作者：若干作者
作者：黄克镳
前 言
老子的道与若望福音的圣言颇有相似的地方，这曾引起不少学者的注意，如近日学者吴经熊便是把若望福音的开端译作「太初有道」。笔者相信，以若望的圣言与老子的道比较，能有助于从道家思想背景了解降生的圣言－－基督，是一种有意义的神学本地化尝试。近期神学界对本地化问题表现新的兴趣，纷纷探讨神学本地化的意义及应采取的路向。1 本地化的方法该是多元化的，但由于传统思想对中国文化有如此深远的影响，笔者认为基督宗教与儒、道、释等传统思想的对谈与融通，始终是神学本地化不可缺少的要素之一。
道是中国哲学思想的主要范畴，在老子以前，道一般指天道或人道，有规律或准则的意义。老子首先给予道形上学的意义，以道为万物的本体或本原。2 老子的道基本上具有对于宇宙（cosmological）及有关人生（anthropological）的两种意义，其宇宙意义表示道对宇宙生成及运行的作用，有关人生的意义表示道是人伦理行为及修养的准则。这两种作用彼此连贯，在《道德经》有平均的论述。
若望福音「圣言」的希腊原文是logos，如同道在中国哲学有特殊的地位，logos也是希腊哲学的重要观念，包含「言」和「理」的意思。若望的圣言主要是来自犹太圣经传统，但大概也受了希腊思想的影向。旧约圣经希腊文译本以logos翻译希伯来文的dabar；dabar有动态意义，除了「说话」的意思外，也包含行动和事迹等意义；「上主的话」表示祂启示的圆满。3 像老子的道，若望序言的圣言也具有对于宇宙和人类救恩的双重意义，4 但序言对圣言的宇宙性任务只是简略提及（若1:3, 10），却偏重于圣言对人类救恩的意义。福音本身更专注于降生的圣言有关启示和救恩的任务；序言所用的圣言一词，在福音中也不复出现了。
老子虽然讨论道的形上意义，但他真正关心的还是道对于人生的意义：道引导人成为「圣人」。本文的主旨在于从道家圣人的角度观看若望福音的基督，藉此展示基督容貌的一些道家风采。圣人的基本特点，如与道同体、归根复命、自然无为、柔弱不争等，都反映在基督身上。但因基督是圣言降生成人，而圣人是道的化身，为此也须讨论圣言和道的意义，对照两者的异同，格外比较道和圣言的宇宙性意义。在比较时遇到的困难是双方资料的不均衡，老子对道的宇宙性意义有深入的论述，而若望序言有关圣言这方面的描述却不多。但如下文显示，若望序言主要来自旧约智慧文学传统，因此，本文首先介绍若望序言与智慧文学的关系，以便在与道比较时可以引用智慧文学资料作补充。5
本文分为两部分，第一部分讨论和比较若望序言的圣言与老子道的异同，主要是关于两者对宇宙的意义。第二部分是从道家圣人的角度看若望福音的基督；在反思时专注于道和圣言对人生或人类救恩的意义。笔者的用意是描绘基督面容的一些东方色彩；具体来说，是要显示若望福音的基督带有的一些道家风格。6
1. 有关神学本地化不同路向的讨论，参阅杨熙楠编，《汉语神学刍议》，香港 汉语基督教文化研究所 2000；张春申，〈神学(灵修)本地化的回顾与前瞻〉，《神学年刊》 (n.21) 2000 1-17页；吴智勋，〈神学本地化的原则〉，《神思》 (n.47) 2000 1-21页；黄瑞俊，〈现代多元处境中的汉语基督神学：承载、转化和期待创造〉，《神学论集》（n.131） 2002 134-157页。
2. 参阅冯友兰，《中国哲学史》，增订本上册，台北 商务 1990 218页；有关「道」在中国哲学思想史的演变，参阅张立文编，《道》，台北 汉兴 1994。
3. 参阅Raymond E. Brown, The Gospel According to John (Anchor Bible 29) (Garden City, NY: Doubleday 1966) 520-521.
4. 参阅Thomas Tobin, "The Prologue of John and Hellenistic Jewish Speculation," The Catholic Biblical Quarterly 52 (1990) 257-261.
5. 张春申神父建议以「智慧基督论」作为基督论本地化的题材；参阅〈基督论本地化尝试〉，《神学论集》 (n.133) 2002 401-408页。有关若望福音序言与智慧文学的关系之探讨可视为「智慧基督论」的准备工夫。
6. 本文部分资料已以英语发表，参阅Joseph H. Wong, "Tao-Logos-Jesus: Lao Tzu, Philo and John Compared," in Roman Malek (ed.), The Chinese Face of Jesus Christ (MSMS 50) vol.1 (Sankt Augustin: Institut Monumenta Serica 2002) 87-125.
1. 若望福音的圣言与老子的道
1.1若望序言的圣言
圣经学者大都同意，若望采用了一首现成的「圣言诗歌」编写成福音的序言；但关于诗歌的思想背景却有不同的意见。7 这些意见大概可以分为两类：一.圣言诗歌属犹太圣经传统，特别是智慧文学传统；二.这诗歌来自希腊化犹太思想背景，格外是以亚历山大的斐洛（Philo of Alexandria, ca. 20B.C. - A.D.50）为代表的。若望的圣言诗歌显然是属于犹太智慧文学传统，但也有一些因素不是智慧文学可以解释的，其中主要是这首诗歌的主题－－圣言。按照智慧文学，智慧有时也称为圣言，但不会被圣言取代；若望序言却没有智慧一词，智慧被圣言代替了，这是智慧文学中找不到的例子。8 为此不少学者认为序言的诗歌来自希腊化犹太思想背景，并指出若望的圣言与斐洛的逻各斯（logos）有不少相似的地方。9
但犹太圣经传统，尤其智慧文学，本身已受到希腊文化的影向；晚期的《智慧篇》大概也是在亚历山大以希腊文写成的。10 为此布朗（Raymond Brown）认为旧约圣经传统应视为若望和斐洛思想的共同来源。11 因此，在探讨若望圣言的意义时，本文主要依据圣言与智慧文学的关系；需要时也引用斐洛有关逻各斯的思想作补充。
若望圣言与旧约智慧文学
与若望序言的圣言最接近的思想背景是犹太智慧文学，尤其是《箴言》，《德训篇》和《智慧篇》；以下是一些若望序言与智慧经书有较显着关连的章节。12 若望序言的开端说明「在起初已有圣言，圣言与天主同在」（若1:1）。智慧从起初便与天主同在这思想也可见于上述智慧经书；《箴言》载有以下美妙的「智慧颂」：
大地还没有形成以前，远自太古，从无始我已被立；深渊还没有存在，水泉还没有涌出以前，我已受生……当他建立高天时，我已在场。（箴8:23-27）
《德训篇》智慧自称在世界未有以前已受造：「起初，当世界未有以前，他就造了我，我永远不会消灭」（德24:14）。
若望序言第三节扼要地指出圣言对创造世界的角色：「万物是藉着他而造成的；凡受造的没有一样不是藉着他而造成的」（若1:3）。13 有关智慧创世的任务，《智慧篇》称智慧为「造万物的技师」：
所有或隐或明的事，我（撒罗满）都知道，因为教导我的，是造万物的技师－－智慧。（智7:21）
《智慧篇》又说:：「智慧与你同在，她洞悉你的工作；当你创造世界的时候，她已在场」（智9:9）。上文引述的《箴言》「智慧颂」也说明，当天主创造天地时，智慧「已在他身旁，充作技师」（箴8:30）。
若望序言继续描述圣言与世界和人类的关系，他进入世界﹕
他来到了自己的领域，自己的人却没有接受他。但是，凡接受他的，他给他们，即给那些信他名字的人权能，好成为天主的子女。（若1:11-12）
《箴言》指出智慧乐于亲近世人：智慧「欢跃于尘寰之间，乐与世人共处」（箴8:31）。智慧也遭到愚昧人的拒绝：「但是，我呼唤了，你们竟予以拒绝；我伸出了手，谁也没有理会」（箴1:24）。但那些接纳她的，智慧使他们成为天主的朋友：
她世世代代，进入圣善的灵魂，使他们成为天主的朋友和先知；因为，天主只爱那与智慧同居共处的人。（智7:27-28）
在序言的高潮，若望宣称「圣言成了血肉，寄居在我们中间」（若1:14）。降生奥迹是新约启示的精华，超出了旧约智慧文学。但有关智慧寓居于天主子民当中的观念，在《德训篇》也可以找到：
那造化我的，给我的帐幕指定了位置，说道：你要住在雅各伯那里，在以色列中建立产业，在我的选民中生根。（德24:12-13）
除了圣言降生的启示超越智慧文学外，还有以下两点也是智慧文学找不到的。若望序言称圣言为父的「独生者」（monogenes）（若1:14, 18）；智慧文学说智慧受造或受生于天主，但没有把「儿子」的名称加给智慧。斐洛却称逻各斯为天主的「首生者」（protogonos）或「长子」，这与若望序言更接近了。14 此外，序言第一节宣称「圣言就是天主」（kai theos en ho logos）；这也超越了旧约智慧文学。若望这里用的天主一词是没有冠词的，而「圣言与天主同在」的「天主」郄是有冠词的：“kai ho logos en pros ton theon”； 15 斐洛也有类似的语句，以没有冠词的天主用于逻各斯，却把有冠词的天主留给那「自有者」。16
最后，我们还须讨论智慧或圣言的位格问题。旧约的智慧表示天主的思想和德能，虽然智慧文学往往把智慧人格化，但事实上智慧仍是天主的属性，没有独立的位格。斐洛以逻各斯为天主的理智，包含了万物的「观念」；他也称逻各斯为天主的「长子」和「首席使者」，位居于天主与世界之间。但斐洛对于逻各斯的真正身份没有一贯的见解，表现模棱两可的立场。但可以说，斐洛继承了旧约把智慧人格化的趋向，并把这趋向带前了一步。17
及至若望序言，智慧或圣言位格化的过程便圆满完成。若望清楚地说明「圣言成了血肉，寄居在我们中间」，圣言成了一位具体的历史人物－－耶稣基督。因此，序言开端的证词：「在起初已有圣言，圣言与天主同在，圣言就是天主」，在降生奥迹的光照下也有了更明确的意义，这起初已有的圣言从永恒便具有独立的位格，因为降生奥迹与圣言位格的先存性（pre-existence）是连在一起的；若望序言是新约有关基督的先存性及降生奥迹最明确的见证。18
圣言的宇宙性意义－－创造与启示
若望圣言的宇宙性意义仅在序言简略提及，并未加以发挥。为此在讨论时，我们也引用了犹太智慧文学有关智慧与创造的资料。论及圣言对于创造的任务，序言说：「万物是藉着他而造成的」（若1:3）；又说：「世界原是藉他造成的」（若1:10）。首先要问，这「藉着他」（di'autou）一词有什么意义？圣言对于世界创造的角色在于什么？他可能是使万物生成的能力，或是天主创造世界时所按照的模型，又或包含了这双重任务；「藉着他」一词对以上几种解释都可以适用，19 表示创造时圣言是天主与世界之间的中介。
从智慧文学来看，智慧似乎兼有这两种任务。上主的智慧也称为「上主的神」，表示天主的德能，也是创造的能力。但智慧更普遍地表示世界所反映的秩序与和谐，这可见于《箴言》的「智慧颂」：
当他上使穹苍稳立，下使渊源固定时，当他为沧海划定界限，令水不要越境，给大地奠定基础时，我已在他身旁，充作技师。（箴8:28-30）20
智慧既是秩序与和谐的来源，为此在智慧文学往往被视为协助天主创造的「技师」（智7:21; 8:6）。《智慧篇》指出智慧洞悉天主的工作，在创造时她已在场，使天主的计划实现（智9:9）。前一节经文提及撒罗满受命按照「起初所预备的圣幕的式样（mimema）」，在耶路撒冷建造圣殿（智9:8）。这使人想起出谷纪所载，梅瑟受命按照在山上看到的模型建造会幕的情景（出26:30）。21 因此，《智慧篇》这经文（「智慧洞悉天主的工作……」）暗示智慧对于创造的任务，格外在于提供每一事物的模型。这思想在斐洛尤其显着，逻各斯是天主的「肖像」，同时也是人的理智和世界的「模型」。22
智慧不但是创造的能力，以及具有每一事物的模型，她也内在于万物，维持世界的秩序与和谐：智慧「是如此精纯能渗透深入一切……她世世代代，进入圣善的灵魂」（智7:24, 27）；「智慧施展威力，从地极直达地极，从容治理万物」（智8:1）。
这些也是若望的圣言有关创造的主要角色，天主藉着圣言创造万物，这圣言一面表达天主的思想，一面也说出每一事物的「名称」，即每一事物的本性；因此，圣言是万物的模型，万物是圣言的反映。23 但天主的话也是命令，能产生事实；在创造世界时祂一命即成。为此圣言也有能力的意思，是使一切事物存在的原因。综合来说，若望序言所说的「藉着他」兼有「模型因」(exemplary cause)及「动力因」(efficient cause) 这两种意义。此外，像智慧一般，圣言不但创造世界，他也进入这世界，并居住在我们中间，是内在于世界的。
智慧或圣言是无形天主的表达，具有启示的任务。为此《智慧篇》称智慧为「永远光明的反映，是天主德能的明镜，是天主美善的肖像」（智7:26）；反映、明镜、肖像等词都表明智慧是那看不见的天主的显示。这显示格外是藉着世界的创造实现，因此，人可以透过这世界的美善认识造物主；通过工程，认识工程师（智13:1）。24
若望的圣言也有启示的作用，言是思想的表达，当天主藉着圣言创造时，这言首先是天主的自我表达，是沉默的天主的自我流露；同时这言也说出每一事物的名字或本性。这样，万物是圣言的反映，而圣言是天主的自我表达，为此万物也是无形天主的显示。有关圣言启示的任务，若望序言不把重点放在世界的创造，却放在降生的圣言身上：「圣言成了血肉……我们看见了他的光荣（doxa），正如父独生者的光荣」（若1:14）。doxa是希伯来文kabod的译文，原来有具体的临在及自我显示的意思。25 在基督身上我们看见了父独生子的真实临现。
序言最后一节对启示的意思格外重要：「从来没有人见过天主，只有那在父怀里的独生者，身为天主的，他给我们详述了」（若1:18）。天主本身是隐晦不可见的，降生成人的独生子给我们启示了父，带来了新约启示的圆满。但父本身仍是不可见的，若望在福音中重复提出这犹太圣经的传统信念（若5:37; 6:46）。26 这信念特别来自天主对梅瑟求见祂的圣容时给予的回答：「你将看见我的背后，但我的面容却无法看见」（出33:23）。日后在最后晚餐，门徒也请求耶稣把父显示给他们，耶稣却回答说：「谁看见了我，就是看见了父」（若14:9）。这表示父本身仍是不可见的，但透过降生的圣言，门徒可以看见父的反映──父独生者的光荣。27 圣言启示父的过程以降生奥迹达于圆满，但在创造世界时，圣言已开始了启示的任务，创造便是天主自我启示的开端。在讨论启示时，我们已由圣言的宇宙性意义进入祂的救恩意义了。
1.2老子的道与若望圣言的异同
若望序言的圣言主要来自犹太智慧文学传统，与智慧的意义和作用相似，具有对于宇宙和人类救恩的意义。从圣言的宇宙意义看，万物是藉着他而造成的，这表示圣言是天主与世界之间的中介，是万物按照着受造的模型，也是使世界存在的能力。同时，这圣言是天主的话，表达天主的思想，透过世界的创造显示那看不见的天主；为此圣言的创造和启示之作用是连在一起的。
道是老子哲学的中心观念，老子的道含有多种意义，学者意见不一；但一般认为可以把道的意义归纳如下：道是形上的终极实体；使宇宙生成的动力；促使万物运动的规律；作为人伦理行为的准则。28 像若望圣言一般，老子的道具有对于宇宙和人生的意义。29 道的宇宙性意义是基于一项重要的预设：为了使宇宙万物生成，必须有一先于一切的总原理，即道的存在。
有、无与万物
如同圣言或智慧，道是万物生成的原因。《道德经》廿五章描述道的存在及与万物的关系：
有物混成，先天地生。寂兮寥兮，独立而不改，周行而不殆，可以为天地母。吾不知其名，强字之曰「道」，强为之名曰「大」。
这段文字概括了老子的宇宙生成论，说明道存在于一种浑朴或混沌不分的状态；静而无声，动而无形。在天地之先已存在，且是天地万物生成的原理，因此，「可以为天地母」。30 老子自认不知其名，王弼加以注释说：「名以定形。混成无形，不可得而定，故曰『不知其名』也。」31
《道德经》强调道是没有形体，不可见，及不可思议的：\视之不见，名曰「夷」；听之不闻，名曰「希」；搏之不得，名曰「微」。32此三者不可致诘，故混而为一。其上不曒，其下不昧，绳绳兮不可名，复归于无物。是谓无状之状，无象之象，是谓惚恍。（《道德经》十四章）
道是无色、无声、无形的，幽而不显，不是感官所能把握的；由于道超越我们的感官，它也是不可思议的，为此老子说它「不可致诘」。但这无形的道并非一无所有；这里所说的「无物」并不是指「空无所有」（nothingness），却是说道是没有形像，不具名相的实存体。33
老子强调道是无形、无名、不可见、不可知的。若望虽然也一再声明：「从来没有人见过天主」，但没有说天主是不可知的；因为降生的圣言给我们详述了。在这方面，斐洛似更接近老子，他不但指出天主是没有形体，不可见的；也强调天主是不可知，及不可名言的。斐洛大概是把这两个否定形容词套用在天主身上的第一人；34 可视为日后基督宗教「否定神学」传统的先声。
正如创造是天主的自我启示，无形的道也是透过造生万物把自己显示出来。智慧文学和若望序言说天主藉着智慧或圣言创造万物，指示智慧或圣言是天主与有形世界之间的中介，是天主创造的助手和工具。《道德经》却没有提及道藉着什么造生万物；但老子也在反思类似的问题，即那隐晦超越的道与现象世界彼此间关系的问题。《道德经》四十章载有老子关于宇宙生成的综合表达：「天下万物生于有，有生于无。」「有」便是「无」，或隐晦无形之道，与万物之间的中介。
学者一般同意，《道德经》第一章是全书的提纲挈领，格外讨论道为无、有的观念，及道与万物的关系：
道可道，非常道；名可名，非常名。
无，名天地之始；有，名万物之母。
《道德经》开始便声明，道是隐晦深远，不可名言的。王弼本关于本章第二句有不同的读法：「无名，天地之始；有名，万物之母。」前人多循王弼，以「无名」、「有名」作解；近日学者大多依从王安石，以「无」、「有」为读。35 但王弼虽以「无名」、「有名」分句，事实上也是以「无」、「有」解释「无名」、「有名」；36 因此，这两种不同的读法，意义上还是基本相同的。
如果我们采用王安石的分句，「无」、「有」便是道的两个不同的名称。本章的道是形上的实存之道，无、有是用来指称道的。无并不等于空无，许慎《说文解字》言：「无、丰也。」无即丰满的意思；但后来又被解作没有、空虚。老子的无兼有这两种意义；道的空虚是建于丰的基础上的。37 道是一种潜藏力，在未成为现实性时，它隐伏着了。这个幽隐末形之道不能为我们的感官所认识，所以老子用「无」来表示这不见其形之道。但这无形之道却充满无限的生命力，能产生天地万物；为此老子又用「有」来形容形上的道向下落实时，介乎无形质与有形质之间的一种状态。可见老子的「无」是蕴藏着无限生机和无限之「有」的。38 因此，《道德经》四十章说：「天下万物生于有，有生于无。」「有」便是「无」与万物之间的中介；道首先由无生有，然后再生成万物。这种过程与天主生圣言，然后藉着圣言创生万物的过程相似。
《道德经》第一章继续说：
故常无，欲以观其妙；常有，欲以观其徼。39 此两者，同出而异名，同谓之玄。玄之又玄，众妙之门。
意思是说：常处于「无」以观照道体之幽深精微；常处于「有」以观照道用之广大无边。「无」是道隐晦的本质；「有」是道透过万物的自我显示。「此两者，同出而异名」，无与有同出于道，代表道的不同两面：无是道之体，有是道之用；有、无异名，而道通为一。40 「玄」是指幽昧深远的意思，意味着无与有均属于形而上的层面。
「无」和「有」是道的两个不同的名称，更好说是道不同的两面。在造生万物时，道首先由无生有，然后再生成万物；道包含无和有，即隐晦和显示的两面。因此，若望的圣言不可以简单地比作道，道是更广泛的观念，可以含括圣言和隐晦的天主。圣言可比作「有」──道显示的一面；而看不见的天主却可以比作「无」──道隐晦的一面。如同天主藉着圣言把自己显示于万物，无也是透过有才展示于万物；因此，圣言或「有」同是天主或道与世界之间的中介。
德者道之舍
有、无代表道显与隐的两面，道和德却表示道的另一种相对特性：超越与内在。上文引述《道德经》廿五章有关道的描述：「寂兮寥兮，独立而不改。」这表现道的超越性；但这超越的道也内在于世界。老子以「德」表示内在于万物的道；德是《道德经》下半部的主题。就如道是天地万物所以生的总原理，德便是一物所以生的原理，《管子心术上》说：「德者道之舍，物得以生……故德者，得也」（《管子》卷十三）。德是道寓居于物者；管子以「得」解释「德」，德即是一物所得于道而成为该物的原理。41
《道德经》五十一章阐述道和德与万物的关系：
道之尊，德之贵，夫莫之命而常自然。故道生之，德畜之；长之育之；亭之毒之；养之覆之。生而不有，为而不恃，长而不宰，是谓玄德。
道使万物生成，德畜养万物，维持各物的本性。老子刻意显示德的母性：「长之育之；亭之毒之；养之覆之。」42 道与世界的关系格外表现于「夫莫之命而常自然」，道是无意识、无目的地造生万物，为此对于万物也不会发号施令，却保持自然无为的态度：「生而不有，为而不恃，长而不宰，是谓玄德。」这是老子对于无为的描述，他认为这是道最基本的属性。
天主的创造却是有目标和有计划的，祂藉着智慧或圣言创造万物，这智慧或圣言可视作万物的模型，世界反映智慧或圣言的秩序与和谐。转过来看，道创生万物虽是出于无心，顺任自然；但也依循恒常的规律，在各种变化中保持不变的常轨，可称为「常道」。道的常轨主要表现于万物的复归：「夫物芸芸，各复归其根。归根曰静，静曰复命。复命曰常，知常曰明」（《道德经》十六章）。归根复命是万物普遍而共同遵守的法则，万物既本始于道体的虚无，亦复归于道体的虚静。43 由道生成的世界不是没有秩序的，因为道的常规已自然地进入了天地万物，万物反映道的规律。因此，廿五章介绍宇宙生成论是这样结束的：「人法地，地法天，天法道，道法自然。」可见天地反映道的法则，人必须法地，法天，以便能法道；而道本身的法则在于自然。老子又说：「孔德之容，惟道是从」（《道德经》廿一章）。德既是一物得于道而成为其本性者，那么，每一事物都成了道的流露，按照各自的本性，在样态及运作中遵循于道及反映道的特性。44
道是既超越，亦内在的；德是道内在于万物，并以母性的关怀照顾、养育万物。同样，智慧也是内在于世界的，智慧「喜悦于尘寰之间，乐与世人共处」（箴8:31）；她「能渗透深入一切……进入圣善的灵魂」（智7:24, 27）。如同智慧一般，永恒的圣言也进入这世界，来到自己的领域，并居住在我们中间。因此，圣言和智慧也内在于万物，维持世界的秩序，使万物潜移默化，可以和「德」相提并论。
道的位格问题
在比较老子的道与若望的圣言时，其中关键性的一点是有关道的位格问题。若望的天主以及祂的圣言都是有位格的，老子的道是否也有位格？大部分学者会给予否定的答案，但笔者认为这问题是值得讨论的。《老子河上公注》是古代对于《道德经》的主要注释之一，河上公形容道具有人格的特征。他对《道德经》卅三章「强行者有志」一语有以下解释：「人能强力行善，则为有意于道，道亦有意于人。」45 河上公所撰的注释成为日后道教的主要经典之一；道教崇奉「道」为有位格的至高神明。
道的位格问题自然与创造的观念相连，一般认为道的创造是无意识、无目标的；与其说「创造」（creation），道的创生更接近新柏拉图哲学的「流生」（emanation） 。46 世界的生成既是道自然无为的结果，这无为的创生也影向道对于世界的基本态度：即「生而不有，为而不恃，长而不宰」的无为态度。老子以无为是道的主要特征，也以此为「圣人」必须向道学习的基本特性。
天主的创造却是有意识和有目标的，但问题是有意识和目标的行动是否必定是有为的？如果答案是肯定的话，那么圣人便难于取法道的无为。事实上无为应以自然为标准，行动处事合乎事物的本性，不强作妄为。依老子的看法，道虽然无心地造生万物，但万物却自然地遵循道的常轨，其中最重要的是「归根复命」。天主创造世界的目标也是愿意万物归根返本，以祂为归宿。万物既出自天主，也本能地归向天主。落叶归根，万物朝宗，这是发自本性，出于自然。天主创造的目标既与万物的本性符合，因此，有目标的创造也可以称自然无为。
这讨论把我们带回道的位格问题，老子最关注的是道无为的态度，他深恐位格及意识会损害这无为的特性，假如位格本身与无为没有抵触的话，相信老子也无意讨论道是否有位格的问题了；老子既以无为作为圣人的特征，这表示他相信无为与位格是可以共存的。由于道的玄奥深远，笔者认为道超越了有位格与无位格的范畴，可以称为「超位格的」（transpersonal）。「超位格」一词表示道享有属人格的基本要素，即具有意识，思维，和意志。人是有思想及意识的，假如说作为这思想及意识的根源之道，其本身却是没有意识和思想的；那是令人难于信服的。但「超位格」一词也指出道的超越性，表示道不是有限的个别存有，而是一切存有的根基；道是充塞天地，贯通寰宇，包罗万象的。
7.参阅C.H. Dodd, The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1953) 263-285; Brown, Gospel According to John, 519-524; Rudolf Schnackenburg, The Gospel According to St. John, vol. 1 (Freiburg: Herder 1968) 481-493; Tobin, "Prologue of John," 252-269.
