第十四卷 (1992-93年) CATHOLIC CRITICAL EXEGESIS
作者:斐林丰 Fedrigotti, Lanfranco M.

CATHOLIC CRITICAL EXEGESIS :

THE GOLDEN MEAN BETWEEN PROTESTANT FUNDAMENTALIST AND LIBERAL EXEGESIS?



1. INTRODUCTION

The Battle of the Exegetes has been raging for the past three hundred years, since the French Catholic Oratorian scholar Richard Simon (1638-1712) published his Histoire critique da Vieux Testament (Paris 1678). Because of the publication of this book later ages gave Simon the title of "father of modern critical exegesis", but in his own age this book caused his expulsion from the Congregation of the Oratory. (1) First used by a Catholic scholar, this type of exegesis soon became the characteristic domain of liberal Protestant scholarship. However, if Richard Simon were to return today among us he would probably find himself comfortably at home in the exegetical atmosphere officially accepted by the Catholic Church.

Does this mean that the Catholic Church has gone over to the liberal Protestant side? Does it mean that Richard Simon himself was a crypto-Protestant of liberal persuasions? Is liberal critical exegesis a viable form of understanding the Word of God? Can one be a critical exegete and at the same time a faithful Christian believer? My reflection on the relationship of critical exegesis and Christian faith has been stimulated by the recent publication in English of a book by two distinguished German exegetes, H. Conzelmann and A. Lindemann, Arbeitsbuch zum Neuen Testament (Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1985, 8th revised edition; English translation by Siegfried S. Schatzmann: Interpreting the New Testament: An Introduction to the Principles and Methods of N. T. Exegesis, Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 1988). The book is a mine of reference material regarding critical exegesis. It is divided into five parts, which read as follows: Part One: Methodology; Part Two: Contemporary History of the NT - The Environment of Primitive Christianity; Part Three: The New Testament Writings - An Overview; Part Four: Jesus of Nazareth; Part Five: History of Early Christianity. Part Three is a detailed historical-critical presentation of all NT books; Part Four begins with the birth and ends with the death of Jesus (the resurrection is left completely out of the picture); in Part Five, the chapter entitled "The Rise of the Christian Church" mentions the faith of the disciples in the resurrection of Jesus.

The reading of this book has posed for me in the strongest possible terms the challenge of critical scholarship to a traditional understanding of the Christian faith. I felt challenged, even though, or perhaps just because, the two authors in the preface assert that they "began with the assumption that the historical-critical interpretation of the NT cannot be an end in itself but is to contribute especially to the clarification of what is Christian belief". While reflecting on the implications of standpoints of this book, I was happy to hear of the publication of an important document of the Pontifical Biblical Commission, entitled The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church (April 15, 1993). The present paper is the result of the interaction of my reflection with the reading of these two influential publications.



  
1. cf. P. Auvray, "Simon, Richard" in New Catholic Encyclopedia, 1967.

2. THE SPECTRUM OF POSITIONS WITH REGARD TO CRITICAL EXEGESIS

The rise of critical exegesis has sparked a whole variety of reactions within the Christian (Catholic and Protestant) community. The differences in the reactions has created different types of exegesis within the Christian Church. A rough classification of these different types of exegesis would look like this:

A. Sectarian Fundamentalist Exegesis.

B. Fundamentalist Protestant Exegesis.

C. Fundamentalist Catholic Exegesis.

D. Conservative Critical Protestant Exegesis.

E. Moderate Critical Catholic Exegesis.

D' Neo-Orthodox Critical Protestant Exegesis.

C' Liberal Critical Catholic Exegesis.

B' Liberal Critical Protestant Exegesis.

A' Faithless Critical Exegesis.

This classification demands a few words of explanation.

2.1

Firstly, regarding the terminology used. The key terms are a) Fundamentalist; b) Critical: c) Conservative or Moderate; d) Liberal. For the purposes of this paper, a) by Fundamentalist I mean a faith that a priori excludes the necessity of the historical-critical method for the understanding of the Bible (2) ; b) by Critical I mean "the scientific study of the Bible utilizing the same formal methods as those used in the study of antiquity, namely, classical philology, archeology, and ancient history."(3); c) by Conservative I mean a critical exegesis which takes seriously the concerns of fundamentalist believers, namely, the "fundamentals" of Christian faith: the inspiration and authority of Sacred Scripture, the divinity of Jesus Christ, his virgin birth, real resurrection from the dead, and second coming.(4) I call today's mainstream Catholic Critical Exegesis "Moderate" and not "Conservative", because I have not found the moderate Catholic Critical Exegetes calling themselves "Conservatives" as readily as moderate Protestants do; d) by Liberal I mean the critical exegesis which dispenses even with the "fundamentals" mentioned above, if so demanded by critical evidence. To give some substance to these definitions, later in this paper I shall consider three works representative of the three main types of exegesis which I shall discuss in detail: the Fundamentalist, the Moderate Catholic Critical, and the Liberal Protestant. Liberal Protestant exegesis will be represented by the work of Conzelmann and Lindemann mentioned above. Moderate Catholic Critical Exegesis will be represented by the new Catechism of the Catholic Church (5); it is a sign of the times that the results of moderate critical exegesis have entered into a Catechism to be used as a standard reference work by the universal Church. Fundamentalist Protestant Exegesis will be represented by the Word Studies in the Greek New Testament of Kenneth S. Wuest (6), an old work recently re-published.

2.2

Secondly, the order of my classification must be legitimated. By putting Moderate Catholic Critical Exegesis in the centre I may appear to beg the whole question from the very beginning. But in reality this is not so. The classification is only a working hypothesis with which to begin. My paper is meant as a test of this hypothesis. The end result of my work will be judged by the reader. Still, the basis of this classification must be explained. This basis is the tension between the contrasting requirements of criticism and of faith in biblical exegesis. At the extremes of the classification there is in A the unqualified appeal to faith and the rejection of any critical stance characteristic of sectarian Christianity (the cults), while in A' there is the exclusive appeal to criticism and the rejection of any role of faith in biblical interpretation, the standpoint aracteristic of liberal exegesis. At first sight at least, the contemporary official stance of the Catholic Church seems to attain an equilibrium between the two exigencies. Therefore, there is at least a preliminary justification for this classification.

