作者：Goodstadt, Leo F. 年份：1979
Since 1976, China's citizens have enjoyed far greater personal freedom than at any time since 1966. The amount of open debate about political ideals and the quality of life has grown steadily. The volume of information about the nation and its problems has expanded sharply. The authorities have proclaimed their respect for individual civil liberties very extensively. In this more liberal atmosphere, the fate of religious belief and liberty of worship is an important topic. A crucial test of personal freedom in any society is the degree to which the citizen is allowed to follow without penalty his own conscience even when his beliefs do not reflect the ruling ideology.
For the Chinese Communist Party, the question of belief ought to cause no great problems. Chairman Mao Zedong laid down very clear principles on toleration for religious opinions. He stated: "We cannot abolish religion by administrative order or force people not to believe in it." He described "patriotic people in religious circles" in these terms: "They are theists and we are atheists. We cannot force them to accept the Marxist world out- look." (Selected Works, vol. V, pp. 389, 424.) The Chinese Constitution of 1978 guarantees under article 46 freedom of religious belief to reflect the continued adherence of Peking to Mao's doctrine on the matter.
Difficulties arise over the way in which private religious belief is to be expressed in practice. The amount of freedom of public prayer, worship and religious instruction which Peking feels it can permit is very limited. This restriction is clear even in statements which pro- mise a new deal to Christian citizens. For example, Xiao Xienfa, Director of the Bureau of Religious Affairs of the State Council, explained in June this year: "Freedom of religious belief is a longterm and fundamental policy of the Communist Party and the state." He admitted that this policy "was seriously sabotaged" in the past. After 1976, he continued, "we have done some work to implement the freedom of religious belief". Xiao is reported officially as showing how religious toleration had improved by quoting "the opening and renovation of some temples and the rehabilitation of religious believers who were victims of framed up cases fabricated by Lin Biao and the gang of four". (Xinhua News Agency 29 June 1979.)
Frank admission that, in the decade after 1966, religious liberty was drastically curtailed is a hopeful sign. But the evidence Xiao Xienfa brought forward to prove circumstances had improved is depressing. Temples are reopened as part of the general campaign to restore cultural relics, preserve scenic spots and encourage tourism. Official accounts of the restoration of famous shrines refer to small numbers of mainly old pilgrims. The reports suggest very strongly that the religious aspect of ancient temples has become a very minor consideration. (Xinhua News Agency on Mount Omei is a good instance. 4 November 1978.) The great exception is Tibet where Buddhism remains a powerful force. The Chinese authorities in 1979 have sought to win the support of the Tibetan population and thus granted concessions to its religious practices. In part, this freedom has reflected the general policy of winning over to Peking all groups attacked by the extremists after 1966 in the Cultural Revolution. But another factor is the diplomatic importance of Tibet. The region is of great concern to India and the Soviet Union with both of whom China has border disputes. Tibet's Dalai Lama has visited the Mongolian Republic in 1979 to Peking's dismay and after a long campaign to persuade him to avoid the Soviet Union's Mongolian satellite and to make even a short trip to China. (Xinhua New Agency 8 & 27 December 1978, 21 February 1979.)
International problems have been the main pressure on Peking when it comes to religious affairs. An obvious example is the reopening of a handful of places of Christian worship. Without such facilities some distinguished personalities would have found a journey to China politically embarrassing. Spain's King Juan Carlos might have offended a majority of his fellow-countrymen if China had no High Mass for him to attend. (Xinhua News Agency 18 June 1978.)
But the close connection between religion and foreign affairs in Peking's eyes is brought out most strongly in its comments on the Papacy in the last two years. Peking reported factually the deaths of the last two Pontiffs and the elections of their successors. Pope John Paul II inevitably inspired Peking's official news media to extensive commentary through his June trip to Poland. The official Chinese account was relatively objective. The power of religion in Poland was noted. "A rapturous welcome from his Polish followers" was stressed. The contrast between Catholic and Communist Party views on life was recorded. The opposition of Pope John Paul II to "Soviet control over Poland" was illustrated. Peking and the Vatican are on the same side when it comes to Eastern Europe. Both view Moscow's presence beyond its national frontiers as serious oppression of the peoples of Eastern Europe. (Xinhua News Agency 12 June 1979.)
Diplomatic considerations affect internal policy with equal force when hostility towards the Soviet Union arises. Peking shows special tolerance of religious practices in areas where there is a danger of Soviet subversion. Such regions lie along the Sino-Soviet frontier and are inhabited often by ethnic minorities who cling to religious traditions. In the case of the Moslems, toleration is relatively extensive, notably in Ninghsia Hui Autonomous Region. The explanation is partly that this toleration seems to imply no more than respect for the social customs and dietary practices of a national minority. (Xinhua News Agency 16 & 19 October 1978.) A second factor is almost certainly Sino-Soviet rivalry for influence among the Moslem nations of Asia and the Middle East.
Other minority nationalities are not treated quite so generously, even in Tibet. The general impression made by reports of local offical attitudes to religion is that overt religious practices in the form of worship are regarded with great suspicion. Thus, stress has been laid on the need to prevent "counter-revolutionary activities under the cloak of religion" even when calling for respect for religious beliefs. (Tibet Radio Service 4 December 1977; Hebei Radio Service 5 December 1977; Qinghai Radio Service 28 November 1977.)
