (Rom 3:28). Christ has fulfilled the law and by his death and resurrection has overcome it as a way to salvation. We also confess that God's commandments retain their validity for the justified and that Christ has by his teaching and example expressed God's will which is a standard for the conduct of the justified also.

The conflict between Law and Gospel seems not to have been tackled or explained very clearly in the Scripture. On the one hand, the Law, signified in the Ten Commandments, comes from God. It is God's utterance and thus, is a presence of the Logos. That is why Jesus reiterated, "Do not imagine that I have come to abolish the Law or the Prophets. I have come not to abolish but to complete them." (Mt 5:17) Here we do not see any antagonism between the two, Law and Gospel. The Gospel uttered by Jesus is nothing but the fulfillment of the Law. On the other hand, the conflict really does run through the ministry of Jesus, and later through that of Peter and of Paul, in their interaction with the Pharisees and Scribes, the advocates of the Law.

Therefore, the entry point for tackling this question is the interpretation of the Law. The Law is an expression of categorical values which govern human relationships with each other and with God. First, the Law is not the only such expression. Second, categorical values are not a self-enclosed system. If Rahner's reading is correct, the human arch-encounter with God has its Sitz im Leben in the encounter with categorical values."22 That is, values are within and thus discovered within an infinitive horizon, or within the ineffable one, who reveals himself to human beings in these values in concrete time and space. The philosophy of language helps us understand that, within different cultural horizons, words have different nuances in meaning and implication. This is no less true of statements of law. Therefore, law is not self-sufficient in itself. Rather, its meaning and application need to await the ever-greater horizon that comes forward in history. This is the horizon of love, signified and culminated in the historical person of Jesus, who is the Gospel itself.

This brings us to our next consideration. Law by its wording is nothing but a congealed form of categorical values revealed in definite time and space. What is congealed loses actual power and life. Then, the transcendental question arises, namely, what is the condition of possibility of recognizing and actualizing the relevant law in the concrete here and now? Without this condition of possibility, as St. Paul experienced, law merely serves as demand and accusation of my sins (Rom7:7-12). Therefore, as Rahner points out, the condition of this possibility is the self-communication of God. Only if one opens oneself to one's very constitution and mystery through a loving and personal relationship, whose prototype and destiny have already been revealed in Jesus Christ, can one can find life and power in fulfilling the law.23

6. Assurance of Salvation (JD 4.6)

We confess together that the faithful can rely on the mercy and promises of God. In spite of their own weakness and the manifold threats to their faith, on the strength of Christ's death and resurrection they can build on the effective promise of God's grace in Word and Sacrament and so be sure of this grace.

According to Rahner, a person can be sure of the grace of salvation because God's self-communication has already been granted to human beings as the constitution of their being. This assurance is even intensified and explicitly expressed in Jesus' Incarnation and Paschal mystery, cf. Jn 3:16. This historical event, as God's definite showing of forgiving love towards human beings, serves as an objective reference for our immediate but implicit knowledge of and love for God's self communication. Jesus' final resurrection and glorification by the Father makes him the finest exemplar of our destiny. In this sense, our individual salvation is sure.

However, Rahner reminds us that the human being is also inevitably threatened by guilt. A definitive "no" to God's self-communication and an absolute contradiction to one's own actual constitution as supernatural existential is still an open possibility for everyone. When the LTS commentary on JD 4.6 states that"Therefore every individual, not humanity in general, should look to God's salvation alone," the word"should" has already indicated that the person may not in fact turn to God for salvation even though objective assurance is granted. Of course, this saying "no" and the contradiction acted out in one's core freedom is never unambiguous during one's life. It is only fully disclosed at the time of one's death. Therefore, in Catholic realism, so far we can definitely say that God intends our salvation.

7. The Good Works of the Justified (JD 4.7)

We confess together that good works - a Christian life lived in faith, hope, and love - follow justification and are its fruits. When the justified live in Christ and act in the grace they receive, they bring forth, in biblical terms, good fruit.

Since Christians struggle against sin their entire lives, this consequence of justification is also for them an obligation they must fulfill. Thus both Jesus and the apostolic Scriptures admonish Christians to bring forth the works of love.

As long as one opens oneself up to God as supernatural existential, one is a justified person. As already noted, discovery of this 'given'24 opening to God occurs in pursuing greater knowledge or in actualizing the exigency of categorical values in the concrete world. In this sense, justification and doing good works happen together. The word follow' in the statement above seems not very accommodating because faith and good works do not appear in a temporal sequence,25 but occur simultaneously. On the other hand, if we take God's self-communication to be the very constitution of the human person as its formal cause, in this sense the wordfollow' is right to describe good works as an effect.

According to Rahner, the human being is a potentia obedientialis, in line with the scholastic description capax Dei. That is, the human being is potentially open to God and capable of reaching God. This is the constitution and destiny of the human being. However, the greatest potentiality cannot compare with the least actuality. If a person is not open to this potentiality, it does him or her no good. That is why St. James reiterates that faith without works is quite dead and useless. (Jms 2:14-26) From a Catholic point of view, the more one is conscientious in responding to the absolute demand of categorical value, the deeper one's core freedom develops, then the stronger yes' one is saying to God's self-communication, the more one's potentiality converts into actuality. In this sense, good works contribute to growth in grace."(JD, #38) This understanding is in line with the LTS commentary on JD, 4.7, which similarly recognized that "through good works one develops a constantly deeper relationship with God, much as the love of a husband and wife deepens throughout a marriage. Finally, the supernatural virtues, faith, hope and love, are inter-connected as a whole. (1Cor13:13)





    14. This understanding reflects a certain affinity with Platonic idealism, where the human lives as a fettered slave in a cave, the natural order. Liberation then comes when the other world of Ideas, the really real symbolized as the sun, is 'seen' by the person.