Of course, I am well aware that, holding any of the other positions, one could draw up a similar classification by putting oneself in the middle and rearranging the other positions accordingly. Actually this is precisely what is done by Conzelmann and Lindemann when they say: "This principle [that the text determines the method and not vice versa] is to be maintained against criticism from the 'right' as well as from the left'. The 'right', i.e. fundamentalism [...] The left' [is] represented for instance by Marxism's ideology of history [...]." (7) The very same thing is done by the fundamentalists, who see themselves as the golden mean between the extremes of liberal exegesis and Catholic exegesis. James Barr's analysis (8) of this fundamentalist claim is worth quoting: "[...] these two opposite wings [Protestant Fundamentalists and Catholics] have or have had very similar views about the Bible. [...] Protestant conservatives, indeed, feel that the comparison is a rather remote one in any case, because there are so many other factors: in particular, Roman Catholicism, excellent as its doctrine of scripture and its conservatism about historical matters may be, then goes and spoils the whole excellently conservative scheme by adding to the Bible the whole mass of church tradition as another major source of authority. The conservative evangelical, quaintly, thinks that he occupies middle ground in this respect: the liberals' depart from the true position about the authority of scripture by subtracting from it, the Roman Catholics by adding to it.(9)

The Catholic Church and Protestant fundamentalists in the past have made common front in their opposition to liberal critical exegesis, especially during the modernist era at the end of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century. But today the situation has changed considerably, especially on the side of the Catholic Church. Hence I think the first thing to do now is to outline more clearly the position of the Catholic Church, comparing it with the positions of Fundamentalism and of Liberal Protestantism.



  
2. H. Conzelmann and A. Lindemami, Interpreting the New Testament (Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 1988) 2, define Fundamentalism as the standpoint "that personal faith is presuppositional for proper exegesis - a faith that a priori excludes certain 'critical' results. "Such a definition does not pinpoint exactly the essence of Fundamentalism, since such a definition includes elements proper to Conservative Critical Exegesis and Moderate Catholic Critical Exegesis. The latter can be considered Fundamentalist only by begging the whole question of what Fundamentalism is.

3. Conzelmann and Lindemann, 2.

4. cf. James Barr, Fundamentalism. (London: SCM Press, second edition, 1981) 2.

5. Accessible to me only in the Italian translation: Catechismo delta Chiesa Cattolica (Citta del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1992). The English translation in this paper is mine, except for the quotations from Scripture, where I follow the Revised Standard Version, with some minor variations.

6. "Jesus of Nazareth - Who is He?" in Word Studies in the Greek New Testament 11: Great Truths to Live By From the Greek New Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1971, first paperback edition; original edition, 1952); "Greek Grammar and the Deity of Jesus Christ" in Word Studies in the Greek New Testament 3: Treasures from the Greek New Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company 1971, tenth printing; original edition1941).

7. Conzelmann and Lindemann, 2.

8. It will be noticed that Barr also locates himself in the middle, between the two supposed extremes of Fundamentalism and Catholicism!

9. Barr, 106-107.

3. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND CRITICAL EXEGESIS

In the first two hundred years after Richard Simon, the Catholic Church had great difficulty in figuring out how critical exegesis could be consistent with a faithful acceptance of the Bible as the written Word of God. In the last one hundred years, however, the Catholic Church has grown increasingly confident that critical exegesis and faithful exegesis can make a good marriage. The first signs of this newly found confidence appeared in Pope Leo XIII's landmark encyclical letter Providentissimus Deus (1893). Fifty years later Pope Pius XII in the encyclical letter Divino Afflante Spiritu (1943) endorsed textual criticism, literary genres, archaeological investigation, etc. as legitimate instruments of Catholic exegesis. This was a decisive breakthrough. The years 1964-1965 saw some basic results of critical Gospel exegesis accepted by the Pontifical Biblical Commission (Instruction Sancta Mater Ecclesia, 1964) and, more importantly, by the Second Vatican Council (Dogmatic Constitution Dei Verbum, 1965).

Finally, on April 15, 1993 the Pontifical Biblical Commission issued a document entitled The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church. This document a) briefly describes the various exegetical methods and approaches, indicating their strong points and weak points; b) discusses a few hermeneutical problems; c) reflects on the basic dimensions of a Catholic interpretation of the Bible and its relationship to the other theological areas; d) considers the place occupied by Biblical interpretation in the life of the Church. (cf. Introduction, B) (10)

Regarding the historical-critical method, the document has this to say (11): "The historical-critical method is indispensable for the scientific study of the meaning of ancient texts. Sacred Scripture, insofar as it is 'Word of God in human language', has been composed by human authors in all its parts and in all its sources. Hence the right understanding of Sacred Scripture not only admits as legitimate, but demands, the use of this method." (I.A)

Naturally, this is not the only method. Hence the document continues: "No scientific method for the study of the Bible is capable of exhausting the richness of the biblical texts. Whatever its validity, the historical-critical method cannot pretend to be all sufficient. Inevitably, this method neglects several aspects of the writings it studies. No wonder, therefore, if today other methods and approaches are proposed to deepen this or that aspect worthy of consideration." (1.B) Even so, the historical-critical method remains fundamental and indispensable.

In presenting this document Pope John Paul II recalls the wonderfully deep reason of this indispensability, namely the mystery of the Incarnation. The Pope refers to a text of the Second Vatican Council: "In sacred Scripture [...] while the truth and holiness of God always remain intact, the marvellous 'condescension' of eternal wisdom is clearly shown, 'that we may learn the gentle kindness of God, which words cannot express, and how far. He has gone in adapting His language with thoughtful concern for our weak human nature.' (St. John Chrysostom, On Genesis, 3,8). For the words of God, expressed in human language, have been made like human discourse, just as of old the Word of the eternal Father, when He took to Himself the weak flesh of humanity, became like other men." (Dei Verbum, 13).

While there was a time when the terms 'critical' and 'Catholic' used in my title were somehow mutually exclusive, today this is no longer the case. On the contrary, they are mutually inclusive. On the one hand, the acceptance of the critical method by the Church is a sign of her catholicity. On the other hand, the critical method is essentially catholic in its reliance on criteria which are as objective as possible. Catholic means universal, and there is nothing more universal for humanity than our God-given rationality. Unreasonableness creates ghettos. Reason opens up the individual to others and to the Other. The Catholic Church's endorsement of the critical method is in line with its uninterrupted acceptance of natural theology as praeambula fidei.