8. Tobin, "Prologue of John," 254.
9. Dodd, Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel, 276-278; Tobin, "Prologue of John," 255-256.
10. 不少圣经学者同意，《智慧篇》大约于公元前一世纪的后半期，在埃及的亚历山大城以希腊文写成；参阅Addison Wright, "Wisdom," in Raymond E. Brown & Others (eds.), The New Jerome Biblical Commentary (London: G. Chapman 1989) 510.
11. Brown, Gospel According to John, 520-523.
12. 参阅Thomas Tobin, "Logos," in David N. Freedman (ed.), The Anchor Bible Dictionary, vol. 4 (New York: Doubleday 1992) 353-354.
13. 序言第十节也重复这思想：「世界原是藉他造成的。」
14. De Confusione Linguarum 28, 146; 14, 63; 以下简作Conf.；本文有关斐洛的引述取自Philo, vol. I-X, Loeb Classical Library, trans. F.G. Colson and G.H. Whitaker (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1929-1962).
15. 这表示圣言是天主，但有别于天主父：祂「与天主同在」，是父的「独生子」；参阅L. William Countryman, The Mystical Way in the Fourth Gospel: Crossing over into God, rev. ed. (Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press 1994) 16.
16. 参阅Dodd, Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel, 280.
17. 斐洛提出有关「人的双重创造」理论，认为在创1:27天主按自己的肖像造了「天上的人」，然后在创2:7天主以这「天上的人」为模型创造了「地上的人」﹛]De Opificio Mundi 46, 134-135；简作Op.）；斐洛说明逻各斯便是这「天上的人」，是没有形体的（Conf. 28, 146）。Thomas Tobin认为斐洛有关「天上的人」的观念把智慧或圣言位格化的过程带前了一步；参阅Thomas Tobin, The Creation of Man: Philo and the History of Intrepretation (Washington, DC: CBAA 1983) 58; id., "Prologue of John," 265-267.
18. 参阅James D.G. Dunn, Christology in the Making: A New Testament Inquiry into the Origins of the Doctrine of the Incarnation, 2nd ed. (London: SCM Press 1989) 213-250.
19. 参阅M.E. Boismard, St. John's Prologue (Westminster, MD: Newman 1957) 102-105.
20. 类似的思想可以见于《约伯传》:「惟独天主认识她的道路……当他划定风的重量，规定水的定量，厘定下雨的季节，规定雷电的路线时，他已见了她，讲述了她，立定了她，考察了她」（约28:23-27）。
21. 参阅David Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon (Anchor Bible 43) (Garden City, NY: Doubleday 1979) 203-205.
22. 参阅Op. 6, 24-25; Quis Rerum Divinarum Heres 48, 230-231.
23. 参阅Boismard, St. John's Prologue, 85.
24. 保禄在罗马书声明天主「那看不见的美善……都可凭他所造的万物，辨认洞察出来，以致人无可推诿」（罗1:20）。
25. 参阅Brown, Gospel According to John, 503-504.
26. 参阅Schnackenburg, Gospel According to St. John, vol. 1, 278.
27. 奥力振以基督比作出谷纪那盘石的裂缝，从那里梅瑟可以看见天主经过时的背后（出33:21-23）。参阅Origen, Commentary on the Song of Songs IV, 15; 见The Song of Songs: Commentary and Homilies, trans. R.P. Lawson (New York: Newman 1956) 250.
28. 参阅陈鼓应，《老子今注今译及评介》，台北 商务 1997 52页。唐君毅列举「老子言道六义」，参阅《中国哲学原论: 导论篇》，台北 学生书局 1974 348-365页。有关近日中国学者对老子的「道」的各种诠释，参阅刘笑敢，《老子》，台北 东大1997 184-198页。
29. 这一节讨论道对于宇宙的意义，本文第二部分将讨论道有关人生的意义。
30. 通行本作「天下母」，帛书甲、乙本均作「天地母」。
31. 袁保新编，《老子王弼注》，台北 金枫 1986 82页。
32. 河上公对此三句作以下注释：「无色曰夷，言一无采色，不可得视而见之。无声曰希，言一无音声，不可得听而闻之。无形曰微，言一无形体，不可搏持而得之。」见王卡，《老子道德经河上公章句》，北京 中华书局 1993 52页。
33. 「是谓无状之状，无象之象，是谓惚恍。」这几句话是描述「无物」并非真的一无所有，而是无状、无象而已。河上公解释「惚恍」为「若存若亡，不可见之也。」见王卡，《河上公章句》，54页。
34. 参阅John Dillon, The Middle Platonists: A Study of Platonism 80 B.C. to A.D. 220 (London: G. Duckworth 1977) 155.
35. 参阅高亨，《老子正诂》，台北 新文丰 1981 2页；高亨赞同梁启超之说，以「有」、「无」为读，并引四十章为证。也参阅陈鼓应，《老子今注今译》，48-49页。
36. 王弼注释此句说：「凡有皆始于无，故未形无名之时，则为万物之始。及其有形有名之时，则长之、育之、亭之、毒之，为其母也。」见袁保新编，《老子王弼注》，7页。
37. 参阅王清祥，《老子河上公注之研究》，台北 新文丰 1994 28页；有关「无」的观念和文字发展过程，参阅庞朴，「说无」，深圳大学国学研究所编，《中国文化与中国哲学》，北京 东方1986 62-74页。
38. 参阅陈鼓应，《老子今注今译》，5-6页。
39. 「常无欲以观其妙，常有欲以观其徼。」王弼以「无欲」、「有欲」为读。「无欲」还可以解通，但「有欲」却难于解释。如严灵峰说：「老子观物方法，以虚静为本……常常有欲之人，自难虚静，何能『观徼』？」；见陈鼓应，《老子今注今译》，50页。
40. 冯友兰引述《道德经》第一章时，也以「无」、「有」及「常无」、「常有」分句；并说明「道兼有无」：「道乃万物所以生之原理，与天地万物之为事物者不同。事物可名曰有；道非事物，只可谓为无。然道能生天地万物，故又可称为有。故道兼有无而言；无言其体，有言其用。」见冯友兰，《中国哲学史》，增订本上册，220页；也参阅冯友兰，《中国哲学史新编》，第二册， 台北 蓝灯 1991 46-49页。
41. 张岱年也以「得」释「德」，并说「德实即是一物之本性」；参阅张岱年，《中国哲学大纲》，北京 中国社科 1982 23-24页。
42. 「亭之毒之」：河上公本作「成之熟之」。但王淮指出「亭毒」有「滋养」之意；参阅王淮，《老子探义》，台北 商务 1969 204页。
43. 王淮注说：「常者，自然之常道，亦即道所运行之常轨，万物普遍而共同遵守之法则（自然律）是也」（《老子探义》，70页）。本文第二部分对这十六章将有更详细讨论。
44. 「孔德」，即「大德」之意；「容」，即「容貌」、「形容」之意；但高亨却说：「容，疑借为榕、动也。」参阅王淮，《老子探义》，88-89页。
45. 王卡，《河上公章句》，134页；参阅王清祥，《老子河上公注之研究》，36页。
46. 以下是有关柏罗丁（Plotinus, ca. 205-270）「流生」理论的扼要解释："This process of emanation is a process of 'overflowing', the potent simplicity of the One 'overflows' into Intellignece, and Intelligence overflows into Soul……Emanation is the One's unfolding its simplicity;" 见Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition: From Plato to Denys (Oxford: Clarendon 1981) 38.
2.从道家圣人看若望福音的基督
本文第一部分讨论了若望序言的圣言与老子道的异同，讨论的重点在于圣言与道的宇宙性意义。老子虽然探讨道的形上意义及其对宇宙的关系，但他主要关心的仍是道对于人生的意义，包括个人及社会层面。老子格外以「德」的观念表明道对人生的意义，德是一物所得于道而成为其本性者；在人来说，人由于「得道」、「体道」而成为「圣人」，为此圣人可视为道的化身或道的反映。在这第二部分，本文将描绘道家圣人的轮廓，然后以这圣人的素描与若望福音的基督对照。道家圣人的基本特性，如与道同体、归根复命、自然无为、柔弱不争等特点，也呈现在若望福音的基督身上；在比较时笔者也会指出基督与道家圣人主要不同的地方。
2.1道家圣人──道的化身
道家「圣人」也称为「真人」或「至人」，与儒家圣人不同，后者是道德型人物，主要在于修养仁义道德；道家圣人的特征却在于反朴归真、与道合一。老子一般以圣人为一国之君，或理想的统治者；但他也相信众人皆可能成为圣人。
与道同体
圣人的基本特色是善于观察道透过宇宙运作所表现的规律，并悉心遵循。这思想格外见于《道德经》廿五章下半部：
故道大，天大，地大，人亦大。域中有四大，而人居其一焉。人法地，地法天，天法道，道法自然。47
「道法自然」不是说道之上还有一个「自然」；若然，该是域中有五大了。「自然」乃是道的基本特性，天地的无不覆载，反映了道的无不生成；而道生万物是无目的，无私心的，一切顺任自然。圣人便是留心观察天地的运作，从中发现道的法则，并尽心遵从。
老子指示人必须通过法地、法天，才能法道，但这取法的意思不该仅限于外在或伦理行为的层面；老子所说的「法道」更包含「存有」（ontological）的意义，这种意义可从「抱一」、「得一」等词语看到。老子说：「是以圣人抱一为天下式」（《道德经》廿二章）。48「一」是道的别名，「抱一」即「抱道」；圣人若能「抱道」，意即与道合一，便能成为天下的表率。老子又有「得一」之说，并列举各种事物由于「得一」而达成其本性：
昔之得一者：天得一以清；地得一以宁；神得一以灵；谷得一以盈；万物得一以生；侯王得一以为天下正。（《道德经》卅九章）49
「得一」正好解释「德」的意义，「德」是一物得于道而达成其本性者。因此，天、地、神、谷、万物之所以能清、宁、灵、盈、生，各成其本性，是由于「得一」；侯王或圣人之所以能为天下之正长，亦是由于得道之故。「德者道之舍」，「得一」表示享有道的「寓居」之意。
老子又说：「故从事于道者，同于道」（《道德经》廿三章）。50 王弼注释说：道以无形无为成济万物，故从事于道者，以无为为君，不言为教……与道同体，故曰「同于道」。51
照王弼的意思，「同于道」不但指与道的规律配合，更包含与道合一，与道同体的存有意义。因此，透过「抱一」、「得一」、「同于道」等描述，老子的「圣人」可视为道的化身：圣人与道同体，在生活行事中表现道。
归根复命
为了「从事于道」，以及达致与道合一的境界，圣人必须观察道藉着天地运行所表现的规律，以便在生活中法道。《道德经》十六章提出「静观」的方法，这章对于了解圣人之道格外重要，前面已部分引述，现把全章载于下：
致虚极，守静笃。万物并作，吾以观复。夫物芸芸，各复归其根。归根曰静，静曰复命。复命曰常，知常曰明。不知常，妄作凶。知常容，容乃公，公乃王，王乃天，天乃道，道乃久，没身不殆。
本章虽然没有明言圣人，但末段「知常客……没身不殆」，描述圣人的特性，52 这特性尤其在于「知常」，「常」表示道在万物运动变化中所表现的不变规律；圣人为了要法道，便须认识道运行的常轨。为了达到「知常」，老子首先提出「致虚」、「守静」的修养工夫，务使心灵清净空明，然后能观照万物。53
「万物并作，吾以观复」；「复」即「反复」或「反本」，是万物活动的共同法则。王弼注曰：「凡有起于虚，动起于静，故万物虽并动作，卒复归于虚静。」54 修道之人其心灵所呈现的智慧，主要在于观照万物活动的共同法则──「复」；万物出有入无，既本始于道体之无，亦复归于道体之无。
「夫物芸芸，各复归其根。归根曰静，静曰复命。」「根」有两种意义，可以解作「本性」：「归根者，反本心之虚静也」。55「根」也可以解作万物的本源，即是道；56「归根」即复归于道体的虚无寂静。以上两种解释皆可说「归根曰静」。「静曰复命」的「命」也有两种意义，河上公把「复命」解作「复还性命」；以下是他对归根复命的注释：「言万物无不枯落，各复返其根而更生也……言安静者是为复还性命，使不死也。」57 但这「复命」的「命」也有「天命」或「使命」的意思，58 王淮案：「而万物之复归于道体（虚无）之活动，是乃完成道（自然造化）所赋予之使命。」59 我们也可以把「生命」和「天命」两种意思综合起来：当万物反本归根，回到道的虚静时，一面达到生存的归宿，完成道赋予的使命；一面也开始新的生命，即以个体的生命回归并融入自然的大生命中，如此生生不息。
「复命曰常，知常曰明」；「常」指自然之常道，亦即道在天地运行的常轨。归根复命是万物普遍而共同遵守的法则；万物由道而生，亦复归于道。圣人便是藉着观照万物而真正了解事物发展的必然之理。「明」是悟，或智慧；有此智慧便能一切顺乎自然，而不会妄求妄执。
自然无为
「自然无为」是老子哲学最重要的观念，「自然」的观念表示事物本身具有潜在性及可能性，应该顺任它自身的情状去发展，不必加上外界的力量去制约它。老子说：「人法地……道法自然。」所谓「道法自然」是说道以它自己的状况为依据，以它内在的原因决定了本身的存在和运作。「自然」一词即形容「自己如此」的一种状态，而「无为」的观念就是指顺其自然而不强作妄为的意思。因此，无为可说是自然的写状，自然与无为这两个名词是二而一的。60
老子以「无」作为道的本体，「无为」便是道运作的法则：「道常无为而无不为」（《道德经》卅七章）。这里「无为」是道之作用的属性，「无不为」是道之作用的效果；「无为而无不为」，即是说不强作妄为就没有什么事情做不成的。或如冯友兰指出：就其生万物说，道是「无不为」，就其无目的、无意识说，道是「无为」。61
无为既是道的特征，也该是圣人的标志。无为并不表示什么都不做，却表示静心观察道在万物运动变化中的轨迹，尊重每一事物受自道的特性及其发展程序，一切顺应自然而不加以人为的干预。老子提倡无为格外是为了针对统治者的有为，所谓「有为」是指统治者强作妄为，以致弄得民不聊生。老子说：「民之饥，以其上食税之多，是以饥；民之难治，以其上之有为，是以难治」（《道德经》七十五章）。为此老子呼吁为政者要实施无为之治：「是以圣人之治……为无为，则无不治」（《道德经》三章）。这无为之治主要在于以身作则：
故圣人云：「我无为，而民自化；我好静，而民自正；我无事，而民自富；我无欲，而民自朴。」（《道德经》五十七章）
上述「好静」、「无事」、「无欲」都是「无为」的内涵；「无欲」并不表示继绝一切欲望，却表示清心寡欲，淡泊有节的作风。
《道德经》第二章描述圣人无为的基本态度：
是以圣人处无为之事，行不言之教；万物作焉而不辞，生而不有，为而不恃，功成而弗居。夫唯弗居，是以不去。62
第十章也讨论圣人的无为，并作类似的描述：「明白四达，能无为乎？生之畜之。生而不有，为而不恃，长而不宰，是谓玄德。」63「不有」、「不恃」、「不宰」含义都是相通的，即要消解一己的占有欲，达到「无私」或「无我」的境界；这是无为的要旨。令人惊奇的是，老子在别处重复使用这段有关无为的写照，但把它贴合于道本身：「故道生之，德畜之……生而不有，为而不恃，长而不宰，是谓玄德」（《道德经》五十一章）。虽然有些学者怀疑第十章的文字是本章错简重出，应予以删除；但也有认为这两处的重复描述是有其用意的，64 这表示老子心目中，圣人是道的化身：圣人由于得道、抱道，及与道合一，因而在生活行事中反映道自然无为的特性。
「反者道之动，弱者道之用」
老子又提出与自然无为相关连的，道的另外两种特性：「反者道之动，弱者道之用」（《道德经》四十章）。这里先看「反者道之动」。老子的「反」字有两种用法：一作反，事物向相反方向运动；一作返，指事物返复循环的运动。65 老子把这两种意义融贯起来，如张岱年解释说：
事物由无有而发生，既发生乃渐充盈，进展以致于极盛，乃衰萎堕退而终于消亡；而终则有始，又有新事物发生。66
「反」的规律出现于自然界，道往往以有余补不足，保持平均调和的状态：「天之道，其犹张弓与？高者抑之，下者举之；有余者损之，不足者补之」（《道德经》七十七章）。这「反」的规律也应用于祸福的交替：「祸兮，福之所倚；福兮，祸之所伏」（《道德经》五十八章）。
自然现象依从「反」的法则，圣人深明此理，为此在生活中采取退隐及处下不争的途径，郄往往反而受到显扬；这并不表示老子教人欺诈的手段，却是描述事实的真相：
是以圣人抱一为天下式。不自见，故明；不自是，故彰；不自伐，故有功；不自矜，故能长。夫唯不争，故天下莫能与之争。（《道德经》廿二章）
老子也指出，圣人由于没有自私心，因而能达成自己的理想：「是以圣人后其身而身先；外其身而身存。非以其无私邪？故能成其私」（《道德经》七章）。
「弱者道之用」的意思其实已包含在「反者道之动」一句内，是一种具体的运用。弱的反面是强，一般人都爱好刚强胜于柔弱，却不知道刚强潜伏着的危险性：
人之生也柔弱，其死也坚强。草木之生也柔脆，其死也枯槁。故坚强者死之徒，柔弱者生之徒。是以兵强则灭，木强则折。（《道德经》七十六章）
老子柔弱的主张，主要是针对逞强的作为而提出的；逞强者刚愎自用，也就是老子所说的自矜、自伐、自是、自见、自彰，是构成各种纷争的原因。老子主张「柔弱胜刚强」（《道德经》卅六章），但他所推崇的柔弱不是通常所说的软弱无能的意思，却表示坚韧不克的性格，及自我控制的能力。67 老子以水为例，说明「柔之胜刚」：「天下莫柔弱于水，而攻坚强者莫之能胜」（《道德经》七十八章）。老子喜欢以水为喻，因为柔弱的水还具有居下不争，及利物的特性。
2.2若望福音的基督与道家圣人
若望福音序言带来了新约启示的高峰：「圣言成了血肉，寄居在我们中间」（若1:14）。这启示超越了斐洛的希腊化犹太思想，完成了旧约智慧文学将智慧或圣言位格化的过程。若望序言宣认圣言从永恒便享有独立的位格，是父的独生子，藉着降生成了历史中的具体人物；圣言的主要任务是藉着创造及降生奥迹启示天主。
在《道德经》也可以找到道降生成人的观念吗？老子描述的圣人可以称为「道的化身」，圣人得道、抱道、与道同体，在生活行事中反映道的特性；日后道教更以老子本人为道的「降生」，尊奉为神明。68 就可以说，道家圣人（道的化身）与圣言降生成人的基督，颇有相似的地方，可以互相对照。本文这部分将从道家圣人的角度讨论基督的复归与无为，柔弱胜刚强，以及基督与父同体的深刻经验；讨论时会同时指出基督与道家圣人相同及相异之处。
复归与无为
归根复命，自然无为，这些是道家圣人的主要特点。无为表示不随一己的私见，不强作妄为，却顺乎自然，遵从道赋予万物的共同法则；这法则在于归根复命，复归于道，为此无为与复归是连在一起的。这两种特点在基督身上格外显着，基督生平的基本心态在于舍弃自己的私意，悉心随从父的旨意，不断回归天父；这便是基督的无为与复归。
若望福音序言最后一节说：
从来没有人见过天主，只有那在父怀里的独生者，身为天主的，他给我们详述了。 （若1:18）
圣经学者波泰里（Ignace de la Potterie）指出，「在父怀里」的希腊原文“eis ton kolpon tou patros”含有动态意义，应译作「向着父怀」。同样，序言第一节说圣言「与天主同在」，原文是“pros ton theon”，也含有动态意义，应译作「向着天主」。69 如此，序言首尾呼应，清晰地把序言划分出来。这两句经文的意思是说，如同圣言从永恒便是在爱的对话中面向着父，在降生后，那在世生活的耶稣也藉着对父的服从与交付，不断归向父怀，这样启示了永恒中圣言与父的密切关系。70
由此看来，若望序言的最后一节不但是序言的结语，也表达了全部福音的主题。若望十三章开始最后晚餐的叙述时，也明显地提出这回归天父的主题：
在逾越节庆日前，耶稣知道他离此世归父的时辰已到……也知道自己是从天主来的，又要往天主那里去。（若13:1-3）71
在耶稣心灵的深处蕴藏着这种由父而来，又要回到父那里去的意识；祂与父的密切联系便是基于父是祂的根源与归宿的深刻意识。若望福音描述的基督「自我意识」，很可能受了圣史在基督复活的光照下所作神学反省的影向；但基督生前享有基本的自我意识，这是无可否认的。拉内（Karl Rahner）依据圣多玛斯的思想，认为「存有」（being）包含了内在的光明，即对其本身的意识；因此，圣言成了血肉的事实，以及对这事实的意识，是同一降生奥迹包含的不同两面。72 但拉内也指出基督的自我意识，如常人一般，也有其从隐含达至明显层面的发展过程。73
基督视祂的在世生活为父的派遣，祂称父为「派遣我来者」，而自称为「被父派遣者」。74 基督被派遣是为了完成父委托的使命，这使命的高潮称为祂的「时刻」（hora）；75这「时刻」包括基督要通过死亡与复活，从这世界回到父那里去的逾越奥迹。耶稣声明自己便是为了这「时刻」而到这世界上来（若12:27）。若望福音的基督不慬在祂生命的最后阶段，才显示对自己的根源与归宿的意识；在祂的传道生活中，尤其与犹太人争辩时，耶稣一再提出祂与父独一无二的密切关系，这成了祂与犹太人辩论的主题（参：若7:28-29; 8:23; 10:36）。
耶稣这种由父而来，又要回到父那里去的深刻意识，与道家复归的思想非常配合，圣人致虚守静，观察万物的运作，体验自己和万物都是由道生成，又要返归于道。老子称万物的复归为道的常轨，而圣人便是具有「知常」的智慧；基督回归天父的趋向正反映了这种智慧，但圣言既是父的「独生者」，因此，基督对于自己的根源──父，也有独特的深刻体验。