In daily life in China, the Government's concern has switched from the religious convict-ions of the individual to open practices of a religious nature. During 1978, attention was fo- cussed on religion and death. For unexplained reasons, even senior Communist Party officials find it difficult to refrain from honouring the dead with traditional rituals, including the participation of Taoist clergy. A number of places published accounts of scandalously elaborate and pious funerals for parents and spouses. (Hunan Daily 12 April 1978; Hebei Radio Service 20 April 1978; Shandong Radio Service 23 April & 16 September 1978.) Some elements of popular religion also crept back into marriages but less widely. (Xinhua News Agency 29 December 1978.) One province has lamented this year that nursery staff and parents keep alive traditional beliefs among children, which shows the importance of oral tradition in a peasant society. (Anhui Radio Service 10 May 1979.)
In 1979, a concerted drive has been made to eradicate traces of popular religion. The main targets have been superstitions, particularly those connected with fortune telling. Reading palms and faces and use of the I-ching have been bitterly attacked. (Hunan Daily 22 March 1979; Qinghai Radio Service II April 1979.) In one province, the current campaign has been justified in the following language: "Feudal superstition is a rather stubborn, evil and backward practice. An arduous and important task on the ideological front is to destroy feudal superstition." (Xinhua Daily 23 March 1979.) To some extent the 1979 anti-superstition drive was inspired by a tragedy in September 1978. Allegedly, two women undertook to cast out demons. In so doing, two children were first beaten and then burned to death. (Jiangsu Radio Service 23 March 1979.)
An additional significance of the anti-superstition drive is the distinction which the Government drew between religion and superstition. Peking resisted the temptation to denounce all forms of religious belief as equally evil. Feudal superstition was defined as "all intrinsically absurd and preposterous beliefs in which nobody with the slightest cultural and scientific knowledge would believe." Religions are "superstitions" Peking explained, but "religions refer mainly to such world religions as Christianity, Islam and Buddhism". (People's Daily 15 March 1979.) Once more, awareness of the links between religion and the outside world has persuaded Peking to adjust its attitude to religion.
Foreign relations are not the whole of the story, nevertheless. In this context, it is interesting how much space was given at the 1978 Atheism Symposium of the World Religions Research Institute to Chinese philosophy. (Guangming Daily 6 January 1979.) Religion and theology have a direct relevance today to the development of Chinese Communist Party ideology.
For the Chinese Government, the legacy of Mao Zedong has become a major crisis. Some elements in the leadership wish to treat Mao Zedong Thought like Divine Scripture. Orthodox Communist Party members condemn this view. The Maoist extremists have been condemned because "they used borrowed religious rites to force people to treat their leaders the way religious believers adore god." (Guangming Daily II March 1979.) Worse still, "they tried to monopolise Mao Zedong Thought like mediaeval popes monopolised the Bible, doing their utmost to establish the absolute authority of Mao Zedong Thought." (People's Daily 26 December 1978.) The Maoist extremists perpetuated a Chinese tradition: "Political power in China was often given a theological connotation." (Red Flag 3/1979, Guo Luoji.)
The irony of the situation is that references to Catholic history in the current Chinese political debate ensure a new status and importance for Catholic doctrines. The Catholic Church is not just a relic of the past or an object of purely cultural interest. The Church has a direct relevance, in the opinion of the Communist Party theoreticians, to a full understanding of the way in which Marxism was perverted after 1966 in Peking. The role given to the Catholic Church by the Communist Party is not an honourable one. But at least the Church is not being ignored. It is still one of the forces which the Communist Party believes must be overcome to establish the Marxist Utopia. Unhappily, the Catholic Church remains the symbol of the persecution of Galileo and of the excesses of the Inquisition, which are frequently recalled by the official press. For the present, intellectual awareness of the Catholic Church by the Communist Party is kept at this unfavourable level. Perhaps there is some room for hope that the situation may improve since most of the Communist Party objections to the Church appear to have been overcome. The Party now claims to "have cut off the churches' ties with imperialism, carried out democratic reforms of religious procedures and abolished feudal privileges." (Xinhua News Agency 18 February 1979.)
A possible sign of an easier regime for Catholics could be the rehabilitation of leaders of the National Church and their appointment to public offices. Large numbers of the members of this pitiable body fell victim to ideological extremists in the Cultural Revolution. The false charges against them have been dropped, and they have been restored to their former positions, treatment enjoyed by large numbers of those purged in the Cultural Revolution. (Xinhua News Agency 5 June 1979; Shanghai Radio Service 11 January 1979.) But these rehabilitations have been caused by factors other than respect for freedom of religion. The first is the desire to discredit totally the Maoist extremists and the opponents of Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping. (Shanghai Radio Service 21 March 1979.) The second factor is the desire to restore the reputation of the Communist Party officials responsible for propaganda and united front activities including work among religious circles. (Xinhua News Agency 18 March 1979.) The post-Mao era is not filled with reverence for religion.
The prospects for the freedom of religious believers in contemporary China seem clear enough. The public practice of religion will be tolerated under very restricted circumstances. Popular religious activities are particularly suspect. Private beliefs are tolerated as a matter of law and practice, more 80 than for many years. However, there are no signs that overt expressions of such beliefs are any more acceptable than in the past. What public worship is permitted can be explained very largely in terms of concern to influence opinion overseas or to compete with the Soviet Union. The status of the Catholic Church has been enhanced by the election of a Polish Pontiff who has made a very successful foray back to his motherland. As long as Peking maintains its concern to contain the Soviet Union's thrust beyond its own frontiers, China and the Vatican have certain shared diplomatic interests. The Catholic Church also benefits from the revival of academic interest in its history because of its relevance to political heresy in China. For the rest, the Catholic Church and its Chinese members are to the Government no more than pawns in the overall calculations by the Communist Party of national interests.