The welcome given by the Catholic Church to the critical method means that the Church can no longer be considered fundamentalist. In fact, it is characteristic of fundamentalism to reject on principle the critical method, or at least a great part of its results. For fundamentalism, the critical method is the negation of the Bible as the written Word of God, inspired and guaranteed by God. For the fundamentalists, the destructive results of the application of this method to the Bible are all too evident. The Catholic Church, with her two hundred years of misgivings with regard to this method, is in a position to understand the concerns off undamentalist Christians. The excesses of liberal Protestant exegesis have their share of responsibility for the opposition aroused against critical exegesis. In particular, the fundamentalists reproach the critics for readily admitting all sorts of mistakes in the Bible. How can the Word of God include mistakes and errors, and still be the Word of God? This is the overriding fundamentalist concern. Within the Catholic Church there has taken place a profound reflection on this problem. It would be good for the Protestant undamentalists to take cognizance of the results of this reflection and see whether they are not a better response to their concerns than their own fundamentalism.

Pressed by the alternatives, to accept the supposed results of critical exegesis and admit errors in the Bible, or to continue to affirm the absolute authority of the Bible and reject the results of critical exegesis, the fundamentalists opt for the second alternative. The price they pay for doing so is double: on the one hand, this rejection induces a certain lack of intellectual honesty and consistency in dealing with problems in the Bible. (12); on the other hand, this rejection results in an undue stress on the supernatural and the divinity of Christ, at the expense of his humanity.

At the opposite pole of the spectrum, the position of liberal Protestantism vis-a-vis critical exegesis is one of unconditional acceptance. Does this mean a corresponding rejection of the I standpoint of faith? No, liberal Protestantism does not reject the I faith but does something which to Catholic and fundamentalist eyes I amounts very much to a rejection of the faith. Liberal Protestants ! argue for the essential irrelevance of the results of historical-critical exegesis to the Christian faith. In their own words: "In terms of method, the biblical texts are to be treated no differently than other literary sources, especially those of antiquity. [...] For the beginner in this discipline, this observation may already cause initial problems to surface. Anyone who expects 'edification' from his encounter with the OT and the NT is at once confronted with the questions of authenticity, unity, and historical reliability. He has to ask whether the certainty of his own faith may be jeopardized by questioning the historical reliability of certain traditions concerning Jesus, or whether such a danger can be avoided on the premise that faith and historical insight belong to two fundamentally different levels.(14) It is clear that Conzelmann and Lindemann opt for this second alternative. It is also clear that behind this choice there is the "sola fide" ("faith only") principle of Martin Luther: no human element (whether rational or historical) can undermine the certainty of the faith or claim to offer any kind of support to a self-sufficient faith.

Whether this is a satisfactory solution to the problem caused by the tension between criticism and faith remains to be seen. In my opinion, this solution is as unsatisfactory as the fundamentalist solution. There, as already pointed out, intellectual honesty becomes a problem and so does the full reality of the Incarnation. Here, strangely enough, the same twofold problem surfaces. On the one hand, the liberal Protestant position also lacks intellectual honesty. Is it not too easy an escape to say that the historical findings of critical exegesis are ultimately irrelevant to the faith? It must be a cheap faith that can be defended all that easily! Moreover, such a facile defence is actually meant to give critical exegesis a totally free rein. The Christian experience of faith is said to be meaningful even apart from its basis in history (a basis which liberal critical exegesis declares mostly irretrievable). "But this attitude is of little interest to the [true] historian, who will be justified in pointing out that 'there must be an adequate basis for the alleged experience if it is to be meaningful.'" (15).

On the other hand, the reality of the Incarnation is also in danger here. If history is irrelevant to the faith, it means that the Word is not truly Incarnate. A tremendous dichotomy is introduced between reason and faith, nature and grace, time and eternity, man and God. The same dichotomy emerges disguised in different clothes in fundamentalism. After all, opposites touch one another. It may well be that Fundamentalist Exegesis and Liberal Exegesis, these opposites which polarize the Protestant field, are finally rooted in the unbalance of the "sola fide" ("faith only") principle as distinct from the Catholic "prima fides" ("faith first") principle.



  
10. The only edition available to me is the Italian edition. The English translation of this document in the text of my article is mine. Cf. Pontificia Commissione Biblica, L 'inferpretazione delta Bibbia nella Chiesa (Citta del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1993) 125. This summary of the whole document appears on page 29.

11. Pontificia Commissione Biblica, 30.

12. cf. Barr, 40-89 and 120-159.

13. Ban, 169-171.

14. Conzelmann and Lindemann, 2-3.

15. Michael Grant, Jesus: An Historian's Review of the Gospels (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1977) 182.

4. CONCRETE EXAMPLES OF THE CONFLICT OF EXEGESES - THE PERSON, TITLES, AND CONSCIOUSNESS OF JESUS

4.1 A FUNDAMENTALIST EXEGESIS OF Jn 1:14

Fundamentalism disdains critical exegesis, but it does not disdains scholarship. Kenneth S. Wuest was a university professor, conscious of his scholarly status. He had a very good knowledge of New Testament Greek. He put this good knowledge to very good use to support his fundamentalist exegesis of NT texts. However, the rejection of a critical attitude at times makes him too easily satisfied with the reasons given for a certain exegetical standpoint, as when, for example, he insists on "a rule in Greek syntax called Granville Sharp's rule [...]. The expression in the Greek text ["our great God and Saviour Jesus Christ"] conforms to this rule. Here Paul [...] teaches that Jesus of Nazareth is deity. " (16) It may well be that the text here refers the title "God" to Jesus Christ. But it does not follow that this is proved by the reason given by Wuest. A somewhat more critical spirit would have warned Wuest not to apply too absolutely Granville Sharp's rule. (17)

Explaining the Greek text of Jn 1:14, Wuest has this to say: "And then John speaks of the incarnation again in the beautiful words, 'And the Word became flesh and lived in a tent among us' (1:14). The A. V. [Authorized Version] has 'The Word was made flesh.' To make something is to take something and mold it into a new form, changing its shape. The first form disappears to have something that has a different form takes its place. But nothing like that happened to Jesus of Nazareth. Absolute God in His preincarnate state. He remained such in His incarnation. He did not relinquish His deity upon becoming man. He was not made flesh. He became flesh. The Greek word is ginornai, and it is in a tense and a classification of that tense which speaks of entrance into a new condition. By 'becoming flesh', John means that the invisible, eternal, omnipresent, omnipotent, and omniscient God added to Himself a human body and put Himself under human limitations, yet without human sin. While still deity and omnipresent He became localized in a human body. While still deity and therefore omniscient. He lived the life of a human being on earth. He thought with a human brain. He became exhausted. He broke into tears. He needed food, clothing and shelter. He gave us a picture of what Deity is like through the medium of a human life. He lived in a tent in the midst of humanity. That tent was His human body. Thus, Jesus of Nazareth is a Person having two natures. He is absolute deity. He is true Man. His deity did not add to His humanity. His humanity did not detract from His deity. "(18)