由于父是祂的根源与归宿，耶稣表露了对父的完全服属，这可由以下言论看到：「子不能由自己作什么，他看见父作什么，才能作什么；凡父所作的，子也照样作」（若5:19）。子不但作父托付的工程（若5:36），也传授父的教训（若7:16）；他所讲论的，都是依照他由父听来的（若8:26-28）。耶稣的生平可以综合于下面这句话：「我从天降下，不是为执行我的旨意，而是为执行派遣我来者的旨意」（若6:38）。耶稣在说话行事中不断忘却自己，而专注于天父的这种态度，与道家圣人的无为相似；无为格外表现于圣人的「无私」或「无我」，不求满足一己的欲望，只知一心「体道」、「应道」。
但耶稣与道家圣人之间也有重要不同的地方，按照老子的看法：「人法地……道法自然」；圣人观察万物，体认道透过天地万物的运作所表现的法则，而予以遵从。耶稣却体察父在救恩史中所表达对于世界的救恩计划，并作出回应。表面看来，父的救恩计划是「有为」的表现，与道的无为互相抵触。但道的自然无为并不表示世界是没有目标和规律的，却是说这目标和规律不是外来，而是内在于事物本身的：「夫物芸芸，各复归其根……」；道的法则已成了事物的本性。天主的救思意愿与此相似，天主既是人类和万物的根源，祂也愿意万物归根返源，回到祂那里，参与祂丰满及永恒的生命；因此，天主的救恩意愿正好反映万物归根复命的本性，是合乎自然无为的。
柔弱胜刚强
「反者道之动，弱者道之用」，这是圣人取法于道的另外两个特点；这「相反相成」及「柔弱不争」的特点可以由若望福音的一个特殊名词合并起来──「光荣」（doxa）。希腊文的doxa是希伯来文kabod的译文，在旧约中「上主的荣耀」表示天主临在可见的显示，天主特别藉着祂大能的作为把自己显示出来，这是若望福音使用「光荣」一词的背景。76 若望福音有关耶稣受光荣的言论与祂的「时刻」是连在一起的（若12:23,28; 13:32; 17:1）；布朗指出，耶稣的「时刻」包括了祂的苦难、死亡、和复活，为此耶稣受光荣也遍及这全部时刻。77
为了表明耶稣在十字架上受光荣的思想，若望用了以下希腊文动词：hypsothenai；这动词有双重意义：即「被举起」及「受举扬」（若3:14; 8:28; 12:32）。按照若望神学思想，十字架代表耶稣受举扬和受光荣的时刻；透过十字架这标记，谦抑与举扬，屈辱与光荣，死亡与复活等对立观念都被连贯起来，成了「相反相成」的。
除了表现「相反相成」的特点外，十字架的光荣胜利也是「柔弱胜刚强」的标记。被高举于十字架上是一种极度屈辱的「举扬」，是那被称为「犹太人的君王」的戏弄式登基礼。在十字架上耶稣被视为软弱无能的，但如同道家圣人一般，这表面上的软弱无能却包含了无比坚强的韧力，正是「柔弱胜刚强」的例证。耶稣曾声明：
谁也不能夺去我的性命，而是我甘心情愿舍掉它；我有权舍掉它，我也有权再取回它来：这是我由我父所接受的命令。（若10:18）
在最后晚餐临别赠言里耶稣也告诉门徒，这世界的首领就要来到，但他在自己身上一无所能；耶稣甘愿把自己交付在恶人手中，是为了服从父的旨意（若14:30-31）。78 耶稣也宣布：这世界的首领已被判断了（若16:11）；撒旦因着耶稣的死获得的短暂胜利，只能导致由基督复活带来的撒旦的最后失败。基督死而复活的逾越奥迹是显示圣人以柔弱胜刚强的最佳实例。
与父同体
按照若望福音，基督深刻意识到自己是由父而来，又要回到父那里去；这也是祂生命的历程。这种回归天父的描述可能使人以为耶稣在世时，与天父之间有一段距离；其实不然，在回归天父的历程中，耶稣同时体验到与天父密切的结合，可以称为一体的经验。在若望福音第十章耶稣作了以下重要宣言：「我与父原是一体」（若10:30）。在最后晚餐临别赠言里，耶稣以彼此寓居及行动一致解释祂与父的一体；当门徒要求耶稣把父显示给他们时，耶稣回答说：
谁看见了我，就是看见了父……你不信父在我内，我在父内吗？我对你们所说的话，不是凭我自己讲的；而是住在我内的父，作他自己的事业。（若14:9-10）
由这段经文可以得到两个结论：第一，基督与父的结合是这么密切，以致谁看见了祂，就是看见了父；这是基于祂与父的被此寓居。拉内认为全部基督论可以包括在对这句经文──「谁看见了我，就是看见了父」──的诠解。79 按照拉内有关「象征」的神学反思，基督──降生的圣言──是父的「实在象征」（real symbol），这「象征」使父在基督身上真实临现并确切地显示出来；因此，谁看见了祂，便是看见了父。80 第二，基督与父的一体不是静态，而是一种动态的关系；父是耶稣行动的来源，祂本人是行动的近因：「是住在我内的父，作他自己的事业。」
耶稣的行动可以解作服从父的旨意，或效法父的工作；但正如陶德（C.H. Dodd）指出，从更深的层面看，这不仅限于服从或效法父；终极来说，耶稣与父行动的一致是由于祂分享父的生命 81：「就如父是生命之源，照样他也使子成为生命之源」（若5:26）。在生命之粮的言论里，耶稣更说明祂与父拥有同一的生命：「就如那生活的父派遣了我，我因父而生活」（若6:57）；「因父（dia ton patera）而生活」一语有深入的意义，表示父是耶稣生命的根源，耶稣活的是父同一的生命。82
耶稣与父同体的经验可以跟道家圣人与道同体的经验相比，但耶稣的任务却超出了道家圣人的角色。圣人与道合一，成为众人与道合一的楷模，但其他人不必通过与圣人的关系才能与道合一。相反地，耶稣与父的关系不但构成耶稣与门徒，及门徒与父的关系之典范；门徒与基督的结合也是他们与父合一的根基：83
谁爱我，必遵守我的话，我父也必爱他，我们要到他那里去，并要在他那里作我们的住所。（若14:23）
假如门徒愿意参与基督与父的关系，享有父的寓居，便须爱慕基督，及遵守祂的话。基督是门徒通往父的道路：「我是道路、真理、生命，除非经过我，谁也不能到父那里去」（若14:6）。
耶稣以葡萄树的比喻解释祂与门徒一体的关系：「我是葡萄树，你们是枝条；那住在我内，我也住在他内的，他就结许多的果实」（若15:5）。84 枝条与树身分享同一的生命，枝条不可以脱离树身而生存。父既是基督的根源，我们也可以把这比喻引申，称父为葡萄树的根；这样，同一的生命来自父，通过基督，达到门徒身上。这种生命交流的程序可以从生命之粮的言论看到：
就如那生活的父派遣了我，我因父而生活；照样，那吃我的人，也要因我而生活。（若6:57）「因我（di'eme）而生活」与「因父而生活」彼此对称，表示基督是门徒生命的原理，正如父是基督生命的根源一般。85
若望福音序言已指出基督作中保的角色：「凡接受他的，他给他们，即给那些信他名字的人权能，好成为天主的子女」（若1:12）；86 信徒藉着信仰基督，从祂那里接受权能，使能在祂内成为天主的子女。87 道家圣人却不同，圣人是众人的楷模，但老子没有说明众人必须通过与圣人的关系才能与道合一；修道之人与道合一是直接的，不必通过圣人作中保。
基督负有中保的角色，但祂作中保的任务也能使人与天主直接地结合。拉内主张，由于基督是天主的「实在象征」，祂可以实施「直接中保」（mediation to immediacy）的作用。88 天父既然在基督身上真实临现，那么，基督便成了与天主会晤的圣事；当门徒与基督接触时，便能在祂内与天主直接契合。这种奇妙的「直接中保」是基于基督是降生的圣言，而「圣言便是天主」的事实；基督与天主同等的地位也可以由若望福音所载「我是」（ego eimi）的言论显示出来。89 这里读者也许要问，我们所作基督与道家圣人的比较是否需要更进一步，以基督与道本身相比？事实上，这进一步的比较看来是需要的，因为基督是圣言降生成人，而圣言可以与道为「有」的内涵相比。90
在基督与道家圣人之间还有一个重要的分别，在不断回归天父的历程中，耶稣常保持与父爱的对话。藉着救恩史，尤其透过天主与以色列民交往的过程，耶稣体察天父对于人类和世界的救恩计划，并对此计划作出回应。反过来看，按照学者的一般意见，道是没有位格的，91 也没有对于世界或人类的任何计划；道的特色是无心，一切顺任自然。道家圣人是藉着观察天地万物的运动，认识道的行径，然后悉心遵从。因此，圣人与道的关系，跟耶稣与父爱的交往有很大的差别；我们不能说圣人与道彼此间有位际的关系或爱的对话。虽然如此，老子描述圣人体道、应道，因而得道、抱道，享有与道同体的深刻体验；这种体验可称为神秘经验，92 与若望福音所记述耶稣与父同体的神秘经验，可以互相比美。
「位际模式」（personal model）与「一体模式」（unitive model）是用以描述我们与天主，或与「绝对存有」（Absolute Being）之关系的两种基本模式；老子采用一体模式，若望福音却同时采用这两种模式。在谈论耶稣与父的关系时，更显着的是位际模式：天主是耶稣的父及派遣者。在叙述门徒与基督或天父的关系时，位际模式也是较普遍采用的；这可见于若望福音对天主或基督的称呼，如父、主、救主、君王、师傅、牧者……等。但除了这些表达位格的称呼外，若望也以非位格的图像形容基督或天主，如生命、光明、气息、活水、葡萄树……等；这些图像表示门徒与耶稣及与天父之间有着一种一体性或参与性的关系。
上述两种模式不是被此排斥，却是相辅相成的。93 与位际模式同时使用时，一体模式更能表达天人合一，及天地一体的深刻经验。在静观天主这莫可名言的「奥秘」，或静观道为「无」及「天地根」时，一体范畴往往更易引人进入静默无言的神秘经验。
结语
若望福音与老子《道德经》这两本天书分别代表基督宗教启示的精华，及中国传统文化的宝藏，蕴涵着亘古常新，不会消逝的智慧，能向现代人提供合时的信息。在比较这两本经典时，本文重点在于从道家圣人的角度看若望福音的基督。但因圣人是道的化身，而基督是圣言降生成人，为此必须先讨论圣言和道的意义，以及比较两者的异同。本文指出圣言与道互相辉映，彼此引起深邃的共鸣。圣言是隐晦的天主的自我显示，这显示藉着创造及降生实现。道本身却包含了「无」与「有」，隐与显的两面，道为「无」与隐晦的天主相似，道为「有」却可以与圣言相比；在以圣言与道作比较时，这是必须留意的一点。
正如圣言与道为「有」相似，基督与道家圣人也可以互相比美。基督在世时不断归向天父，一心舍弃私意，忠于履行父委托的使命，这态度与圣人自然无为，归根复命的行径可以互相对照；基督在十字架上受举扬及受光荣，也反映了道家圣人以柔弱胜刚强的特点。再者，圣人得道、抱道，与道同体的一体经验，也跟基督与父同体的深刻体验彼此响应。就可以说，道家圣人的轮廓也呈现在若望福音的基督身上。
但基督与道家圣人也有不同的地方，其中主要区别在于历史幅度的问题。圣人是道的化身，是理想的典型人物；老子对圣人的描述虽然透露了一些个人的经验，但他笔下的圣人仍是超越时空的。基督却是一位具体的历史人物，祂的生平深刻地影向了人类历史。道家圣人可以作众人的导师与表率，基督却不但为人师表，更是通往父的道路，神人间的中保。还有，耶稣是透过天主在历史中的作为，体会父对世界的救恩计划，并作出回应；为此耶稣在世时常保持与天父亲密的位际关系。道家圣人却藉着静观天地万物，发现道运行的常轨，并悉心遵循；圣人与道的关系超越了位际范畴，可称为一体模式。
位际模式与一体模式在若望福音同时采用，两者是互相补足的。在与老子对谈时，圣人对于道为「天地根」，及天地一体的深刻体验，能助人更深入了解若望福音一体范畴的意义，体会门徒与基督的关系好比枝条与葡萄树，共同分享来自父的同一生命；因而门徒彼此间也息息相通，一起参与基督奥体的共融。
教会初期为了把基督的喜讯传播给外邦人，教父们作了很大的努力，把基督信息与当时希腊及罗马文化配合，绘制了一幅带有希腊和拉丁文化色彩的基督像。这画像在教会内一直沿用了二千年，今天教会历史已进入新的千年，教会也切盼把基督信息传给亚洲人民，尤其庞大的中华民族。神学本地化是当前急务，神学界务须描绘中国式的基督像，使人产生亲切感。本文试图展示若望福音的基督容貌带有的一些道家风格，深盼其他神学同工不但从道家思想角度，也从儒家及佛教思想背景，绘画中国式的基督画像。这画像该具有以下特色：一面保存圣经启示内容的完整，一面与中华文化韵合，使人看了引发内心的共鸣。
47. 王弼本作「王亦大」及「而王居其一焉」，但下文是「人法地……」；从上下文的脉络看来，两个「王」字均当改正为「人」；参阅陈鼓应，《老子今注今译》，150-151页。
48. 帛书甲、乙本均作「执一」，但意义与「抱一」差别不大。
49. 王弼本作「侯王得一以为天下贞」，今随帛书甲、乙本改作「天下正」，即「天下正长」之意。
50. 全句为：「故从事于道者，同于道；德者，同于德；失者，同于失。」高亨怀疑「失」字是「天」的误字，当改作「天」，谓从事于天者，同于天；见高亨，《老子正诂》，57页。
51. 袁保新，《老子王弼注》，76页。
52. 本段意为：「懂得常道，就能包容一切；能包容一切，就能公正无私；能公正无私，就能为天下王；能为天下王，就能与天通；能与天通，就能合乎道；能合乎道，就能长治久安；这样，就终身没有危殆」；见黄钊，《帛书老子校注析》，台北 学生书局1991 83-84页。
53. 老子也把心灵比作镜子：「涤除玄览，能无疪乎？」（《道德经》十章）。高亨说：「『览』『鉴』古通用……玄鉴者，内心之光明，为形而上之镜，能照察事物，故谓之玄鉴」；见高亨，《老子正诂》，24页。
54. 袁保新，《老子王弼注》，49页。
55. 这句话出自范应元；见陈鼓应，《老子今注今译》，112页。
56. 老子也称道为「天地根」（《道德经》六章）。福永光司指出老子复归思想的特色所在，是承认现象万物之根源有个本体之道的永恒不灭；即是说，一切万物就其自身而言，虽是有限不完全，但其存在之根源，却是稳踏着无限而完全的道；见陈鼓应，《老子今注今译》，113页。
57. 王卡，《河上公章句》，62-63页。
58. 吴经熊，陈荣捷，及林语堂均把「复命」的「命」译作“destiny”；见John C.H. Wu, trans., Lao Tzu: Tao Teh Ching (Boston: Shambhala 1989) 33; Wing-tsit Chan, The Way of Lao Tzu (Tao-te Ching) (New York: Macmillan 1963) 128; 林语堂译，《老子的智慧》，上册，台北，正中书局 1994 277页。
59. 王淮，《老子探义》，70页。
60. 有关老子思想的「自然」、「无为」的详细分析及讨论，参阅刘笑敢，「第三章──自然：老子思想的中心价值」；「第四章──无为：老子思想的原则性方法」，《老子》，68-103页，105-145页。
61. 参阅冯友兰，《中国哲学史新编》，第二册，55-56页。
62. 福永光司对老子的无为有恰当的解释：「老子的无为，乃是不恣意行事，不孜孜营私，以舍弃一己的一切心思计虑，一依天地自然的理法而行的意思」；见陈鼓应，《老子今注今译》，57页。
63. 王弼本作「能无为乎？」，河上公本及多种古本作「能无知乎？」；但下文「……生而不有，为而不恃，长而不宰」，与「无为」的意思更配合。
64. 第十章这段文字在帛书甲本残缺，但乙本却载有「生之畜之生而弗有长而弗宰也……」等文字；再者，第二章的文字一般没人置疑，但在形容圣人无为时也用了五十一章有关道的描述。
65. 返复循环的意思除了见于十六章「吾以观复」外，也见于廿五章：「吾不知其名……强为之名曰大。大曰逝，逝曰远，远曰反。」
66. 老子的「反」一般指「反复」：「事物在一方向上演变，达到极度，无可再进，则必一变而为其反面，如是不已。」因此，「反」既指相反方向，也有往复循环的意思；参阅张岱年，《中国哲学大纲》，101页。
67. 如「胜人者有力，自胜者强」，（《道德经》卅三章）；「守柔曰强」，（《道德经》五十二章）。
68. 参阅袁步佳，《老子与基督》，北京 中国社科 1997 27-29页；作者提出老子笔下「圣人」之谜，认为「圣人」是「大道在人间的化身」，与基督是圣言降生成人可以互相比美。有关道教以老子为道的「降生」的思想参阅Livia Kohn, "Embodiment and Transcendence in Medieval Taoism, " in R. Malek (ed.), The Chinese Face of Jesus Christ, 77-83.
69. Ignace de la Potterie, La v＿it?dans Saint Jean, vol. I (Rome: Biblical Institute 1977) 228; 参阅Francis J. Moloney, The Gospel of John, (Sacra Pagina Series IV) (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press 1998) 42; 作者说："It is often denied that in the koin蜌憯[?Greek of the New Testament the preposition pros followed by the accusative retained this idea of 'motion toward.' The intimacy of the overall context must determine what is possible, however much the Greek of the time have lost some of these nuances."
70. de la Potterie, La v＿it?dans Saint Jean, vol. I, 228-239; Moloney, Gospel of John, 46-47.
71. 在临别赠言里耶稣也说明祂与父的这种关系：「我出自父，来到了世界上；我又离开世界，往父那里去」（若16:28）。
72. 参阅Karl Rahner, "Dogmatic Reflections on the Knowledge and Self-Consciousness of Christ," in Theological Investigations, vol. V (New York: Seabury 1966) 205-208.
73. 仝上，210-215页；参阅黄克镳，〈卡拉内论基督的意识〉，《神学年刊》（n.7），1983 3-20页。
74. 耶稣自称被父派遣，为了完成父委托的工程，这思想遍见于若望福音；参阅Francis J. Moloney, "Johannine Theology," in New Jerome Biblical Commentary, 1420.
75. 有关若望福音「时刻」（hora）的观念，参阅Brwon, Gospel According to John, 517-518。
76. 仝上，503页。
77. 仝上，504页。
78. 在受审判时耶稣也向比拉多声明：「若不是由上赐给你，你对我什么权柄也没有」（若19:11）。
79. Karl Rahner, "The Theology of the Symbol," in Theological Investigations, vol. IV (New York: Seabury 1966) 237.
80. 仝上，237-240页；拉内所创「实在象征」一词有深入的意义，这种象征能使被表征的事物真实临在，并显示出来。有关拉内「实在象征」的形上理论基础参阅Joseph H. Wong, Logos-Symbol in the Christology of Karl Rahner (Rome: LAS 1984) 75-82.
81. C.H. Dodd, Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel, 194.
82. 参阅Brown, Gospel According to John, 283. 布朗指出，"dia ton patera"并不表示「为了父的缘故」，而是说「藉着父」而生活，意即父是耶稣的生命之根源。
83. 参阅Dodd, Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel, 195.
84. 门徒与耶稣的彼此寓居反映了耶稣与父的彼此寓居。
85. 以门徒与基督的关系比作基督与父的关系也见于善牧的比喻：「我认识我的羊，我的羊也认识我，正如父认识我，我也认识父一样」（若10:14-15）。
86. 不少学者认为这节经文是若望序言的中心信息，圣言降生成人格外是为了使人参与祂作儿子的身份，成为天父的子女；参阅Bruno Barnhart, The Good Wine: Reading John from the Center (New York: Paulist 1993) 293-295.
87. 斐洛的逻各斯也有中保的任务，逻各斯是天主的「首生者」，谁若愿意成为天主的子女，可以先成为逻各斯的子女；参阅conf. 28, 146-147.
88. 有关「实在象征」的中介作用，拉内有以下言论："For the true and proper symbol, being an intrinsic moment of the thing itself has a function of mediation which is not at all opposed in reality to the immediacy of what is meant by it, but is a mediation to immediacy" ("Theology of Symbol," 244)。拉内认为复活基督的中保作用能使我们与天主直接会晤（mediation to immediacy）；参阅Karl Rahner, "Dogmatic Questions on Easter," ibid, 131-133.
89. 若望福音所载基督的「我是」言论可分两种：没有宾语的及有宾语的，那些没有宾语或独立的「我是」言论是用来表达天主在基督身上的自我启示；那些有宾语的「我是」言论却是为了显示基督的救恩意义的，如：「我是生命之粮」（6:51）；「我是世界之光」（8:12）；参阅Moloney, "Johannine Theology," 1423-24.
90. 这里可以看到「道的化身」与「圣言降生」的意义不尽相同；假如老子认为众人皆可能成为圣人－－道的化身，按照若望的见证，唯独耶稣基督是圣言的降生：基督是父的「独生子」（若1:14, 18），其他人是通过祂才成为天主的子女（若 1:12）。
91. 在讨论道的位格问题时，笔者提出道是「超位格的」（transpersonal）；见本文第一部分。
92. Harvey Egan 对于「神秘主义」有恰当的描述：Mysticism is "the universal thrust of the human spirit for experiential union with the Absolute and the theory of that union"; 参阅Harvey Egan, What Are They Saying About Mysticism? (New York: Paulist Press 1982) 3. 有关老子及庄子的神秘思想参阅Livia Kohn, Early Chinese Mysticism: Philosophy and Soteriology in the Taoist Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 1992) 4-9.