15. The LTS commentary on JD, 4.1, clearly expresses a feeling of disturbance towards the Catholic use of"cooperation", while The Response of The Catholic Church (#3)obviously affirms it again.

16. Enarrationes in Psalmos. PL 36, 845.

17. Cf. Dei Verbum #5.

18. MATERA, F.J. (1992). Galatians. (Daniel J. Harrington, S.J. (ED) Sacra Pagina, vol. 9). Collegeville, Minnesota. The Liturgical Press: A Michael Glazier Book. pP. 100-102. Six points are illustrated to prove this thesis.

19. RAHNER (1976). p. 416.

20. Ibid.

21. This understanding is linked to the Church's doctrine on Original Sin. As Rahner interprets it, we are people who must inevitably exercise our freedom subjectively in a situation which is co-determined by objectification of guilt, and indeed in such a way that this co-determination belongs to our situation permanently and inescapably. Taking the advantage of buying bananas at a low price may already involve one in the injustice and exploitation imposed on the banana pickers. Cf. Ibid. p. 110.

22. GLASER, J.W. (1969). Man's Existence: Supernatural Partnership. Theological Studies, Vol.30 (3). p. 482.

23. This thinking is in line with the LTS commentary on JD, 4.5, which states that "The Law reveals our need for the Gospel...Without the continuous demand of the Law we do not realize how necessary the Gospel is."

24. The use of the word 'given' is to emphasize that one's opening up is itself a grace of God in the first place.

25. A qualification is needed here that, if justification is by the faith of Christ, with subjective genitive as discussed above (p.17), a temporal sequence certainly makes sense because all of our justification comes from him.

D. Conclusion

In the foregoing lines, a dialectic is at work, trying to strike a delicate balance between God and human beings. Rahner's understanding of supernatural existential as his starting point for the theology of grace grants us a secure approach and foundation upon which to resolve the tension between the two. Not only is this understanding congruent with the traditional teaching of the Church; it also successfully infuses a spiritual and religious dimension into modern anthropology.

The doctrine of justification is the Pauline insight into the dialectic between Christology and Anthropology. First, salvation is not a second thought after the Fall. As St. Paul exhorts us, "Before the world was made, he chose us, chose us in Christ."(Eph 1:4). God created us for full communion with him through the Incarnated Logos. This understanding gives the biblical ground for Rahner's doctrine on God's self-communication as the capacitas Dei of the human being, who is now like God as person and subject. This capacity for transcendence, as the basic human constitution, leads to the other side of the coin, namely, freedom and responsibility in human destiny. However, freedom involves the possibility of saying "no", the absolute contradiction of one's own being. The actually sinful situation of the world forms the stage for the preparation, expression and final fulfillment of the Incarnated Logos in the whole salvation history.

Therefore, since the Christ event is the axis and pivot of history, the human being has nothing to boast about with reference to salvation because all the achievement, in openness towards the infinite horizon either of knowledge or of categorical values, comes from God, the uncreated grace itself. In response by faith to this call of grace mediated through categorical values, one becomes forgiven, righteous, and justified in God's sight, whether or not one has previously said "no". Yet, Rahner reminds us that we are not fully transparent in the reflexive process, concerning our definite response to this call of God. It is only revealed at the time of our death when we will take our final stance. So, in this sense, salvation is truly intended, but not fully assured as such. If this is so, this life must have something important and significant to contribute to our final stance towards God. Consequently, there comes the understanding of the potential sinner and good works, now in the context of Gospel rather than of Law. Work, expressed in response to the categorical and hierarchical values, renders one thematic in saying "yes" in the inner core of one's constitution as person and subject, where one's final stance is taken. The demand of works, however, should not come from the enforcement of Law which has no life or power, but from the recognition of the Gospel, namely, the love and invitation of Jesus Christ fully expressed in his life and Paschal Mystery.

In relating to the latest response on the JD from the Catholic Church and Lutheran circle, the effort of reaching the fusion of horizons for both sides is affirmed again, while recognizing honestly the want of full communion due to some substantial differences in understanding the doctrine of justification. If communion is the sign of deepest relationship, is that also a sign for us to reflect deeper on categories of relation in our ongoing theological discourse? The doctrine of justification is not the only doctrine of the Christian faith. Its significance should be illuminated by and related to other dogmas, especially the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. Contemporary re-focus on the dynamics between the immanent and economic Trinity contributes no little insight to ecclesiology, missiology and spirituality. Our God is a God-in-Relation, and so any doctrine of God should also be doctrine-in-relation. Therefore, the criterion and significance of the regula fidei (RCC. #2) need to be explored more deeply by both sides. Furthermore, the notion of sin should be viewed more from a relational perspective between God and human beings than as something "physical" or "material" as if some kind of dirt needed to be or could be wiped out. Forgiveness of sin is actually, not superficially, the wounded relation restored, where human beings become the genuine children of God again. Finally, in this context, the notion of imputation cannot but appear inadequate to describe the whole picture of justification, which grants human transformation and sanctification by God's grace.

As a model, Rahner's transcendental anthropology tries to find suitable categories to describe the relation between God and human beings for better insight and integration into our faith. As a whole, a thorough and well-grounded understanding of the doctrine of justification depends on a sound anthropology, in order to avoid any too one-sided bias, either on the powerlessness or on the merit of work by human beings in attaining salvation. I think the recent Joint Declaration has achieved a delicate balance, while a Rahnerian interpretation may even expand the vision. All this effort and achievement towards a better understanding of the doctrine of justification, and reconciliation between the two Churches can, once again, only be attributed to the grace of God.