There are several things that strike me in this passage. Firstly, the stress on an orthodox expression of the faith, but in such a way that the orthodoxy sounds exterior, forced (some of the expressions used perhaps are simply heterodoxical: "he became localized in a human body" and the like). Great trouble is taken to give the impression that all this dogmatic material is contained in the single verse of Jn 1:14. Between the lines one reads an attack on liberal and faith-less denials or doubts about the divinity of Christ. The urgent need to confute them transpires from the repetitive and emphatic style. (19) Totally absent is any reference to historical-critical or literary questions. Grammar is the instrumentum princeps of fundamentalist exegesis, because fundamentalists apparently believe in a verbal (dictation type) inspiration of the Bible, so that every word in the Greek text is somehow inspired and is a carrier of revelation. "Thus the rules of Greek grammar teach the deity of Jesus Christ."

There is a sense of smug confidence in what Wuest says, which leaves little room for the sense of mystery. Fundamentalist exegesis is overly confident in dealing with the mystery of God and of Christ. It would do well to ponder a little these words of Kier- kegaard: "One is deeply moved, one longs to be back in those beautiful times, a sweet yearning conducts one to the desired goal, to see Christ wandering in the promised land. One forgets the dread, the distress, the paradox. Was it so easy a matter not to be mistaken? Was it not dreadful that this man who walks among the others - was it not dreadful that He was God? Was it not dreadftil to sit at table with Him? Was it so easy a matter to become an Apostle? But the result, eighteen hundred years - that is a help, it helps to the shabby deceit wherewith one deceives oneself and others. I do not feel the courage to be contemporary with such events, but hence I do not judge severely those who were mistaken, nor think meanly of those who saw aright."(20)

It is strange that it should take a philosopher to remind faith stalwarts like the fundamentalists (or, for that matter. Catholics) that the core of their faith is the mystery of God in Christ. Concern for orthodoxy is a very good thing. But there is also a negative side to it, namely, the danger of turning God into an object and Truth into a series of propositions.

4.2 A CRITICAL LIBERAL PROTESTANT EXEGESIS OF THE SELF- CONSCIOUSNESS OF JESUS AS REVEALED IN THE GOSPEL TITLES OF JESUS

Paragraph 56 of Conzelmann and Lindemann's Interpreting the New Testament is dedicated to "The Question of Jesus' Self consciousness". It discusses the problem whether the titles "Messiah", "Son", "Son of God" and "Son of man" reveal anything about Jesus' self-consciousness. Let me simply report the conclusions of their investigation.

4.2.1

Firstly, with regard to the title "Messiah". Their exegetical conclusion about the Confession of Peter in Mk 8 is this: "The analysis of Mk 8:27ff. indicates agreements with the confession of faith formulated by the Christian community. The pericope contains no concrete, historical material but turns out to be a sort of credal presentation in the form of a scene: that which the whole community believes. Peter voices as representative of all."(21) As for Mk 10:46ff., their verdict is: "Of course, the cry of Blind Bartimaeus ("Son of David") is no historical datum, since it is a question of an introduction to a miracle story, hence a question of a formation by the community." The entry into Jerusalem "proves to be a messianic legend of the community. The scene is inconceivable as a historical event". What about the trial of Jesus before the Sanhedrin? "[...] It is likewise clear that this scene is devoid of a historical core, for the presentation of the trial is altogether determined christologically. The question of the high priest presupposes that the designations 'Messiah' and 'Son of God' are ultimately identical - a linguistic usage that is foreign to Judaism."(22)

4.2.2

Secondly, with regard to "Son (of God)". "The demons address Jesus as Son of God (Mk 3:11); but this is the community's formation, as is the trial before the Jewish Council, as we have already seen. And the same applies ultimately also to the two epiphany narratives of the baptism and of the transfiguration. They too are legends. [...] Mk 13:32 reflects the early Christology of the church. [...] In its tradition, the early church did not consciously distinguish between authentic sayings of Jesus and secondary formulations of the community. [...] Mt 11:27 is also an expression of community Christology (cf. the affinity with Mt 28:18). It is more difficult to assess the situation in Mk 12:lfft...] If one attempts to reconstruct an original parable of Jesus by excising the allegorical features, all that would remain is merely a parable concerning the fate of the owner of a vineyard and of his son; even then the text would not answer the question of whether Jesus laid claim to the title Son (of God). Conclusion: As far as it can be recognized, Jesus did not designate himself as Son of God" (23)

4.2.3

Thirdly, with regard to the title "Son of man". The "Son of man" sayings are classified by Conzelmann and Lindemann into a) Sayings concerning the parousia of the Son of man; b) sayings concerning the suffering Son of man; c) a saying concerning the Son of man's having come". About a), Conzelmann and Lindemann have this to say: " (a) If the statements about the parousia of the Son of man (Mk 8:38; 14:62) were to be viewed as authentic, one would have to assume that Jesus expected his own future transformation into the Son of man; but this construct can in no wise be derived from the texts. [...] The sayings which speak of the coming Son of man probably point back to Dan 7:13f. and were subsequently applied to Jesus by the community. (b) There are sayings that speak of the suffering Son of man (Mk 8:31) but [...] these are likewise formulations of the community." (24) With respect to c), i.e. Mt 8:20, the following is said: "The statemerit becomes meaningful when it is understood as the community's retrospective glance upon the overall ministry of Jesus; only from this vantage point does it take on meaning as a call to discipleship. It is probable, therefore, that this understanding of the Son of man concept originated only in the church. " (25)

General conclusion drawn by Conzelmann and Lindemann: "As far as we can discern, Jesus used none of the christological titles mentioned in the Synoptics in connection with his own person. Consequently it is impossible to reconstruct the self-consciousness of Jesus from the christological titles of the synoptic tradition" (26)

What is left, then? This: "[...] it follows from the message of his preaching and from his ministry (healings) that he understood himself, as well as his appearance, as the sign of the kingdom of God that is at hand. Any statements that go beyond this are nothing more than mere presupposition." (27)

4.2.4

Now a few comments of my own are in order. Reading through this book of Conzelmann and Lindemann I get a very strong impression of the all-pervasive presence of the logical fallacy of circularity (vicious circle, petitio principii, begging the question). The two authors systematically eliminate material which could be used for a counter-argument that would reach conclusions very different from their own. I think that in the few pages that I have surveyed above this vicious circle appears clearly: it is self evident that Jesus never used or assented to the use of any title if you systematically attribute all these titles to the supposedly creative function of the community! The consistency with which the material is eliminated as a source for evidence of the Sitz im Leben Jesu points to the fact that this elimination is not really demanded by considerations of a historical-critical and literary nature. Instead this elimination is dictated by some basic presuppositions which guide the exegetes and determine their choice beforehand. One such presupposition is certainly the one mentioned in the previous section, namely, the belief that historical data are ultimately irrelevant for the Christian faith.