93. 有关「位际模式」与「一体模式」在神学及灵修上彼此补足的性质参阅张春申，《中国灵修刍议》，台中 光启 1978 142-161页。1
作者：周景勋
绪 论
荀子谈「性恶」的资料内容可以从《性恶篇》中完全透射出来，故吾人欲研究荀子的性恶论，必须深切地精读《性恶篇》，才能体味荀子性恶论的内涵要旨。再者，荀子在谈论「性恶」之外，也常单独地讲论「性」的内容本质，这些内容遍及各篇，如《荣辱篇》、《礼论篇》、《不苟篇》、《正名篇》、《天论篇》等，吾人亦不可以忽略，然而，只是当作参考资料，或作为资料之根据之用。
吾人在介绍荀子性恶论时，先将《性恶篇》的结构，分段说明，找出荀子谈性恶的内容、根据、和目标；然后再将荀子对「性」的看法，及将性与情与欲的相连关系说明、分析荀子面对经验反省及他对当时现实生活的看法，再谈性伪之分，好能给荀子性恶论作一个简单的综合说明，这也是性恶论的论证。由性恶论的论证上看到荀子强调「化性起伪」，而了解他提出性恶论乃一个警世的思想，要求人不断强加「矫饰」，也因明礼义而得到「扰化」，是一条由「恶」向「善」的通路，好使人离恶行善，通神明，参天地。
《性恶篇》的结构
荀子在《性恶篇》的开始，便立刻给了一个肯定：「人之性恶，其善者伪也。」
这个肯定实在是一个大胆的断论，也是对「善」的一个判断。倘若说，荀子开宗明言是以「破题」的方法来作肯定，却没有「前题」加以引发；故，不如说，荀子将《性恶篇》之结语的肯定提前放在文章的开始，作为标题，然后按部就班地找出论证，一一作解释和说明。1
吾人分析《性恶篇》的内容，可清楚找出荀子以同一的手法，用不同的论证来说明：「人之性恶，其善者伪也」。
吾人将全篇的论证分作九段，每一段都以同一的肯定作为结论：「用此观之，然则人之性恶明矣，其善者伪也。」
荀子每次作结论时，都要找出具体的理由，以配合自己的主论和给予理想化的肯定；否则，他不可能说：人的性恶「明」矣！
现简析荀子言性恶的理由于下：
1. 《性恶篇》的第一段言
今人之性，生而有好利焉，顺是故争夺生，而辞让亡焉。生而有疾恶焉，顺是故残贼生，而忠信亡焉。生而有耳目之欲，有好声色焉，顺是故淫乱生，而礼义文理亡焉。然则从人之性，顺人之情，必出于争夺，合于犯分乱理，而归于（暴）；故必将有师法之化，礼义之道，然后出于辞让，合于文理，而归于治。用此观之，然则人之性恶明矣，其善者伪也。
荀子举凡：今人之性，生而有：「好利、疾恶、耳目之欲和好声色」等生活现象，以顺之则「争夺、残贼、淫乱」生，而「辞让、忠信、礼义文理」亡，而归于暴。因而提出了「师法之化、礼义之道」，作为「化性」之用，使人不致顺性之恶而行，便能归于治。荀子没有假设人之性有力量「生而不顺」的可能性，因他乃针对当时社会的现象，以及他对「人性」的体验而立论，认为人性顺于「好利、疾恶、耳目之欲和好声色」乃自然的倾向，于是他以自己心中的理想去评定现实的「恶」。唐君毅说得好：
礼义文理善，则性必不善而为恶；礼义文理为理想，性则为其所转化之现实；唯因理想之善，方见现实之恶。此非孤立此性，而言其为恶，乃就人之顺性，必使礼义理不存，方谓性为恶也。2
可见，荀子实在是以自我心目中的善的理想与现实恶的现象作一个比较，才作出第一次立论。
2. 《性恶篇》的第二段言
故枸木必将待檃栝烝矫然后直；钝金必将待砻厉然后利；今人之性恶，必将待师法然后正，得礼义然后治。今人无师法，则偏险而不正；无礼义，则悖乱而不治。古者圣王以人之性恶，以为偏险而不正，悖乱而不治，是以为之起礼义、制法度，以矫饰人之情性而正之，以扰化人之情性而导之也。使皆出于治，合于道也。今之人、化师法、积文学，道礼义者为君子，纵性情，安恣睢，而违礼义者，为小人。用此观之，然则人之性恶明矣，其善者伪也。
荀子在第二段中，再承上的理想而指出师法能正恶之性，礼义能治恶之性，犹似古圣王之作为。故起礼义、制法度的原因在于矫正和化导人之「恶之性」，目的就是能治和合于道。于是荀子用枸木之曲而不直，及纯金不利之实例说人性之恶偏险悖乱而不正不治；更用君子小人之比较，反映出人性一也，如《荣辱篇》所言：「材性知能，君子小人一也。」其不同者在于君子为「化师法、积文学，道礼义者」，故去恶；小人则为「纵性情，安恣睢而达礼义者」，故恶之性存，而没有君子之善，《不苟篇》曰：「君子，小人之反也。」由此可见：人之性乃恶，其善者乃后天之教化而改之也。
3. 《性恶篇》第三段言
孟子曰：「人之学者，其性善。」曰：是不然：是不及知人之性，而不察乎人之性伪之分者也。凡性者，天之就也，不可学，不可事。礼义者，圣人之所生也，人之所学而能，所事而成者也。不可学、不可事，而在人者，谓之性；可学而能，可事而成之在人者，谓之伪，是性伪之分也。今人之性，目可以见，耳可以听。夫可以见之明不离目，可以听之聪不离耳；目明而耳聪，不可学明矣。孟子曰：「今人之性善，将皆失丧其性故也。」曰：若是则过矣；今人之性，生而离其朴，离其资，必失而丧之。用此观之，然则人之性恶明矣。
荀子常常以自己的理想思想作为跟别人比较的方法，他自己很注重「学」，且作《劝学篇》，故将自己的思想套在孟子身上：「人之学者，其性善」；当然孟子也谈「学」，然在性善上则不重「学」，且这句话在《孟子》书中是没有的，荀子在于批评孟子之说，而提出反面的论调：人因为性善而学；不如说：人的性乃恶，故需要「学」，以为善。故荀子很清楚的评说：「是不及知人之性，而不察乎人之性伪之分者也。」于是便给性与伪下定义：「凡性者，天之就也，不可学不可事。」又「不可学不可事，而在人者，谓之性。」也就如《正名篇》所言：「生之所以然者谓之性。」荀子之言性，实在是「生即性也」；由此，荀子便肯定目明耳聪乃天性，不假于学，学乃在于人有恶之性，始需师法以治；藉此以反驳孟子说恶乃人之本性之善失而变成的－－因为人若是性善，任其自然发展，当能不离其质与材，然今之人，不但一天一天离其「质」与「材」，而至于残贼淫乱，这便显易而见：「人之性恶明矣」。（笔者按：在这一段中，荀子没有说：「其善者伪也」，究竟是漏了没写，抑或是故意不写，吾人没有考据，只是惊奇荀子在其他八段中，都强调而言之，惟有这一段没写，是否荀子不排斥性善之可能，只不过在他的经验中，所看到与所接触到的，加上与他的理想之配合，认为性恶较性善之说较确实吧！）
4. 《性恶篇》第四段言
所谓性善者，不离其朴而美之，不离其资而利之也；使夫资朴之于美，心意之于善，若夫可以见之明不离目，可以听之聪不离耳。故曰：目明而耳聪也。今人之性，饥而欲饱，寒而欲暖，劳而欲休，此人之情性也。今人饥，见长而不敢先食者，将有所让也；劳而不敢求息者，将有所代也。夫子之让乎父，弟之让乎兄；子之代乎父，弟之代乎兄；－－此二行者，皆反于性而悖于情也；然而孝子之道，礼义之文理也。故顺情性则不辞让矣，辞让则悖于情性矣。用此观之，然则人之性恶明矣，其善者伪也。
这一段乃荀子连接第三段的内容，以反驳孟子性善之说，再以「饥而欲饱，寒而欲暖，劳而欲休」－－ 人之常情，与辞让有着相背且反于性的矛盾，故「今人饥，见长而不敢先食者，将有所让也；劳而不敢求息者，将有所代也。夫子之让乎父、弟之让乎兄……」实在是「反乎性而悖于情也」。由此可见：「饥而欲饱……」乃人之常情，没有善恶之分，乃天生自然的需要；荀子之言性恶，在于「顺情性则不辞让，辞让则悖情性」，在这个矛盾互反的关系中，荀子经验到人之性恶在于顺之而为，实在与第一段中所言：「今人之性，生而有好利焉……」是互相呼应的，故言性恶是也。
5. 《性恶篇》第五段言
问者曰：「人之性恶，则礼义恶生？」应之曰：凡礼义者，是生于圣人之伪，非故生于人之性也。故陶人埏埴而为器，然则器生于工人之伪，非故生于人之性也。故工人斲木而成器，然则器生于工人之伪，非故生于人之性也。圣人积思虑，习伪故，以生礼义而起法度，然则礼义法度者，是生于圣人之伪，非故生于人之性也。若夫目好色，耳好声，口好味，心好利，骨体肤理好愉佚，是皆生于人之情性者也；感而自然，不待事而后生之者也。夫感而不能然，必且待事而后然者谓之生于伪。是性伪之所生，其不同之征也。故圣人化性而起伪，伪起而生礼义，礼义生而制法度；然则礼义法度者，是圣人之所生也，故圣人之所以同于众其不异于众者，性也；所以异而过众者，伪也。夫好利而欲得者，此人之情性也。假之人有弟兄相拂夺矣；且化礼义之文理，若是则让乎国人矣。故顺情性则弟兄争矣，化礼义则让乎国人矣。
凡人之欲为善者，为性恶也。夫薄愿厚，恶愿美，狭愿广，贫愿富，贱愿贵，苟无之中者，必求于外；故富而不愿财，贵而不愿执，苟有之中者，必不及于外。用此观之，人之欲善者，为性恶也。今人之性，固无礼义，故强学而求有之也；性不知礼义，故思虑而求知之也。然则生而已，则人无礼义，不知礼义。人无礼义则乱，不知礼义则悖。然则生而已，则悖乱在己。用此观之，人之性恶明矣，其善者伪也。
这一段乃荀子面对别人关于「性恶与礼义的关系」的质询作回答。他的回答依然是以经验的实例作出发点，如陶匠以黏土制造陶器，及本匠以木块制成木器，都非生于人之性使然，而是陶匠、木匠后天学习其艺而懂其方法而制成的；荀子藉此实例推论礼义之成亦由人所制造的，而非人性而有的。原则是谁可以创制礼义法度呢？荀子推以「圣人」为之；其目的何在呢？用以「化性」。为什么要「化性」呢？为荀子来说，因「性恶」故，所以必须化之；因必须化改性恶而为善，圣人便「积思虑，习伪故。」（梁启雄案：广雅释诂：故，事也。）而且，圣人之性乃与众人同，其异于众之处在于能「起伪」－－从习思中找出方法以改造人性，变化人性，而礼义法制因之而兴起。可是，荀子没有反省到：制造陶器与木器，以及改造人性而兴起礼义法制，在性质上不同，而且层面上也不同，一为实用层面，另一为心性层面；荀子只以经验的观察说出的结论，再加上自我的理想要求，便作出判断：顺之者悖乱之故也。更以「凡人之欲为善者，为性恶也」的说法来肯定「性恶」，其根据理由是一般人的欲性：「薄愿厚，恶愿美，狭愿广，贫愿富，贼愿贵，苟无之中者，必求于外……人之欲为善者，为性恶也。」由这个肯定看来，荀子实在有些诡辩之强辞夺理。反言之，因为人之欲为善，可以证明人之初，有本善之性，才愿为善也。这与第一段所言：「今人之性，生而有好利焉，顺是故争夺生……生而有疾恶焉，顺是故残贼生……」有出入之处，有矛盾之处。吾人若将其改写：「今人之性，生而有欲为善焉，顺是故礼义生……」如是者，则荀子所言：「今人之性，固无礼义，故强学而求有之也」，亦必改写了。但一切刚好是相反的，荀子以后天的经验，看不到有善的实际状态，故言性恶，而在荀子的理想意念中：人在恶性中必须改化之，故必须学习以知礼义，渴慕去恶成善，这种欲善之想，乃荀子性恶说的产品；因此，荀子才强硬地肯定出－－「用此观之，人之性恶明矣，其善者伪也」－－这一个结论。
6. 《性恶篇》第六段言
孟子曰：「人之性善。」曰：是不然：凡古今天下之所谓善者，正理平治也；所谓恶者，偏险悖乱也；是善恶之分也已。今诚以人之性固正理平治邪？则有恶用圣王，恶用礼义矣哉！虽有圣王礼仪，将曷加于正理平治也哉！今不然：人之性恶；故古者圣人以人之性恶，以为偏险而不正，悖乱而不治，故为之立君上之埶以临之，明礼义以化之，起法正以治之，重刑罚以禁之，使天下皆出于治，合于善也；是圣王之治而礼义之化也。今当试去君上之埶，无礼义之化，去法正之治，无刑罚之禁，倚而观天下民人之相与也；若是，则夫强者害弱而夺之，众者暴寡而哗之，天下之悖乱而相亡不待顷矣。用此观之，然则人之性恶明矣，其善者伪也。
荀子在这一段中，清晰地给「善」与「恶」下定理：「所谓善者，正理平治也；所谓恶者，偏险悖乱也。」然后作假设以言圣王以「有由思虑伪故起之礼义」及「无此而人任其性必致天下于悖乱」的对当比较说出人之性恶明矣；荀子的假设实际上也是天下中执行的教化工夫：「无礼义之化，去法正之治，无刑罚之禁，倚而观天下民人之相与也；若是，则夫强者害弱而夺之，众者暴寡而哗之，天下之悖乱而相亡不待顷矣。」为何是这样呢？荀子断言乃人之性恶的原因吧！而圣王也是因此而：「明礼义以化之，起法正以治之，重刑罚以禁之，使天下皆出于治，合于善也。」不然的话，圣王就不用有所作为了。
7. 《性恶篇》第七段记载
故善言古者必有节于今；善言天者必有征于人。凡论者，贵其有辨合，有符验。故坐而言之，起而可设张而可施行。今孟子曰：「人之性善。」无辨合符验，坐而言之，起而不可设张而不可施行，岂不过甚矣哉！故性善则去圣王，息礼义矣；性恶则与圣王贵礼义矣。故檃栝之生，为枸木也；绳墨之起，为不直也；立君上，明礼义，为性恶也。用此观之，然则人之性恶明矣，其善者伪也。
荀子在第七段中，承第六段所言作发挥而否定性善之说。因为孟子所言之性善未能与「善言古者及善言天者」所有的征兆符验吻合；且不必有圣王及礼义之存在。然今「则与圣王贵礼义」，此乃性恶故。荀子再引用第二段之意，配合实际情况之需要而言：「檃栝之生为枸木也，绳墨之起为不直也，故立君上，明礼义乃为性恶也。」
8. 《性恶篇》第八段言
直木不待檃栝而直者，其性直也。枸木必将待檃栝烝矫然后直者，以其性不直也。今人之性恶，必将待圣王之治，礼义之化，然后皆出于治，合然善也。用此观之，然则人之性恶明矣，其善者伪也。
荀子在这段中，重覆以直木之性直，枸木之性不直，及人之性恶作为同一层面的「性」作比喻，而肯定圣王之治，礼义之化可改变性恶，以合于善作理由，肯定性恶善伪。
9. 《性恶篇》第九段言
问者曰：「礼义积伪者，是人之性，故圣人能生之也。」应之曰：是不然：夫陶人埏埴而生瓦，然则瓦埴岂陶人之性也哉！工人斲木而生器，然则器木岂工人之性也哉！夫圣人之于礼义也，辟亦陶埏而生之也；然则礼义积伪者，岂人之本性也哉！凡人之性者，尧舜之与桀跖，其性一也；君子之与小人，其性一也。今将以礼义积伪为人之性邪？然则有曷贵尧舜，曷贵君子矣哉！凡所贵尧舜君子者，能化性、能起伪，伪起而生礼义，然则圣人之于礼义积伪也，亦犹陶埏而生之也。用此观之，然则礼义积伪者，岂人之性也哉！所贱于桀跖小人者，从其性，顺其情，安恣睢，以出乎贪利争夺。故人之性恶明矣，其善者伪也。
荀子在《性恶篇》第九段中，不断重覆引申前面的论证，再一次强调人人之本性乃天生都一样的，不论圣人与恶人，如尧舜与桀跖，君子与小人都没有例外；而为何有圣人君子与恶人小人之分别呢？实因圣人君子能化性起伪，思虑而习礼义，故合于善；恶人小人皆从性顺情，而陷于贪利争夺，未能化除本性之恶。
10. 《性恶篇》最后的一大段
由「天非私曾骞孝己，而外众人也；然而曾骞孝己，独厚于孝之实，而全于孝之名者，何也？以綦于礼义故也……」到「……尧问于舜曰：『人情何如？』舜对曰：『人情甚不美，又何问焉？妻子具而孝衰于亲，嗜欲得而信衰于友，爵禄盈而忠衰于君，人之情乎？人之情乎？甚不美，又何问焉？唯贤者为不然。』」
荀子在此段中，实在只是言人可以为善之理，且言「涂之人可以为禹」，以「仁义法正」作为衡量，故荀子曰：「今使涂之人伏术为学，专心一志，思索孰察，加日县久，积善而不息，则通于神明，参与天地矣。」能不能达到「通神明，参天地」的目的与境界，则要视乎人肯不肯：「故小人可以为君子而不肯为君子，君子可以为小人而不肯为小人。……故涂之人可以为禹，则然；涂之人能为禹，未必然也。……」荀子在最后一段中，根本不再谈性恶的问题与论证，反而提出能为善，为圣人、上勇、中勇、下勇，以及人情等问题，故吾人亦不加以谈论。
由上述的分析，吾人可见荀子之论人性之恶，实在是从实际的、具体的、经验的和感觉的角度来证实，即乃从人性与礼义文理之善作关系上的对当比较，以言人之恶明矣。而且，在九次的论证中，常常重覆提出「礼义」、「思虑习伪」、「化性」、「顺性情则悖乱」等等思想。还常以实例作比喻，来支持自我理想中所界定的思想，以实际的生命（生活）状态作出转化而为善，来肯定性恶之立论。诚如唐君毅在《原性篇》中的评论：
观人之现实生命之状态，即未善而不善，便仍可谓其性之趋向在为不善，而乃为恶。人之欲为禹者，亦未必能实求自转化其现实生命之状态。人果必求转化之，即必意谓此状态为未合于善，而为不善，为恶；不得因其可能被转化而可为善，即不谓其性恶矣。
又
在此人已有一道德文化理想之情形下，对此理想之实现，必待于人对于其现实生命之状态，能有所转化之义，荀子之所认识者，实较孟子为深切。既欲转化之，即不以之为善，而当以之为恶；性恶之论，亦即在此义上，为不能不立者矣。
1. 罗光著，《中国哲学思想史》（先秦篇），学生 639。 荀子主张性恶，在书中有「性恶」篇。在这一篇的开端，他就开宗明义地说明：「人之性恶，其善者伪也」，这两句话为这一篇的结论，放在前面，作为标题，他用许多证据去证明……。
2. 唐君毅著，「第二章 庄子之复心言性、荀子之对心言性与《中庸》之即性言心」，《中国哲学原论原性篇》，新亚研究所印行 49, 50。
荀子言「性」的境况
荀子在《性恶篇》中常常说：「今人之性……」，然后引申出性恶的结论。例如在《性恶篇》的开始便说：「今人之性，生而有好利焉，顺是，故争夺生而辞让亡焉。……」又「今人之性恶，必将待师法然后正，得礼义然后治。今人无师法，则偏险而不正……」又「今人之性，饥而欲饱……」等等。荀子强调：「今人」，实因他以「观察」当时社会的情景所得之经验作反省，而由经验的肯定建立他的礼义法制的理想政治，以礼义法制克制人之性恶，化而为善。由是，吾人当视察荀子时代的生活背境，便能一目了然地瞭解为何荀子会提倡性恶说。
《史记》孟子荀卿列传记载：
荀卿，赵人，年五十，始来游学于齐，驺衍之术，迂大而闳辩， 也文具难施，淳于髡久与处，时有得善言，故齐人颂曰：谈天衍、雕龙 ，炙毂过髡，田骈之属皆已死，齐襄王时，而荀卿最为老师，齐尚修列大夫之缺，而荀卿三为祭酒焉。齐人或谗荀卿，荀卿乃适楚，而春申君以为兰陵令，春申君死而荀卿废，因家兰陵，李斯尝为弟子，已而相秦，荀卿嫉浊世之政，亡国乱君相属，不遂大道，而营于巫祝，信禨祥，鄙儒小拘，如庄周等，又滑稽乱俗，于是推儒墨道德之行事与坏，序列着万言而卒，因葬兰陵。
而梁任公则假设：荀子当生于西元前三○七年，即周赧王八年，卒于西元前二一三年，即秦始皇三十四年，约九十四岁。3
由《史记》所言，及荀子的生存时代的背境，吾人可知荀子怀着满腹经纶，但未能有所遇，所遇又不如所想，道不能衍，连李斯亦舍他所教之仁义以迎秦：「李斯因荀子议兵以仁义为本，乃谓荀子曰：『秦兵强海内，非以仁义为之也！』荀子斥其舍本求末，『此世之所以乱也』（《议兵篇》）。后李斯被秦所重用，荀子闻之『为之不食，睹其罹不测之祸也』（《盐铁篇》，《毁学》）。」4
又因时势局面之乱，人心求利，求功之切，礼义皆亡，荀子乃退而发愤着书，现传于世的《荀子》一书，共为二十卷三十二篇。5
《性恶篇》的着作日期吾人难以考据，若假设言之，当是荀子退出当时的政治局势，于兰陵隐居时所着，以他对社会政治的理想期望为终旨，而将他一生所观于时局的经验及遭遇为根据，作出反省思虑，终觉得「今人」之性的表现皆自私自利，常常互相争夺，嫉恶残贼没有忠信，欲起淫乱生，礼义文理亡 ?? 这是「为什么」呢？荀子由经验所得，亦由当时的背境局势反映，人人皆顺性而为，自我放纵，社会国家悖乱不治，民不聊生，故将儒学传统的善视作制止恶性泛滥的工具或方法，因而在《性恶篇》中言：「用此观之，然则人之性恶明矣，其善者伪也。」这可说是荀子面对现实生命与自我理想目标的一个对当比较的成果。
3. 周绍贤著，《荀子要义》，台湾 中华书局 2-3。周绍贤接纳梁任公假设，且认为这较为可信的史实。
4. 周绍贤著，《荀子要义》，台湾 中华书局 2。
5. 陈大齐著，《荀子学说》，中华文化出版事业委员会 2。
荀子「性」论
当吾人论及荀子对「性」的观点时，无不自然而然地想到「性恶论」，可见「性恶」的思想观点已经是荀子哲学的特征，这个特征与孟子的「性善论」是并驾前往的，也就是吾人所莫明的一个疑问：孟子荀子皆同出于儒家，所持的思想路向却是如此的分歧，且有相互对当的局面，真使人费解；然而其分歧的地方，实在是对「性」有不同的看法，和不同的诠释，因不同的看法和诠释而有不同的论证和定义，诚如周绍贤在《荀子要义》一书的自序中说：
至于性善性恶之说，亦不至两相水火，孟子谓「人之所以异于禽兽者几希」（《离娄篇》），并不否认人有恶性；荀子谓「涂之人可以为禹」（《性恶篇》），并未否认人有善性；孟子谓「人之有道也，饱食暖衣，逸居而无教，则近于禽兽」（《滕文公篇》）；荀子谓人「必将待师法然后正，得礼义然后治」（《性恶篇》）；总之皆注重礼义教化，两家之说，殊途同归。
吾人更肯定的一点乃：不论是性善或性恶之说有多大的分歧，其目的在于针对「性」的问题，且将「性」投向一个伦理的形上层面，即达到至善的境界，孟子言性善，在于将人之所以为人的天赋之善，扩而充之，以达到至高的善境；而荀子言性恶，在于将人「生之所以然者谓之性」的性，在生而有好利、嫉恶和欲望的恶中，「化性起伪」，加以教化矫饰，归于礼义，且「专心一志，思索孰察，加日县久，积善而不息，则通于神明，参于天地矣」（《性恶篇》）?? 实在也是达到一个善的境界。
故此，吾人若要瞭解荀子性恶的思想，必须从荀子的「性」论说起。
1. 何谓「性」？
唐君毅先生在《中国哲学原论原性篇》中言：
中国古代之泛论人物之性，通常涵二义：一为就一人物之当前的存在，引生其自身之继起的存在，以言其性；一为就一物之自身之存在，以言其引生其他事物之存在之性。
前者如《诗经》中有「俾尔弥尔性」之性是也；后者如《左传》昭王二十五年：「因地之性」的性是也。6 可见「性」之说早已存在，且广泛地表达了存在的力量，及存有与存有之间的存在关连。及至孔子，在《论语》中说：「子贡曰：夫子之文章，可得而闻也。夫子之言性与天道，不可得而闻也。」（《公冶长篇》）按何晏注释：「性者，人之所受以生也。」而朱熹的解释是：「性者，人所受之天理。」由两者的注释内容看来，何晏之注较合于原始之义。《论语》另一处提及「性」字乃：「性相近也，习相远也。」（《阳货篇》）也是就生之所以然的「性」来谈「性」，除了这两处，《论语》就没有提及「性」字了，无怪乎子贡会说：「夫子之言性与天道，不可得而闻也。」及其后，乃有「就人之面对天地万物，与其人生理想，以言人性。由此所言之人性，在先秦诸子中，或为人当谋所以自节，以成德而与天地参者，如在荀子；或为人当谋所以自尽，以备万物，上下与天地同流者，如在孟子；或为人当谋所以自复自安，以与天地并生，与万物为一者，如在庄子。」7
然单就荀子之论性一事言之，则有「生之谓性」的思想：
性者，本始材朴也。（《礼论篇》）
生之所以然者谓之性。（《正名篇》）
性之和所生，精合感应，不事而自然，谓之性。（《正名篇》）
凡性者，天之就也，不可学，不可事。（《性恶篇》）
不可学、不可事，而在人者，谓之性。（《性恶篇》）
由荀子所言的「性」中，吾人可看出有两个层面的意义：
1.1 「生之所以然者谓之性」的「生之所以然」，乃是「生之谓性」的具体表达，亦即 是人求生的力量及根据，不是从生理现象的层面立论，而是先天的层面所表达的自然的「性」。
而「性者，天之就也」，乃是从生理现象的层面作推论上达于天的。荀子所言的天，冯友兰在《中国哲学史》中指出乃自然的天；徐复观在《中国人性论史》（《先秦篇》）中说：「荀子的所谓天，只不过尚未被人能够了解的自然物，但究竟是比人高一个层次。」罗光在对《天论篇》的「天」字作分析归纳后，指出「天」的意义：「一、天字指着人性；二、天字指着天生官能；三、天字指着天地之天；四、天字指着自然；五、天字指着上帝。」8吾人接纳荀子的天乃自然的天，指人性及天生官能而言，故「性者，天之就也」就是「生之所以然者谓之性」的「生之谓性」也。
1.2 第二个层面乃指出「生之所以然」或「天之就」的「性」的表达层面，这可说是生理现象的层面，可以由经验得知，即荀子所说的「性之和所生，精合感应，不事而自然，谓之性」，此乃先天自然的性与生理相合所产生的官能交融，其与外物相合（精合），外物接触（感）于官能所引起的官能反应（感应），如饥欲食，寒欲暖，及目辨色等，都不必经过人为的构想，乃自然如此 ??「不事而自然」，「不可学，不可事，而在人者」，即在经验中可直接把握到的。9
荀子性恶论就是从后天经验的察视人的生理现象反应，所作出的肯定，人的生理现象就在人欲中呈露出来，「欲」在荀子的意念中乃是「情」，都是人之所生而有的：「凡人有所一同，饥而欲食，寒而欲暖，劳而欲息，好利而恶害，是人之所生而有的，是无待而然者也，是禹桀之所同也。」（《荣辱篇》）故吾人进而谈论荀子之言「性」与「情」与「欲」。
2. 性与情与欲
荀子所言的性，常与情与欲互通而言的，这与先秦学者，特别是孔子、孟子所言的不太吻合，因「在先秦，情与性，是同质而常常可以互用的两个名词。在当时一般的说法，性与情，好像一株树生长的部位。根的地方是性，由根伸长上去的枝干是情；部位不同，而本质则一。所以先秦诸子谈到性与情时，都是同质的东西。人性论的成立，本来即含有点形上的意义。但荀子思想的性格，完全不承认形上的意义，于是他实际不在形上的地方肯定『性』，所以把性与情的不同部位也扯平了。」10 吾人可以从荀子所言所说中以予证明：
性之好恶喜怒哀乐，谓之情。（《正名篇》）
性者，天之就也；情者，性之质也；欲者，情之应也。（《正名篇》）
故虽为守门，欲不可去，性之具也。（《正名篇》）
今人之性，生而有好利焉……生而有疾恶焉……生而有耳目之欲，好声色焉。（《性恶篇》）今人之性，饥而欲饱，寒而欲暖，劳而欲休，此人之情性也。（《性恶篇》）
凡人有所一同：饥而欲食，寒而欲暖，劳而欲息，好利而恶害，是人所生有也，是无待而然者也，是禹桀之所同也。目辨白黑美恶，耳辨音声清浊，口辨酸 甘苦，鼻辨芬芳腥臊，骨体肤理辨寒暑疾养，是又人之所常生而有也。（《荣辱篇、非相篇》）
若夫目好色，耳好声，口好味，心好利，骨体肤理好愉佚，是皆生于人之情性者也。感而自然，不待事而后生之者也。（《性恶篇》）
人之情，食欲有刍豢，衣欲有文绣，行欲有舆马，又欲夫余财富积之富也；然而穷年累世不知不足，是人之情也……是人情之所同欲也。（《荣辱篇》）
按上面所言，可见荀子所谓的性，实在是情，也是欲，三者是同一而异名：「情者性之质也」，就是说没有情就没有性之意也；「欲者情之应也」，情欲乃互相相应而生，也就是说欲乃随情而生，没有情也就没有欲了。再者，荀子更以「情性」合言，表示其乃同一义也。由于荀子言性与情与欲同，故其性恶论也因欲多而起争夺的现实生命反映出来的，故由「欲多起争」之显恶肯定性恶，而善者伪也之说。
3. 性伪之分
荀子将性与伪作区分，在于分言恶与善。因性为情为欲，故自然之性是恶的，这是由经验上得到的结论：「生而有好利，生而有疾恶」等。而「伪」字在荀子的思想中，即「人为」之意。王先谦注：「荀书伪皆读为」。「善伪」：乃荀子为生而倾向恶之性作一个转化的提供：「化性起伪」，使人转向善的机会，这也是圣人所生之礼义法度之伪也。
在《荀子》一书中，荀子对性伪之说和界定如下：
不可学，不可事而在人者，谓之性。可学而能，可事而成之在人者，谓之伪。是性伪之分也。（《性恶篇》）
若夫目好色，耳好声，口好味，心好利，骨体肤理好愉佚，是皆生于人之情性者也；感而自然，不待事而后生者也。夫感而不能然，必且待事而后然者，谓之生于伪，是性伪之所生，其不同之征也。（《性恶篇》）
性者，本始材朴也；伪者，文理隆盛也。无性，则伪之无所加；无伪，则性不能自美。（《礼论篇》）
故圣人之所以同于众，其不异于众者，性也。所以异而过众者，伪也。（《性恶篇》）
由「无伪，则性不能自美」可知，伪为「有所加」之意，则可以赋予性力量，使能趋向美善，此因荀子言性恶之故。
「伪」－－人为之作能改善人性，使能学而知，能事礼义而去恶，文理隆盛而合于道，这就是圣人之所以异于众的原因，且「起礼义，制法度，以矫饰人之情性而正之，以扰化人之情性而导之也，始皆出于治，合于道也。」（《性恶篇》）所以荀子强调：「其善者伪也」（《性恶篇》），也就是表达了人由性恶起伪，便可以化性趋善，甚至能如禹一样而为圣人，通于神明，参于天地。荀子曰：
人之性恶，其善者伪也……故必将有师法之化，礼义之道。然后出于辞让，合于文理，而归于治。用此观之……其善者伪也。」（《性恶篇》）
又
今人之性，必将待师法然后正，得礼义然后治，今人无师法，则偏险不正，无礼义则悖乱而不治。古者圣王以人亡性恶，以为偏险而不正，悖乱而不治，是以为之起礼义，制法度，以矫饰人之情性而止之，以扰化人之情性而导之也；始皆出于治，合于道者也。今之人化师法，积文学，道礼义者，为君子。纵性情，安恣睢，而违礼义者，为小人。用此观之……其善者伪。（《性恶篇》）
在《性恶篇》中，荀子凡九次言及「其善者伪」，使吾人肯定他所提倡之性恶说，乃在于警愓当时的人不要顺性而为，当起伪化性：「伏术为学，专心一志，思索孰察，加日县久，积善而不息，则通于神明，参于天地矣。」（《性恶篇》）
6. 陈训章著，《孟子管窥》，黎明文化事业 94。
7. 唐君毅著，「第一章 原性（一）中国人性观之方向与春秋时代之德言性」，《中国哲学原论原性篇》，新亚研究所印行 11。
8. 罗光著，「第八章 荀子的哲学思想」，《中国哲学思想史》（先秦篇），学生 665-673。
9. 徐复观著，「第八章 从心善向心知 ?? 荀子的经验主义的人性论」，《中国人性论史》（先秦篇），台湾商务 229-233。
10. 徐复观著，「第八章 从心善向心知 ?? 荀子的经验主义的人性论」，《中国人性论史》（先秦篇），台湾商务 229-233。
性恶之论证
吾人在分析《性恶篇》的结构中，已分段释说《性恶篇》的内容，亦不断地提出荀子性恶的论证，现只是作综合性的说明。
1. 顺性则乱言性恶
人之性恶，其善者伪也。今人之性，生而有好利焉，顺是故争夺生，而辞让亡焉。生而有疾恶焉，顺是故残贼生，而忠信亡焉。生而有耳目之欲，有好利声色焉，顺是故淫乱生，而礼义文理亡焉。然则从人之性，顺人之情，必出于争夺，合于犯分乱理，而归于暴。故必将有师法之化，礼义之道，然后出于辞让，合于文理，而归于治。用此观之，然则人之性恶明矣。（《性恶篇》）
今之人……纵性情，安恣睢，而违礼义者为小人。用此观之，然则人之性恶明矣。（《性恶篇》）
顺情性则不辞矣，辞让则悖于情性矣。用此观之，然则人之性恶明矣。（《性恶篇》）
为什么顺性的结果是好利、争夺生；嫉恶，残贼生；耳目声色之欲，淫乱生；形成辞让亡、忠信亡、礼义文理亡呢？
荀子肯定地说：「性恶之故。」
由荀子经验所得的反省思索中，人常纵性情，安恣睢，违礼义，今世有多少君子呢？小人当道，国恒乱，民恒苦，由社会现象透视生命现象，由生命现象透视人的生理反应，由人生理反应所产生的现象就是顺性情，故「今人之性，生而离其朴，离其资，必失而丧之，用此观之，然则人之性恶明矣。」（《性恶篇》）
2. 求善去不善乃性恶故
凡人之欲为善者，为性恶也。夫薄愿厚，恶愿美，狭愿广，贫愿富，贱愿贵；苟无之中者，必求于外。……用此观之，人之欲为善者，为性恶也。今人之性，固无礼义，故强学而求有之也，性不知礼义，故思虑而求知之也。然则生而已，则人无礼义，不知礼义；人无礼义则乱，不知礼义则悖。然则生而已，则悖乱在己。用此观之，人之性恶明矣。（《性恶篇》）
凡古今天下之所谓善者，正理平治也；所谓恶者，偏险悖乱也，是善恶之分也已。（《性恶篇》）
古者圣人以人之性恶，以为偏险而不正，悖乱而不治。故为之立君上之埶以临之，明礼义以化之，起法正以治之，重刑罚以禁之，使天下皆出于治，合于善也，是圣王之治而礼义之化也。……用此观之，然则人之性恶明矣。（《性恶篇》）
故性善则去圣王息礼义矣，性恶则与圣王贵礼义矣。故檃栝之生，为枸木也；绳墨之起，为不直也。立君上，明礼义，为性恶也。用此观之，然则人之性恶明矣。（《性恶篇》）
为什么需要礼义呢？礼义在于引人向善。
为什么人欲为善呢？因为希望离开恶。
荀子以薄厚、恶美、狭广、贫富、贱贵的相对作比喻，引申出人之欲厚、美、广、富、贵。犹似圣王之愿国能治一样。荀子的原则：「苟无之中者，必求之于外」，今因人性无善，故必求之也；求之于礼义，求之于法正。