Such a criticism of liberal critical exegesis is standard in the fundamental ist field.(28) This is no reason for setting it aside as pointless. The ftindamentalists have a point here. A point recognized by Conzelmann and Lindemann themselves: The exegete "must ask (or be asked) about the presuppositions he brings to the text. What tradition is in his background? What questions does he expect the text to answer? Why indeed does he even deal with this text? [...] There is no exegesis without presuppositions. Each interpretation is at least influenced by the exegete's own historical setting. Therefore, he must first of all be clear about the presup- positions he brings along. " (29)

This is very good advice. But I doubt whether the two distinguished authors have taken it themselves. Their book is full of so many "only", "exclusively", "of course", "impossible", "inconceivable", "entirely different", "contradictory", "absurd", "utterly grotesque" etc., all words which betray a self-confidence little in tune with the critical (and therefore self-critical) enquiry. It is all too easy to commit the fallacy of "cavalier dismissal" of different views when one is so full of self-confidence.(30)

Then from time to time one bumps into some problems which seem to be of the exegetes' own making. Take the following example: "Indeed, this is what poses the theological problem of why the Christian faith is not identical with the faith, that is, with the proclamation of Jesus. One needs to explain why, apart from the Gospels, all early Christian literature all but completely ignores both the teaching and the history of Jesus. " (31) That there is a certain discrepancy between Jesus' proclamation and the church's proclamation, this is true. But the explanation is not so far away, unless you have already pre-empted all possibility of an explanation by eliminating all the Gospel material as a possible source of the solution. The "complete ignorance" of early Christian literature (the rest of the NT?) about the teaching and the history of Jesus is not, after all, such a great problem. One has only to pay attention to the literary genre of this early Christian literature. Most of it is of a strictly didactic and paracletic literary genre (the Acts of the Apostles and the Apocalypse being the exceptions). Now it is only to be expected that a didache and a paraklesis will systematically ignore the kerygma, presupposing it as already announced and received. Paul, James, Peter and John did not write letters to announce the kerygma, i.e. to announce Jesus in his sayings and doings. They had done this already by word of mouth. They wrote letters to tackle particular problems of thought and practice that had arisen in the communities. With these considerations in mind, it is easy to see how the problem presented by Conzelmami and Lindemann evaporates like mist in the sunlight.

I have mentioned the circularity of much of this work of Conzelmann and Lindemann. At times other logical fallacies come to the surface in a rather transparent way. One of the most frequent perhaps is the fallacy of false disjunctives, making an improper appeal to the law of the excluded middle. Just one example: "On principle this pericope could also be placed elsewhere in the Gospel, in other words, it does not constitute evidence for a historical development and, instead, fulfils a theological or christological function. " (32) The authors of this sentence have presented the disjunctives in such a way that its two terms (history and theology) seem mutually incompatible. It did not enter their heads that a pericope could have both an historical and a theological ftinction. If any incompatibility is perceived, this is due to the subjective (and invalid) presupposition of the authors that these two levels are "fimdamentally different" to such an extent as to be mutually irrelevant.

Another frequent fallacy is the failure to recognize distinctions as when one argues that "because x and y are alike in certain respects, they are alike in all respects" (33) This fallacy lurks under every appeal to more or less parallel material in Hellenistic literature to deny the historical character of the Gospels.

Finally, on certain problems Conzelmann and Lindemann seem to be out of touch with the latest research. For example, in dealing with parable and allegory, it would appear that no significant advance has been made in the solution of these problem and in the exegesis of the parables since Julicher (end of 19th century, beginning of 20th century). Of his landmark work. Die Gleichnis-reden Jesu, our two authors say that it "has not been replaced to date. "(34) But this does not seem to be the real state of affairs. Perhaps it is true that no single book has appeared to surpass Julicher 's book in importance. However, the cumulative research of exegetes after Julicher has produced results which demand fundamental modifications to some of Julicher's most fundamental tenets. The precise relationship between parable and allegory is one of the tenets in need of revision. Another example: when dealing with the problem of whether the Last Supper was a paschal meal or not, no notice is taken of significant new suggestions. Perhaps one of the reasons for this way of acting is a certain auto-limitation (except for the bibliographies, which have been enriched by the addition of English works by the translator) merely to German scholarship in the discussion of problems. " (35)

I have dwelt somewhat at length with this book of Conzel-mann and Lindemann because it seems to me that, while offering an amazing amount of useful information, it is radically vitiated by theological biases that drastically reduce its utility as a guide to an adequate understanding of the nature of the NT material. It is time now to turn to an equally critical (but not equally destructive or faulty) approach to the exegesis of the Gospels, namely, the approach presented in the new Catechism of the Catholic Church.

4.3 A Critical Catholic Exegesis Of Jesus' Identity As Revealed By The Gospel Title Of Jesus

In Chapter Two of Section Two of Part One, the Catechism of the Catholic Church deals with "Jesus Christ, Only Son [of God the Father], Our Lord". The approach is fundamentally scriptural. The choice of texts is very careful. The Chapter starts with several quotations: one from Galatians, two from Mark and two allusions from Luke, thus:

"'But when the time had fully come, God sent forth his Son, born of woman, born under the law, to redeem those who were under the law, so that we might receive adoption as sons' (Gal 4:4-5). This is the Good News regarding 'Jesus Christ, Son of God' (Mk 1:1). God has visited his people (cf. Lk 1:68), has fulfilled the promises he made to Abraham and his posterity (cf. Lk 1:55); he has gone beyond all expectation: he has sent his 'beloved Son' (Mk 1:11)". (No. 422)

The choice of these texts has been critically influenced. The core of Gal 4:4 is an old pre-Pauline kerygmatic formula. Mark, commonly accepted as the first Gospel, is also drawn upon. The transcendent meaning of "Son of God" is stressed. Will this be critically ascertained? The next number (423) draws upon the Gospel of John to stress even more the transcendent meaning of "Son of God". Then the Catechism continues:

"Moved by the grace of the Holy Spirit and drawn by the Father, with regard to Jesus, we believe and we proclaim: 'You are the Christ, the Son of the Living God' (Mt 16:16). On the rock of this faith, confessed by Peter, Christ has founded his Church (cf. Mt 16:18)." Will any critical observation be made about this? Let us see.