荀子清楚地将善恶之意作区分－－善者乃正理平治也；恶者乃偏险悖乱也。因为人性本恶，就有偏险而不正、悖乱而不治的现象。故古之圣王了解这一点，便以「明礼义以化之，起法正以治之，重刑罚以禁之，使天下皆出于治，合于善也。」事实上，荀子见到时势的现象：「夫强者害弱而夺之，众者暴寡而哗之，天下之悖乱而相之，不待顷矣。」（《性恶篇》）其原因乃：「今当试去君上之执，无礼义之化，去法正之治，无刑罚之禁」；其结果将如何呢？就是强欺弱，众暴寡的现象了。故荀子肯定，若人本性善，根本不需要礼义助人求善，不需要法正及刑罚来规限人之恶；然而，现今的经验告知，实际的现况证之，人不断求善，在于去除本身之恶；人需要礼义、法正及刑罚，使之不陷于恶而趋善，故性恶明矣。
3. 「不治与治、不正与正」谈性恶
故必将有师法之化，礼义之道，然后出于辞让，合于文理，而归于治。（《性恶篇》）
今人之性恶，必将待师法然后正，得礼义然后治。今人无师法，则偏险而不正，悖乱而不治。古者圣王以人之性恶，以为偏险而不正，悖乱而不治，是以为之起礼义，制法度，以矫饰人之情性而正之，以扰化人之情性而导之也，始皆出于治，合于道者也。（《性恶篇》）
古者圣人以人之性恶，以为偏险而不正，悖乱而不治。故为之立君上之埶以临之，明礼义以化之，起法正以治之，重刑罚以禁之，使天下皆出于治，合于善也。（《性恶篇》）
今人之性恶，必将待圣王之治、礼义之化，然后皆出于治，合于善也。（《性恶篇》）
荀子在《性恶篇》中重覆地强调：师法、礼义、正与不正、治与不治，实在要说明性恶对人、对社会、对国家的影响；还有对自己的影响。至于对自己而言，因性恶之故，人便「偏险不正」，故必须先正己，正己之法就是「师法」，即接受教育，不断学习，如《劝学篇》所言：「木受绳则直，金就砺则利，君子博学而日参省乎己，则知明而行无过矣。」由此，人就有能力「矫饰」自我的性恶，使之化而为善，这就是所谓「师法之化」也。
至于对人、对社会、对国家，则在「礼义」上立言，从「治与不治」上作出发点。荀子认为礼义乃圣人所制，以助人不顺性而行，故有法度，刑罚比较消极的方法去约束人之性恶，使能导引人走向善合于道；而明礼义乃积极的方法，使人能去己恶而不起悖乱；如是者，国恒治，诚如《修身篇》所言：「人无礼则不生，事无礼则不成，国家无礼则不宁。」故荀子以「礼义」作为「扰化」人的性情，以引导人、地、事物得以「生、成、宁」，于是悖乱不生而治。
4. 欲多不知足现性恶
今人之性，饥而欲饱，寒而欲暖，劳而欲休，此人之情性也。（《性恶篇》）
人之情，食欲有刍豢，衣欲有文绣，行欲有舆马，又欲夫余财蓄积之富也。然而穷年累世不知不足，是人之情也。（《荣辱篇》）
人生而有欲，欲而不得，则不能无求；求而无度量分界，则不能无事。争则乱，乱则穷。（《礼论篇》）
天下害生纵欲，欲恶同物，欲多而物寡，寡则必争矣。（《富国篇》）
子宋子曰：「人之情欲寡，而皆以己之情为欲多，是过也。故率其群徒，辨其谈说，明其譬称，将使人知情欲之寡也。」应之曰：「然则亦以人之情为欲，目不欲綦声，口不欲綦味，鼻不欲綦臭，形不欲綦佚，此五綦者，亦以人之情为不欲乎？」曰：「人之情欲是已。」曰：「若是则说必不行矣。以人情为欲此五綦者而不欲多，譬之是犹以人之情，为欲富贵而不欲货也，好美而恶西施也。古之人为之不然，以人之情为欲多而不欲寡，故赏以富贵，而罚以杀损也，是百王之所同也。（《正论篇》）
夫人之情，目欲綦色，耳欲綦声，口欲綦味，鼻欲綦臭，心欲綦佚，此五綦者，人情之所不免也。（《王霸篇》）
从「欲」上看，荀子认为性就是情就是欲：「性者天之就也，情者性之质也，欲者情应也。」（《正名篇》）但由于人生而有好利、嫉恶、欲望，故不断地陷于纵欲中 －－「人之情欲多而不欲寡」，故「欲不得，则不能无求，求而无度量分界，则不能无争，争则乱，乱则穷」，就是欲不知足的后果。在人的生理现象中，吾人感悟到所谓：「人心（欲也）不足蛇吞象」，这也是在人的衣、食、住、行中表达无遗。人人欲有财富上的拥有，无有则求之，求的方法很多，有正当之法，也有不正当之法，而荀子《荣辱篇》所言的不知足，有乱起的含意，因人的不知足，就不免于争夺残杀，而做成社会的纷乱。因此，荀子从「欲」的不知足以证明性恶论。11
11. 参阅华仲麔等著，《儒家思想研究论集》（二），黎明文化事业。 周群振著，《荀子之心术观与性恶论》，215-260。
结论
先秦学者，尤其是春秋战国期间，论及人性的问题的学者很多，其内容不外是详述人性之善，人性之恶，或人性无善无恶，而以孟子性善说、荀子性恶论，告子的性无善无恶为显着，其他如世硕、宓子贱、漆雕开、公孙尼子之徒等皆有论述「性」的问题。吾人可从王充《论衡》中的《本性篇》所记述，得到可靠的资料：「周人世硕，以为人性有善有恶，举人之善性养而致之则善长，恶性养而致之则恶长。如此，则性各有阴阳，善恶在所养焉。故世子作《养书》一篇。宓子贱、漆雕开、公孙尼子之徒，亦论情性，与世子相出入，皆言性有善有恶。孟子作《性善之篇》，以为人性皆善；及其不善，物乱之也。谓人生于天地，皆禀善性；长大与物交接者，放纵悖乱，不善日以生矣。若孟子之言，人幼小之时无有不善也。告子与孟子同时，其论性无善无恶之分，譬之湍水，决之东则东，决之西则西。夫水无分于东西，犹人无分于善恶也。孙卿有反孟子，作《性恶之篇》，以为人性恶，其善者伪也。性恶者，以为人生皆得恶性也。伪者，长大之后勉使为善也。若孙卿之言，人幼小无有善也。」
其后，中国二千年来的哲学，都不断地在「性论」上寻求答案，而以儒家的「性善」说影响较大，当然性恶论、性无善无恶说，以及性有善有恶说也有学者从之，但影响不大；然亦有学者在谈论「性」之时，有新的思维观念，尤其是在汉朝，贾谊、王充、魏荀及唐韩愈的「性三品说，汉杨雄的「恶善混说」，较为特别，但对后世的影响亦不大。12
中国哲学上所谈论的「性」，不论是人性有善有恶说，无善无恶、性善或性恶等学说，其目的皆希望提醒世人，要求人活在善中，或走向善的生活，特别是儒家的思想，更要求人不断走向善，直到「至善」的境界方可停止，此即所谓「止于至善」也。荀子虽然谈论性恶，其目标也是一样，要求人离恶向善：「荀子自己提出了此一问题，也解答了此一问题 。－－『涂之人可以为禹，曷谓也﹖曰：凡禹之所以为禹者，以其为仁义法正也。 然则仁义法正，有可知可能之理。然而涂之人也，皆有可以知仁义法正之质，皆有可以能仁义法正之具，然则其可以为禹明矣』（《性恶篇》）」13。
荀子所言性恶，实在是一条由恶向善的通路，使人多观察人性的软弱，社会的不安不治，而要求人多多矫饰自我的不正，进而正己；由正己做到安人安百姓的扰化作用，导引人行义明礼；如此，悖乱不生，人人能积善而不息，社会国家也积善而不息，则皆能「通于神明，参于天地矣」，这也是荀子谈性恶所希望导引人达到的境界。实在的，这与《中庸篇》所言：「唯天下至诚，为能尽其性，能尽其性，则能尽人之性；能尽人之性，则能尽物之性；能尽物之性，则可以赞天地之化育；可以赞天地之化育，则可以与天地参矣。」－－ 不谋而合，只是《中庸篇》言尽性，而荀子则言「矫饰」的师法，去性之恶，而行善显善，明礼正己治人，其最终的目标皆在于「通于神明，参与天地」也。
因此，我们可从荀子《性恶篇》的反思中，寻找一条去性恶以行善显善，和明礼正己治人的明道行道的指向，落实在现时代的社会中，作为现代人的修养、社会道德规范和知性认识的反省与跟进；至于能否达致「通于神明、参与天地」，就必须视乎个人的修维了。
1. 劝学
这是劝人为学，重视认知意识和自我醒觉的教育指导，注意道德和知识互调的全人教育，故荀子强调「学」在于明「礼」：「学至乎礼而止矣。」（《劝学篇》）这在乎人能否专心勤勉，而不在于智与愚，能专心勤勉的人，便可成就：「虽愚必明，虽柔必强」（《中庸篇》）。故此，荀子肯定后天学习的重要；知识是由积累而博的，道德是由修持而得的；这两者是认知的目标，好能培育完善的人格：「君子博学而日参省乎已，则知明而行无过矣。」（《劝学篇》）14 从认知意识引发出的「知明」到自我醒觉的道德实践，就是「行无过」，肯定了知识与道德的「知行」一体。这一个「知行」一体的配合之「能与不能」，「成与不成」不是外在的，而是「人」自身的意识和醒觉，以建立个人的道德修养和实践，同时也设立了社会的道德规范和伦理秩序的运作，荀子说：「可学而能，可事而成之在『人』者。」（《性恶篇》）可见，荀子在教育上重视「知」的认知意识以劝学明礼和「行」的道德修养以践仁成圣；更重要的是「在『人』者」，就是「人」本身的自我意愿 －－「认知意识」的「学」以「知」；和自我醒觉的「道德修养」的「践」以「行」，这与化性起伪是相联系的，就是由「学」到「伪」（为）来改造人性之恶，成就道德修养的「行」而为君子，给社会注入伦理秩序，使人能体验「天见其明，地见其光」（《劝学篇》），人便升华到宇宙间的大道，故必修身以致道，「通于神明，参与天地矣」（《儒效篇》）15 这种伟大的理念，为现时代物质化生活的人，究竟能起多大的力量，又可改变人心多少，值得今人深入的反思；千万不要将教育变成物质化的职业培训园地。
2. 虚壹而静
荀子劝人为学以明「礼」，明「礼」必须先知「道」，因为「治之要，在于知道」（《解蔽篇》），知「道」以至体「道」；故荀子清楚地作诠释：「人何以知『道』？曰：心。心何以知？曰：虚壹而静。……谓之大清明。」（《解蔽篇》）
人由「心」以知「道」，因为荀子认为：「心也着，道之工宰也。」（《正名篇》）心能思道亦能察道，也是「道」的主宰，于是人在学习中必须用心专一，排除杂念，摒弃成见，即「不以所已藏害所将受」（《解蔽篇》）的「虚」，和「如盘水，正错而勿动，则湛浊在下，而清明在上，则足以见须眉面察理矣」（《解蔽篇》）的「静」－－ 静心不动，保持清彻澄明来知「道」。16 可见，荀子论虚静完全是以知「道」为目的，虚静只是存心的方法，要人以醒觉的心去认知和实践「道」，好能化性起伪，培育善的人格，活出真实无妄的「诚」，「诚心守仁」，「诚心行义」（《不苟篇》），由此，荀子提出「养心莫善于诚」（《不苟篇》）的要求，劝人「以仁心说，以学心听，以公心辨」（《正名篇》），务使在自觉自省中，知「道」行「道」－－「君子博学而日参省乎已，则知明而行无过」（《劝学篇》）。知「道」是认知意识的形上目标，知明就是明礼，认知的落实，在道德生活上的实践。行「道」就是依道之向而行的形上要求，随「道」之意而活，行无过就是具体地在生活中活出「道」，使道德和认知的生活在无过失中实践，故不必有所已藏，也不可害所将受。
现今的物质社会不但不养心，更有所已藏的自私自利，更为追求物质科技的发达而忘掉了虚静的精神需要和方向，故人与社会都不虚不静而为躁，「躁则失君」（道德经26章），能静者，可胜躁 17 而养心，心正而专一能知「道」而行无过，所以「清静为天下正」（道德经45章）。
3. 解蔽
人的生命既软弱又有限，加上社会的转变，人的思想认知和道德取向都容易失去目标，放纵行事，以偏盖全，以私遗公，还自以为知「道」，依「道」而行，这实在是无知。荀子在《解蔽篇》中言：「凡人之患，蔽于一曲，而暗于大理。」又在《天论篇》中言：「万物为道一偏，一物为万物一偏。愚者为一物一偏，而自以为知道，无知也。」
再者，在复杂的社会中，一切事物都是互动互系互联的，人在认知上不可一意孤行，虽以客观的判断和推论为要，也当知己知彼，不可蔽于己而不知彼：「有见于此，无见于彼」（《天论篇》），就会陷于片面性或主观性，于是在认知上没有正确的判断，流于偏见的私心和片面之词，荀子说：「故为蔽：欲为蔽，恶为蔽；始为蔽，终为蔽；远为蔽，近为蔽；博为蔽，浅为蔽；古为蔽，今为蔽。凡万物异莫不相为蔽，此心术之公患也。」（《解蔽篇》）以上十种蔽的原因，在于警愓人要对自己的心加以谨慎：「主其心而慎治之。」（《解蔽篇》）
人因偏心便易陷于「情欲动心」，看事处事便不能清明，心不清明便疑心不定：「凡观物有疑，中心不定，则外物不清。……以疑决疑，决必不当；夫苟不当，安能无过乎。」（《解蔽篇》）由是荀子提出隆礼重法，18 作为人思想言论是非得失的准则，个人立身处世的规范，行修正身的工具，调和情欲和治气养心之道，维系社会秩序使之共融合一的基要，社会阶层合理化的依据，节用裕民的合理分配等。19 然而，世事人事无一不变，故明礼亦有其历史性和社会性的不同幅度，便要求「变通」－－「穷则变，变则通」－－「百王之无变，足以为道贯，一废一起，应之以贯，理贯不乱。」（《天论篇》）能「处常」而「应变」，在历史过程中，把握学之要在知「道」，养心在诚，有虚壹而静的觉醒，足以明礼之共理，归纳成一定的准则和统类，处常应变，审视社会的需要，社会才能长治久安，「贯之大体未尝亡。」（《天论篇》）20
12. 参阅滕春兴著，「第二篇第二章 孟子的人性论」，《孟子教育哲学思想体系与批判》，正中书局 29-31。
13. 徐复观著，「第八章 从心善向心知 ?? 荀子的经验主义的人性论」，《中国人性论史》（先秦篇），台湾 商务 239。
14. 惠吉星著，《荀子与中国文化》，贵州人民出版社 1996年1月第1版 226-236页。
15. 赵士林著，《荀子》，世界哲学家丛书，东大图书公司 1999年 68-70页。
16. 惠吉星著，《荀子与中国文化》，贵州人民出版社 1996年1月第1版 212-213页。
17. 陈鼓应著，《老子注译及评介》，中华书局 1984年 四十五章 241-242页。 「静胜躁，寒胜热」，原作「躁胜寒，静胜热」，根据蒋锡昌和严灵峰之说改。
18. 罗光著，《中国哲学思想史（先秦篇）》，台湾学生书局 1982年（民国71年） 「第八章 荀子的哲学思想」 627-629页。
19. 李哲贤著，《荀子之核心思想 ??「礼义之统」及其时代意义》，文津出版社 1994年（民国83年） 95-107页。
20. 同上，50-51页。
by Bruno Forte
Faith and Reason "Fides et Ratio" as The Interpretative Key To The Principal Encyclicals of Pope John Paul I
"Faith" and "reason" are the two terms around which John Paul II builds his reflections on the human being and his/her highest vocation. This is true not only of the encyclical on "Faith and Reason" but also of the entirety of his magisterium as both thinker and as pastor. In order to clarify the meaning of this affirmation it is necessary to understand the meaning of the two terms faith and reason in the light of two backgrounds: the background of the time in which Karol Wojtyla worked, and the other one of his heart. Together they constitute the very core of his "theological biography". It is only in this way that the full meaning of these two terms and the motive which John Paul II speaks of as being "like two wings on which the human spirit rises to the contemplation of the truth" 1 can be fully understood.
1. What reason? The metaphors of modern time
In the events of the twentieth century, "reason" is the singular and decisive protagonist: it lies at the very heart of the parable on the modern era, which sees both its apex and decline in this twentieth century. Opening with the triumph of "strong reason", characteristic of the Enlightenment, modernity has led to the widespread diffusion of the experience of fragmentation and non-sense so typical of "weak reason", which has flourished since the fall of ideologies. Succeeding the "lengthy" century, which began with the French Revolution and ended with the out break of the Great War (World War I), is the so-called "short twentieth century" (E. Hobsbawm), marked by the affirmation of the extreme fruits of totalitarianism and of ideological models, which ultimately led to their downfall and collapse (1989). This process is described by Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno through a powerful metaphor at the beginning of their Dialectic of Enlightenment: "The fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant." 2 The Enlightenment - taken in the broadest philosophical sense as a continuous process - had pursued the objective of ridding men and women of all fear and of rendering to them complete control of their destiny, thanks to boundless faith in the possibility of reason. Its final outcome - fulfilled through the dramas of the two world wars and the high costs of totalitarianism - can be recognized in the condition of renunciation, in the denial of questions of meaning and the search for the foundation, which is the condition of the so-called "weak thought". Three stages can be identified in this process, which lies at the origin of the crisis of the European consciousness on the threshold of the third millennium, stages which can be traced back to the metaphor of light, darkness and dawn respectively.
1.1 The light of strong reason and its decline
The first stage is characterised by the metaphor of light, which expresses the principal inspiration underlying modernity, which is the pretext of the adult reason to be able to understand and illuminate every thing. According to this pretext, the ability rationally to embrace the world means to make the human person the master of his/her own identity. Emancipation is the dream that pervades all the great processes of transformation in the modern era. The presumption to triumph over every obscurity through the use of reason is expressed by the total visions held of the world, which are the ideologies. Ideology tries to impose the order of reason on the whole of reality, to the point of establishing a complete equation between the ideal and the real. It excludes any form of diversity and is by its very nature violent. The dream of totality becomes inexorably totalitarian. It is not by chance, nor is it an accident of time, that all forms of modern ideology have resulted in totalitarian and violent forms. Indeed, it is precisely this historical experience of the violence of totalitarian ideologies that has produced the crisis of the absolute pretexts of "enlightened" reason.
1.2 The night of weak reason
If adult reason sought to give sense to everything, then the "weak thought" of the post-modern condition does not recognize the possibility of any sense in anything. It is a condition that can be expressed by way of the metaphor of darkness; it is a period of ruin and of failure, of darkness and uncertainty, a period which has, above all, been marked by indifference. For many people, the rejection of the strong and total horizons offered by ideology bears the inability of posing the question about meaning. This has led to the extreme point of a loss of all interest in seeking out the ultimate reasons for human life and death. The extreme face of the epochal crisis of the European consciousness can be associated with the face of "decadence". This means the loss of value, since there is no longer any interest in comparing or measuring oneself to anything. It is in this way that the passion for the truth has been lost. The "strong culture" of ideology shatters into the fragmentation of "weak cultures", in which the loss of hope folds in on itself and everything is reduced to the narrow horizon of the individual's own particular. In this way, then, the end to ideologies appears more truly as the pallid avant-guard of the advent of the idol, which is the total relativism of those who no longer have any faith in the power of the truth, and as a result seem incapable and uninterested in realising the passage from phenomenon to foundation. This is the extreme face of the crisis surrounding the European consciousness at the close of the "short twentieth century."
1.3 The dawn of an open and questioning reason
In the analysis of this process, which takes us from the triumph of modern reason to its decadence, we cannot exclude some signs of change and of hope, with which we will associate the metaphor of the dawn. There is a "nostalgia for a perfect and consumed justice" (Max Horkheimer), which will enable us to recognize a sort of search for lost meaning. We are not talking about "une recherche du temps perdu", of an operation based in the past, but rather of a diffused attempt to rediscover a meaning that goes beyond that of ruin and failure, one that enables people to discern a horizon that inspires and moves them. Among the many expressions used in relation to this search we should point out the use of the expression: a rediscovery of the other. We are witnesses to a growing awareness of the need for solidarity, at an interpersonal level, as also at social and international levels. We can see a sort of "nostalgia for the Totally Other" emerging (Max Horkheimer), a rediscovery of the ultimate questions and the ultimate horizon. This outlines the need for a new consensus on ethics to motivate a moral involvement, not for the sake of the benefits that arise from it, but rather for the sake of the good it arouses in itself. The nostalgia that is evident in the crisis of our present time has, therefore, the face of the other, not only the face that is near by and immediate but also of the Other, that is the transcendent foundation of life and of living together. Thus we can say that there are in fact some signs of a return to a reason that is open to transcending itself and to seeking out the Other.
1. John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Fides et Ratio, Preface, Dublin: Veritas Publications, 1998, p. 3.
2. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, NY, 1969, p. 3.