In Article Two, the Catechism examines the name Jesus and the titles Christ, Only-begotten Son of God, and Lord. I shall concentrate on the last three.

4.3.1 Christ.

"Christ derives from the Greek translation of the Hebrew term 'Messiah' which means 'anointed'. In itself it is not a proper name, but it becomes Jesus' proper name because Jesus fulfils perfectly the God-given mission signified by this term. As a matter of fact, in Israel those who were consecrated for a mission entrusted to them by God were anointed in the name of God. Thus kings were anointed, (36) priests also, and, in rare cases, the prophets. Such an anointing vas due par excellence to the Messiah whom God planned to send in order to inaugurate definitively his Kingdom. The Messiah had to be anointed by the Spirit of the Lord, thus becoming at the same time king and priest, but also prophet. Jesus has fulfilled Israel's messianic hope in his threefold capacity as priest, prophet, and king (No. 436).

We have here a good catechetical presentation of the meaning of the term Christ. It presupposes a certain work related to Biblical Theology. No critical feature is yet apparent.

"A number of Jews and also some Gentiles who shared the Jewish hope recognized in Jesus the fundamental traits of the messianic "Son of David" promised by God to Israel. Jesus accepted the title of Messiah, since it was his by right, but not without some reservations, because some of his contemporaries understood it in a way all too human, essentially political." (No. 439)

The observation that Jesus had reservations in accepting the title of Messiah is critical. The next number explains the meaning of Jesus' acceptance.

"Jesus accepted Peter's profession of faith, recognizing him as Messiah, by announcing the imminent passion of the Son of man. In this way he has revealed the authentic content of his messianic kingship in the transcendent identity of the Sonrofman "descended from heaven" (Jn 3:13) as well as in his redemptive mission as Suffering Servant. ' The Son of man came not to be served but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many' (Mt 20:28). For this reason the true meaning of his kingship is revealed only from the height of the cross. Only after his Resurrection, can his messianic kingship be proclaimed by Peter before the people of God: " Let all the house of Israel therefore know assuredly that God has made him both Lord and Christ, this Jesus whom you crucified'." (No. 440)

The stress on the Cross as the core of the messianic identity of Jesus is fruit of critical redactional work on the Gospel of Mark. The crucial character of the Resurrection is a commonplace of critical exegesis. Throughout there is a robust, and yet guarded, confidence that the Gospels offer reliable material for the understanding of Jesus, his identity and mission. Here, and not in the presence or absence of critical judgement is the great difference between Catholic Critical Exegesis and Protestant Liberal Exegesis.

4.3.2 Only-begotten Son Of God

Son of God in the Old Testament is a title given to the angels, to the chosen people, to the children of Israel, to their kings. In these cases it has the meaning of an adoptive sonship which establishes between God and creatures particularly intimate relationships. When the promised Messiah-king is called "son of God', this does not necessarily imply, according to the literal meaning of the texts, that the Messiah is more than human. Those who thus designated Jesus as Israel's Messiah probably did not intend to mean anything more." (No. 441)

This is a strictly critical presentation of the historical situation with regard to the meaning of the title "Son of God". The note appended to the last sentence refers to Lk 23:47: "Now when he saw what had taken place, he praised God, and said: 'Certainly this man was innocent!"'. This means that, after a comparison with the parallel texts in the other two Synoptics, the Catechism concludes that the Lucan version expresses the historical meaning of the words recorded by Mark and Matthew: "Truly this man was the Son of God!" (Mk 15:39; Mt 27:54). Such a conclusion pre-upposes the acceptance of at least a double level of complexity in the process of formation of the Gospels, i.e. the level of historical fact and the level of Gospel redaction.

But then the Catechism continues:

"The same thing cannot be said of Peter when he confessed Jesus as 'the Christ, the Son of the Living God' (Mt 16:16), because Jesus responds with solemnity: 'For flesh and blood has not revealed this to you, but my Father who is in heaven' (Mt 16:17). In a parallel way, with reference to his conversion on the way to Damascus, Paul will say: 'But when he who had set me apart before I was born, and had called me through his grace, was pleased to reveal his Son to me, in order that I might preach him among the Gentiles...' (Gal 1:15-16). 'And in the synagogues immediately he proclaimed Jesus, saying, 'He is the Son of God.' (Acts 9,20). This will be from the very beginning the centre of the apostolic faith, first of all professed by Peter as foundation of the Church." (No. 442).

Here the title Son of God is given a transcendent meaning. What is the ground for such an attribution? In the following three numbers the Catechism gives the answer:

"If Peter could recognize the transcendent character of the divine sonship of Jesus Messiah, it is because Jesus let it clearly appear. Before the Sanhedrin, to his accusers' question: 'Are you the Son of God, then?', Jesus replied: 'You yourselves say that I am' (Lk 22:70). Long before, he had already spoken of himself as 'the Son' who knows the Father, who is distinct from the 'servants' whom God had previously sent to his people, who is superior to the very angels. Jesus made a distinction between his sonship and that of his disciples by never saying 'our Father' except when giving them the command: "You pray then like this: Our Father" (Mt 6:9). He has even emphasized this distinction: 'my Father and your Father' (Jn 20:17)." (No. 443)

This is a very careful collection of Gospel evidence for the understanding of the self-consciousness of Jesus. Again one can see the positive approach to the historical value of the Gospel material. In the next number we pass from Jesus' self-consciousness as unique Son of God to the human recognition of such uniqueness:

"The Gospels in two solemn moments, the Baptism and the Transfiguration of Christ, report the voice of the Father who calls Jesus his 'beloved Son'. Jesus presents himself as 'the only Son' (Jn 3:16) and with this title affirms his eternal pre-existence. He demands faith 'in the name of the only Son of God' (Jn 3:18). This Christian confession appears already in the exclamation of the centurion before the crucified Jesus: 'Truly this man was the Son of God' (Mk 15:39); as a matter of fact, only in the Pascal Mystery can the believer give to the title 'Son of God' its full meaning." (No. 444)

Several points should be noted here. Firstly, John is used with as much confidence as the Synoptics as a source of reliable knowledge about Jesus. Secondly, the scholarly discussion whether Jn 3:16-21 should be put on the lips of Jesus or on those of the evangelist seems to have been overlooked or judged irrelevant. Thirdly, unlike liberal exegesis, the Catechism does not find any irreconcilability between a confession formula "In the name of the only Son of God" and the fact that this formula has a background in the life of Jesus. Fourthly, Mk 15:39 is said to be a Christian confession. This must be put in relation with what has been said above about Lk 23:47. In this way it will be seen that this paragraph again envisages at least a double level of Gospel formation: the level of history (where the meaning of the centurion's exclamation is rendered by Lk 23:47) and the level of redaction (where the meaning intended by Mark is that of the Christian confessional formula, i.e. the transcendent meaning of "Son of God"). Finally, the last sentence of paragraph 444 is the fruit of critical exegesis, which has established that only after the resurrection, when Jesus appeared to them, did the disciples come to full faith to him.

This last point is stressed also in the next paragraph:

"After the Resurrection, Jesus' divine sonship is revealed in the power of his glorified humanity: he is constituted 'Son of God in power according to the Spirit ofholiness by his resurrection from the dead' (Rom 1:4). The Apostles can now proclaim: 'We have beheld his glory, glory as of the only Son of the Father, full of grace and truth' (Jn 1:14)."

Notice how again recourse is had to an old pre-Pauline kerygmatic formula. This frequent recourse to old kerygmatic formulas is a way of putting to good use the results of critical exegesis which has had the merit of detecting these formulas. Moreover, the use of these formulas is the Catechism's way of pointing to a third level of Gospel formation, i.e. the level of pre-Gospel written sources. As a consequence, in these few paragraphs which we are examining, one can see the complete basic set of levels of Gospel formation discovered by modern critical exegesis: the level of the evangelist, the level ofpre-evangelist sources (written and oral), and the level of the historical facts. This is one of the main critical results officially accepted by the Catholic Church in one of the most solemn forms possible, namely, a dogmatic constitution of an Ecumenical Council. The Catechism has been faithful to the authoritative indications of the Second Vatican Council's Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation No. 19. The Council first professes the Christian certainty of the historical value of the Gospels, and then explains the critical threefold level of formation. I think that article 19 is worth quoting in full, with indications of the three levels added in parentheses:

"Holy Mother Church has firmly and with absolute constancy held, and continues to hold, that the four Gospels just named, whose historical character the Church unhesitatingly asserts, faithfully hand on what Jesus Christ, while living among men, really did and taught for their eternal salvation until the day He was taken up into heaven (see Acts 1:1-2) [FIRST LEVEL OF GOSPEL FORMATION].

Indeed, after the ascension of the Lord the apostles handed on to their hearers what He had said and done. This they did with that clearer understanding which they enjoyed after they had been instructed by the events of Christ's risen life and taught by the light of the Spirit of truth.

The sacred authors wrote the four Gospels, selecting some things from the many which had been handed on by word of mouth or in writing [SECOND LEVEL OF GOSPEL FORMATION], reducing some of them to a synthesis, explicating some things in view of the situation of their churches, and preserving the form of proclamation [THIRD LEVEL OF GOSPEL FORMATION] but always in such fashion that they told us the honest truth about Jesus. For their intention in writing was that either from their own memory and recollections, or from the witness of those who themselves 'from the beginning were eye witnesses and ministers of the word' we might know 'the truth' concerning those matters about which we have been instructed (cf. Lk. 1:2-4)." [FIRST LEVEL OF GOSPEL FORMATION].(37)

Again, it should be noticed how the faith in the transcendent sonship of Jesus is firmly rooted in the experience which the disciples had of the Risen Jesus. These last two paragraphs of the Catechism also indirectly explain the redactional situation of Mt 16:16b-19. A comparison with the parallels in Mark and Luke shows that Matthew has here transposed a post-resurrectional account into the ministry of Jesus. The confession of Jesus as Christ-Messiah by Peter belongs to the pre-paschal ministry of Jesus, as recorded by Mark, Luke and Matthew (and also by John: cf. Jn 6:66-71). On the other hand, the confession of Jesus as Son of the Living God and Jesus' reaction to this Father-given confession is probably post-resurrectional. It is an account of the Risen Jesus' appearance to Peter (ICor 15:5; Lk 24:34; Jn 21) and of Peter's acknowledgment in faith of Jesus' transcendent sonship. This acknowledgement has been preceded by Jesus' decisive witness to his divine sonship during the Jewish trial before the high priest and the Sanhedrin, a witness sealed by death. By this faith acknowledgement Peter reverses his threefold denial of his relationship with Jesus. Jesus' reaction to Peter's confession of faith is to build his Church upon this rock (cf. Jn 21:15-19). Such a redactional analysis of Mt 16:13-20 is the achievement of recent critical exegesis.

4.3.3 Lord.

"In the Greek translation of the books of the Old Testament, the ineffable name by which God has revealed himself to Moses, YHWH, was rendered by Kyrios ['Lord']. Since then, Lord has become the most usual name to denote the very divinity of the God of Israel. The New Testament uses the title 'Lord' in this strong sense for the Father. But, and this is new, it is also used for Jesus, who is thus acknowledged as God." (No. 446)

"Jesus himself, in a veiled way, attributed to himself this title when he discussed with the Pharisees the meaning of Psalm 110. But he also did so in an explicit way when addressing his Apostles. During his public life his acts of power over nature, over sickness, over demons, over death and over sin, were all manifestations of his divine sovereignty." (No. 447)

"Very often in the Gospels people address Jesus by the title 'Lord'. By this title they intend to express the attitude of respect and trust with which they approach him to obtain help and healing. Pronounced under the motion of the Holy Spirit, this title expresses the acknowledgement of Jesus' divine Mystery. In the encounter with the Risen Jesus, it becomes an expression of adoration: 'My Lord and my God' (Jn 20:28). Then it assumes a connotation of love and affection which will remain typical of Christian tradition: It is the Lord!' (Jn 21:7)." (No. 448)

In these three paragraphs we have a careful analysis of the usage and meaning of the term kyrios. Different layers of meaning are distinguished. The pre-paschal usage by people is defined in non-transcendent terms, while the post-paschal usage is full of transcendent meaning. This transcendent meaning is based on Jesus' own pre-paschal hints at such a transcendent meaning. It is clear that this distinction between pre-paschal and paschal is the fruit of modern critical exegesis of the New Testament. Its incorporation into the Catechism of the Catholic Church shows that the Catholic Church recognizes the validity of these critical results.

It will also be clear, of course, that we are in an almost totally different world from that of Conzelmann and Lindemann. What makes the difference? Is it the critical nature of the results? If there is a difference in this regard, I dare suggest that it will be because the results of Conzelmann and Lindemann are not critical enough! Of course, the superficial apparatus is ominously critical. But what about the substance?

Evidently the clearest difference is in the attitude to the historicity of the Gospel material. We have seen that the negative attitude of the two German exegetes is due to ideological presuppositions of doubtful validity. I call these presuppositions ideological because they are recognized explicitly by the two authors, but from the very beginning they are excluded from scrutiny and discussion. Now this, I think, is the definition of ideology: a way of thinking that has not been critically examined. And this, in my opinion, is what the presuppositions of Conzelmann and Lindemann amount to.



  
16. Wuest, Great Truths, 15-16; ibidem, 31.

17. The fallacy of applying this and other grammatical rules too absolutely has been pointed out by D.A.Carson, Exegetical Fallacies (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1984) 80-90.

18. Carson, 29-30.

19. A few pages earlier, Wuest had this to say about the Liberals' suspicions of the Testimonium Flavianum: "In an attempt to break the force of this passage from Josephus, Liberalism claims that it was placed in his writings by the Christian Church to strengthen the argument for miracles." (Wuest, Great Truths, 15). Wuest, Treasures, 33.

20. Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling. Translated with Introductions and Notes by Walter Lowrie (New York: Doubleday 1941, Anchor Books edition 1954) 76.

21. Conzelmann and Lindemann, 323. Notice how the non-historicity of the scene is deduced from the fact that the title is present in the faith of the community.

22. Conzelmann and Lindemann, 323-324. Notice how the reasons given are very summary and of a rigid form-critical nature. However, this book is a summa of critical Findings. Hence no roofs are given. Still, the whole procedure smacks of the defect Conzelmann and Lindemann find in Bultmann's The History of the Synoptic Tradition: "If one consults the book for the purpose of analyzing particular pericope, the immediate impression is that the author makes apodictic decisions about the text without even as much as an attempt at substantiation. " After making this remark, the authors immediately go to the rescue ofBultmann, adding: "This, however, is not the case at all. If one begins to read each chapter in light of its end, as it were, the criteria upon which Bultmann has established his arguments become clear. Only in this way is it possible either to retrace his decisions or to criticize them." (Ibidem, 65) It is not clear what Conzelmann and Lindemann mean by this observation (what does "in the light of its end" ean?). In any case it is not easy to free the whole endeavour of Bultmann from the charge of a deep seated and all-pervading vicious circle fallacy.

23. Conzelmann and Lindemann, 324-325.

24. Conzelmann and Lindemann, 326.

25. Conzelmann and Lindemann, 327.

26. Conzelmann and Lindemann, ibidem.

27. Conzelmann and Lindemann, Ibidem.

28. cf. Barr, 145-149.

29. Conzelmann and Lindemann, 2.

30. "The fallacy in this instance lies in thinking that an opponent's argument has actually been handled when in fact it has merely been written off". Carson, 120.

31. Carson, 286.

32. Carson, 304.

33. Carson, 97.

34. Conzelmann and Lindemann, 74.

35. See, for example, the discussion of the presentation of Jesus' teaching on page 305.

36. Here and throughout, I omit the numerous biblical references given in the footnotes.

37. Walter Abbott (ed.). The Documents of Vatican II, (New York: The America Press 1966) 124.

5. CONCLUSION

I would like to conclude this paper by first quoting two more paragraphs from the Catechism of the Catholic Church, which will form the basis of my concluding comments:

"By attributing to Jesus the divine title 'Lord', the first faith confessions of the Church, from the very beginning, affirm that the power, the honour, and the glory due to God the Father are due also to Jesus, because he is 'in the form of God' (Phil 2:6) [another pre-Pauline faith formula!]. At the same time these faith confessions also affirm that God has manifested this lordship of Jesus raising him from the dead and exalting him to his own glory." (No. 449)

"From the beginning of Christian history, the affirmation of Jesus' lordship over the world and history implies also the acknowledgement that man must not submit his or her own personal liberty in an absolute way to any worldly power, but only to God the Father and to the Lord Jesus Christ: Caesar is not 'the Lord'. 'The Church believes...that in her most benign Lord and Master can be found the key, the focal point, and the goal of all human history.' ( (Gaudium et Spes, 10)." (No. 450)

No human being must submit his or her personal liberty to any worldly power in an absolute way. This challenge also faces all Christian exegesis of the Bible. The spirit of the Enlightenment has been in one sense the breakthrough of the Spirit of God, rich in fruits of tolerance, justice, sense of brotherhood and equality, desire for peace and universal communion, based on the principle that God-given reason is the common charism of all human beingsa nd freedom is of the essence of human nature. But the Enlightenment can also become a source of new slaveries and unimaginable oppressions, if it becomes detached from the ideal source of its world-stirring ideals, God.

By denying that "personal faith is presuppositional for proper exegesis", Conzelmann and Lindemann appear to me to fall into the pitfall of making an idol out of the spirit of the Enlightenment. By saying this, they are actually submitting themselves to the Caesar of modern rationalism, a contradictory form of rationalism, which devours its own childen: modern constitutionalism and democracy are as much the fruit of the Enlightenment as the two World Wars and the breakdown in morality which will characterize the 20th century in all future history.

Protestant (and Catholic) liberal critical exegesis seem to me, therefore, to be capitulating before the Moloch of modern godless rationalism. On the other hand, Protestant Fundamentalism apparently believes that, to meet the challenge of preserving the Christian faith in its pristine purity, it must deny the necessity and inevitability of the critical approach. Moderate Catholic Critical Exegesis stands between these two extremes. Why should it be given central place, if not because it is the only exegesis that effectively affirms the Mystery of God in Christ, while at the same time respecting the integrity of this rational animal, the human person?