2. What faith? A theological biography
It is against the background of the time-described above - that the intellectual and spiritual biography of Karol Wojtyla is found. His life resounds naturally within the historical context in which it has developed and on which it has had considerable influence. His profound identity as thinker and as pastor finds its essence in the strong sign of faith: every aspect of his existence and of his work is characterised by a living and fecund relationship with the Christian God. If Wojtyla, as an alternative to the rationalistic pretexts of ideology, develops a strong sense of the Transcendent, which is characterised by a true and pure mystical experience, in response to the renunciation of the very foundation by the "weak reason", he does not hesitate to propose a thoughtful faith, one which does not flee the challenges of the inquiring or searching intelligence. In both of these attitudes the faith of John Paul II is highly responsible. It never calls on one to step outside of history but is rather very much a part of history, with a precise ethical consciousness. In this way the connotations of the faith, to which his magisterium is testimony, are clearly outlined: a mystical faith, a thoughtful faith and a responsible faith.
2.1 A mystical faith
A constant and characteristic motif of the magisterium of the word and life of John Paul II is the sense of the absolute primacy of God. We are not dealing here with merely one element among others, but with a dominant note. We are talking about the horizon and dwelling place within which and from which everything else is born. The motif of the living God is the motive behind the life and work of Karol Wojtyla. A valuable indication of this is given by the very structure of the magisterium expressed in his encyclicals. This structure is radically theological and in particular Trinitarian. The fundamental cycle is represented by the three encyclicals: Redemptor Hominis (1979) on the Son, Dives in misericordia (1980) on God the Father, and Dominum et vivificantem (1986), on the person and work of the Holy Spirit. The Trinitarian structure resounds significantly in Tertio Millennio Adveniente (1994), the itinerary for the preparation of the great jubilee of the year 2000. Everything else finds accordance in the underlying theological note, as seen in his series of reflections: the reflection on anthropology, presented in the three Encyclicals aforementioned, and again in Laborem exercens of 1981 on the dignity of human work; the reflection on women in the apostolic Letter of 1988, Mulieris dignitatem; the reflection on ethics, proposed in Veritatis splendour (1993), Evangelium vitae (1995), and in the Encyclicals on the social question, Sollicitudo rei socialis (1988) and Centesimus annus (1991); and finally the reflection on ecclesiology, outlined in light of the singularity of the Redeemer and of the Trinitarian communion in Redemptoris Missio (1991), Slavorum Apostoli (1985) on the Eastern Christians, and Ut unum sint (1995) on ecumenism. In the reflection on Mary offered in Redemptoris Mater (1987) the various aspects of the Christian mystery are gathered together in the dense icon of the Mother of the Redeemer, in which everything returns to the work of the Trinity and to the glory of God.
From the very beginnings of his research, Karol Wojtyla has borne witness to the strong coincidence of the mystical experience with the truth. Proof of this is evident in his degree thesis on the Doctrine of the Faith according to St. John of the Cross (1948), defended within an academic context-the Dominican one of the Angelicum-marked at that time by the absolute predominance of the neo-scholastic, and therefore towards an elaborate theology which finds its basis in the mystical. It will remain the profound conviction of Wojtyla, man and thinker, that the light necessary to a clear intelligence which desires to discern the divine design for life and history, is drawn from an experience of God, as the following expressions from a great mystic poet, one much loved by Wojtyla, say with the greatest of intensity: "!Oh lamparas de fuego, / en cuyos respandores / las profundas cavernas del sentido, / que estaba oscuro y ciego, / con extra╴s primores / calor y luz dan junto a su Querido!" 3 Truly, as a significant witness from the "Lumen Orientale" affirms, "it is not the conscience that illuminates the mystery, but the mystery that illuminates the conscience. We can only know, thanks to that which we can never know" 4.
2.2 A thoughtful faith
The strong emphasis on the mystical dimension does not in any way take away the questioning and searching character of the faith: the faith of John Paul II is and will always remain thoughtful! "Fides nisi cogitetur nulla est" - "if faith does not think it is nothing": these words of Saint Augustine 5 - quoted in Faith and Reason 6 - express the profound conviction behind the entire existential and intellectual itinerary of Karol Wojtyla, for whom to think means to continually move from the phenomenon to the foundation, taking the two terms of this transcendent movement with the utmost seriousness. In the Encyclical Faith and Reason the Pope writes: "We face a great challenge at the end of this millennium to move from phenomenon to foundation, a step as necessary as it is urgent. We cannot stop short at experience alone; even if experience does reveal the human being's interiority and spirituality, speculative thinking must penetrate to the spiritual core and the ground from which it rises." 7 This concept of thought - which faith can never renounce, if it desires to be as it should be, a faith of historical beings open to the Mystery and entrusted to it-matures in Wojtyla as a result of an encounter with two great authors, to whom he owes his intellectual formation. On the one hand we have Thomas Aquinas, whom he got to know in full during his years studying at the Angelicum, and on the other hand we have Edmund Husserl, the father of Phenomenology, to which the future Pope was to dedicate much research. From Saint Thomas Wojtyla draws on the strong metaphysical question, and therefore the need to base the phenomenon on the foundation in order to avoid falling into the inconsistency of much pragmatic and purely functional thought. From Husserl he learns to give full value and attention to the phenomenon, which is also the exclusive key to gaining access to the metaphysical profundities of all that exists. The sobriety of Husserl's phenomenology and the teaching that it gives on attention to others and to things as they appear to us - another peculiar characteristic of Karol Wojtyla - are expressed for example in the following statement from Husserl's Ideas: "Everything originally offered to us in 'intuition' is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there." 8 To stop at phenomenological observation would, however, reduce reality to the all too narrow horizon of that which can only be experienced. This is why true phenomenological intuition points to the essence, that is to say, to the transcendent ground of the phenomenon in the direction of that which profoundly constitutes it in its identity and relevance. It is at this point that St. Thomas' teaching integrates the study of Husserl: the world of beings is constituted in its intimacy by being immanent to each. Here we have the true and ultimate foundation of reality. In a formulation of great audacity Thomas affirms that: "Esse autem est illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet, et quod profundius omnibus inest" 9 . To summarise, then, the ontological level coincides with the profundity of reality. It is that which gives stability and dignity to what exists and which prevents everything being reduced to a transient moment that is inconsistent and empty. However, if the phenomenon is transcended in the direction of the foundation in order to draw on its profound source and hidden root, then the foundation is only attainable by means of the phenomenon, through history. No devaluation of the worldly reality is therefore admissible. Thoughtful faith will live, therefore, in a twofold and unique fidelity: faithful to the eternal, but equally faithful to the earth, uniting heaven and earth in one unique movement, transcending toward the ultimate mystery and returning to things and their consistency.
2.3 A responsible faith
The third characteristic that qualifies faith in the "theological biography" of Karol Wojtyla is his being responsible: by this adjective we desire to indicate the ethical relevance of the experience of believing. The polemic of the Reformation against "works" as means of merit and salvation, has favoured a certain separation between a life of faith and an active life. We have arrived at this point on the one hand by way of spiritualism, which is characterised by an evasion of history, and on the other hand by pragmatism, which has, above all, exiled God from the sphere of worldly responsibilities. The presence of Wojtyla, the believer, in history has always been acute, involved, from the years of resistance to Nazism to the years when he faced the daily struggle against militant ideological atheism and communist totalitarianism, to the battle against the ethical emptying of consumerist capitalism. Even in this area there was a thinker at whose school the future Pope was to be formed, namely Max Scheler. In response to the "formalism" of Kantian ethics, which ran the risk of reducing moral behaviour to good intentions, Scheler emphasised the value of a "material ethics", which is attentive to the actual contents of actions, and is far from being limited merely to the intentional, formal aspect. The ethics of values moves in this direction because it recognizes a real criterion in them and not just some abstract and theoretical reference, a criterion that takes on a visible form in the actual living of historical choices and responsibilities. John Paul II has always demonstrated a great interest in the ethical dimension of every option, even those that are apparently more speculative. His fundamental theoretical work, Person and Acting, is a rigorous speculative foundation for the indissoluble relationship of the personal being to its moral acting in the concreteness of decisions. From faith, ethics draws on the ultimate horizon, within which the actual value of penultimate choices is situated and qualified. From ethics, faith draws on the real space from within which it can translate itself into history, as well as the living questions that stimulate the search for fundamental orientations in light of the Absolute, in whose horizon the weight and the value of every act is actually qualified.
3. St. John of the Cross, Llama de amor vivo, translated: The Living Flame of Love', 3rd Stanza; "O Lamps of fire! / In whose splendors / The deep caverns of feeling, / Once obscured and blind, / Now give forth, so rarely, so exquisitely, Both warmth and light to their Beloved." Trans., Kieran Kavanagh, The Collected Works of St. John of the Cross. London: Nelson, 1966. p. 579.
4. P. Evdokimov, La donna e la salvezza del mondo, Milano : Jaca Book , 1980, p.13.
5. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, 2, 5 : PL 44, 963.
6. Faith and Reason, p. 116, 79.
7. Faith and Reason, p. 123, 83.
8. E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen philosophie, trans. F. Kersten, Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy. The Hague: Nijhaff, 1982. I, 24. p.44.
9. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I q. 8 a. 1 c.
3. Which kind of encounter between faith & reason? Beyond the "aut-aut", the challenge of an "et-et"
Read in the context of the historical period in which John Paul II grew up and lived, and in light of the figures who played such an influential role in determining his "theological biography", "faith" and "reason" are tightly woven within a vital relationship, by a reciprocal stimulus and enrichment. What the Polish Pope affirms in the Encyclical Faith and Reason, he has, above all, experienced in his intellectual adventure and in his own spiritual experience as protagonist of our time. If the presumptions of enlightened reason excluded every residual element linked to the world of faith from the dominion of rationality, opposing reason and faith in an "aut-aut" relationship without any remission, then the history of modernity has shown how this exclusion has been lethal for reason itself, making it inexorably totalitarian and violent. This is why the recovery of the correct relationship between faith and reason has been emphasised by Karol Wojtyla as being of vital urgency, not only at the service of the proclamation of the faith but also in order to promote the dignity and ethical quality of the human person. The "et-et" relationship which the Pope proposes - and, as has been said, it is found "in actu exercito" in all the works that he has produced as thinker and as pastor - moves in three directions: the first could be defined as a sort of apology for "open reason"; the second refers to a faith that is truly involved in a search ("fides quaerens intellectum"); while the third relates more directly to the actual encounter between these two terms, in an open and reciprocally fecund dialogue.
3.1 A reason aware of its limits and open to transcending them
Fides et Ratio is, first of all, an apology for reason 10. In an era marked by a crisis of trust in the possibility of reason, because of the results of the ideological adventures, such an apology is indeed far from insignificant. Reason is certainly not defended as an absolute knowledge, presumptuously closed in on itself, but in so far as it is the fundamental instrument by which human beings set out to live in the service of the truth to which they are originally called by the very fact that they exist. What is at play here is the idea of truth itself. 11 If the truth is a possession to be manipulated, as ideological reason proposed, then the human being is and remains closed within his/her own horizon of truth, limited to the point of suffocation, as the historical parable of ideology demonstrates. If, instead, truth is not a possession, something that is captured and held within the confines of reason, but is the objective and transcendent Other that also embraces us, then it is not possible to disclose oneself to the truth without posing the ultimate questions and without allowing oneself to listen to the various possibilities by which the transcendent and sovereign truth also reaches us. To summarise then, the truth is not circumscribable from the "cogito ergo sum", from the "I think, therefore I am". It rather has to be grasped from within the experience of the "cogitor ergo sum", of the "I have been thought of therefore I am". Truth is the very guardian of existence, and it alone can open up a flight from oneself towards the Other.
What the Pope emphasizes is a faith in the capacity of reason to open itself up to the truth, of being an "open reason". The refusal is not addressed to the exercise of the reason, but rather to a weak exercising of it, one that renounces the possibility of opening up to the horizon towards the Transcendent. To propose the metaphysical question again, in the etymological sense of that which lies "beyond physical things" and that moves beyond the phenomenon in order to arrive at the foundation, means to propose again the one true question which is worth asking in philosophy, that question to which human beings are predisposed by the radical nostalgia that they bear within themselves from the very first moment of existence. It is at this point that philosophy truly appears not to be concurrent with theology, but appears rather as a discipline united by a thought that searches for the horizons and listens to the various ways by which the Other speaks to us, which is precisely the thought of faith.
3.2 A faith which seeks
The Encyclical clearly affirms that there is no one Christian philosophy, even if it supports the full legitimacy of a "Christian Philosophizing", that is, of "a philosophical speculation conceived in dynamic union with faith" 12. Two thousand years of Christianity bear witness to this speculation. Even the inculturation of the faith in new contexts would be superficial if it were to omit some of the baggage of this two thousand years history that has produced extraordinary fruit in both the Western consciousness and beyond. The reference to the history of the thinking of the faith shows how it is possible to exercise the philosophical quest and to be at the same time open to the gift of revelation. From this point of view, one can understand how philosophy is the ground for possible mutual understanding and of dialogue with those who do not share the faith. Reason is not limited by faith but is, rather, empowered by faith. Neither, on the other hand, is faith dominated or subjected to reason. Reason and faith are two sources of knowledge that are neither identical nor concurrent. One is the pure exercise of our understanding, while the other is the reception of the light that comes from on high through the gift of revelation. These two sources do not annul or suppress each another. Rather they meet, and this encounter of the human flight and the advent of the divine is the thought of faith, which makes the baggage of philosophical questioning its own and enriches it through the heard word of revelation.
Dialogue between reason and faith is, therefore, made possible, in the degree to which each one is itself and both are open to the possibility of being transcended. A philosopher who proposes radical questions does not exclude the possibility of hearing the advent of the Other. A thinker of the faith who recognizes the pronunciation of the divine Name in revelation integrates the philosophical questions with the understanding he has been given. In the light of these premises it is possible among contemporary philosophies to point out three great souls which are linked to this searching faith ("fides quaerens intellectum"). The first one is that of a philosophical thinker who is not only open to transcendence but also to the recognition of it in revelation. We are dealing with the so-called "Christian philosophy", which involves the full use of reason within the horizon that is disclosed by the accepted belief in the Deity's self-communication in history. Then there is a second model, which could be characterised as that philosophy which poses radical questions and is open to the ultimate questions but is not conjugated with obedience to the faith. There are various thinkers who move within this dimension, including some of the greatest nineteenth century thinkers. For this form of thought the Encyclical constitutes an ulterior invitation to enter into a dialogue with the faith in revelation and with theology, in the belief that the truth of revelation is neither concurrent with nor adverse to philosophical research, but open to the wonder of transcendence. A third possibility refers to the so-called "weak thought", that is, to the thought that prejudicially closes itself off from the possibility of transcendence and from the questions that surround it, not recognising any effort of the human reason to transcend itself in a move toward the objective truth. In face of such thought, the Encyclical presents itself as both critical and problematic, and rightly so since a thought which from its very beginnings denies the possibility of an objective truth and of a transcendent movement towards it condemns reason to a sort of "solipsism". In reality the Encyclical challenges the "weak" or "nihilist" thinkers to measure themselves against their own philosophies. Even in this way, however, it presents itself as a challenge and as a testimony that favours the highest dignity of human reason and the possibilities given it to search for and arrive at the truth before ever making a decision about it. In this sense it resumes, in the densest possible way, the entire anthropologic magisterium of John Paul II.
3.3 Faith and reason listening to the Other
The terms in which the Encyclical arranges the dialogue between philosophy and theology, between faith and reason, are, therefore, profoundly respectful of the reciprocal dignity and autonomy of these two worlds, as well as of their necessary and fecund integration. In the spirit of his entire magisterium as thinker and pastor, the Pope affirms that the recognition of the truth which is universally valid - that is the truth of revelation - does not determine any intolerance, since it brings one to recognise the value that exists in every human person, in his/her questions and possible responses, even if it offers criteria in respect of which everyone, beginning with the believer, can measure his/her own affirmations and acquisition of the truth. Dialogue is possible, then, and useful where the interlocutors accept to be measured by the truth that transcends them and to some degree embraces them. This would not be possible where one of the two holds himself/herself to be the exclusive guardian of the truth or indeed even goes so far as to identify himself/herself with it. The Pope affirms the transcendence of the truth also in respect of the very mediation of the thought on the faith, which lives in fact through obedience - that is profound hearing - of revealed truth and not in the presumption to dominate it. Even dogma should not be interpreted as a limit to the progress of human thought, but as the bulwark against its regression, that is, the resistance against moving backwards in respect of the possible openness of reason toward the profundity of the revealed Mystery.
The custody of the message and the freedom of the question are not meant to annul one another, but rather to meet one another. We are not talking about imposing limits to philosophy. Where it is understood to be the exercising of a radical questioning, philosophy cannot but recognise its own limits, which are the same as those of the reason by which the question is posed. If the highest task of reason is that of rendering reason, then it cannot but recognize that it is limited by the incapacity to give a reason for everything, especially before the ultimate mystery of existence. "Why does something exist and not nothing?" This fundamental philosophical question, which has turned up again and again even in contemporary philosophy, coincides with the constancy of the radical impossibility to give a reason why everything exists. For this reason one can say that philosophy is such when it recognizes rather than denies its actual limit. In this Encyclical, and indeed throughout his entire magisterium, the Pope reminds us that revelation is the gift by which God helps reason to open itself up to that which lies beyond the limit which it has already recognized. On the threshold of "the wonder of reason", that is, the admission of the very paradox of existence that cannot find any explanation in reason alone, to dispose oneself to the ear of an Other, to His speech in words and in events, does not lessen reason but makes it rather more thoughtful. Faith in revelation is not concurrent with reason. It is rather that which stimulates reason toward a much higher transcendence and in so doing nourishes and strengthens it, opening it up to horizons that would otherwise remain unknown and impenetrable.
It is here that the history of western philosophy, even in the modern era, confirms the fecundity of the encounter that is possible between faith and reason. How much light has the Christian revelation given to human beings in order to make them more intense searchers, opening them up to horizons that alone can truly correspond to their thirst for meaning and their nostalgia for peace! God is not concurrent with the human person, but is his/her friend, the Creator who came down and drew close to us in order to draw us closer to him, in a covenant that is celebrated fully in the person of the Redeemer. This encounter, fulfilled in Christ, is the true reason for his absolute singularity for the salvation of the world. John Paul II has been called to be its herald through the word and the life of his entire itinerary as thinker and pastor. This task he has entrusted to the Church through this Encyclical, "Faith and Reason". It is precisely for this reason that it can be taken as the dense compendium of all of the coordinated fundamentals of what this Pope, who came from the East, has wanted to say and has said to the Church and to the world, for the glory of God and the salvation of humanity. Indeed it is the interpretative key to his Encyclicals and summarizes the entire message of his word and his life.
10. Faith and Reason, p. 87, 56: "Faith thus becomes the convinced and convincing advocate of reason".
11. The word "truth" appears 208 times in the text of the Encyclical.
12. Faith and Reason, p. 110, 76.
by Stephen Tong S.J.
Insight in St. Ignatius' Spiritual Exercises
Introduction
"I am a knower": Lonergan explicitly makes this first judgment in Chapter XI of Insight, which is commonly recognized among scholars 1 to be the most important section of the whole book. As a knower, one operates within the four levels of consciousness, namely, the experiential, intellectual, rational and responsible levels, to receive cognition about the world or oneself so that objective truth and value is attained. The implication of this judgment is that all kinds of knowledge unite in the same operation of knowing where the subject, in the process of self-appropriation, is commonly attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsible. Lamenting the split of knowledge after Modernity, when the ground of knowledge loses its objective certainty and cannot help but retreat to the subjective boundary so that empiricism or idealism becomes the only solution, Lonergan sets up his project to rebuild the dignity of knowledge which is rooted in being, yet he transforms the traditional and scholastic categories.
As a child of his time, when historical consciousness prevails, Lonergan affirms that what is at stake is no longer the static nature of knowledge as permanent achievement, but the method of ongoing process of discovery where the authenticity, transcendence and metanoia of the subject become central and critical. 2 Therefore, personal but continual conversion is the issue in theological discourse.Against this basic understanding of Lonergan as background, the purpose of this paper is twofold. First, if various kinds of knowledge, namely, mathematics, science and common sense as illustrated in Insight, follow the same pattern of knowing, this paper tries to for God. Among various spiritualities and figures in history who set up milestones for us to dialogue demonstrate that the same pattern can also be applied and be valid in our interior searching with God and know God, Ignatius' self-appropriation and legacy in his conversion and Spiritual Exercises is destined to be a significant paradigm in congruent very much with Lonergan's categories on self-discovery. In fact, the assumption may not be too naive that as a Jesuit, Lonergan implicitly receives no little insight from the Spiritual Exercises to arrive his own theory of epistemology and method in theology.
Secondly, this paper represents an attempt at my own self-appropriation of the Spiritual Exercises. It is taken for granted as self-evident is that God, though the absolute Other and totally transcendent, wants to show us his way in concrete historical contexts for our own salvation and happiness as long as we are willing to get rid of our inordinate attachments. In fact, nothing in this life is more important and rewarding for us than finding and knowing God's will. However, what is at stake here is a genuine and deep self-knowledge on the one hand, and a personal, intimate yet solid understanding of the incarnated and historical Jesus on the other.
To fulfil these two purposes, chapter I delineates the basic elements of Lonergan's Insight which are relevant and similar to what Ignatius experienced in his life and later organized into his Spiritual Exercises. Chapter II is a succinct presentation of how Ignatius arrived at his own insight. Chapter III, as the major part of this paper, shows how the Spiritual Exercises fits into the Lonerganian pattern of discovery and knowing as discussed in chapter 1, and represents my own understanding of its focal dynamics and content. Finally, chapter IV, as a further reflection, tries to pin down why the need of conversion for the subject is problematic and crucial in the whole process, and to understand more deeply the incarnated elements of, as well as resistance to, God's will in concrete history. It is important to keep these in view for any director to co-discern with the retreatant for a better and more confident grasp of what is possibly happening in the dynamics of the latter's self-discovery of God's will.
1. Cf. David Tracy, The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan (NY: Herder and Herder, 1970), 133; 关永中, "认知者的自我肯定：郎尼根「洞察」第十一章一至六节释义(上)", 哲学与文化 第20卷 第四期 (93年4月), 375.
2. Cf. Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J., Method in Theology (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972), xi, 104, 131, etc.
Chapter I : An Introduction to Lonergan's insight into insight
A. The Elements of Insight 3
Lonergan's basic tenet is that knowing is self-appropriation, a process of raising the question and searching for the unknown, a task that nobody can replace oneself in doing and which everyone should take great pain to achieve. Only then is it possible for the insight into the unknown to emerge, followed by the construction of a cohesive system of knowledge. Taking Archimedes' discovery as an illustration, Lonergan shows that insight comes first from attention to a definite question, namely, how to check the purity of a crown, which is linked to a certain image, the actual crown. This image becomes a thematic presence and inquiry in his consciousness, and thus creates tension and anxiety. With this disposition as basis, insight suddenly and unexpectedly comes as a result, not of outer circumstances like bathing, but of inner conditions, such as raising questions, inquiring and searching with patience so that the banal image and experience of bathing serves as a spark. What follows is that this insight pivots between the concrete and the abstract, from solving the concrete case to making primitive terms like mass and volume, to laying down definitions such as that of density, and finally to constructing the principles of displacement and of specific gravity; which can then be applied to further individual cases.
Insight will then lead to other insights. Lonergan takes positive integers as an example: the insight into addition tables leads to homogeneous expansion like multiplication, powers, subtraction, division, root, etc. However, when this system of knowledge encounters anomalies which cannot be subsumed into it, then the need of a higher viewpoint will emerge. The higher viewpoint includes new operations and rules. "They will be more symmetrical. They will be more exact. They will be more general." 4 In this sense, algebra represents a higher viewpoint of arithmetic.
What is described above is the progress and development of direct insight, which grasps the point or sees the solution. However, there is also inverse insight, corresponding to a more subtle and critical attitude, which denies the possibility of getting the point or solution, in other words, denies intelligibility. Lonergan uses the notion of the square root of two as an illustration of inverse insight, for it affirms the impossibility of obtaining its corresponding fraction. It is an irrational number. Therefore, the meaning of inverse insight grants us the boundary of asking relevant and right questions.
B. The Heuristic Structure
After explaining what insight is, Lonergan points out how to approach insight, namely, following a heuristic structure. "Heuristic is from the Greek word heurisko, to find. In Greek, the ending -ikon denotes the principle. So a heuristic is a principle of discovering." 5 It is a systematic and cohesive procedure of operation, based on what is known to approach the unknown target so that finally the truth can be grasped. Therefore, a heuristic structure is "that structure of concepts by means of which the inquirer gives a preliminary description of what is to be known, such as will serve to direct his inquiry." 6 In classical science, the heuristic structure is 'the nature of...', followed by classification and correlation. In classification, similars are similarly understood since 'the nature of ...' is the universal, not the particular. However, there are two kinds of correlation. The first is the similarities of things in their relation to us, while the second is in their relation to one another. Therefore, there will be two kinds of classification, followed by two kinds of understanding of 'the nature of ...' Thus, there is the nature of colour in its relation to us, in contrast to the nature of the wavelengths of light in their relation to one another. In this sense, the notions of nature, similarity, classification and correlation become the heuristic structure of classical science.
C. Levels of Consciousness
In the past, what was at stake was the objectivity of truth, which was self-evident as long as the conclusion was logically drawn from premises. A subject is needed to arrive at truth, but he is just supposed not to fail to grasp what is self-evident. Once truth is attained, it is beyond the subject as if it were non-spatial, atemporal, and impersonal. Only falsity can contradict it. No doubt, intentionally truth is independent of the subject, but ontologically it resides only in the subject because the latter, under definite psychological, social and historical conditions, must first go through a laborious process of investigating, coming to understand, marshalling and weighing the evidence in time and space before "the fruit of truth can be plucked and placed in its absolute realm." 7 This laborious process is, in fact, that of the self- transcendence of the subject, who is required to go beyond what he feels, what he imagines, what he thinks, what seems to him, in order to arrive what is so.
This neglect of the subject is also due to the notion of the soul. The human soul seems to be as objective and universal as the soul in plants or animals, no matter whether the person is awake or asleep, a saint or a sinner, lazy or responsible. In other words, the study of the human soul in its essence, potencies, and habits has little to do with the study of human consciousness whose operations are the centre of the subject. The implication of this neglect is an anti-historical immobilism. 8 Human knowledge is no doubt expressed in concepts which, however, are abstract and immobile, standing outside the spatio-temporal world of change. Human understanding, subject to its limited yet expandable horizon, changes in different historical contexts. So, while concepts do not change on their own, still they are changed as the mind changes which forms them. 9
An existential subject is a subject by degrees. It discerns different levels of consciousness. In a dreaming state, we are only potentially a subject without freedom to think or act. However, we become experiential subjects, capable of perceiving and feeling the sensible world when we are awake. When we follow our desire for intelligibility and go on to inquire into our experience by raising relevant questions, to understanding its possible meanings and implications, we arise to the level of an intelligent subject. Then the rational subject sublates the experiential and rational when it desires to check if its understanding is correct, marshals the evidence pro and con and finally judges it to be or not to be. Being able to judge what is true means to reach the virtually unconditioned, i.e. all the necessary conditions for making a judgement are fulfilled. Finally, the rational consciousness is sublated by the responsible one when the latter follows the intention of the good, the question of value, to deliberate, decide and act on what is truly worthwhile. Reaching this level means the objective value is embodied into subject. Therefore, a study of the subject looks into the different operations on these levels and their mutual relationships. 10
Here, Lonergan wants to tell us that, first, knowing is a compound of many operations, not a single uniform property. Objectivity in experiencing the immediate world is attained by sensing and intuition, yet it is not the only mode of knowing. In the mediated world of meaning, objectivity is approached by questioning, which governs the exigencies of human intelligence to investigate and understand, and of human reasonableness to judge in its virtually unconditioned. What is grasped in understanding or judging is not some further datum added on to the data of sense. In fact, it is unlike all data but consists in an intelligible or reasonable unity.
Secondly, apart from being a thinker, the subject is also a doer who deliberates, chooses and acts as a free and responsible agent making of himself. If knowing is for the sake of being, acting is for the sake of value. Value here not simply means particular good but ordering goods for the sake of the truly good. Being and value are both transcendental notions, i.e., their entirety is beyond the reach of the subject, yet they are always present in the activities of knowing and acting and guide the subject towards their greater fullness. Just as we can only have limited knowledge of being by knowing this and that and other beings, the actualization of value can only be found in this or that act of a good person. 11 Therefore, what is finally at stake is the subject who, by the effect of self-transcendence, attains objectivity in his knowing and becomes the principle of goodness in his decisions and actions.
Lonergan insists that this pattern of operations in our consciousness is transcendental and normative, i.e. it is valid for any kind of knowing and not open to revision. 12 In this sense, in order to understand better the insight into interior knowledge in the Spiritual Exercises, it is pertinent to see how Ignatius goes through his own appropriation in the first place, an experience and paradigm which is destined to be pedagogical and inspirational for his spiritual sons and daughters.
3. Cf. Bernard J.F. Lonergan, Insight (New York: Philosophy Library, third edition, 1970), 3-25
4. Ibid., 16.
5. Bernard J.F. Lonergan, Understanding and Being (New York & Toronto: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1980), 74.
6. Hugo A. Meynell, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Bernard Lonergan (London & Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1976), 173.
7. The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, 71.
8. Bernard J. F. Lonergan, A Second Collection, ed. by William F.J. Ryan, S.J., and Bernard J. Tyrell, S.J. (London: Darton, Longman & Todd), "The Subject", p.69-86.
9. This difference can be further illuminated by Marcel's categories of problem and mystery. A problem is something like x-1=3: when x is solved, the problem is no longer followed up on or attended to. However, in our mediated world of meaning, love, faith, freedom, etc. belong to the realm of mystery. Mystery carries us to an unending journey of discovering ever deeper and wider truth.
10. Second Collection, 79-81.
11. According to Aristotle, "Virtue...is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which a man of practical wisdom would determine it." (Nicomachean Ethics, II, iii,4; 1150b 5-8) So, there is no definition of virtue without its embodiment in a virtuous person.
12. Cf. Method in Theology, 19.
Chapter II : The Conversion of St. Ignatius
The insight of Ignatius into spiritual exercises came from two major experiences. In 1521, he took the initiative with great courage to lead a group of soldiers to resist the French attack on the fortress of Pamplona, Spain. Unfortunately, he was hit by a cannon ball on the leg. Heavily wounded but treated nicely by the French, he was carried back to his hometown Loyola. During the period of convalescence, the only books he could find to help him kill time were books on the life of Jesus and the lives of the saints. Soon, the images of the saints' heroism and love for Christ, especially those of Saints Francis and Dominic, dawned on him and he began to think of imitating them in all the austerities they performed. This kind of imagination granted him great joy and satisfaction. At other times when he set reading aside, he thought of worldly things and a career through which he desired to win the heart of a royal lady. This also gave him great delight. However, insight arose when he began to notice differences in the two kinds of delight. The afterglow of the worldly joy was dry and unhappy, while that which rose from thoughts of imitating the saints still remained joyful and consoling. This perception of feeling linked to images in experience led him to understand that different spirits were moving him. The former was coming from the devil, and the latter from God. From understanding he then came to the judgment that he needed to reform his life by doing penance for his past sins as the saints had done before him. Finally, when he recovered, he committed himself in a decisive manner to become a pilgrim.
The second important experience happened in Manresa, where he stayed for ten months for prayer and penance after leaving Loyola. At this period, he was deeply troubled by scruples, fearing that he had not entirely confessed his sins to God. He wanted to do away with the scruples by extreme fasting, taking no care of his external looks and spending long hours in prayer, yet without avail. He fell prey to depression and almost came to the point of committing suicide. In this thematic searching for God's help and a knowledge God's will for himself, though making a lot of mistakes, one day insight suddenly poured into his soul, similar to that of Archimedes. "Though he remembered his earlier resolve, still he did not hesitate to decide that he ought to eat meat." 13 Later on the bank of Cardoner, as he sat there the eyes of his understanding were opened and, though he saw no vision, he understood and perceived many things, numerous spiritual things as well as matters touching on faith and learning, and this was with an elucidation so bright that all these things seemed new to him... Now having passed his sixty-second year, if he were to gather all the helps he received from God and everything he knew, and add them together, he does not think they would add up to all that he received on that one occasion. 14
Based on this insight, Ignatius turned to be new man, a spiritual master on mission and for the Church. As is common to the development after insight, Ignatius gradually synthesized what he has appropriated into a general picture and organic whole, namely, the Spiritual Exercises, which lay down a heuristic structure of self-appropriation in finding God's will. Written from his own blood and tears, this book was a gift from heaven, destined to be a milestone in Catholic spirituality.
13. A Pilgrim's Journey - The Autobiography of Ignatius of Loyola, translated by Joseph N. Tylenda. (Wilmington, Delaware: Michael Glazier, 1985), 35. This represents an insight, called election in the first time (#175; Cf. footnote 16).
14. Ibid., 38-39
Chapter III The Insight of St. Ignatius
A. The basic insight
Before any elaboration, Lonergan is mindful to tell us, "When we say that the insight grasps necessity and impossibility, we are saying. If one is saying, one has already gone beyond the insight.... Insight is prior to concepts, even to the ones I use here. I am giving an expression of the insight.... The insight consists in the basis from which I can have those concepts and that expression." 15
In the experience of Manresa, especially on the bank of Cardoner, the fundamental insight Ignatius received was a deep understanding of the relationship between human beings and God in salvation history. This insight, initiated by his various images during continual prayers and questioning, gradually emerged through understanding and judging and finally came to concepts and definitions, which were formed and organized into the text of the First Principle and Foundation 16. Its spirit permeates the whole of the Spiritual Exercises. Its truth may simply be similar to the distinct statements in our catechism, such as "why we are created on earth", or other sources 17, but the realities understood profoundly and savoured interiorly (#2) cannot be compared.
In this relationship, the reality is human creatureliness and responsibility, the goal is freedom and salvation, the attitude is indifference, the guiding principle is means and end, the key words are desire and inordinate attachment. This cluster of concepts forms the so-called primitive terms, as Lonergan tells us, "for every basic insight there is a circle of terms and relations, such that the terms fix the relations, the relations fix the terms, and the insight fixes both." 18 In Ignatius' insight these terms are taken as self-evident in the context of our Christian faith.
B. Definitions
1. Principle and Foundation in the spiritual life (#23).
What Ignatius gets in his insight he has to name, giving it a significant nominal sign which underlies and governs all of his thought, and from which flow conclusions of the greatest importance for the spiritual life. This name, this nominal sign, contains in germ the substance of his expansive world-view on God, the universe, and the role of free human beings in God's plan of salvation and spiritual growth. According to Luis de la Palma, "It is called a principle because in it are contained all the conclusions which are later explained and specifically expounded; and it is called a foundation because it is the support of the whole edifice of the spiritual life." 19
2. Spiritual Exercises (#1).
In this elaboration Ignatius delineates two dimensions. The first is the 'what' or means, namely, various methods of prayer analogous to physical exercises. The second is the 'why', the purpose of these activities, namely, negatively to rid the soul of all its disordered affections, and positively to seek and find God's will for the salvation of one's soul.
Here, we see Ignatius' insight into the importance of self-appropriation in the spiritual life. Different from insight in science or mathematics, which can be passed on or taught to others at will as information without the need of the learners making the same effort as the discoverer, the spiritual truth of Principal and Foundation must be owned by each retreatant individually by going through a process of prayer, mediation and contemplation so that personal inordinate attachments can be confronted and got rid of, and they can finally see God's light shed on their own life.
3. Consolation and Desolation (# 316, 317).
Here, the spirit of the Principle and Foundation sets up a clear reference, namely the relationship with God. If its key words are desire and inordinate attachment, Ignatius elaborates two more 'tangible' terms to understand them. While in consolation the soul is inflamed with love of its Creator and Lord. In desolation one feels separated from one's Master. Expressed through inner motion, consolation brings the soul an increase in faith, hope and love, and dwelling in joy, peace and tranquillity, but desolation moves one towards the opposite, disquiet from various agitations and temptations, listlessness, tepidity and unhappiness, a lack of faith, hope and love.
Noteworthy is it that both consolation and desolation dwell within one's experiential level of consciousness. This is this inner experience which Ignatius wants us to focus on, the raw material for our discernment. In his rules for the discernment of spirits (# 313-336), almost all guidelines are about recognizing the dynamics of consolation and desolation. These definitions are mostly comprised of "feeling" words. Therefore, it is not so much thoughts or determinations which count in the initial sphere of spiritual exercises, no matter how good or great they might be. On the contrary, they might just serve as masks to cover, hide or suppress the significance of personal feelings behind and below where the treasure and genuine encounter with oneself and the Lord dwell. 20 These definitions are connected with the insight in Annotation 6, where the director is told what area he should pay attention to: "when the one giving the Exercises notices that the exercitant is not experiencing any spiritual motions in his or her soul, such as consolation or desolation, or is not being moved one way or another by different spirits, the director should question the retreatant much about the Exercises..."
4. Meditation (# 45).
Ignatius does not give a distinct definition of meditation, but simply takes it as "by using the three powers of the soul" in the context of the first, second, and third sins, followed by the indication of these three powers as memory, understanding, and will (# 50). Clearly, the faculty of memory, in Ignatius' intention, puts us into the experience of past events in history, including those of the angels and first parents, the world and the self. Therefore, experience implies a view as holistic and comprehensive as possible, not just taken from a particular or relativized perspective, since partial experience only leads to incomplete or even biased understanding. Then, understanding belongs to the faculty of intellect, a process of drawing out the meaning of these events in history, especially the meaning related to me. For instance, Ignatius encourages the retreatant to reflect during the first exercise on sin: "For one sin they went to hell; then how often have I deserved hell for my many sins!" (#50) Here, as one commentator suggests, "From the beginning to end, the Ignatian experience is sustained, explained and guided by an intellect solidly rooted in the truths of salvation history. Ignatius cautions the retreat director to expose the "true essentials" of this history as faithfully as possible (#2)." 21
Finally, it belongs to the judgment to reach the truth by the faculty of the will. As the function of our consciousness is not content to remain on the level of understanding, the retreatant conceives in order to judge the salvific truth for himself. According to Lonergan, coming to the level of judgment involves a personal commitment, 22 so the will must be moved to give consent. This movement is linked to the signs of deeper emotions. Here, we see the difference between judgment in scientific truth and religious truth. The former usually does not accompany deeper emotion while the latter always does. Only with this appearance can the judgment become one's own. That is why Annotation 6 emphasizes this aspect so much.
5. Contemplation (#101, 106).
As in the case of meditation, so too in the case of contemplation, Ignatius does not give a distinct definition but simply teaches the retreatant to understand its meaning by following his guidelines and doing the prayer itself. Where meditation uses memory, contemplation utilizes our power of imagination, on the experiential level, to put our presence into the actual events of the Gospels and relive them with Jesus Christ. Then, as in meditation, it belongs to our intellect to understand the meaning of the events, and to our will to judge and move our emotion in relishing them.
6. Four Weeks (# 4)
Here, Ignatius clarifies that each week does not necessarily consist of seven or eight days. Its length greatly depends on the progress, capacity and rhythm of the individual retreatants. However, four weeks provide an inherent and heuristic structure for direction and growth. Its design corresponds to the traditional pattern of spiritual progress from the purgative way, whose focus is on purifying ourselves from past sins or inordinate attachments, then progressing to the illuminative way, which guides us to see the light and truth in Christ, and finally to the unitive way, which means an intimate union with God, the ultimate goal of any spiritual life. If this is so, however, what is the reason for dividing the Spiritual Exercises into four weeks, instead of three, if the basic paradigm is the same? Ignatius has no words on this in his definition, yet this is a question worth probing more deeply in the following reflection.
C. The Heuristic Structure of Interior Knowledge
As discussed above, a heuristic structure is a systematic and cohesive procedure which guides the knower to discover the unknown. In interior knowledge, the guiding target is the will of God for me. This correlation mediates into the dynamic between knowing and loving, between self-knowledge and Christ's life on earth, between the director and the retreatant, between the four weeks, and among the rules of discernment.
1. Knowing and Loving.
Insight represents Lonergan's self-appropriation of the structure of human knowing. 23 By illustrating, for pedagogical purposes, the activity of knowing in classical science, statistical science, and common sense, he demonstrates that there are three levels of human consciousness, namely, empirical, intelligent and rational consciousness. Yet, coming to Method in Theology, Lonergan adds a fourth level, responsible level on which "we are concerned with ourselves, our own operations, our goals, and so deliberate about possible courses of action, evaluate them, decide, and carry out our decisions." 24 This level seems to be a further development and refinement of what Lonergan describes about the third level of consciousness, as mentioned already above, "A third determination of the notion of judgment is that it involves a personal commitment." 25 This personal level makes our knowledge not simply an affirmation of something out there, such as mathematics or science 26, but an engagement of our whole person to participate. This is true especially with reference to our knowledge which is interiority.
However, reaching to this level, the leading thrust is love. Only love can render one capable of committing to a value which one affirms, to be consistent with what one knows, finally not to contradict oneself. Sin, on the contrary, either confuses our knowing, or makes one split between knowing and loving as in the experience of St. Paul in Romans chapter 7. Lonergan put it beautifully: "Faith is the knowledge born of religious love." 27 In other words, love is the condition of possibility of our interior knowledge. This love is the self-communication of God Himself as both the Giver and the Gift itself, so that we are the image of God, the place of indwelling of the blessed Trinity. Therefore, it is no wonder that Ignatius urges the retreatant to ask for God's love or to express one's love (# 5, 12, 13, 104) to God, the pre-requisite of any deeper understanding.
Dialectically, we cannot love what we do not know. Love at first sight is only a myth. Even with love towards God, we have to know who God is, a God communicating Himself in human history, especially in the unique event of Christ incarnated. The whole Exercises are typically Christocentric in guiding the retreatant to make long and profound meditation or contemplation on Christ's historical events for the sake of drawing personal meaning out of them. Following St. Jerome's dictum, "The one who does not know Scripture does not know Christ", Ignatius depends greatly on the revelation of Jesus' life in the Gospels. Moreover, "Ignatius emphasized profound theological study because of an authentic conviction that love must know what is loving and why it is loving. Authentic love presupposes intellectual harmony with the truths of faith. A service rooted in discrete charity cannot be theologically blind." 28 In fact, the assurance of knowing makes the whole process of discernment possible and grounded.
Here there is a dialectic or tension. First, according to Ignatius, discernment is "to some extent" (#313). This implies that we have no guarantee of getting the full picture of God's will, as part of the spiritual tradition emphasizes, "for my thoughts are not your thoughts, my ways not your ways ..." (Is 55:8-9) or "God's foolishness is wiser than human wisdom, and God's weakness is stronger than human strength." (1Cor 1:25). Ignatius had his own experience of this. After his conversion, in many prayers he felt without doubt that God was asking him to go to Jerusalem, to stay there and even to die there. But history tells us finally God had another plan for him. Was he mistaken in the first place? It seems not. Ignatius' insight includes this total freedom of God who wants us to know His will step by step. What is important is that we are faithful and make an effort in this present moment to find His will. No one can definitely capture God's mind, not even the prophets or saints. God is the totally beyond or absolute other who transcends all our limited knowledge and horizons.
On the other hand, the purpose of discernment is exactly to find what God wants me to do in this particular time and space in history. The presupposition is that we can know God's will. Without this basis, our image of God is either that of a watchmaker who does not care or of a puppeteer who controls our life by whims, without needing our responsibility and cooperation. The implication is either atheism or fideism where predestination becomes a natural conclusion, signified in the idea that what is most unreasonable to human beings is more likely to be God's will. Ignatius, clearly, does not suggest this solution, following the Thomistic realist tradition to affirm that being is intelligible.
In a way similar to Lonergan's epistemology, though perhaps not consciously or thematically in his proceeding, Ignatius' pedagogy in the Spiritual Exercises goes through the four levels of human consciousness. Appealing to the memory of worldly and personal sins and to the imagining of Christ's events in history is on the empirical level. Reflecting on them and drawing out meanings occur on the intellectual and rational level. Finally making an election is on the responsible level. According to Ignatius' experience, this process of searching will finally reach to an intimate understanding of God. So, knowing and loving unites.
2. Self-knowledge and Christ's life on earth
Ignatius' interior transformation starts from insight into himself, acquired when he was in convalescence. Lying in bed and reading the books on Christ and the saints, he began to notice the arousal two kinds of pleasant feelings. Then he understood that the feelings of longing for Christ were much deeper than those for a woman. This experience is the point of departure in Ignatian pedagogy.
First, the Spiritual Exercises create a time and space for a person to face himself in depth. As a scientist has to be at pains to find out and confirm the correlation between thing and thing by doing complicated experiments, no less a pilgrim needs to make an effort to discover who he is. Though he was without modern categories in psychology, Ignatius understands clearly that the self is not immediately transparent to one's consciousness because of the influence of sin and evil spirits. My masks prevent not only others, but also myself, from knowing who I am.
Here, Ignatius has a deep sense of history. In the first week, he invites the retreatant to go back into his own background, by the power of memory, and discover the fact of sin in the world and in his very own person, and then to understand how sin has blocked him from recognizing God's presence in his life. The question may arise, how does one know whether this kind of knowledge is not another kind of mask?29 As Pousset wisely points out, "There is a danger that many people making the Spiritual Exercises get no further than representation. With a great deal of good will and fidelity, they fill their imagination with images, words, stories, and yet nothing or almost nothing happens. St. Ignatius was concerned with this problem in the sixth annotation, but he did not dwell on it at great length." 30 It is clear that inner growth is not like a mechanical process which one can control at ease, since the time of transformation remains in God's hand. Yet, being aware of this problem, Ignatius marks out a clear reference in Annotation 6: "When the one giving the Exercises notices that the exercitant is not experiencing any spiritual motions in his or her soul, such as consolation or desolation, or is not being moved one way or another by different spirits, the director should question...." Here, the reference point is feeling.
Secondly, Lonergan sees feelings as responding to values in accord with a scale of preference in an ascending order, namely from vital values, to social, cultural, personal and religious values. Our discernment is exactly to identify these on their proper levels so that "there are in full consciousness feelings so deep and strong, especially when deliberately reinforced, that they channel attention, shape one's horizon, direct one's life" 31 and "to take cognizance of them makes it possible for one to know oneself, to uncover the inattention, obtuseness, silliness, irresponsibility that give rise to the feeling one does not want, and to correct the aberrant attitude." 32 No wonder that, in the Ignatian heuristic structure of the Spiritual Exercises, the high point is, from an anthropocentric perspective, one's own election, i.e., one's judgment of value. Lonergan emphasizes that "the judgment of value, then, is itself a reality in the moral order...By it the subject is constituting himself as proximately capable of moral self-transcendence, of benevolence and beneficence, of true loving." 33
Ignatius states in Annotation 2: "For what fills and satisfies the soul consists, not in knowing much, but in our understanding the realities profoundly and in savouring them interiorly." Therefore, what is at stake is not so much knowledge by representation as the feeling attached to it. As a matter of fact, though Ignatius sanctions the third time for making a sound and good election (#177), namely, a time of tranquillity and having no special inner movement, when one uses one's natural faculties to calculate the pros and cons for one's decision, he still makes it clear that "When that election or decision has been made, the person who has made it ought with great diligence to go to prayer before God our Lord and to offer him that election, that the divine Majesty may be pleased to receive and confirm it, if it is conducive to his greater service and praise."(# 183) But how does one know whether God is pleased to receive and confirm it or not? One must appeal to one's desolation and consolation of the second time (# 176) Therefore, for Ignatius, self-knowledge properly speaking Ignatius is one's own inner and deeper feeling, from which one can detect either one's own inordinate attachment or one's freedom and joy towards God's will.
However, self-knowledge is not some kind of closed system as are some modern systems or movements like New-Age, which claims that, as long as we are liberated, we are like God or are gods. The ideal may be all right, but the whole process is missing. No doubt, being God's image is asserted in Scriptures, but we have to conform ourselves to this image, whose perfect expression is, in the first place, Jesus Christ. Only Jesus is the condition of possibility of one's true liberation. Thus it is not accidental that Ignatius arranges the whole second, third and fourth week as almost wholly Christocentric, guiding the retreatant to get familiar with Christ's life and teaching on earth. Contemporary categories help us much here to understand his insight. The basic structure of the human being is philosophically I-Thou, or theologically the self-communication of God. There is no such thing as "Cogito, Ergo Sum" or pure human nature. If this basic tenet is accepted, there is no genuine self-knowledge without reference to others. 34 However, the dimension of others is always a corrupted or contaminated reality, as meditated on in the first week. Thus the Christ event, both as prototype as well as fulfilment of human destiny, becomes salvific in its actual sense. Jesus' life and mystery on earth is never just a past event congealed in history, but becomes a constant pivot of reference for one to see what one's true self rests upon.
These two dimensions come back to the dynamics of knowing and loving. In knowing Christ more deeply, we come to love him more dearly. In experiencing love and being accepted unconditionally, we can open up to a greater horizon of knowing ourselves and God's will. This is a circular and unending movement in our pilgrimage on earth, according to Ignatius.
3. Director and Retreatant
Comments on his experience in Manresa, Ignatius says: "During this period God was dealing with him in the same way a schoolteacher deals with a child while instructing him." 35 At first glance this seems to imply a simple I-God relationship, without the involvement of a third person. However, in his presentation of the Spiritual Exercises, the presence of a director is simply taken for granted, without the need of any justification.
In fact, Ignatius himself treasured very much the role and need of a director in his own spiritual journey because a lack of knowledge on spiritual matters made him suffer a lot, fast too much and even come to the point of thinking of committing suicide under the spell of scruples. By experience he also discovered that instruction from the director is helpful, "The confessor ordered him to break off his fast and though he was still feeling strong, he nevertheless obeyed his confessor, and that day as well as the following day he found that he was free of his scruples." 36
As the Exercises are basically designed for beginners in the spiritual life, the presence of a director for the retreatant is presupposed.Yet, Ignatius is very much aware that the whole Exercises are mainly a self-appropriation process engaging the retreatant with his Lord, rather than a course from the director on catechism or spiritual exhortation, no matter how meaningful these may be on some other occasion. Though not as scrupulous as St. John of the Cross, 37 Ignatius sets up clear boundary and advice for the director, whose main task is a faithful companionship in the ups and downs of the retreatant. From Annotation 6 to 15, the director is advised to inquire into the retreatant's experience during prayer; to be patient, kind and gentle towards the retreatant; to explain the rules of discernment according to the retreatant's progress and need; to keep the retreatant living in the present moment and free from worrying about what will come next; to encourage the retreatant to be faithful in prayer even in desolation; to warn the retreatant not to make hasty promises to God during consolation; and not to impose any personal preference and suggestion for a particular state of life, but to let God work directly on the retreatant. In summary, all these guidelines ask the director to be indifferent and pedagogical, implicitly setting up a good example of the Principle and Foundation for the retreatant to imitate. In other words, if the director shows a clear attachment to his own ideas, feelings and wishes for the retreatant, the latter will unconsciously follow this way of proceeding, either blindly adopting the director's prejudice or stubbornly sticking to his own inordinate attachment and spiritual freedom will not emerge.
In parallel manner, Ignatius is mindful of the attitude and disposition of the retreatant towards the director, though the Spiritual Exercises is mainly the former's process of self-appropriation. The basic tenet behind this is that, as a novice in spiritual matters, any retreatant may easily fall prey to self-deception or the tricks of the evil spirits, as affirmed by Ignatius' own experience of scruples and depression. Even an advanced pilgrim is still open to deception by Satan pretending to be an angel of light, "who brings good and holy thoughts attractive to such an upright soul and then strives little by little to get his own way, by enticing the soul over to his own hidden deceits and evil intentions." (# 332) Therefore, the retreatant is advised to examine the whole train of thoughts, if they "end up in something evil or diverting or in something less good than what the soul was originally proposing to do... all this is a clear sign that this is coming from the evil spirit..." (#333).
Undoubtedly, the instruction is clear; but Ignatius foresees implicitly that this is not easily carried out. Therefore, all these principles are not given to the retreatant for a self reading, but are left to the director to explain. Moreover, "the enemy acts like a false lover,... wants his words and solicitations to remain secret....But when the person reveals them to his or her good confessor or some spiritual person who understands the enemy's deceits and malice, he is grievously disappointed."(# 326) That is why Ignatius exhorts in Annotation 5 that the retreatant should enter the exercises with a great spirit and generosity, implying also a great openness and freedom towards the director in one's inner journey, apart from aiming at a lofty desire and ideal for God. In fact, following the structure of I-Thou, one comes to understand oneself through the presence of others. Concerning other responsibilities, Ignatius reminds the retreatant about being faithful in doing the Exercises, more rather than less, especially in time of desolation (#12). The retreatant is to be content in the present moment and not to be agitated or curious to know what is to be done next (# 11). This filial trust is a pre-requisite disposition to let oneself go and then conform oneself to God's will.
4. The Four Weeks
Ignatius structures the Spiritual Exercises in congruency with the traditional understanding of the spiritual life as a progress through the purgative way, the illuminative way, and finally the unitive way (#10). His originality seems to lie in anthropocentrically setting a personal election as the thematic goal, lying between the second and third weeks, signified as the high point of the whole Exercises, while the thrust is totally Christocentric, coming from an intimate understanding and love of Christ.
The first two weeks is the preparation for this election, whose condition of possibility is a heart purged of inordinate attachments and filled with a willingness to follow Christ wholeheartedly. Implicitly following the transcendental structure of human consciousness as discovered by Lonergan, Ignatius sees no benefit in one's spiritual life if the soul, guided by love, does not come to actualize a definite stand and commitment towards God and the world. Starting from personal experience, the interior life cannot be satisfied simply by understanding or so-called illumination, no matter how lofty it is. Even in the first week, Ignatius does not accidentally put the question to the retreatant who may still be troubled by personal inordinate attachments, namely, "What have I done for Christ? What am I doing for Christ? What ought I to do for Christ?" (#53) Therefore the soul should not stop being reasonable in searching for what is true and real, or being responsible in committing to what is truly good. This desire for deliberation and action echoes through the Spiritual Exercises, in the contemplation of the kingdom of Jesus Christ (# 96), the two standards (# 146), the three classes of persons (# 153-155), the three degrees of humility (#165-167), and finally the contemplation to attain love (# 233-237). The key word is "labour", while the conviction is "love ought to manifest itself more by deeds than by words."(# 230)
A question may then arise, namely, if the election is already the fulfilment of the process of our consciousness, why do the Spiritual Exercises not end here, but continue to structure the whole Paschal mystery in the third and fourth week? First, election means one's creating oneself in a definite manner by deliberating on and choosing the genuinely good and the distinctively better. It represents an experience of moral conversion to higher values. "Then is the time for the exercise of vertical freedom, and then moral conversion consists in opting for the truly good, even for value against satisfaction when value and satisfaction conflict."38 However, cooperative grace signified by moral conversion presupposes the pre-eminence of operative grace, which is religious conversion, that "other-worldly falling in love" which is total and permanent self-surrender without conditions, qualifications, reservations."39 In this sense, the moral stage must yield to the religious one as fulfilment. Otherwise, as Kierkegaard suggests, one easily falls prey to pride and arrogance as the self-righteous Pharisees did, an insight already so adequately expounded by Paul: "If I give away all that I possess, piece by piece, and if I even let them take my body to burn it, but am without love, it will do me no good whatever" (1Cor 13:3), Therefore, religious conversion provides "a new basis for all valuing and all doing good. In no way are fruits of intellectual or moral conversion negated or diminished. On the contrary, all human pursuit of the true and the good is included within and furthered by a cosmic context and purpose and, as well, there now accrues to man the power of love to enable him to accept the suffering involved in undoing the effects of decline."40 In this sense, the whole dynamic of the third and fourth weeks is to put this pre-supposition and immediacy of operative grace into a thematic and conscious reflection so that our election is affirmed in love, while we receive the necessary strength to bear the cross as Christ did and open up to the hope of resurrection and glory which Christ experienced.Secondly, through the first week one acquires reformation of oneself, through the second week conformation to Christ, while the election begins the confirmation in Christ as choosing those things which Christ chose. But we will not succeed or be faithful in our election unless we are transformed into Christ. Lonergan tells us: "It is not merely a self-mediation in which we develop, but it is a self-mediation through another. One is becoming oneself, not just by experiences, insights, judgments, by choices, decisions, conversion, not just freely and deliberately, not just deeply and strongly, but as one who is carried along." 41
The one who carries us along is Christ, whose image and example the Father destined for us to conform to and transform into. Therefore, it is a self-mediation through Christ and by Christ. In a deeper reflection, perfection through suffering is no longer an abstract principle as the human lot but becomes an event of mutual self-mediation. "Christ chose and decided to perfect himself in the manner in which he did because of us...the way of the cross is the way in which fallen nature acquires its perfection...; by his own autonomous choices, he was thinking of us and thinking of what we needed to be able to attain our own self-mediation." 42 In this sense, the third and fourth weeks become necessary to achieve a union with Christ, as the unitive way aims at. This union does not just mean making oneself Christ-like. It means letting Christ become man in reference to us and especially to myself in the very Paschal mystery, His and mine. "I live now not with my own life but with the life of Christ who lives in me."(Gal 2:20)
5. Rules for discernment - direct and inverse insight
It is quite true to say that the Principle and Foundation and the rules for discernment are the heart of Ignatius' insight. Concerning the latter, Rahner affirms: "We should even like to risk the assertion that they (the rules) are actually the first and so far the only detailed attempts at such a systematic method."43 Every insight will sooner or later develop into a system, providing certain boundaries and rules. As in the study of Scripture, textual criticism, literary criticism, form criticism and redaction criticism signify both way as well as boundary, beyond which scholarship is not recognized as proper. Similarly, the positivist approach in modern human sciences only tackle value-free statements so that moral or metaphysical statements are not and cannot be treated. Of course, whether the validity of these insights is grounded or not is not our interest here. The basic tenet is that insight follows this dynamic, as Lonergan points out.
As direct insight, the rules for discernment mainly provide guidelines for understanding desolation and consolation, in relation to the good and evil spirits. There is no attempt here to explain the details of each rule, on which many distinguished writers have already contributed a lot. Yet two suppositions are worth noticing in order to grasp these rules in a better way.
First, Ignatius seems to affirm the possibility of an original and deep experience of God, which serves as a prototype and is beyond doubt. This is mentioned as the first time of doing the election (#175) and as consolation without a preceding cause (# 330). The characteristic of this experience is that "it is the prerogative of the Creator alone to enter the soul, depart from it, and cause a motion in it which draws the whole person into the love of His Divine Majesty." (# 330) However, in a 30-day retreat context, "without a preceding cause" cannot mean that consolation is totally without our preparation, effect or expectation, since we are told to ask the Lord for what we want and desire in the second prelude to meditation (##48, 55, 65) and the third prelude to contemplation (##91, 104, and to spend time doing them (#4, 12). Consolation is rather that which is out of proportion to 'what I want and desire', or beyond our conceptual object, a phrase used by Karl Rahner, so that one enters entirely into God's love. "This experience allows the person to judge an experience not only by its fruit, but also by its origin." 44 This standpoint might be arguable, yet Ignatius shows no suspicion about it. What he is cautious about is the after-thought of this experience. (# 333)
The original and deep experience of God mentioned as the first time of doing the election (#175) and as consolation without a preceding cause (# 330) serves as a prototype because other and thinner consolation or desolation take their reference from it, since it is a relationship with God without doubt, like a perfect glass to show the true face of other experiences. In fact, even Jesus asked the apostles to go back Galilee to witness his resurrection (Mk 16:7, Mt 28:7). Does Galilee not signify the undoubted experience of God's calling and love? If that is so important for the interior life, it should not be a rare phenomenon... "An experience of the CSCP (consolation with preceding cause) of varying purity and intensity is certainly to be expected as the normal crowning of the CCCP (consolation with cause) which the exercitant frequently receives during the exercises." 45 Therefore, it is the common effort of the director and retreatant to recognize its happening and presence.
Secondly, discernment deals mainly with "the various motions which are caused in the soul" (# 313). By "motions" is meant desolation and consolation. As discussed earlier, they include mostly feeling words. It is, thus, the feelings which we discern and not the thoughts. "The feelings are crucial: They are the raw material of our experiences of God. But they must be judged, rationally evaluated to distinguish the weeds from the wheat." 46 However, before understanding or judging, the recognition of true feelings is already an important task. Sometimes our true feelings can be masked or moralized into something we wish to be: I should be joyful, or grateful, etc. rather than I actually am joyful or grateful. Or we tend to hide our true feelings from ourselves or the director for various reasons, like the tactics of the false lover (# 326). Here, the words of Jesus are valid: "The truth will make you free."(Jn 8:32)
In fact, it is part of the task in the first week to discover all the historical, cultural and human factors which has been blocking our true self, especially our feelings, from emerging. No doubt, feelings can be treacherous or deceitful. That is where discernment comes in. The convalescent Ignatius had to measure his happiness in searching for the worldly career against the happiness inherent in the heroism of saints like Francis and Dominic. Only then did he discover the latter to be the truer and deeper joy. Later, the Cardoner experience became Ignatius' reference axis for discernment: "After Cardoner, Ignatius easily discerned true from false consolations, as exemplified by his rejection of the serpent-form vision because of diminished colour, his distaste for Erasmus because of diminished fervour, and his decision to reject consolations which prevented him from sleeping." 47 In this sense, the consolation without a preceding cause is the crucial criterion for discernment. In the same line, our fundamental option towards God is also an important criterion. God hardly calls into question one's fundamental commitment, unless it is wrongly made in the first place (# 172).
Let us now turn to inverse insight. It is famous that Ignatius lays down rules for thinking, judging, and feeling with the Church. Though not explicitly mentioned among the individual rules, (##353 to 370), the basic motive seems to be to answer the question whether genuine consolation from God can lead us to go against the authority, doctrines or religious practices in the Catholic Church. Ignatius may be said either to give a definite "no" or perhaps to point out that this is a wrong question, since God cannot contradict Himself by showing a different revelation to the Church and individuals. From this assertion, such consolation cannot be true.
15. Understanding and Being, 46-47
16. The Spiritual Exercises of Saint Ignatius, A Translation and Commentary by George E. Ganss, S.J. (St. Louis: the Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1992), #23. References to the text of the Spiritual Exercises are indicated by #. ##1-20 are commonly called Annotations.
17. Cf. Ibid., 211, where Ganss points out that Erasmus' Handbook of the Christian Soldier expresses certain ideas similar to those of Ignatius.
18. Insight, 12
19. The Spiritual Exercises, 149
20. This will be elaborated more in the later part. Cf. Thomas H. Green, Weeds Among the Wheat (Makati: St. Paul Publications, 1984), 98-99.
21. Harvey D. Egan, S.J., The Spiritual Exercises and the Ignatian Mystical Horizon (St. Louis: The Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1976), 69.
22. Cf. Insight, 272.
23. Cf. Insight, xix-xxiii.
24. Method in Theology, 9.
25. Insight, 272
26. This is not to deny that finally they also involve our commitment, e.g., if we judge something poisonous, we won't take it. But in the process the ideal is only the relationship between thing and thing.
27. Method in Theology, 115
28. Ignatian Mystical Horizon, 70
29. It is clear in the case of Jonah. He fled from God's call, and then was saved by God after three days in the whale. Then he complied with God's will and proclaimed the message to people in Nineveh. But only at the end is his deeper rebellious attitude unmasked. He has actually not been at peace with God.
30. Edouard Pousset, S.J., Life in Faith and Freedom (St. Louis: The Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1980), 61-62. The meaning of representation is covered in pages 57-63
31. Method in Theology, 32
32. Ibid., 33
33. Ibid., 37
34. Study affirms that without the positive caring and affirmation of others, a person cannot know his worth as a true image of God. Therefore, the presence of others is not only accidental, but also substantial.
35. A Pilgrim's Journey, 36.
36. Ibid., 34.
37. In The Living Flame, John indicates three blind guides who can cause the soul to go into the dark night. While he dedicates only three paragraphs to the devil and two to the soul itself, he devotes many pages to the danger of entrusting oneself to a director whose only goal is to form carbon copies of himself. Cf. Thomas H. Green, S.J., Drinking From a Dry Well (Makati: St. Paul Publications, 1991), 33.
38. Method in Theology, 240
39. Ibid., 240
40. Ibid., 242
41. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 6, ed. By Robert C. Croken, Frederick E. Crowe, and Robert M. Doran. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), "The Mediation of Christ in Prayer", 180.
42. Ibid., 181.
43. Ignatian Mystical Horizon, 132
44. Ibid., 15
45. Ibid.,56
46. Weeds Among the Wheat, 99
47. Ignatian Mystical Horizon, 138
Chapter IV: A Further Reflection
In his book Insight, Lonergan provides a set of exercises to help the reader to attain self-appropriation, which is a process of the subject raising questions and seeking the unknown. In the interior life, the unknown is God's will-for-me. Here, what is at stake involves the subject, apart from the objective pole of God's will. These two poles have no temporal, spatial, or sequential priority in the process of self-appropriation, though ontologically God is absolutely prior as my existence is always contingent to and dependent on God. In this sense, what the self is greatly determines the experience, understanding, judging and commitment to God's will.
The Spiritual Exercises, in fact, provide a context for an appropriation of the self, which is a super-natural existential opening to God, overcoming any dichotomy between natural and supernatural, strictly human and divine, etc. As the Ignatian maxim states, "Have faith in God as if all success depended on you, nothing on God; Set to work, however, as if nothing were to come about through you, and everything through God alone." 48 Taking this dialectic as basis, the ongoing discussion follows the traditional categories, namely, subject and object. The conviction behind is that, unless we have a deeper grasp of and greater courage to face the existential disposition of the subject and the forces surrounding him, the insight into doing God's will cannot be clear and commitment in following it cannot be total.
A. Interior Knowledge and its subject 49
Aristotle defines virtue as "a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which a man of practical wisdom would determine it." 50 Therefore, the characteristic of the subject as virtuous person contributes not a little to deciding the right thing to do, apart from the objective guideline of finding the mean. In analyzing the subjective field of common sense, Lonergan describes patterns of experience, namely, biological, aesthetic, intellectual and dramatic patterns, 51 which greatly decide the experience or focus of the subject. The classic example is that Thales was so intent on the stars that he did not see the well into which he tumbled, while the milkmaid was so indifferent to the stars that she could not overlook the well.
In the context of the Spiritual Exercises, it is important to notice and respect the aura of each individual as Ignatius insists in Annotations 7 and 15. The director is to be aware that he is not going to make the retreatant a carbon copy of himself or pursue his own agenda. Yet, it is healthy to call attention to what is missing. As a matter of fact, any pattern of experience is incomplete or even becomes too selective, leading one to lose sight of the whole picture or greater horizon. Thales' example is clear enough. Jesus boldly points to the rich young man, "There is one thing you lack..."(Mk 10:21) Although the director has no need or even authority to be so instructive as Jesus, he should detect where the blind spots lie and so invite the retreatant to bring them out and talk directly with the Lord. (# 15)
Apart from patterns of experience, Lonergan's description of dramatic bias or scotosis seems to be relevant. In a healthy make-up, everyone desires to know, i.e. to look for insight. However, in reality, most of us can be lovers of darkness, not wanting insight. "To exclude an insight is also to exclude the further questions that would arise from it and the complementary insights that would carry it towards a rounded and balanced viewpoint." 52 Then, the whole self-appropriation becomes unauthentic. Lonergan classifies scotosis into aberration of understanding, repression of censorship, inhibition of affects, and aberration of performance. In the context of the Spiritual Exercises, it is precisely the main task of the first week to discover and tackle these. That is why the first week is so crucial in the whole dynamic. Sin is not simply an item or wrong behaviour which one can correct by will, in the sense of cleansing away some dirt. "In Paul it is sometimes a personified might which has entered the world, but it also dwells in men and makes them slaves. In John in particular sin appears as the ultimate unrighteousness, in which individuals, but above all 'the world', is imprisoned." 53
Therefore, sin is an existential power preventing a person from seeing the light and obtaining the insight. Its first tactic is to create contrary insight, similar to Ignatius' description of the evil spirit which makes the great sinner imagine delights and pleasures of the senses (# 314). This explains why some persons apparently committed to moral errors seem to be serene in their wrongdoing because they fall prey to egoism, which is "an interference of spontaneity with the development of intelligence.... [and] is an incomplete development of intelligence...Its inquiry is reinforced by spontaneous desires and fears; by the same stroke it is retrained from a consideration of any broader field." 54 As Caiphas shows, "you fail to see that it is better for one man to die for the people, than for the whole nation to be destroyed."(Jn 11:49)
Meanwhile, sin represses the censorship. Usually, censorship, according to the characteristic of the subject, positively selects and arranges materials that emerge in consciousness in a perspective that gives rise to insight, or negatively leaves other unrelated materials aside. Yet, sin does the contrary, repressing all the possible materials and perspectives that might lead to insight. That is why Ignatius gives advice (##6, 326) that the director should keep an eye on ways in which the retreatant may unconsciously or consciously repress the related and significant images.
Furthermore, sin cultivates an inhibition of affects. Insight comes from imaginative presentation, just like the crown in the water for Archimedes or the falling apple for Newton, not from experience of affects, though both of them might feel the same tension or anxiety of inquiry. In order to prevent any insight from emerging, one just needs to suppress the related images. Affects are suppressed only when linked with unwanted images, so they are usually channelled to another unrelated yet acceptable set of images, and emerge freely and frequently, so that the subject then forgets what is really influencing him. It is common for people to express anger or other negative feelings towards others. Though they recognize that those feelings are inappropriate, mostly in a deeper way they refuse to link this kind of feeling with the original images, especially those of beloved ones or family members. Here, original sin receives its greater import and existential meaning. If we have no shame in dogma to attribute our human misery to some remote ancestors, seeing unwanted images of sinfulness in our family, nation and own cultures grants us ground for suppressing them unconsciously. Here, Jesus surely has great insight, "If any man comes to me without hating his father, mother, wife, children...he cannot be my disciples."(Lk 14:26) While "hating" is a Hebrew emphatic way of expressing a total commitment, 55 the main point is to bring the inordinate attachment into consciousness and focus. Inhibition creates, in fact, some kind of inordinate attachment, since what is suppressed keeps on controlling us without our knowing what or why. We can leave or detach ourselves from only those things which are consciously present to or possessed by us. Otherwise, giving up has no meaning and is beyond our capacity. Only when the original image is liberated can forgiveness, reconciliation, and conversion become possible.
Finally, sin creates an aberration of performance. This scotosis renders us unable to focus on our higher activity, since the energy has dissipated for the sake of repression. It can be detected by our dreams or some fixated body language, like stomach-ache, dizziness, headache, aggressiveness, tiredness, etc. "The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak."(Mt 26:41) This aberration keeps us from reaching the fourth level of consciousness, namely, to commit ourselves to the true values that we uphold and cherish.
In this analysis, scotosis is actually the embodiment of our sinfulness, which should more or less be tackled in the first week. Recognition of its depth and the possibility of healing are, of course, due to God's grace and the openness of the subject itself. However, along with the religious themes to be expounded and the making of one's basic world-view or value-system, it is crucial for the first week that seemingly repressed emotions, affection towards family members and certain physical reactions, be somehow thematized as possible signs of scotosis.
B. Interior Knowledge as Object
God's will never comes out of nowhere. Even the Lord's prerogative entry into one's soul points to a concrete and historical situation where He wants to act through this or that person, as "love ought to manifest itself more by deeds than by words."(# 230) Salvation history, culminating in the event of the Incarnation and the Paschal Mystery, has set up this pivotal axis and paradigm once and for all. The divine will is mediated through human situations, though the latter has often been scandalous or sinful. "But where sin increased, grace abounded all the more."(Rom 5:21) In this sense, to look for God's will is to put one's historical context, personal, communal and universal, into perspective where one discerns the signs of the time. "When you see a cloud looming up in the west you say at once that rain is coming, and so it does....You know how to interpret the face of the earth and the sky. How is it you do not know how to interpret the present time? Why do you not judge for yourselves what is right?" (Lk 12:54-56)
According to Lonergan, in this heuristic progress, two dialectic principles are working in mutual tension, namely, affectivity and intelligence. Affectivity signifies one's desires, interests, ambitions, communal customs, interests, sub-cultures, and finally universal ideologies; while intelligence signifies one's censorship, practical ideas, communal laws, hierarchy of values, proverbial wisdom and universal moral principles. In short, the former represents the principle of life, "I have come so that they may have life and have it to the full."(Jn 10:10), and the latter the principle of truth, "you will learn the truth and the truth will set you free." (Jn 8:32) These two principles are opposed yet bound together in the historical context: the spontaneity of life has to be guided by truth, "...obey his voice, clinging to him; for in this your life consists..." (Deut 30:20), while the revelation of truth depends on the consummation of life, as Jesus offers Himself in the Paschal Event. (Even the truth of virtue depends on the virtuous person) The balance and synthesis of these two principles lies in love. Since God is love, God's will shines through in the dialectic of these two poles.
Our problematic, of course, always lies in losing balance between the two because of sin. Apart from the corruption of personal scotosis as discussed above, the power of sin creates group bias and general bias which form the structure of sin, and thus confuses and restrains the very person from striking the balance. Group bias creates various kinds of division, antagonism, exploitation, discrimination, etc., which unconsciously constitute an individual's attitude and thus are taken for granted. General bias represents the social situation deteriorating cumulatively, the dynamic of progress is replaced by sluggishness and then by stagnation. "Culture retreats into an ivory power. Religion becomes an inward affair of the heart. Philosophy glitters like a gem with endless facets and no practical purpose." 56 This kind of minor surrender may, even worse, lead to a major one when lower viewpoints prevail, allowing human intelligence to give way to all kinds of social surd and totalitarianism, followed by complete disintegration and decay.
To overcome these biases, one has first of all to recognize their presence. 57 The fact of their being taken for granted in individual souls must be challenged by the rationality of Scriptures, especially the life and teaching of Christ. This is exactly the meaning of the meditation on Two Standards. The call of metanoia from Christ is supposed to be a concrete encounter and confrontation with these biases. Only then can the possibility of a radical election for Christ and with Christ as mission emerge, since the Spiritual Exercises were never designed merely for personal piety. As Ignatius exhorted Francis Xavier before the latter's departure for the East, "Go, and set the world on fire!"
48. Faith And Freedom, 238
49. For the following two sections, Cf. Insight, Ch. VI Common Sense And Its Subject and Ch. VII Common Sense As Object.
50. Cf. Footnote 7.
51. Cf. Insight, 181-190
52. Insight, 191.
53. Piet Schoonenberg, "Sin", Sacramentum Mundi - An Encyclopedia of Theology, ed. by Karl Rahner with Cornelius Ernst and Kevin Smyth. (London: Burns & Oates, 1970), Vol. 6, 87-88.
54. Insight, 219-220
55. Jerusalem Bible, Popular Edition, Gospel of Luke, Ch. 14:26, footnote a.
56. Insight, 229.
57. This is what the inner journey of Jonah shows to us. Cf. Footnote 22
Conclusion
After Insight, Lonergan named his next book as Method in Theology, instead of Method of Theology. His idea is clear that there is but one transcendental method operating through the human spirit's four levels of consciousness to approach the being of all beings by our unlimited drive of questioning and knowing. 58 In this sense, theology belongs to part of this most worthy enterprise of being human. Following the master's conviction, I name this paper "Insight in Ignatius' Spiritual Exercises".
There is another Lonerganian reason, though somewhat more implicit. His project shows insight to be adequate with being, then insight understands itself, and finally the primary insight is equal to the notion of God. 59 Therefore, every insight participates in God, comes from God and returns to God. This understanding matches very much what Ignatius' inner journey and his Spiritual Exercises aim for, culminating in the contemplation to attain love.
Since Plato's metaphor of the cave, searching for truth has been signified as a journey, a process of running out from darkness to the light. However, though every human being desires to know, this process is not automatic or mechanical because various contrast forces have corrupted our drive for truth, just as the people in the cave were originally fettered by chains while the darkness and shadows seem to dominate. Therefore, it is an uphill battle to liberate oneself from them. In Christian anthropology, this darkness is our personal, communal and universal, sinfulness and inordinate attachments, which block us from seeing God's will, the light itself. The foregoing chapter IV tries to bring this reality into a thematic and deeper understanding.
Ignatius called himself a pilgrim, signifying an inner journey and struggle within to free himself from sin and become free for God. Yet it is God who initiates the whole process and guides Ignatius to follow the whole heuristic structure, as illustrated above, and so to discover his divine will. Therefore, gratitude is the distinctive Ignatian disposition and characteristic. In the last few months, I myself began the intellectual journey to struggle with what the insight of Lonergan is up to, in the context of my spiritual journey as a son of St. Ignatius. With deep gratitude, coming to the closing line of this little paper, I share very much the sentiment of T.S. Eliot in his beautiful lines:
With the drawing of this Love and the voice of this Calling
We shall not cease from exploration,
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.
Four Quartets
Little Gidding, V
58. Cf. Method in Theology, Ch. I, 3-25.
59. Cf. Insight, Ch. XIX, 657-669.
by Sean O Cearbhallain S.J
Christology of the Letter to the Ephesians :An essay in theological method
http://218.188.3.99/Archive/periodical/abstract/A023E02.pdf本网站无商业目的，若我们上传的资料侵犯了您的利益请联系我们，我们会在24小时内撤下。
版权所无，欢迎转载。